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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between state and capital in post-independence 
India. There was a dramatic shift from the strategy o f state-led capital accumulation. After the 
1950s, this strategy became increasingly dirigiste. From the 1980s, economic policy in India 
shifted towards neoliberalism. The conventional wisdom is that this transition to neoliberalism 
was driven by poor economic performance in India during the period o f state-led growth. The 
economy was characterised by inefficiencies because o f government-created distortions that 
stifled entrepreneurship and needed to be corrected by neo-liberal ‘reforms’. However, 
capitalists in India were beneficiaries o f dirigiste policies, and did not adopt neoliberalism as 
their collective agenda even when their disenchantment with the state peaked in 1965-66. It was 
only from around 1980 that a section o f capitalists in India began to support a neoliberal turn. 
What explains this paradigmatic shift? This is the central question o f the thesis. This research 
examines the role o f the state in the capital accumulation process in India with a focus on the 
period from 1965 to 1980 to shed light on how and why the change in state-capital relations 
occurred.
Throughout the 1970s, the expansion and diversification o f the capitalist class with the 
rise o f ‘new’ family-controlled business houses played a critical role in shaping the changes 
towards neoliberalism. This thesis examines the social origins, institutional access, privileges 
and restrictions, forms o f political organisation and modes o f  expansion o f  capital. Both ‘zones 
o f intervention’ and ‘zones o f non-intervention’ by the state facilitated the various dimensions 
o f this expansion. These developments forged new political alignments o f  capitalist interests 
and led to significant stratification within the class. These changes had critical impacts on the 
access o f the capitalist class to technology and finance, defined the attitude o f Indian capitalists 
towards ‘globalisation’ and accelerated the informalisation o f labour force.
3
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the support and help from various 
individuals and organisations. I would particularly like to thank Dr Chandra Ghosh and Dr 
Norman Hindson for the physical and material support they provided all through the span o f the 
work. I would also like to thank Universities UK for the Overseas Research Student 
Scholarship, University o f London for the Central Research Fund Grant, School o f Oriental and 
African Studies for the Fieldwork Grant, the British Foundation o f  Women Graduates for the 
maintenance award for the writing up and Newby Trust, UK for a finishing grant. I would also 
like to thank all the staff members in the Department o f Economics, SOAS, with whom I had 
the pleasure to teach and learn as a Teaching Fellow. I am particularly grateful to Dr Sonali 
Deraniyagala and Dr Stephanie Blankenburg for help and guidance at the start of the teaching 
process.
I am grateful for suggestions and advice that came at various stages from various 
people. I would specially like to express my gratitude to Professor Ben Fine, Dr Sonali 
Deraniyagala, Dr Stephanie Blankenburg, Professor Amiya Bagchi and Professor Jayati Ghosh 
for their valuable comments. I would like to thank Professor P P Ghosh and Dr Shaibal Gupta o f 
ADRI, Patna, for giving me the opportunity to present part o f this work to a diverse audience in 
India.
During the course o f the fieldwork, I received immense co-operation and help from the 
staff at the Parliament Library, New Delhi, the FICCI Library, New Delhi, the Jadavpur 
University Central Library, Kolkata, the SNDT W omen’s University Library, Mumbai and the 
library o f the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata. I would also like to thank P.K. 
Ganguly o f the CITU and Samik Laliiri and Nilotpal Basu o f the CPI (M) for helping with 
access to data and interviews. I am grateful to FICCI and CII officials in Delhi and Mumbai, 
trade-unionists in the CITU and AITUC in Delhi and Patna and all the people from various 
organisations o f industry and business, trade-unions and political parties who readily and 
patiently gave interviews and took part in surveys. I am also indebted to friends and family for 
their hospitality while travelling during the fieldwork.
Debashis Das Gupta, Hazel Gray, Nina Balogh and Thomas Allan spent their valuable 
time reading, editing and proofreading the thesis. I cannot thank them enough. This thesis would 
not have been possible without their suggestions and comments.
Alexis, Asma, Bappa, Emily, Foqia, Gaurav, Hazel, Jawahar, John, Laura, Madhuja, 
Michael, Mousumi, Nina, Paromita, Radhika, Sandy, Sobhi, Stephanie, Suchetana, Tom and 
Urvi stood by me in both good and bad times during the course o f the thesis. 1 gratefully 
appreciate their friendship and solidarity. This thesis would not have been completed without 
the support I got from family members. I would like to thank my parents, Debashis and Deepa 
Das Gupta for their steadfast encouragement all through. I would also like to thank my partner 
Sayan Jyoti Gupta, my brother Aurko Das Gupta, and other family members Kajol and Pumima 
Gupta, Debjani M itra and Gautam Das Gupta for their encouragement and help.
Last, but not the least, I would like to express my debt, appreciation and gratitude for 
my supervisor Professor Mushtaq Khan. His advice, encouragement, ideas and constructive 
criticism transformed the arduous process o f the PhD into a very pleasant learning experience. 
He was much more than a supervisor. He has been a constant guide and friend. No words can be 
enough to express my indebtedness to him.
4
Table of Contents
Chapters Title Page
Introduction 7 - 1 5
1 Dirigisme to Neoliberalism in India: The Context and the Debate 1 6 -4 8
2 State and Capital in Independent India: The Problematic 4 9 - 7 4
Independence and Emergence o f State-led Capitalism 7 5 - 9 8
4 Growth o f the Indian Capitalist Class: 1950-1966 9 9 -1 3 3
5 Continuity and Change in Capital Accumulation: 1966-1980 1 3 4 -1 6 3
6 Sources o f Accumulation: State Intervention and Non-intervention 1 6 4 -1 9 4
7 New Enclaves: ‘Old Oligopolies and New Entrants’ in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector
1 9 5 -2 2 3
Conclusion 2 2 4 -2 3 3
Bibliography and References 2 3 4 -2 6 0
List of Tables
Table No Title Page
2A South-South FDI Flows 51
4A Index o f Industrial Production (Base: 1946 = 100) 108
4B Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) as Percentage o f 
GDP, 1950-55
109
4C Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) as Percentage of 
GDP, 1955-65
116
4D Listing o f Foreign Collaborations in India 1957-64 120
4E Taxation and Profits o f Foreign Companies 1962 122
5A Average Annual Growth rates o f GNP at 1993-94 Price 138
5B Percentage Shares o f Sectors in GDP: 1950-51 -  2000-01 143
5C Hotels and Restaurants as a Share o f GDP 145
5D Andhra Pradesh: Investment in Fixed capital in Industry 152
5E Small Registered Factories: Employment, Output and Investment 158
5F Sector wise Direct Project Assistance by IDBI between June 1964 
to June 1975
161
6A Concentration o f Assets and Capital Formation by Major Business 
Houses
177
6B Sectorwise Sanctions from All India Financial Institutions 191
6C State wise Assistance Sanctioned and Disbursed by IDBI 192
7A Drugs and Pharmaceutical Production Units 200
7B List o f Reserved Drug and Pharmaceutical Products for Small- 
scale Production, 2003
201
7C Number o f Drugs under Price Control 217
7D Contingent Liabilities o f Alembic Pharma 218
7E Estimates o f Retrenchment o f Factory Workers 220
5
List of Figures
Figure Title Page
4.1 Percentage Share o f GDP 113
4.2 Gross Capital Formation at Current Prices 114
5.1 1950-51 -  2000-01: Transformation by Mapping Sectors Shares 139
5.2 Average Five-Yearly Growth Rates: 1950-51 -  2000-01 142
5.3 Regulated Manufacturing 144
5.4 Regulated Manufacturing: 1950-51 -2000-01 144
5.5 Sector Share o f  Trade in GDP 145
5.6 Trade Output since 1950-51 146
5.7 Capital Formation in Trade 146
5.8 Hotels and Restaurants: GDP at 1993-94 Prices 147
5.9 Sectorwise Capital Output Ratios 159
Note: 1 Crore =10 Million
6
Introduction
This thesis focuses on the relationship between state and capital in the post­
independence period in India from the perspective o f political economy. It begins with an 
examination and subsequently a rejection o f the ahistorical but conventional neoclassical 
assessments o f post-Independence India, which are based on a ‘false dichotomy’ between the 
state and the market. The arguments that form the core of the enormous body o f literature on 
India based on neoclassical economics and its expansion into ‘new political economy’ and ‘new 
institutional economics’ are reviewed. A critique is offered based on a brief assessment o f the 
sociology of knowledge across disciplines in social sciences that scrutinises important debates 
on the relationship between state and society in India. This critique takes into account a 
fashionable body o f scholarship on state-society relations in India spanning the last three 
decades o f the post-independence period.
The impact o f these debates on the political economy o f policy-making in India after 
independence and for our understanding o f the relationship between state and capital is briefly 
reviewed based on secondary literature. The conclusion from the literature points to a gap in the 
analysis o f the relationship between state and capital from the period o f the balance o f  payment 
crisis and the first IMF loan in 1966 till the liberalisation episodes o f the 1980s. This gap is 
traced through a survey o f academic writings across disciplines on India and in India with an 
emphasis on the political imperatives that shaped the major academic debates from the 1980s 
around the adoption o f neoliberalism as the dominant ideology.
Our approach rejects the conventional neoclassical assessments o f the Indian economy 
which asserts that a full-fledged ‘market-led’ approach in state policy is the only way of 
integrating into the globalised world. In contrast, this work looks at the political economy o f the 
role o f changing social relations in the process o f transformation and consolidation o f the capital 
accumulation process in India after independence. The primary aim o f this research is to add to 
the understanding o f the specific relationship between state and capital in forging the dynamic 
role o f the institutions of the state and the market that form the basis o f capital accumulation in 
economies undergoing transition. This is the fundamental driving force o f the economic growth 
process in societies attempting a capitalist development without a radical change in non­
capitalist social relations that pervade the bulk o f society. The approach taken is to identify how 
the relationship between the ‘public’ institutions o f state and the ‘private’ institutions o f capital 
was critical for the capital accumulation process in post-independence India, and how this 
relationship changed over time.
Post-independence political economy in India has been characterised by Ghosh (1998) 
as a drama enacted between votaries and opponents o f liberalisation. At one level, it is posited 
as a drama based on academic debates stemming from different ideological positions and
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different interpretations o f the Indian economy (Ghosh 1998). Byres (1997, 1998) and Ghosh 
(1998) provide excellent historicised reviews o f these debates on planning and state policy 
respectively within the academic literature in India. The other level was o f actual state action, 
which had less correspondence with this debate and was determined by the relative power of 
political configurations within society (Ghosh 1998). This is the area that has received relatively 
less attention though each o f the ‘liberalisation’ episodes in the history o f  independent India saw 
a concomitant academic debate. The two levels o f debate according to Ghosh (1998) have 
merged occasionally in history but since the 1980s, there was a decisive merger o f the two. This 
was a part o f the political process o f the shift to the ideology o f ‘ neoliberalism’ as opposed to 
this or that specific deregulation or liberalisation that is a feature o f the entire post-independence 
period.
The origins o f these debates can be traced to the ideological struggle within the national 
liberation movement before independence. The arguments and ideological debates about the 
role o f the state in the building and expansion o f a viable capitalism in India were evident in the 
actual arena o f state-society relations and political action, which defined the contours and limits 
o f the relationship between state and capital in the decade preceding independence. This was a 
significant political development right from the time o f the Congress taking office in the 
Provincial Governments in 1937 under the Government o f India Act o f 1935 (Rasul 1989), the 
political developments in ensuring the marginalisation o f ‘Left’ opinion within the top echelons 
o f the Congress from the annual session in Haripura in 1938 to the Tripuri session in 1939 
(Sarkar 1983; Tripathi 1990) and the constitution o f the National Planning Committee in 1939 
that drew up the blue-print o f planned capitalist development based on import substituting 
industrialisation (Chibber 2003). The post-independence strategy was therefore one of 
developing a state-led capitalism with a significant role assigned to the state developing a 
‘mixed economy’ with the aim o f complementarity and development o f linkages between the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’ sectors (Bagchi 1982; Chandrasekhar 1994). This was an outcome of 
the political limits on mass radicalisation o f the national liberation struggle. Added to this was 
the understanding that late capitalist development requires a more obvious role for state 
intervention and even early capitalist development had a significant, but different role for state 
intervention.
Two decades o f  experiments after independence with a state-led approach to a regulated 
capitalist development based on planned allocation o f resources was within the framework o f a 
‘mixed economy’ that already had a ‘private’ sector while the state had the onerous task of 
building up the ‘public sector’ as part o f the task o f nation-building based on capitalist growth 
processes (Desai 1984). These experiments achieved much higher rates o f capitalist growth than 
were achieved in the colonial period but also developed a specific set o f contradictions that 
manifest themselves in rising inflation, high rates of unemployment, entrenched corruption and 
asset concentration in the hands o f ‘big business’. This led to collective disenchantment in the
polity reflected in the rise and consolidation o f oppositional politics all through the period under 
consideration (Frankel 2005). The collective disenchantment o f a group o f political 
functionaries and sections of capitalists in their relationship with the state reached a peak in 
1965-66 with the ‘food crisis’ combined with a severe balance o f payment crisis (Nayar 2001; 
Chibber 2003). Some o f  these disenchanted sections had advocated and organised politically 
(Shroff 1966) for a radical deregulatory ‘regime change’ towards laissez fa ire  by funding 
individual candidates on the extreme right in the Swatantra Party' and its electoral allies, mainly 
the Jan Sangh (Kochanek 1971). State policies in response shifted from an incentive based 
approach to ‘industrial capital’ to an increasing panoply o f dirigiste measures (Patnaik 1984) 
that was popularly termed the Ticense-control raj’ o f the 1970s.
However, organised platforms o f capitalists in India collectively rejected the idea of 
floating parties representing business in opposition to dirigisme (Kochanek 1974). Neither did 
the collective platforms o f the capitalist class as a whole endorse the arguments (FICCI 1959, 
1965) advocated by the likes o f A.D. Shroff who organised the ‘Forum for Free Enterprise’ and 
the organised political opposition to the Congress namely the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party 
during or after the 1965-66 financial crisis and the period o f the Third Plan. On the contrary, 
after the brief interlude o f the Shastri period, the various fora o f capitalists gave either active or 
passive support to the growing dirigisme (Patnaik 1984) under the Indira Gandhi regime (FICCI 
1976) including the severely repressive period o f the Emergency. Individual capitalists did of 
course oppose the Emergency, based on their choice o f ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ determined by a 
whole range o f  political exigencies related to the functioning o f  the Emergency regime 
(Chandra 2003).
After the brief but politically volatile disjuncture provided by the ‘economic reforms’ o f 
the Janta government from 1977-1980, a section o f capitalists in India did see a rationale in the 
shift to deregulation and a redefining o f the role o f the state in the economy. They gave a 
cautious welcome to the neoliberal rationale o f ‘opening up’ in 1991. In the next fifteen years, 
through strategies o f accommodation and adjustment, the top rung o f Indian capitalists reached 
a consensus on the desirability o f ‘reform’ o f internal economic regulations and removal of 
controls (FICCI 2001; Forbes 2002; Narayana Murthi 2002). By the late 1990s, one o f the 
representative voices o f capital, N Vaghul, the chairman o f Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation o f  India, was relieved to note in front o f an American audience that the Congress- 
led and BJP-led coalitions had reached a consensus on ‘economic reforms’ and thus there would 
be a bipartisan approach on pushing through appropriate legislation to further neoliberal 
‘reforms’ in spite o f opposition from Communists and other Leftists (Vaghul 1999).
This research is concerned with the political economy o f  the ideological shift o f the 
independent Indian state from a paradigm o f  state-led capital accumulation associated with the 
Nehru-Mahalanobis growth strategy in the first two decades after independence. It is widely 
noted both in Marxist political economy and the ‘liberal pluralist paradigm’ defined by
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Sridharan (1993) that this state led process developed a number o f critical contradictions by the 
end o f the Third Plan period in 1965-66. These contradictions from a Marxist perspective 
according to Patnaik (1994) were inherent in the nature o f ‘dirigisme’ that characterised the 
‘democratic absolutism’, which informed the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy. The contradictions 
o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy that led to the balance o f payment crisis in 1965-66 and the 
recession that followed have been widely discussed within Marxist political economy on India 
(Patnaik 1986; Bagchi 1998; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002; Chibber2003) and within a liberal 
pluralist paradigm (Frankel 2005; Nayar 2001; Rudolph and Rudolph 1998) in terms o f the 
inability o f  the state to ‘control’ the terrain o f primary accumulation (Sridharan 1993).
The phenomenal asset concentration in the hands o f  the top ten oligopolistic ‘business 
houses’ with the publication o f Hazari’s (1967) study on industrial planning and licensing 
policy led to popular demands for a curb on the accumulative activities o f ‘big business’. 
Nevertheless, both liberal and Marxist social scientists have pointed to increased asset 
concentration combined with the rise o f new ‘houses’ o f ‘big business’ after 1965-66 (Baru 
2000, Nayar 2001, Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002, Frankel 2005). The processes at play here 
and their implications for the final implosion o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy into a 
neoliberal paradigm o f a so-called ‘market-led’ social process in the last two decades o f the 
twentieth century have not been subject to detailed academic scrutiny.
The literature on the period from the mid-sixties has reviewed the ‘structural 
retrogression’ (Shetty 1994) in the Indian economy as a crisis o f the process o f industrialisation 
with a slow-down o f both public and private investment and a slow rate o f growth o f agriculture 
despite the Green Revolution. However, a closer scrutiny with the benefit o f hindsight and a 
historical distance o f more than a quarter o f  a century reveals a range o f undiscussed features 
related not to stagnation, but to methods o f expansion o f capital after independence. There was 
also further expansion and restructuring o f capital from 1965-66 during a decade and a half o f 
recession in regulated manufacturing. This expansion has received less attention compared to 
the analysis o f recession in the economic literature except for passing observations.
What were the changes since 1965-66 in the process o f capital accumulation and 
expansion that led to the paradigmatic shift from dirigisme to neoliberalism? Did it contribute to 
a shift in the relationship between capital and the state? Was this change a paradigmatic shift 
that entailed a significant change in the relationship between state and capital? These are the 
central questions o f the thesis. The analysis will focus on the role o f state, class and ideology in 
the expansion and reproduction o f the capital accumulation process in India with a detailed 
review o f the period between 1965 and 1980 to examine how and why the shift took place, and 
to assess the significance o f the change.
The literature emanating from neoliberal academia obfuscates the nature o f economic policy 
by generalising its analysis over the historical period after 1947 to 1980 (Virmani 2004) or 1991 
(Bhagwati 1998) depending on when the authors believe the state ‘got it right’ in its moves
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towards deregulation and liberalisation. For the sake o f historical specificity, we need to be clear 
about the exact domains o f state intervention and non-intervention in reviewing post­
independence economic history. A clear periodisation is necessaiy to carry out this exercise 
(Byres 1998). This research is based on a periodisation o f post-independent India’s political 
economy into four distinct periods. The relationship between state and capital from 1947 to 
1966 can be periodised into two distinct phases, the first o f which is the decade from 1947 to 
1956 and the second from 1956 to 1966. Chenoy (1985) used a similar periodisation in a study 
o f the relationship between multinationals and Indian capitalist development.
The first period starts in 1946 and ends in 1956 converging with the end o f the first plan 
period. This can be argued to be spanning a decade from the time o f transfer o f power to the end 
o f  the first plan period during which ‘liberalism’ informed state policy. It must be noted that 
during the first ten years, India’s status was that o f a ‘dominion’ o f the British Empire between 
15th August 1947 and 26th January 1950. Full sovereignty came only in 1950 with the adoption 
o f the Indian constitution that guaranteed the right to property as a fundamental right. Thus 
capitalists in India needed repeated assurance from leading figures o f the Congress that there 
would be no nationalisation o f  property and curbs on profit in the constitution and the making of 
other legislation. The second period spans the decade from 1956 to 1965-66, that is the period 
o f the Second and Third Plan. This was the decade of expansion o f  the accumulation process 
through indicative planning as a tool for allocation of resources informed by the Nehru- 
Mahalanobis strategy. This ended in a series o f contradictions reflected in a severe balance of 
payment crisis that resulted in the first IMF loan and contingent devaluation and deregulatory 
measures.
The third period spans from 1966 to 1980, a period characterised in the literature by low 
growth rates, a gradual undermining o f planning and stagnation in the economy. The findings o f 
this research combined with the interpretations from significant work on the topic points to a 
resolute restructuring o f the institutional organisation o f capital in this period covering both 
‘zones o f intervention’ and ‘zones o f non-intervention’ by the state in the economy. This 
spanned from 1965-66 that is the time o f the balance o f payment crisis and up to the IMF loan 
to l980, the year which marked the decisive move towards deregulation and decontrol. This 
period saw the expansion o f capital that combined ‘continuities’ and ‘changes’ in the modes of 
capital accumulation reflected in the formation and expansion o f ‘new’ business houses.
This period was marked by an expansion o f the role of the state in enabling primary 
accumulation through the guarantee o f intellectual property over processes mainly developed 
through reverse-engineering, the interlocking o f banking and industrial capital along with the 
protection o f subsidies that enabled Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI). These changes 
could be characterised as an extension of the ‘zone o f intervention’ by the state. More 
importantly, this period also saw ‘new’ entrants into the preserve o f big capital enabled by the 
monopoly restrictions laws and legalisation o f  process patents, who engaged in accumulation
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processes in areas that were not covered by the state’s ambit o f regulations and control. This 
spanned ‘informal’ zones o f non-intervention over the labour process, the development of 
business empires based on ‘franchisee’ operations and development of a relatively ‘free-m arkef 
in finance. It is clear from published private and public records reviewed in this work that such 
accumulation came with the tacit support o f the ‘policy framework o f non-intervention’ by the 
state. The central argument is that these developments were part o f a new and emerging 
relationship between the state and emerging sections o f capital and this laid the necessary 
foundations for the emergence o f the subsequent ideological consensus that informed the 
political rhetoric and reality o f neoliberal reforms from the 1980s.
The last period starts from the 1980s and spans a quarter o f a century and is characterised by 
a gradual process o f ‘marketisation’ in keeping with neoliberal prescriptions. Thus, in this 
research, the structural adjustment programme o f 1991 is not considered a ‘break’ but only an 
acceleration o f neoliberal policies that had started in the 1980s.
The territorial jurisdiction o f the Indian state was a vital part o f the process o f  state 
formation after independence.
Out o f India’s inheritance o f fourteen jurisdictions o f British India and five 
hundred and fifty-odd states o f princely India emerged twenty-nine states in the 
Constitution of 1950 (Wood 1984:7).
The territorial dimensions o f  the Indian nation-state even in 1956 when the Second Plan was 
being implemented were still under flux. Thus the idea o f a homogenous Indian economy in the 
1950s is a wrong assumption as major epicentres o f growth like the ‘princely states’ in the post­
independence period only came under state jurisdiction in 1955-56. Agitations for linguistic 
reorganisation o f the states took up great momentum in the 1950s. By the end o f 1956, after the 
major thrust o f reorganisation, India had fourteen states. In the next decade the number o f states 
had risen to sixteen with reorganisation. Between 1966 and 1975 another six were added. In 
terms o f territorial measures o f what constituted the Indian economy at the level o f the states the 
geographical area after 1960 was a contiguous whole with the creation o f Kerala in 1956, 
reorganisation o f  Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in the same 
year and the creation o f  Maharashtra in 1960.
The geographical reorganisation of India affects our research in two ways. A state-wise 
assessment o f capital formation in a comparative perspective is difficult in the period before 
1965-66. Second, and more importantly the politics o f ‘development’ and accumulation at the 
level o f region and state was intrinsically inter-locked with the demands for state-hood.
The discussion in this thesis focuses on the relationship between state and capital in the 
expansion o f accumulation and the restructuring o f the organisation o f capital in the Indian 
economy in the first three periods. The ‘rhetoric’ o f policy changes in the scopes of 
‘intervention’ by the state since 1965 since the first IMF loan was one o f ‘reforms’ in the Indian
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economy. There are significant continuities in the relationship between state and capital despite 
the reforms. The dominant literature on this period provides accounts often based on ‘false 
dichotomies' for example between the state and the market (Khilnani 2003), the private and the 
public sector (Nayar 2001), and the unnecessary protection o f capitalists through import 
substitution that could have been avoided by export orientation (Chibber 2003). Harris-White 
(1981, 1996b) provides empirical refutation o f the false dichotomy between the ‘state’ and 
‘market’ in the process o f  accumulation. The findings o f this research are based on an analytical 
narrative o f how each o f the constructed ‘binaries’ were related to the development o f capital 
and the extent to which representatives o f  the capitalist class were themselves part o f the 
institutional apparatus o f both the ‘market’ and ‘state’ in the course o f  this development.
This thesis is organised into seven chapters followed by a brief conclusion. Chapter One 
reviews the academic debates that informed the premise o f the shift from dirigisme to 
neoliberalism in India. It highlights the limits o f the social categories o f analysis through which 
the market was presented as a panacea for all economic problems state-society relations. The 
chapter puts forward some basic propositions on the ‘false dichotomy’ between the state and the 
market in India that establishes the inadequacy o f ahistorical assessments o f the ‘role o f the 
state’. It identifies a range o f theoretical debates on Indian society, economy and polity that 
suffer from these problems. ‘Neoliberalism’ as an ideology is located within the global project 
o f capital. Its specific forms in India were established through the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the functionaries and representatives o f state and capital in India. This ideology allowed the 
development o f the particular relationship between state and capital that is the subject o f 
analysis in this thesis.
Chapter Two establishes the case for undertaking this research and the importance of 
examining the relationship between state and capital in independent India. In this context it is 
important to note that a historical study over the period in terms o f standard sources like 
archival material is not possible due to the contemporary nature o f the historical exercise. 
However an enquiry establishing certain patterns o f accumulation and the organisation of 
relations between state and capital that allowed and enabled these patterns is important and can 
be based on published sources and the available data. The validity o f a methodology based on 
an analytical narrative is detailed in this chapter.
Chapter Three focuses on the economic, social and political imperatives o f  the nascent 
Indian capitalist class in the period o f colonialism and its power to influence the direction o f the 
‘state to be’. The main argument in this chapter is to establish first that the path o f development 
charted out by 1947 was that o f state-led capitalism countering arguments that India was 
heading towards a ‘socialist’ society or that the Indian experiment was a ‘modernisation’ 
process imbibing both socialist and capitalist ideas. The chapter explores how the specific form 
o f state-led capitalism commonly described as ‘Nehruvianism’ became the dominant ‘path’.
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Chapters Four to Seven form the core o f the thesis. The periodisation of the chapters 
follows from the principle o f historical specificity outlined above. Chapters Four and Five 
provide a review o f the growth and accumulation strategies o f the Indian capitalist class and the 
role of the state in the accumulation process from 1950 (when India became a sovereign 
republic) to 1980 (the year o f the second IMF loan and the beginning o f the liberalisation 
episodes o f the 1980s). In these two chapters, the importance o f the emergence o f ‘new’ 
capitalists in different parts o f India is established. Chapter Six locates this expansion in the 
period from 1966 (the year o f the first IMF loan) to 1980 and examines the modalities o f 
expansion o f the capitalist class and its changing relationship with the state in this period. 
Chapter Seven presents a detailed case study o f  the pharmaceutical sector that spans the entire 
historical period under consideration in the thesis.
Chapter Four is a study o f the domain o f state policies o f intervention and non­
intervention in the project o f  building capitalism in the period between 1947 and 1965-66. It is 
argued that the first two decades after independence can be split into two distinct periods, 1947- 
1955 and 1956-1966. This periodisation provides a better understanding o f how much o f a 
‘free market’ economy India was in the first decade and the nature o f state policy in terms o f 
incentives, control and command in the second decade. A detailed study o f planning and 
industrial policy is aimed at establishing the relationship between state and capital in the decade 
characterised by the dirigisme o f the Mahalanobis strategy and the contradictory outcomes it 
generated in terms o f public and private investment.
Chapter Five provides an assessment o f the structural changes or their absence using 
sector wise time-series data for the fifty-year period from 1950-51 to 2000-01 for growth, 
sectoral shares and capital formation. The aim is to establish the importance o f  sources o f the 
accumulation process even during the acknowledged period o f recession in the Indian economy 
from 1965-66 to 1980. Four lines o f enquiry are then pursued focusing on this period: a 
detailed sectoral analysis o f accumulation processes, the regional characteristics o f this process, 
the nature o f the institutional structure through which this accumulation took place, and the role 
o f the state in sustaining this process.
Chapter Six provides an account o f the political economy o f intervention and non­
intervention o f the state since the first IMF loan o f 1966. The social processes o f accumulation 
o f the economy are studied to highlight the role of the state and the limits on it through the 
change in power structures with change in the sources o f accumulation in the economy. The 
chapter aims to analyse contradictory features o f  the period o f acknowledged recession in the 
Indian economy from 1965 to 1980. The contradictions lie in the formation and growth o f ‘new’ 
oligopolistic business groups in this period o f recession. The focus is on sources o f primary 
accumulation and political power o f the ‘new ’ capitalists and the relationship o f these to the 
changes in the nature o f state-interventions and non-interventions in this period.
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Chapter Seven traces the accumulation patterns, growth and restructuring using the 
pharmaceutical industry as a case study from the period o f dirigisme to the current epoch o f 
neoliberalism. This highlights the relationship between state and capital in the sphere of 
technology, intellectual property, labour, finance and protection o f markets, all o f  which are 
linked to the restructuring o f  accumulation and the convergence o f the ideology o f capital 
towards neoliberalism.
The conclusion provides a summary o f the key arguments, its limitations and possible 
arenas o f further enquiry based on the arguments o f this work.
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Chapter One
Dirigisme to Neoliberalisin in India: The Context and the Debate
These masses o f  people you are seeing 
Have heard Him guaranteeing 
A  great time by and by.
Meanwhile they must make sacrifices 
As the shops all pu t up their prices 
That great time is p ie in the sky.
(Adapted from  Bertolt Brecht: Fear and Misery o f  the Third Reich)
The timing, pace and content o f the transition from dirigisme to neo-liberalism in India 
are embedded in changes in the social relations o f capital and changes in the trajectories of 
capital accumulation in India. A satisfactory explanation o f how neo-liberalism emerged in 
India is important for understanding why it took a specific form and why it did not conform in 
many details with the model o f liberalisation coming from an ahistorical understanding o f the 
state. It is therefore also necessary to differentiate our methodological approach from many of 
the established ways in which these questions have been addressed in the political economy 
literature and academic debates in India. This is important for three reasons: first, neoliberal 
explanations o f the transition are part o f a broader academic literature that uses ahistorical 
analysis o f the ‘role o f the state’ in explaining the shift to neoliberalism in India (Ahluwalia and 
Little 1998; Bhagwati 1993, 1998; Lucas and Papanek 1998; Krueger and Chinoy 2002; Das 
2006). This type o f explanation became rhetorically dominant in mainstream academic writing 
explaining the transition to neoliberalism in India Second, the link between ‘state’ and ‘market’, 
is typically critical for understanding the success of capital accumulation in developing societies 
attempting capitalist development without a radical change in the social structure o f non­
capitalist relations. The analysis o f the transition exposes many limitations in the literature 
addressing this relationship. Third, the factors driving the transition are related to our 
understanding o f ‘neoliberalism’ as a new global ideology and the role o f this ideology in the 
global project o f  capital. The specific forms this project took in India need to be understood to 
comprehend the complex relationship o f ‘neoliberalism’ in India to ‘deregulation’ and 
‘liberalisation’ -  the two pillars o f ‘reform’ in economic policy that are often uncritically 
equated with the transition from dirigisme to neoliberalism.
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We put forward three analytical propositions in this chapter based on our review o f the 
relevant literature. First, neoliberalism as an ideology derives its economic logic from a certain 
kind of neoclassical economics based on methodological individualism. Nevertheless, 
neoliberalism as an ideology has more complex roots, derived not only from the development o f 
disciplinary imperatives, but also drawing on wider political developments, a proposition that 
we shall address in the Indian context in this research. Second, in India, the expansion o f capital 
underlying India’s growth both in the period of ‘dirigisme’ and in the period o f the ‘neoliberal 
ascent’ was and remains heavily dependent on the state. Capital accumulation in both periods 
relied on both legitimate and illegitimate state support and mechanisms o f the market to engage 
in legal accumulation and also in profiteering, hoarding, racketeering and the flouting o f a wide 
range o f legal norms. Accumulation in the broad sense - thus encompassed both ‘zones of 
intervention and non-intervention’ by the state. Third, the period since 1965-66 when the 
contradictions o f  the ‘state-led capitalist path’ came to a head in social and political turmoil, 
asset concentration and a foreign exchange crisis. The decisive turn towards a ‘neoliberal’ 
strategy from the 1980s was a critical period characterised by accumulation processes that 
involved both continuities and changes in the ‘sites’ of primary accumulation o f capital.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. 1.1 critically assesses the development of 
the political basis o f ‘deregulation’ couched in the rhetoric o f ‘economic reforms’ since the 
1980s. This is necessary in order to spell out the specific policy changes that defined either 
continuity or changes in the relationship o f state and capital in India that the thesis seeks to 
examine. An examination o f  the limitations o f culturalist critiques to address the central 
question o f the thesis is important as a significant strand o f such literature fails to address the 
modalities o f capitalist transition in India. Section 1.2 is developed to establish a critique o f the 
link between the rise o f culturalist scholarship, the ascent o f neoliberalism and its concomitant 
disciplinary rationale in economics in strengthening the basis o f  ‘monoeconomics’ covering two 
interlinked spheres o f  influence -  the social aspects o f the rise o f extreme right-wing forces and 
the economic basis o f the ‘market fundamentalism’ that informed the politics o f these forces. 
These developments need to be addressed in order to comprehend the rise o f the neoliberal 
agenda combined with a resurgence o f  a very vicious form o f cultural nationalism in 
contemporary India. Having set the intellectual context o f the major political debate on 
neoliberalism, sections 1.3 to 1.7 are devoted to analysing various facets o f the debates around 
neoliberalism and the role o f the state. 1.3 provides a critical account o f  the ‘faulty’ shell o f ‘the 
economics’ that formed the basis o f  fostering a Bretton Woods directed process o f ‘economic 
reforms’ in India. 1.4 critically assesses the rationale of the argument that neoliberal ‘economic 
reforms’ are a response to the failure o f the ‘state’ in bolstering economic performance and the 
problems with this understanding. 1.5 provides an analysis o f the limits o f the debate on the 
‘state’ in the literature on India. 1.6 is a synthesis o f the debate on the nature and role o f the 
state in India first, inside academia and second, outside based on the experiences o f resistance to
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neoliberalism. 1.7 briefly identifies the gaps in methodological praxis synthesised through the 
literature ‘for’ and ‘against’ neoliberalism that are critical for developing a framework for this 
research.
1.1 The Convergence of ‘Reforms’ as ‘Globalisation’ and ‘Deregulation’
At the outset, one must acknowledge that the rich scholarship on the complexities of 
social relations in India covers many aspects o f the relationship between state and society and 
not all o f these aspects can be covered within the limits o f this research. Our focus will be on 
those aspects o f the state-society relationship in India that are most important for understanding 
the shift to neoliberalism as the dominant political ideology o f  the Indian state. The context o f 
the shift to neoliberalism in India was defined by a series o f important policy changes since the 
mid-1980s within the Indian state. The debate on exactly when the move towards a ‘market- 
economy’ took place has mainly preoccupied neoclassical practitioners and supporters o f 
liberalisation (Panagariya 2004; Vinnani 2004; Nayar 2006). For some economists, the 
structural adjustment programme initiated in 1991 by Bretton Woods institutions marks the shift 
(Krueger and Chinoy 2002, Basant 2000, Venkateswaran 1996). However, critiques have 
pointed to the general observation that India’s domestic economy was characterised by a ‘free- 
market’ with state dirigisme since independence (Patnaik 2004) and have exposed the hierarchy 
o f social organisation that characterises such market relations (Harriss 1985). Historicised 
accounts based not on this or that ‘liberalisation’ policy but on a move towards a specific set o f 
tenets on the minimalist role o f state in the economy that define neoliberalism identify this 
process as very much a phenomenon that started in the 1980s (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). 
This process accelerated after the implementation o f the structural adjustment programme in 
1991 (Patnaik 1999a). There has been a lot o f debate on the period, rationale, extent, scope and 
relevance o f  the ‘economic reforms’.
The obfuscating nature o f the term ‘reforms’ and how these set o f policies differed from 
earlier policies o f  ‘reform ’ in independent India have been interpreted by various practitioners 
o f political economy as a structural break in paradigms o f economic policy from a state guided 
and state-led dirigiste path to capitalism to a market-led neoliberal process (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2002). Neoliberal academics have lauded this as a gradual shift towards a ‘market-led’ 
economy aimed at improving ‘allocative efficiency’, and ‘productivity increase’ based on the 
‘comparative advantage’ o f  a cheap labour force and ‘competitiveness’ based on mobility of 
capital within and across sectors in the economy (Bhagwati 1998; Ahluwalia 2002; 
Pushpangadan and Shanta 2006). Some authors critical o f the process have interpreted this as a 
‘shift from planning to management o f the economy’ (Kurien 1994: 94).
The agenda o f ‘reform’ pushed through by the Rajiv Gandhi government from 1985 was 
based on the contention that information and communication technology was ‘revolutionising’ 
the world and India should not be left out o f  this ‘globalisation’ process. The emphasis was on
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‘modernisation’ of technology and communication facilities and associated with Sam Pitroda of 
C-dot fame (Chakravarty 2004). The assumption that technological innovation is a class neutral 
phenomenon was promoted through a media campaign on state owned television and radio 
focussing on the benefits to the laam ja n ta ’ (ordinary people). The state-led expansion o f 
media, satellite and telecommunication across the length and breadth o f the country laid the 
foundations for the vision o f the powers that be in India o f integrating into the changing 
‘globalised’ world (Bajwa 2003).
Apart from this huge state-led expansion o f telecommunications, the most significant 
policy was to reduce direct taxation, to facilitate the increase in consumption demand, 
compensated by sharp increases in public borrowing and deficit financing (Datta 1992). The 
actual trends in public finance in India in this period have seen the expansion o f public 
expenditure associated with increased reliance on deficit financing, indirect taxation and 
commercial borrowing. Further, they have involved a divorce between development goals and 
actual resource allocation, increased decentralisation o f public expenditure decisions and a 
preference for consumption over investment spending (Harriss 2001).
In the 1980s, the shape o f  these expansive, debt-dependent fiscal ‘reforms’ was to let 
the more affluent sections in the country influence the pattern o f industrial production by 
exercising their purchasing power and to enable industry to respond to this market (Patnaik 
1999b). Increases in industrial production were based on increased import content o f products, 
which was not adequately covered by export growth and hence necessitated foreign borrowing. 
Thus a restructuring of the production process geared towards a debt-dependent process of 
accumulation was absolutely fundamental to the outcome o f ‘economic reforms’ o f the 1980s. 
In just ten years, India joined the club o f the biggest debtor nations in the world. External debt 
rose to 80 billion USD in 1991 from 20 billion USD in 1981. The ratio o f debt-service to 
exports amounted to more than 30 per cent (Bagchi 1998).
By the beginning o f 1991, India was faced with the prospect o f  defaulting on 
her debt obligations and accordingly being unable to secure even short-term 
loans except on very onerous terms. (Bagchi 1998: 5)
Committees were set up by various Indian states to facilitate decontrol and delicensing. 
This was characteristic o f the ‘reforms’ encompassed in the New Economic Policy that kicked 
in from 1985 covering all the major fields o f regulation in the economy except the capital 
market. There was a short-lived industrial boom in the mid-80s, followed by a drastic slow­
down in 1989-90. How far that boom can be attributed to ‘successful integration into the world 
economy’ can be contested (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). By the late 1980s, new 
contradictions started building up in the economic sphere. The debt-driven growth met its 
obvious nemesis in less than a decade. In June-July 1991, exacerbated by the G ulf War, the 
crisis o f confidence in the rupee peaked and the government resorted to borrowing from the
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IMF and carried out a series o f  policy changes once again termed ‘reforms’ in keeping with 
classic Fund-Bank prescriptions for stabilisation and structural adjustment (Government of 
India 1991). The reforms in 1991 started with the devaluation o f the rupee by 24 per cent. A 
dual-exchange rate was introduced and exporters could benefit from a lower rate. By 1993, the 
currency was made convertible for current account transactions and the two rates were unified. 
Fiscal austerity measures were announced.
Thus the first attempt at unleashing the ‘free-play o f  market forces’ often termed 
‘liberalisation by stealth’ from the mid-1980s, based on neoliberal tenets, resulted in a massive 
foreign debt that manifested itself in terms o f a severe balance o f payment crisis in 1991 and 
formed the backdrop o f the full-scale implementation o f the Bretton-W ood’s guided structural 
adjustment programme in India. 1991 formalised a dynamic process o f ‘opening up’, in keeping 
with Fund-Bank conditionality, but the premises o f the shift to neoliberalism had been slowly 
laid out in the previous decade.
These ‘reforms’ were financed by an import-intensive growth process on the supply side 
(Iyer 1991) and the purchasing power o f the top income groups on the demand side. In the 
1980s, foreign resources were based on borrowing; in the 1990s there was a shift in favour of 
foreign direct and indirect investment (Kurien 1994). One significant change at this time was 
the formal abandonment o f planning as a policy tool for determining resource allocation by a 
state that was supposed to be intent upon dissolving economic backwardness via capitalism 
(Byres 1997). These shifts marked not merely shifts in economic policy, but a larger ideological 
and political shift.
On a more accelerated basis since the 1990s, restrictions on foreign investment were 
removed. The Foreign Investment Promotion Board was set up. Internal deregulation meant 
throwing open industrial sectors to private enterprise that had been earlier reserved for the 
public sector. Cuts in subsidies were implemented. A number o f  import items were de­
canalised. A shift was made from quota restrictions to tariffs. Licensing policy and restriction 
on monopolies were practically abolished. Financial ‘liberalisation’ consisted o f an effort to 
unity the capital and money markets. Control over new capital issues was removed. Banks 
were allowed to set up mutual funds to deal in shares. Foreign financial institutions were 
allowed to invest in the stock market subject to some mild restrictions.
This period o f neoliberal transition has been marked by intense social tensions, not only 
in the escalation o f communalism and Hindu fundamentalism, but also the intensification of 
proto-fascist carnage, marked by the demolition o f the Babri Masjid in 1992 and culminating in 
the genocide in Gujarat in February 2002. The Vishwa Hindu Pari shad’s Ram-janmabhoomi 
movement received support from businessmen within India as well as Indian entrepreneurs and 
professionals living abroad who supported the slogan o f ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan’ (Mohanty 
2002).
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This period marks the end o f one-party rule and can be called the period o f coalition 
governments, both at the centre and state levels. This period has also been characterised by the 
weakening o f national political parties reflected in the weakening o f the Congress (Jannuzi 
1990) and the rise o f autonomy movements (Mohanty 2002). The increased importance of 
regional political groupings is often associated with a deeper economic and political 
fragmentation, which has often been attributed to intensification o f ‘uneven development’ in the 
era o f neo-liberalism. Marxist critics o f neoliberalism have generally established the narrowing 
o f the class basis o f state power in global capitalism (Harvey 2005).
The Indian state tried ruthlessly to repress the power workers’ long strike in 2000 against 
privatisation in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s largest state. 90,000 workers o f the UP State 
Electricity Board went on strike against a Cabinet decision in January 2000 which disbanded the 
Board and replaced it by three new corporations: the UP Power Corporation, the UP Hydro­
electric Corporation and the UP Thermal Power Production Corporation in a move towards 
privatisation. In 1999 the BJP led Kalyan Singh government in UP passed the Electricity 
Reforms Bill and an electricity regulatory body was established. In real terms the disbanding of 
the Board and its substitution by 3 corporations was a two-phase process o f privatisation aimed 
at the transfer o f the entire power sector in UP into private hands. When this process was 
initiated in 1999 by the passing o f the Electricity Reforms Bill the workers hit back with a 
strike. The then Kalyan Singh government in UP summoned the Army, invoked the Essential 
Services Maintenance Act and the National Security Act and resorted to other repressive 
measures to crush the strike. The strike collapsed after two days.
Since then some 25,000 jobs were abolished under the restructuring plan. As the plan 
entered the second phase the workers again went into offensive strike action. The Union 
Minister for State for Power and Energy P. Kumaramangalam in unambiguous terms declared 
that no dialogue would be opened with the striking workers. Similar statements were issued by 
the UP Chief Minister Ram Prakash Gupta and the UP Power Minister Naresh Aggarwal (The 
Tribune 2000). When the workers did not budge, the government resorted to repressive 
measures. The Army was called in to maintain the electricity supply but even 20% o f the supply 
could not be maintained after such draconian measures (The Tribune 2000). In desperation the 
UP government terminated the employment o f 25,000 workers and started fresh recruitment. 
The workers still did not relent. Then 6,000 workers were arrested, their houses were raided and 
their families harassed. But electricity production ground to a halt in U.P. The U.P. government 
was forced to retreat temporarily and proposed negotiations which ultimately ended in a 
negotiated settlement. Aspects o f this deadlock still continued into 2005 with workers in UP 
resisting a new bid to privatise another thermal power unit (Ranganathan 2005). Similarly, there 
was severe repression assisted by forms o f legal anti-worker interventions against government 
workers on strike in Tamil Nadu in 2003.
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The English language media at that point emphasised statistics on the strike waves 
engulfing India all through the 1990s and the likely adverse effect on foreign investment. On 
January 19, 2000 the lead news in The Telegraph and the Chandigarh Tribune was about the 
power workers' strike in Uttar Pradesh (UP), and both expressed fear that this might be the 
turning point, with the working class awakening from a long stupor. On January 20, STAR 
News led o ff with statistics on the strike wave engulfing India. The online edition o f the Asia 
Times reported on January 21, 2000, that
...a  crippling five-day-old strike by 100,000 power employees in 
northern Uttar Pradesh state threatens to stymie ambitious World Bank- 
recommended plans to restructure ailing government power utilities.
This is symptomatic o f a convergence o f the different executive and judicial arms o f the 
state towards the ideology o f neoliberalism propagated by a ‘privatised’ media. The upholding 
o f neoliberal thought in the making o f a consensus for an ideal ‘market economy’ as the 
‘panacea’ for all ills in mainstream perceptions urges the state’s abdication o f its professed 
developmental role (Harvey 2005).
Marxist critiques o f the Indian state have pointed to the changing modalities of 
operation o f international finance capital that have been central to this shift (Patnaik 2000). 
Locating the growth and ‘proliferation’ o f the Indian bourgeoisie within this changing paradigm 
of finance capital, some Marxist scholars have highlighted the contradictions o f the state-led 
path o f capitalism and nation-building that took the form o f dirigisme in its elaborate structures 
o f regulation and command o f the economy (Patnaik 1984; Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 1995). 
They have also highlighted the obvious failure o f the subsequent neoliberal project o f 
‘marketism’ in solving the structural problems o f employment generation and poverty 
alleviation, and uneven regional development in spite o f ‘growth’ (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 
2002).
Before we put forward a detailed assessment o f the economic theories and debates 
around these developments, it is necessary to recapitulate the wider methodological 
developments in academic literature relevant to our task within which the debates in political 
economy o f the Indian context took place. Shifts in ideological premises in the making o f the 
shift to ‘neoliberalism’ cannot be assessed without establishing the context o f such changes 
within and across disciplines.
1.2 Culturalist Academia, Ascent of Neoliberalism and ‘Monoecononiics’
After the Communist debacle in Eastern Europe and the growth o f self-confidence o f 
countries allied to the US (Yates 2003), the political debate that emerged to dominate academia 
in and on India was in the first place not about economics. The intense debate that developed 
began with critical perspectives on Indian historiography and then expanded across other 
disciplines in the social sciences. Many academic practitioners o f social science working on
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India started moving towards post-structuralist perspectives. Some o f them in due time 
embraced a post-colonial/post-modem perspective premised on a false notion o f indigenity like 
Nandy (1989a, 1989b) and based their contributions in the upcoming field of culture studies to 
reject the validity of any kind o f universal ideology o f emancipation (Qadeer and Hasan 1987).
These trends have been attributed by some critics to the tendency o f certain scholars to 
appeal to a metropolitan and selective academic audience in India. Such scholars operate front 
multiple locations in academia in India and in metropolitan countries as part o f the upwardly 
mobile middle class ‘negotiating their positions in an international pecking order’ (Desai 2004: 
55 emphasis added) defined by the hierarchy o f international academia dominated by 
neoliberalism. After 1991, with the collapse o f the Soviet Union, some o f these academic 
writings started with pronouncements on the irrelevance o f Marxist historiography (Chakravarty
1993) addressed the flawed premises o f secular Indian historiography (Chatterjee 1993; 
Chakravarty 2000) that according to Bagchi (2002) predated their writings. Chakravarty (2000) 
addresses the transition to a ‘capitalist modernity5 that devotes a few pages to Marx in 
acknowledgement o f the universalising ‘logic o f capital’ but then resorts to the much-repeated 
criticism coming from the postcolonial school that there was a problematic but
...honored tradition, both in Europe and elsewhere, o f regarding “rational 
outlook”, the “spirit o f science” and of “free enquiry” as constituting the “progressive” 
aspects o f modernity. Secular and Marxist Indian intellectuals have long held this 
v iew ... (Chakravarty 2000: 287).
By tracing all secular and Marxist writings to the intellectual project o f the 
Enlightement, this school o f  authors castigated materialist history writing in specific and 
materialist scholarship in general, a This was based on a twin attack both on nationalist and 
Marxist historiography on India as these were all tainted by Europe, European Enlightenment 
and Western ways o f seeing in terms o f scientific enquiry and hence were guilty o f aiming at 
objectivity and steeped in rationalism (Nandy 1994; Nandy et.al 1995). These arguments traced 
almost all significant scholarship that appeared before them to the abhorred Enlightenment. 
Within a decade, developments in Indian academia followed the trends in historiography in the 
academic institutions in metropolitan countries. The baby o f materialist historiography had been 
thrown out with the bathwater o f the contradictions between strands o f ‘modernity’ and 
‘rationalism’ associated with the Enlightenment. This was contingent on the separation o f the 
project o f ‘modernity’ from the project o f ‘capitalism’ (Wood 1998).
Ironically, despite its attempt to establish the irrelevance o f Western thought tainted by 
the Enlightenment, the postcolonial post-modern literature in India drew directly on the post­
structuralist debates o f the Left and later on the post-modern debates that emanated from 
metropolitan academia from the 1970s. These were defined by the ideological debates around 
Althusser’s reading o f Lenin and Marx (Althusser 1971; Althusser and Balibar 1997), 
Foucault’s work on power and discourse (1972), Derrida’s methods o f deconstruction o f 
phenomenology (1976), Lacan’s perspective on the ‘se lf  and the ‘other’ (1994), and Said’s
23
‘Orientalism5 (1979). Kurtz (1996) and Gledhill (1996) in their separate assessment o f various 
strands o f literature that claim to derive from Gramsci point out a very selective appropriation of 
Gramsci’s (1971, 1988) discussions on ‘hegemony5, ‘consciousness5 and ‘ideology5, often 
taking Gramsci out o f his social and political context and concentrating on his formulations 
about the ‘organic intellectual5 and ‘civil society5. In this sense, the particular strand of 
culturalist pre-occupations that informed the scholarship on India and in India were no less a 
‘derivative discourse5 compared to the ‘discourse o f nationalism5 argued by Chatterjee (1986)) 
in the pre-independence period if  not more. This is not a repudiation o f Gramsci, but the 
literature on India that uses Gramsci as a point o f departure. This is further elaborated in the 
discussion on passive revolution in Chapter Two.
The project o f ‘subaltern studies5 from the early 1980s in the course o f two decades 
developed into a conceptual framework that was based on the simplistic premise o f defining the 
‘subaltern5 as “the demographic difference between the total Indian population55 and all those 
who could be described as the ‘elite5 (Singh 2002). Tracing the trajectory o f the subaltern 
studies project, Sarkar (1997) terms this gradual dilution o f the ideological and social basis o f 
the subaltern project as the ‘decline o f  the subaltern in subaltern studies5. The emergent binary 
between a nebulous ‘elite5 and the equally obfuscating ‘subaltern5 relegated the Marxist concept 
o f ‘class5 as the basis for constructing hierarchy o f social structures irrelevant even though the 
early subaltern studies group started from a class based critique o f  colonial structures that had a 
role in shaping the ambiguity o f consciousness o f rebel peasants for example in Guha5s work on 
‘peasant insurgency5 (Guha 1983). The ‘subaltern studies5 group took a peculiar trajectory 
starting with a selective application o f Gramsci as an alternative to their criticisms o f the 
inadequacy o f Leninism practiced in the trajectory o f the Indian Left led by the Communist 
Parties. A Gramscian perspective on ‘subaltern consciousness5 and the ‘organic intellectual5 
were presented as a binary to the ‘elite derivative consciousness5 and ‘hegemony5. History 
writing conceived as ‘history from below5 constituted a political project to underscore the ‘war 
o f position5 o f  the subaltern to establish ‘counter-hegemony5.
Since then, in just over a decade many o f the ‘subaltern5 practitioners crossed over to a 
postcolonial/post-modern trajectory informed by culture studies very much in keeping with 
similar trends in metropolitan academia. The postcolonial propositions like Chatterjee (1986) 
dwelled on the intricacies o f India5s modernity where modernity is conceived as either Western 
or non-western by default rather than as a process o f transition to capitalism. More importantly, 
the focus on modernity made the question o f capitalism almost redundant in the entire work. It 
started with a critique o f the ‘discourse5 o f  the earlier historiography in its ideological and 
political offensive that raised important issues about the nature o f ‘consciousness5 among ‘elite 
nationalists5. This was then dismissed because the epistemology of nationalist thought was 
traced to a framework o f knowledge whose representational structure corresponded to the very 
structure o f power it sought to repudiate - the colonial bearers o f the ideology o f  the
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Enlightenment (Chatterjee 1993). Thus rejection was based on the source o f knowledge and 
operated within a simple discursive binary o f the West and the Non-west without any 
assessment o f material context in which specific strands of nationalist thought became dominant 
through the colonial period in India.
One outcome o f this discursive, anti-materialist trajectory was that the theses on the 
‘subaltern peasant’ slowly became dissociated from land-relations (Singh 2002). The thesis on 
the nature o f political power in India became steeped in relativism and was argued to be 
fundamentally different from the ‘W est’, with a different political system and a different model 
o f power that yields multiple notions o f ‘hybridity’ (Bhabha 1990) and the articulation of 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ (Rajan 1993).
What is notable in the context o f our enquiry is the non-engagement o f either subaltern 
studies or the postmodern practitioners o f ‘specificity’ and ‘hybridity’ with the developments of 
the specific twists and turns o f capitalist expansion in ‘post-colonial’ India by the 
characterisation o f the dominant sections o f society as the ‘elite’, thus clubbing together the 
upper echelons o f society without any cogent analysis o f how different sections o f this ‘elite’ 
figure in the materiality o f a society based on systems o f accumulation and provision (Fine and 
Leopold 1993). Most importantly, the analysis o f the political economy o f  capital accumulation 
that underpins changes in power and social relations were completely abandoned. Huge 
amounts o f  writings on the ‘nation’ analysed narratives without any analysis o f the modalities of 
the ‘nation-state’, a phenomenon specific to capitalism (Wood 2003). Harriss (1999) locates the 
rise o f postmodernism in the great changes in capitalism in the course o f the previous half 
century and notes that in pursuing a theme o f social transformation, the adequacy o f pursuing 
derivatives o f Enlightenment thinking may have been inadequate. Specifically, for the purpose 
of this research, the twists and turns o f political developments in the consolidation o f political 
power by Indian capital in the higher echelons o f the Congress and the institutional apparatus 
that defined the contours o f economic policy like the National Planning Committee as shown by 
Chibber (2003) in the run up to Independence are crucial. This remained outside the purview of 
culturalist assessment o f ‘elite ascendancy’ and narratives o f ‘nationhood’ mainly pre-occupied 
with the making o f petty-bourgeois consciousness in 19th and early 20th century.
Moreover, some strands o f  postmodernism ended up creating an unfathomable ‘power 
language’ and rhetorical structures o f ambiguity that one critic termed ‘vaguology’ (Paranjape 
1998). This power language was inaccessible to most except for the initiated few within the 
inner circles o f this academic circuit. An example o f such work is Bhabha (1990). These 
developments in academia legitimised a decade o f political cynicism and attacks on secular and 
Marxist historiography. Taken in by the methodology o f this strand o f scholarship a large 
number o f a new generation o f academics embraced this praxis just when India’s social fabric 
was being torn apart by the ravages o f neoliberal transition reflected in persistent poverty, rising
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inequality, decelerating growth in employment, a rise in neo-fascist violence culminating in the 
genocide in Gujarat in 2002 and in debt-driven suicides by thousands o f farmers by 2004.
Post-modem scholars might have individually opposed the neo-fascism o f the Sangh 
Parivar and the ravages o f  the neoliberal transition. But the methodological approaches 
informed by postmodernism with attacks on ‘secular scholarship’ opened up the ideological 
space for the justification o f the ‘Hindutva’ brand of neo-fascism o f  the Sangh Parivar (Desai 
2004). The rewriting o f Indian history in understanding the impact o f ‘colonialism’, the fuzzing 
o f boundaries between myth and history and the denial o f a materialist basis o f  politics and 
historical development in India contributed to this. The attack on materialist writings on 
economy and society then diverted into premising other social categories over class. Rudolph 
and Rudolph (1998) is an early example o f such an attempt that posits the transition to 
neoliberalism in India in a postmodern framework using the Hindu goddess o f wealth 
‘Lakhshmi’ as a metaphor for the aspirations o f ‘all’ people and holding the ‘modernism’ and 
‘domination’ o f the state as the causal explanation for ‘economic performance’ since 
Independence. In its turn, the soft version o f Hindutva was not slow to appropriate and 
accommodate the ‘dalit’ politics o f ‘social justice’ into the fold o f neoliberal ‘reforms’ based on 
a combination o f post-modern theories o f ‘identity’ and ‘indigenity’ with a neoliberal economic 
paradigm. For an example o f such work, see Debroy and Shyam Babu (2004).
These trajectories o f academic preoccupation were not something specific to India. The 
denial o f a materialist analysis and o f social class as central objects o f study in mainstream 
political science in US academia had been evident since the 1950s and 1960s in the shaping of 
disciplinary imperatives at the height o f Cold War politics (Grendzier 1985). After the 
intellectual upheaval o f ‘dependency theory’ and the ‘structuralist school’, mainstream political 
science in the USA consistently rejected the idea that social classes should be objects o f study 
(Leys 1996). There was a huge intellectual investment during the Reagan period in a particular 
strand o f culture and area studies that took the lead in formulating ideas o f ‘hybridity’ and 
‘fragmented forms’ and ‘fluid identities’ rather than ‘structured social formations’ like race and 
class as the counter to different branches o f cultural relativism, essentialism and idealism that 
emanated as ‘new’ theory from the mainstream of US academia (Roediger 2006). These 
intellectual models ran a serious ‘risk that one’s subject would be deconstructed into fragments 
united only by the common experience o f an incommunicable identity crisis’ (Hobsbawm 1998: 
261). This risk stems from the emphasis on ‘cultural collisions, confrontations and dialogues of 
the deaf ’(Hobsbawm 1998: 257) and statements ‘devoid o f meaning’ (Hobsbawm 1998: 261) 
rising from the separation o f the ‘cultural’ from the ‘material’ in the recasting o f ‘social history’ 
and ‘studies o f society’ in a form where the ambiguity o f the ‘narrator’ and the ‘non-specificity’ 
o f ‘subject position’ were premised over earlier analytical narratives based on the material 
construction o f social relations that defined the structures o f society.
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The separation o f the material from the cultural meant that an important section o f the 
political and intellectual leadership o f the dominant ‘new left’ consensus within the social 
sciences increasingly lacked the intellectual tools to counter the growth o f political ideologies of 
neoliberalism as well as o f the extreme right forces. This sef-inflicted separation o f economics 
from politics and culture relegated the critique o f ‘neoliberalism’ to the sphere o f the economic. 
However the project o f neoliberalism has not just been about the creation and strengthening of 
markets. It is premised on changing production and consumption patterns. This is a process 
where secure property rights for a few come at the cost o f greater material insecurity in ordinary 
life for many others. Thus the materiality o f life in all its social forms are affected with a growth 
o f insecurity and inequality affecting large sections o f the population, the development o f new 
patterns o f aggressive consumerism, and new attempts at constructing ‘national’ identity that 
take the form o f a virulent jingoism in the mainstream media.
A parallel offensive was launched by neoclassical ‘experts’ in Indian economics to 
pronounce that the ‘public sector’, that is the state-owned enterprises, and ‘planning’ as an 
allocative tool were the ultimate culprits to be blamed for all that was perceived to be ‘wrong’ 
with the economy (Datta 1992; Bhagwati 1993; Ahluwalia and Little 1998; Krueger and Chinoy 
2002). The emergent neoliberal fundamentalism did have a political philosophy (Desai 2004) as 
it argued that the market was the ‘supreme medium for the expression o f individual choice’ 
(Hodgson quoted in Harriss-White 1996b: 21). The market is the only institution that is ‘fair and 
ju st’, a tenet that had to be indoctrinated through repetition. The philosophy o f methodological 
individualism is at the core o f neoliberal analysis and ideology. The individual’s aspirations for 
material benefits is beneficial because it blurs social privileges over time and also means that 
individuals matter, not social classes or other groups.
Thee two strands o f scholarship emanating out o f ‘postcolonial/postmodern culture 
studies’ and the root and branch ‘neoclassical economics’ on India emerged during the global 
context o f the Reagan-Thatcher era and addressed different disciplinary imperatives. We will 
address the economic analysis in detail in the next section.
The trajectories o f culturalist and neoclassical preoccupations since the 1980s had four 
things in common: first, the ideological obfuscation and denial o f  the relevance o f ‘class’ as a 
social category in the context o f the collapse o f the Soviet Union and Communism in Eastern 
Europe and the ‘market socialist’ developments in China after 1978; second, the claim that they 
were trying to develop ‘new ’ ways o f theorising that were untainted by the ‘flaws’ and ‘errors’ 
o f previous methodological and ideological approaches to disciplinarity and addressed 
complexities that the ‘old’ theories had failed to do; third, the invention o f  a ‘new’ rhetoric and 
jargon with claims o f  a new and more appropriate language and methodology suitable to 
specific ‘fields’; and fourth and most important, the analytical concern in focussing on state- 
society relationships and the assertion o f specific categories through which the problematic of 
such relationships should be addressed.
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There were differences in the way the last two took specific disciplinary forms. The 
debates in literature, history, anthropology, culture studies, politics, sociology, gender studies, 
women’s studies and area studies either premised other social categories like race, caste, gender, 
religion and ethnicity over class or argued for ‘amorphous’ forms o f social agency and identity 
that relegated class to a factor o f minor importance. Different strands focussed on separate 
aspects o f social relations in the definition o f ‘identity’ o f ‘s e lf  and o f  the ‘other’ and the 
‘relative’ relevance o f social categories o f differentiation.
This debate fed in minor ways into discussions on methodology in economics. A very 
similar critique on ‘methodology’ emerged from the margins o f neoclassicism on the rhetoric of 
economics (McCloskey 1983) highlighting the problems o f ‘rationalism’ and ‘positivism’. 
However, the mainstream o f the discipline paid scant attention to this complex debate 
concentrating on the separation o f the ‘economic’ from the ‘social’ and ‘political’ and operated 
within the frameworks o f  ‘homoeconomicus’, where the social was just an aggregate of 
‘individual economic agents’. According to Lazear (2000), it was the language o f economics 
that permitted economists to strip away complexity. According to Gans (2000), the peculiar 
incentive structures o f the North American academic community contributed to this process. 
Complexity in what Leijonhufvud (1973) described as ‘Life among the Econ’ did not pay in a 
world o f ‘publish or perish’. Sen (1999: 4) contends that simplification is important for any 
empirical discipline, but what is objectionable in economic theorising is the ‘particular 
simplification chosen’, which has the effect o f taking a very narrow view o f human feelings, 
ideas and action, thus impoverishing the scope and reach o f economic theory.
According to Hirschman (1981: 4), the rationale for this form o f ‘monoeconomics’ 
derived from two propositions. First is the assertion that, economics consists o f a number of 
simple yet ‘powerful’ theorems o f universal validity. This leads to the claim that there is only 
one economics and defines what Hirschman (1981) calls ‘monoeconomics’. Second, one of 
these theorems is that, in a market economy, benefits flow to all participants, be they individuals 
or countries, from all voluntary acts o f economic intercourse ( ‘or else they would not engage in 
those acts’). Since every body benefits from such economic intercourse, all societies are happy 
little islands o f equilibrium. Hirschman argues that a cosy internal consistency bent on 
oversimplifying reality made this economics attractive for ideology formations. Neoliberalism 
definitely derives its economic logic from this ‘monoeconomics’. The premises o f ideology 
formation, however, may have a dialectical relationship with the development o f disciplinary 
imperatives and wider political developments, a proposition that is addressed in the Indian 
context in this research.
1.3 The ‘Faulty Shell’: The Economics of Neoliberalism
During the hey day o f  Keynesianism and ‘structuralism’ in the post Second World War 
period, the ‘self-regulating market utopia’ (Polanyi 1957) o f Walrasian and neoclassical
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economics had come under scrutiny within neoclassicism. This was the period when the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis held sway, when the role o f  the state to reduce unemployment in 
advanced countries using fiscal policy and to accelerate industrialisation in developing countries 
by protecting domestic markets was widely accepted in economic theory (Martin 1991). 
During this period, neoclassical models o f the market began to ponder puzzles like ‘why do 
firms exist?’ in attempts to resolve the contradictions that non-market institutions were 
necessary in market economies (Coase 1937). These investigations led to the elaboration of a 
number o f concepts that assisted in the development o f a counterattack on intervention. The 
analysis o f ‘transaction costs’ was developed to explain why institutions like the firm existed 
(Coase 1960). This allowed neo-classical economics to begin to develop tools that could be used 
to challenge the efficiency o f  non-market institutions. The development o f the concept o f X- 
efficiency (Leibenstein 1966) deepened the argument for competition by showing that ‘technical 
efficiency’ was different from ‘allocative efficiency’. Even if  all the conditions for allocative 
efficiency did not exist, competition could reduce intra-organisational slack, and encourage 
innovation over time (Vickers 1995). The analysis o f rent-seeking and regulatory capture began 
to develop to explain why state intervention could be much worse than conventional 
neoclassical economics suspected (Stigler 1971). These concepts along with ‘asymmetrical 
information’ (Akerlof 1970) and its extensions into ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ 
(Arnott and Stiglitz 1988; Stiglitz 1990) formed the basis o f the supposedly brave new world of 
exploration by various strands o f neoclassical economics in the 1980s and 1990s into hitherto 
unchartered territory o f non-market institutions.
However, all o f these investigations were starkly different from the concerns o f an 
earlier generation o f economists like Joan Robinson whose critique o f Walrasian economics was 
very different. Their concern had not been that Walrasian markets were imperfect but that in the 
Walrasian market,
...there is no account of capital and capitalists. There are no capitalists who 
have invested finance in productive capacity with a view to employing labour and 
making profits. There is only a list o f quantities o f various kinds of available inputs 
(Robinson 1980:56).
This critique o f  the technoeconomic paradigm of the market model has recurred again 
and again in the writings o f a range o f academics and intellectuals, but ‘the triumph of 
capitalism’ with the collapse o f the ‘Second World’ made it easy for practitioners of 
neoclassicism to be on the offensive against other paradigms and never question their own 
(Yates 2003).
In these developments within the monoeconomics tradition, economic history became 
defined as the ‘performance o f economies through tim e’ (North 1994). New institutional 
economics added a number o f propositions to earlier versions o f  neoclassical theories o f growth 
from the 1960s onwards. New growth theory developed the idea that technology was 
endogenous and that ‘learning by doing’ was important (Arrow 1962; Frankel 1962; Romer
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1986, 1990) and that human capital investments were important for growth (Lucas 1988). 
Building on these insights, the new institutional economics argued that institutions and time 
matter in economics and that institutions form the ‘incentive structure’ o f a society that 
determines amongst other things, its growth performance over time. In consequence, political 
and economic institutions are the underlying determinants o f economic performance (North
1994).
In the dominant days o f Anglo-American Keynesianism, these debates were often on 
the political fringe o f academic journals. It was only with a radical shift in academic praxis after 
1973 following the rise o f ‘monetarism’ as the ambit o f state policy and the resurrection of the 
Hayekian concept o f a ‘minimalist state’ under the Reagan-Thatcher regimes that the ‘new’ 
economics started finding legitimacy (Datta 1992). The Hayekian theory from the Austrian 
school set the ‘entrepreneur’ at the centre o f the question o f economic agency deriving its 
competitition driven ‘equilibrium’ from knowledge and not capital accumulation (Kirzner
1997). The dissociation o f these debates from the process o f class formation and capital 
accumulation paved the way for isolating political economy based on a materialist conception of 
history from economics (Sawyer 1989). Instead, what Hirschman (1981) described as 
‘monoeconomics’ began to evade the analysis o f politics in the form o f ‘new political economy’ 
that combined the assumptions o f ‘homoeconomicus’ and ‘methodological individualism’ with 
cultural relativism, essentialism, idealism and reductionism.
Despite the growing diversity o f economic approaches within the dominant school, four 
assertions were shared by all o f them. First, that society is an aggregation o f individuals; two, 
individuals engage in maximising rational behaviour (even if  constrained by bounded 
rationality); three, this behaviour results in the creation and maintenance o f equilibrium (though 
equilibrium can often only be analysed at the microeconomic level); four, these behavioural 
premises imply that markets achieve (constrained) efficiency for all individuals and by 
aggregation for society. These four propositions reiterated in thousands o f economics textbooks 
published in the last quarter century defined the core principles o f ‘economics’ (Keen 2001). 
This not-so-subtle omission o f other approaches became defined as ‘the method o f economics’ 
in less than two decades.
Deep questions are unavoidable about approaches that see ‘growth’ as inter-temporal 
utility maximisation by individual economic agents designated in their roles as savers, investors 
and consumers rather than a complex outcome o f the interaction o f movement in ‘capital 
accumulation, labour force and technological progress’ (McFarlane 1989). The striking 
convergence in the different branches o f neoclassical economic theory and its particular 
applications in trade theory based on the ‘standard version’ o f the Hecksher-Ohlin models and 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the newer versions that factored in ‘increasing returns’ 
through trade in replicating the ‘new growth models’ informed the literature spawned by the 
World Bank arguing that ‘trade liberalisation’ was the best bet for growth for ‘developing
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countries’. This argument informed the influential work o f Dollar and Kray (2000). Ocampo 
and Taylor (2000) and Deraniyagala (2005) have demonstrated that this was based on ‘common 
sense’ and ‘faith’ irrespective o f historical evidence.
Based on this faith-based economics, country after country in the Third World was 
subject to policy packages and conditionalities in the form o f stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes as the short-run and long-run paths to ‘equilibrium’ and ‘stability’ 
abandoning Keynes’ dictum that ‘in the long run we are all dead’. In the binary construction of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ institutions, the state was established as the ‘bad’ and the market as the ‘good’. 
It became wholly inadmissible in the mainstream o f the discipline to discuss the complex 
relations between growth and the dynamics and evolution o f the social order (Baran 1970).
However, the debate on the role o f the state was partially re-instated once the 
modalities o f the East Asian ‘miracle’ could no longer be denied and a literature emerged 
demonstrating the critical role o f state intervention in the ‘miracle’ o f growth in East Asia 
(Amsden 1989, 2001; Wade 1990, 1994; Chang 1994, 2002) at least till the financial crisis of 
1996. This literature from a statist perspective re-instated the state as an important actor in the 
economy and the ‘state versus market’ debate got a new lease o f life just when the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ on neoliberalism seemed to have prevailed.
Economics as a discipline began to recognise that ‘history matters’ but subtly replaced 
complexities o f history to ‘path-dependency’ with ‘multiple equilibria’ (David 2000) and 
reduced the specificity o f different modalities o f exploitation o f labour in a capitalist system to 
‘human capital’ drawing on Becker (1964). This reduction o f history into what Hobsbawm 
called ‘retrospective econometrics’ once again ‘deliberately narrowed the ‘new’ economic 
history’s field o f vision to fit the highly restrictive nature of the ‘cliometric’ models (Hobsbawm
1998). Harriss (2001) and Fine (2001) have demonstrated the depoliticisation o f the debate on 
politics o f development and social theory respectively with Putnam’s depoliticised versions of 
‘social capital’.
A further set o f arguments focussed on ‘corruption’ and ‘democracy’ to establish the 
importance o f markets and the dangers o f state power. A series o f papers established the 
negative association between ‘corruption’ and investment as well as growth (Mauro 1995) 
refuting Huntington’s 1968 argument that corruption could be expected in countries 
experiencing rapid economic growth. Bardhan (1997) formulated a new political economy 
justification for ‘getting rid o f  dysfunctional regulation’ by the state based on an evaluation of 
‘public institutions’ as the source o f corruption. This was in keeping with his earlier work that 
traced the ‘bureaucracy’ as a separate ‘ruling class’ and the source o f the ‘political evils’ related 
to the ‘control’ regime in India (Bardhan 1990). Similar accounts came from Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) in their analysis o f corruption that attributed economic problems to the political 
evils o f public enterprise.
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Khan (1996) demonstrates that these new political economy evaluations were often based 
on a ‘typology o f corruption’ that comprised a series o f homogenising assumptions about the 
source and nature o f corruption that one can argue are once again in keeping with the 
fundamental precepts o f ‘monoeconomics’. Harriss-White (1996a) in her discussion o f the 
theoretical treatment o f corruption points out that in the ‘new political economy’ literature, 
‘bureaucrats’ who control public sector goods take centre stage. Corrupt behaviour involves the 
creation o f new private property rights over such goods. The solution in neoliberal treatments 
emerges as deregulation and privatisation that is claimed to have the power to destroy the 
preconditions for corruption.
In spite o f  a range o f literature that pointed out the theoretical fallacy o f  such propositions 
(Khan 2000; Harris-White 1996a), and provided evidence o f the ‘process o f accumulation 
through market exchange’ and ‘political power’ being closely associated with the specific nature 
o f corruption, the new political economy propositions slowly found their way in to the post- 
Washington consensus on ‘good governance’. A series o f assertions were dressed up in 
economic jargon and sophisticated modelling, adding a false veneer o f ‘high technicality’ and 
expertise to a flawed intellectual paradigm with ‘lack o f historical warrant’ (Byres 1998).
The World Bank now had a new set o f tool kits that widened the scope o f its programmes 
and directives based on the ‘good governance’ agenda. In the World Development Report o f 
1997 published by the World Bank, the debate on the role o f the state found a key focus and the 
focus was now on building ‘effective states’ built on the logic o f  the market. The clarion call 
after the East Asian crisis was towards ‘matching the state’s role to its capability’ (World Bank 
1997: 3) and to ‘raise state capability by reinvigorating public institutions'1 (Word Bank 1997: 
original emphasis). The analysis o f this ‘capability enhancing strategy’ was elaborated:
...This means designing effective rules and restraints, to check arbitrary state 
actions and combat entrenched corruption. It means subjecting state institutions to greater 
competition, to increase their efficiency. It means increasing the performance o f state 
institutions, improving pay and incentives. And it means making the state more 
responsive to people’s needs, bringing government closer to the people through broader 
participation and decentralization... (World Bank 1997: 3)
The report advocated focussing on fundamental tasks through ‘partnerships with the 
business community’ and ‘civil society’. The first job for all states was to get the 
‘fundamentals’ right. The fundamentals were laid out clearly: establishing a foundation o f law, 
maintaining a ‘nondistortionary’ policy environment including macroeconomic stability, 
investing in basic social services and infrastructure, protecting the vulnerable and protecting the 
environment. The way to do this was formulated in terms o f a toolkit: harnessing the power o f 
public opinion, making regulations more flexible, applying self-regulatory mechanisms and 
choosing effective market-based instruments. Thus ‘monoeconomics’ prevailed in the
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assumptions that the ‘free market’ is the virtuous path towards the eradication o f corruption, 
rent seeking and other political evils that are the prerogative o f ‘state’ functionaries.
The ‘good governance’ agenda o f  the post-Washington Consensus was the new 
marching song for international financial institutions along with a greater ‘surveillance’ role 
assigned to the International Monetary Fund (Griffith-Jones 1998) after the East Asian crisis. 
New political economy approaches informed by the wisdom o f  the ‘good governance’ agenda 
spelt out ways in which the market mechanism could introduce transparency, reduce corruption 
and bring about a fairy-tale ending to all the ‘problems’ o f ‘developing countries’ (World Bank 
1989, 1996). However, China and India seem to have grown defying the good governance 
agenda. In India, the expansion o f capital underlying India’s growth was not only dependent on 
the state, but capital accumulation also combined state support and mechanisms o f  the market in 
profiteering, racketeering and the flouting o f every possible legal norm. Establishing the 
legal/formal and illegal/informal mechanisms through which capital accumulation was 
organised in India during its transition to more open markets is one o f the central objectives o f 
this thesis.
1.4The Context of Neoclassical Rationale in India
In the late 1990s when the ‘good governance agenda’ was being fostered by the 
Bretton-Woods institutions, every other columnist worth a by-line with a few political 
exceptions were emerging as ‘expert commentators’ on contemporary political economy in 
India based on rudimentary and cavalier neoclassical commentary that dressed itself up as 
‘sound economics’. This is important as these commentators greatly advanced the cause of 
neoliberalism through the English language media and played an important political role in 
justifying neoliberal policies o f the state. One example is Gurcharan Das, a columnist in the 
mainstream media. This example is particularly relevant as his convergence with Nandy’s 
cuturalist views on Indian society is acknowledged and cited in his column in Outlook April 12, 
2004. In his article in Foreign Affairs (2006), on the current growth o f the Indian economy, he 
argues that
...w hat is most remarkable is that rather than rising with the help o f the state, 
India is in many ways rising despite the state. The entrepreneur is clearly at the center 
o f India's success story. (Das 2006)
This is an example o f a ‘new political economy’ rendering o f the post-independence 
‘role o f the state’in India, encapsulated earlier in some analyses o f planning (Srinivasan and 
Narayana 1994). The public sector is presented here as an ahistorical monolithic monstrosity 
that impeded and strangled Indian ‘entrepreneurship’ and 'developm ent'. These accounts are 
based on denials o f connections and relationships with the state in the spawning o f ‘successful 
entrepreneurships’ in the so-called market-led process o f development. There is an obvious
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reluctance to use the c-word capital, its social agency namely capitalists, and its system of 
social relations, namely capitalism, in these popular conventional accounts. In much o f the 
propaganda upholding neoliberal prescriptions for the Indian economy, there are no capitalists 
or even aspiring proto-capitalists, only ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘markets’ in India. Thus the 
problematic for neoliberal columnists like Das (2006) cited above is then the technical task of 
finding ways to create more efficient markets based on the ‘animal spirits o f entrepreneurs’.
Yet this neoclassical perspective 011 India’s state has been questioned by renowned 
economists like Sukhamoy Chakravarty (1987, 1994), and Vaidyanathan (1994). Nevertheless, 
many more experts saw the solution o f India’s ‘problems’ in the ‘full blooded operation of 
markets’ (Byres 1998:37) and privatisation o f  the ‘public sector’. This increasingly found a 
guarded resonance in the high-ranking functionaries within the establishments o f the state, 
reflected in publications since the late 1980s by the state (Economic Survey 1986, 1991). The 
neoliberal interpretation o f India’s woes was also adopted by spokespersons o f organised Indian 
capital. The Federation o f Indian Chambers o f Commerce and Industry (FICCI) gave a cautious 
welcome to the move towards privatisation and internal deregulation in its annual session in 
September 1991 (FICCI 1991), but openly advocated aligning with a regional trade bloc in 
anticipation o f the developments around the Uruguay round and the disadvantages envisaged 
with the formation o f the World Trade Organisation (FICCI 1990; FICCI 1991).
The most interesting convergence o f views between business (FICCI 1959, 1972, 1991,
2000) and neoliberal economists (Deb Roy and Bhandari 2005) emerges in the context o f labour 
laws where the literature considers India’s labour laws in guaranteeing ‘employment security’ as 
the single-most important impediment to ‘investment’. This argument comes in a context where 
only 7 to 8 percent o f the work force comes under the ambit o f such laws (Unni 1999) and 
factory closures and shifts o f capital in the wake o f ‘economic reform ’ has informalised a vast 
segment o f even this small percentage o f organised labour in the formal sector (Unni 1999; 
Breman 2001). In addition, ‘business houses’ in the ‘formal’ sector have evolved a multitude of 
ways o f evading such laws (Unni 1999).
The neoliberal interpretation o f Indian history is that the pattern o f growth and 
structural change in India from the Nehru-Mahalanobis period was characterised by 
‘inefficiencies’ and ‘sub-optimal outcomes’ because o f government created ‘distortions’ in the 
market through the policies o f  import substitution and regulatory licensing and control. These 
views are often at odds with their own neoclassical premises, which recognise market failures, 
but the sheer political force o f  such marketism has spawned a series o f publications articulating 
Fund-Bank views o f Indian economic history (Joshi and Little 1994; Lucas and Papanek 1998; 
Ahluwalia and Little 1998). Neoliberal interpretations that have emerged dominant on the 
nature and pattern o f  growth in the Indian economy are best articulated in the writings of 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1993, 1998; Bhagwati and Desai 1970) and Anne Kreuger (1974; 2002) who
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advance a neoclassical perspective on the Indian state’s role before the adoption o f the 
neoliberal consensus.
Although India’s monetary and fiscal policies were relatively conservative 
contrasted with those in a number o f developing countries, upward shift in demand for 
imports arose from the plan pattern o f expenditures and a rate o f inflation higher than 
the rest o f the world...overvaluation and ISI protection both from tariffs and from the 
unavailability o f  import license discouraged export production and exporting. “Export 
pessimism” ... became a self-fulfilling prophecy (Kreuger and Chinoy 2002: 13).
According to Bhagwati (1993), the trend rate of aggregate growth right from 
independence is explained not by a Harrod-Domar style poor savings performance but by poor 
productivity performance. Based on calculations o f aggregate growth rates, he argues that this 
poor productivity performance is linked to the
...(H arrod Domar) model o f economic analysis that was used to think about 
development and was essentially focussed on two parameters: the rate o f investment 
and the productivity o f capital. But for policy purposes, the latter was largely treated as 
‘given’ and the policy question therefore centred on raising the rate o f investment... 
(Bhagwati 1993:10).
Bhagwati further argues that this mainstream approach coincided with the Marxist focus 
on ‘primitive accumulation’ as the mainspring o f industrialisation and also with the quasi- 
Marxist models o f  the investment-allocation literature, a reference to the debate that grew 
around Maurice Dobb’s contributions and the mode o f production debate in India (Thorner 
1982; Patnaik 1990). According to Bhagwati, the productivity question in the literature is 
associated with the failure o f import substituting industrialisation combined with a mixed 
economy planning strategy that created a stifling system o f bureaucratic controls, inward 
looking trade and investment policies and a large, unjustified and inefficient public sector. For 
Bhagwati, the framework o f economic policy was defined by
...the iron fist o f controls over the private sector, the spreading stain of 
inefficient public enterprises and an inward looking trade and investment policy 
(Bhagwati 1993: 17).
Thus, according to this argument, the mixed economy basis o f planning strategy was 
itself responsible for low productivity. This is an extension o f  the simple neoclassical 
dichotomy between politics and economics and argues that the pushes and pulls o f the political 
demands on the state due to India’s democratic framework weakened it significantly and 
deserving winners turned out to be losers because ‘fools were being protected from their own 
follies’ (Bhagwati 1993: 17) by the policy framework o f the state. The neoliberal literature of 
pessimism around ISI, encapsulated in the work o f Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1993) has 
often tried to establish that growth rates in India were dismal and this performance was due to 
inefficient use o f resources accounted for by X-inefficiency. The source o f  this X-efficiency is 
attributed to state policy o f  inward orientation that led to poor productivity (Bhagwati 1993).
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However, Khan (2000 and 2002) has demonstrated that an outward oriented policy based on 
export-led industrialisation yielded exactly the same situation in terms o f  poor productivity 
trends in Pakistan. Thus poor productivity growth was not a necessary result o f the so-called 
inward policies as argued by Bhagwati. Neither import-oriented policies, nor export-led 
stategies necessarily produce growth. A more plausible explanation emerges in the analysis o f 
the Indian state’s inability to discipline the capitalist class in ways that could address the 
productivity question because o f the political powers o f the class to resist or subvert any such 
measures (Chenoy 1985; Khan 2001; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). Bhagwati in his writings 
has always concentrated on ‘state failure’. Three contributions (Bhagwati 1982, 2000; Bhagwati 
et.al 1984) are aimed at addressing the other spectre that haunts neoclassical dreams o f fostering 
pristine market in ‘emerging economies’. This spectre o f ‘crony capitalism’ is seen as the source 
o f ‘directly unproductive profit seeking activities’. Bhagwati (2000) has argued vociferously for 
a capitalism that is not rent seeking, but is instead profit enhancing. In reality, profits and many 
types of rents are closely intertwined and are impossible to differentiate. Rent seeking and profit 
seeking have been intractably intertwined over the entire history o f capitalist development and 
one o f the functions o f  so-called developmental states has been to create and manage rents to 
accelerate capitalist development (Khan 2002).
The ahistorical neoliberal arguments have also been effectively contested by a range of 
critics who have pointed out the inherent irrelevance o f the ‘allocative efficiency’ hypothesis to 
provide an informed account o f growth performance or lack o f it. More specifically, these 
arguments are shown to be inappropriate for accounting for India’s growth performance in the 
two decades from 1970 to 1990, before the full thrust o f liberalisation was implemented. Yet 
these two decades created the foundation for the full-scale implementation o f IMF/World Bank 
style stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes in 1991, and in any case economic 
growth in India accelerated a decade before that in the 1980s (Chakravarty 1987, Patnaik 1994, 
Nayyar 1996, Rodrik and Subramanian 2004).
Theoretical weaknesses in critical parts o f the neoliberal case are also well known. For 
instance, the X-efficiency hypothesis borrowed by Bhagwati from Leibenstein (1966) 
establishes a case not only for competition but also for effective monitoring and control o f 
managers by shareholders and regulators (Bowles and Gintis 1993). The state that is required to 
enable and manage such a ‘monitoring’ and ‘control’ regime, is closer to a Weberian notion of 
power and state structure identified in the developmental state literature rather than Bhagwati’s 
vision o f a neoliberal ‘minimalist state’. Yet the utopian discussion o f a minimalist state by a 
growing number o f neoclassical economists completed the convergence between the 
neoclassical and the Austrian school on the structural requisites for a competitive capitalism 
(Sawyer 1989). Bhagwati’s prescriptions o f deregulation to ‘free the economy’ are an example 
o f these developments within neoclassical economics, based more on articles o f faith rather than
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any compelling evidence on the social dynamics o f growth, investment and accumulation in 
India.
Bhagwati had him self argued in 1969 that democracy was a disadvantage for 
accumulation as totalitarian countries could extract savings that democracies could not 
(Bhagwati 1969). Kohli (1986) called this the ‘cruel choice thesis’. By Bhagwati’s own 
admission democracy did not look so bad in India by the 1970s. But by the mid 1970s, when 
India’s democratic framework had reached its weakest point through the centralisation o f state 
power and the period o f the emergency, the main preoccupation o f both state policy and the 
policy concerns o f the organised platforms o f the capitalist class was not concern about the 
savings rate or even to increase productivity, but reforms in the market for capital and 
curtailment o f ‘labour militancy’ (FICCI 1972; Lok Sabha 1972; Lok Sabhal975). This period 
was characterised by regional disparities in investment and the social dimensions o f the 
accumulation process became associated with distinct regional characteristics. The period 
between 1965-66 when the contradictions o f the ‘state-led capitalist path’ came to a head and 
the decisive turn towards a ‘neoliberal’ strategy from the 1980s was characterised by the social 
dimensions o f an accumulation process that involved both continuities and changes in the ‘sites’ 
o f primary accumulation o f capital. An important task o f this thesis is to map these continuities 
and changes in the relationship between state and capital. This, we argue, provides a more 
convincing explanation o f what really changed in the 1980s and beyond rather than 
ideologically loaded explanations which focus on liberalisation and state withdrawal that in 
general terms simply did not happen.
Despite its empirical and historical weakness, the dominance of neoclassical 
explanations o f India’s liberalisation is part of a broader movement where neoclassical 
arguments have won out because they serve the interests o f powerful groups. The neoclassical 
paradigm, in spite o f its positivist claims, is based on a very limited range o f ‘normative’ 
arguments. The dichotomy between politics and economics is one o f these fundamental 
nonnative precepts. Institutions can either be ‘political’ or ‘economic’ with ‘political 
institutions’ characterised as ‘inefficient and corrupt’. Tabb (1997) argues that the self- 
confidence with which market ideologists attack any sense o f public space, and o f solidaristic 
provision o f services, represents a measure o f  the defeat o f broad social groups who would 
benefit from such provision. Thus the argument o f the good governance agenda that fiscal 
devolution is a way o f ‘democratisation’ is fundamentally ideological. These processes are the 
result o f victories o f capital over labour, and the resulting damage to the rights o f citizenship 
involves clear winners and losers (Tabb 1997).
However from a neoliberal point o f view as evident in Srinivasan (1985), the dichotomy 
o f politics and economics is extended to the dichotomy between state and market. So markets, 
being ‘economic’ institutions are efficient and transparent, the state being a ‘political’ institution 
is inefficient and corrupt. Planning, inward orientation, profligacy o f  state expenditure and
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inflation inducing policies were the ‘political evils’ in India that needed to be corrected by 
‘economic reforms’ based on fiscal cuts, reduction o f public investment and extensive 
deregulation. (Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1982). Given the essentially ideological nature o f the 
neoclassical arguments, its limited tool-kit was an advantage since constant repetition could 
replace ‘realism’ with ‘rhetoric’ (Toporowski 2007).
These blinkers in the neoclassical methodology explain why this ‘economics’ failed to 
address a wide range o f diverse methods o f accumulation and investment processes in the 
private sector that were dependent on the policy structures o f the public sphere with significant 
outcomes for productivity and growth in India. Neither can it properly analyse the relationship 
between state and capital that was not necessarily adverse or in conflict during the run-up to 
independence and the following two and a half decades. Indeed, this relationship continues to 
this day. One o f  our central arguments is that liberalisation has to be seen as a change in some 
aspects o f the state-capital relationship, not as a victory o f the market over the state.
Accounts very similar to the neoclassical ones also emanated from an influential 
section o f economists mainly based in or trained in the USA or in premier institutions in India 
(Shastri 1997) practicing ‘new political economy’ (Srinivasan 1985; Ahluwalia 2002) or its 
slightly modified counterpart ‘new institutional economics’. These views were also popularised 
by neoliberal corporate ‘gurus’ turned media pundits (such as Das 2000), and functionaries o f 
the Indian state who were also office-holders in international financial institutions like the 
Bretton Woods institutions. The social and political ties and influence o f these economists in 
policy-making circles became suddenly visible from the 1980s.
Once again, this was not a phenomenon specific to India. The rise o f  economists as 
‘professional policy-makers’ in the highest echelons o f power has been noted in the economic 
literature as part o f the process o f an ‘emerging transnational political culture in which 
economists occupy a sacerdotal role’ (M arkoff and Montecinos 1993: 37). While assessing the 
modalities o f the Narasmiha Rao government’s hard-selling o f the IMF/World Bank-prescribed 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programme adopted in July 1991, the editors of 
Economic and Political Weekly commented in December 1991:
It would appear that even as there have been changes o f government in New 
Delhi, a group o f policy-makers has grown progressively more powerful, so much so that 
today it feels justified in taking support for its chosen economic policies for granted 
(Editorial, Economic and Political Weekly, December 21 1991: 2907).
The political enthusiasm around the structural adjustment programme in 1991 was based 
on the contention that ‘market-friendly’ reforms and “liberalisation” would be the panacea for 
all ills in India provided the vast mass o f people were prepared to ‘tighten their belts’ for a short 
time. This was exactly what Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao was to call for from the 
ramparts o f the Red Fort on Independence Day to introduce India to reform in 1991. This 
assumed that sufficient ‘openness’, cuts in fiscal expenditures and deregulation would lead to 
higher productivity growth. The labour market could be left to just grow on its own and the poor
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could be ‘pulled up’ through outward oriented policies rather than the ‘trickle down5 process 
advocated earlier under the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy (Bhagwati 1993). This echoed the 
arguments o f Dollar and Kray (2000) that neoliberal growth processes were good for the poor, 
based on doubtful evidence that actually shows at best that neoliberal growth processes do not 
have wore adverse effects on the poor compared to the other deciles or quintiles o f income 
classes in any society (W eisbrot et al 2001).
Aliy adverse effect on the poor were purely short term, and as there was no 
alternative path o f growth, there was no alternative but to follow the route. The ‘there is 
no alternative’ argument rapidly found its proponents amongst rapacious free- 
marketeers, prematurely aged philosophers o f the ‘Third Way’, delusional economists, 
opportunistic politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, bankrupt journalists and other desperados. 
They claim that human beings are genetically programmed to be greedy, that capitalism 
is the law of nature, that transnational capital is usually right, and that non-intrusive 
regulation is possible when it goes wrong. They argue that capitalist societies, even 
though historically recent, will last forever, and that the triumph o f the market should be 
embraced because it is both unavoidable and advantageous to all. They reassure us that 
massive improvements in living standards are just around the comer, and that only a 
little bit more belt-tightening will suffice (Saad-Filho 2003: 3, emphasis added).
A decade later, another Prime Minister who was often described as a visionary and a 
scholar ascribed the high levels o f underemployment in India to a combination of technological 
change and population explosion. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s address to the Nation, 26th January 
2002 was a classic combination o f Malthusian and neo-liberal logic. At best, it was a very weak 
explanation o f recent trends in employment and unemployment. Nevertheless, the poor 
performance o f employment meant that attention was being directed by the policy-makers to the 
issue o f employment.
A document published by the Federation of Indian Chambers O f Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI) in 2002 noted that the unemployment situation in India is a cause for concern because 
the decline in the rate o f growth o f employment in the 1990s was accompanied by a higher 
growth rate in GDP — a sign o f falling labour intensity in production (FICCI 2002). It noted that 
employment elasticity o f  output had fallen from 0.52 in the period between 1983 and 1993-94 to 
0.16 in the period between 1993-94 and 1999-00. In the words o f the author o f the document, 
despite the growth in GDP and a move towards truly
India Inc global...w e have a dangerous element in the belly o f this optimistic 
scenario -  the hydra heads o f unemployment (FICCI 2002: 5 emphasis added).
The failure to generate adequate employment and improving aggregate productivity of 
labour in the Indian economy rather than just in a few chosen sectors like heavy manufacturing 
in the pre-reform era and software, food-processing etc in the post-reform period has been the 
most obvious symptom o f the lacuna in Indian economic development (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2002). Economic policy discussion in India had relegated employment generation to a 
subsidiary position since 1991. The emphasis was on ‘efficiency’ as the primary aim of 
government economic policy in 1991. By 2004, the debate had transformed to contend that in
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India ‘liberalisation5 needs a ‘human face5 and should be accompanied by greater concern for 
the plight o f the ‘masses5 (Economic Survey 2004-05).
This shift came with the reversals in political fortunes for both the Congress and the BJP 
in the period o f the neoliberal transition and the imperatives to maintain coalition governments 
where ‘election works merely as the ‘first round5 o f the contest, while the final outcome is 
determined by the full play o f market forces in the second and subsequent rounds5 (Dasgupta 
2002: 19) and where the buying and selling of factions is limited only by the arithmetic of the 
anti-defection law in the absence o f an absolute electoral majority (Dasgupta 2002).
1.5 Mainstream Approaches to the Analysis o f the ‘State in India ’
At the theoretical level o f  academic discourse on the role o f the state, a distinction can be 
made between the hard-line neo-liberal market-fanaticism and a soft-line version, presented by 
the proponents o f ‘liberalisation with a human face5. In the hard-line view, the ideal form o f 
state in all societies derives from a Hayekian vision o f a society based on ‘spontaneous order’ o f 
the market based on individualism. The ideal form o f the state is therefore a minimalist state 
(Hayek 1980). All forms o f state that deviate from this ideal create and protect vested interests, 
spread inefficiency and distortion, prevent markets from working properly, generate rent- 
seeking rather than productive activity, deny the transforming role of outward looking export 
growth, and so on (Byres 1997).
So the Indian state was no exception as a ‘bad’, as it misallocated resources and sought 
rent through complex government controls. This led to low growth, technological backwardness 
and the persistence o f  poverty (Bhagwati 1998). The hardliners argued that freeing the economy 
from state controls and regulations would lead to a massive unleashing o f entrepreneurial 
animal spirits, which would in turn generate high investment rates (Joshi and Little 1994) and 
sufficient ‘openness’ would lead to poverty alleviation (Tendulkar 1998) as long as a Hayekian 
spontaneous order o f the market was supplemented by a minimalist state.
The soft-liners argued for more markets in some areas and more beyond the market 
measures in other areas. They pointed out the adverse social dimensions o f neoliberal policies 
on different sections o f people and argued for limits to be imposed on the process and for a 
greater role o f the state as an investor in education, health, women, etc, thus fulfilling its role as 
the creator o f ‘social and human capital’ (Singh 1993). Some o f the soft-liners argue for 
selective intervention assuming that the state is autonomous, benevolent and progressive and 
state activity can address market failures. This has been observed by Sawyer (1989). Byres 
(1998) demonstrates that there is also an idea that redistribution rather than accumulation is the 
basis o f capitalist growth processes. In this tradition, recently, certain economists have started 
propagating an idea o f ‘community-based-neo- industrialisation5 in a study o f  industrial clusters 
where community is defined as a ‘group o f people who are connected to one another through 
multiple and durable relationships that would each be costly to dispense w ith5 (Banerjee 2005).
40
The inequities o f underlying property rights remain unaddressed in such abstract definitions of 
‘community’. There is also a subtle convergence o f idealistic notions about the ‘community’ in 
economics and culture studies. The soft views also suffer from similar ‘ideal’ notions o f the 
state in their assumptions o f autonomy and benevolence. They assume that the state is neutral 
and state functionaries are prepared to act upon their own judgements for the public good (see 
Byres 1997 for a full critique).
Parallel to the abstract state, we have notions o f an amorphous ‘elite’ that can play a 
damaging role in market economies. The abstract elites were constructed in subaltern and 
postcolonial studies and have now been picked up by ‘new institutional economists’ in the 
literature on neoliberalism. Rajan and Zingales (2003) address the importance o f institutions to 
development and assess obstacles to economic participation and poverty reduction. A major 
argument in their research is that established ‘elites’ work to stifle competition by preventing 
new entry by lobbying politicians to formulate rules serving their limited, private interest. They 
describe how ‘elites’ have come to dominate some economies and governments and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) provide examples from several regions and sectors in India. They also elaborate 
how historical power structures developed in various regions o f  the country and how 
hierarchical structures, controlled by ‘elites’, tended to have a negative effect on institutions 
and, over the long term, exacerbated ‘poor economic conditions’. They note that the resentment 
against capitalism stems from the form o f “monopoly capitalism” in which only a few people 
have access to the benefits o f capitalism. This seemingly radical argument is then followed up 
with a call to ‘save capitalism’ and ensure that its benefit reaches the ‘people’ by means of 
enforcing a decentralised market. Capitalism is thus defined as a system o f free-markets. This 
defines tasks for the state that converge with the ‘good governance’ agenda o f  the Bretton- 
Woods institutions.
Most o f  the neo-liberal literature cited above is completely ahistorical -  both in terms of 
analysis and chronology. The neoclassical approach in Forbes’ (2002) analysis o f ‘doing 
business in India’ is largely a dates and events approach to history. This is in keeping with the 
dominant reading o f ‘history’ in economics as a series o f ‘path dependencies’ (David 2000), 
which embodies a static correlation o f social relations with time.
The use o f  undifferentiated social categories often leads to very misleading conclusions. 
One conclusion is that as the role o f the state is in the realm o f the political and so it 
automatically needs to be dissociated from the economic, if  efficiency is to be ensured. So the 
neo-liberal academics who also hold important position as policy makers and advisors both in 
the offices o f the Indian state and the international financial institutions are burdened with the 
twin task o f creating the elusive efficient market that according to them India does not have and 
also dissociating the state from the process o f creating markets. The assumption is either that the 
state is free and completely autonomous or that the state is neutral just as the market is and
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defends the interests o f all. This is the proposition that Lenin described as a ‘bourgeois lie' 
(Lenin 1972).
Interestingly, a final strand o f literature stresses that the minimal state has been 
structurally created by globalisation and for neoliberals, the implication is that we do not need 
to worry too much about how to achieve it. One o f the most important results o f ‘globalisation’ 
has been the expansion o f the operations o f multi-national corporations in terms o f global reach 
and power. This diffused power o f capital is making the nation state increasingly irrelevant. 
Some analysts have gone so far as to argue that the power o f trans and multi-nationals has 
proved that the nation-state is already irrelevant (Hardt and Negri 2000). This literature in its 
theorisation o f the state takes the neoliberal thesis further. Neoliberal theorists are still arguing 
for the ideal minimal state, but for this new strand o f literature, nation states exist only in name 
or are the figments o f an imagination trapped in a bygone era.
The limits o f  such readings o f the state are further explored in the first section of 
Chapter Two based on a critique o f both ‘globalisation’ and the role o f  the state.
1.6 The Premises of Resistance to Neoliberalism
A wide-ranging political resistance to neo-liberalism has also gathered strength in the last 
two decades. The mobilisations against neoliberalism have spanned social categories and 
nation-states. In India, there have been different forms of political mobilisations to fight and 
resist privatisation, retrenchment, casualisation, displacement, the destruction o f livelihoods and 
the environment in the specific contexts o f neoliberal attacks on life and livelihood. The 
organised Left in India in the past decade saw a broad recognition evolve on the nature, modus 
and danger posed by communalism in its most vicious form o f Hindutva or cultural 
nationalism. The same period was marked by resistance of the Left to the heightened impact on 
Indian society o f  the state's surrender to neoliberalism. However, the links between the two have 
not really been a part o f public debate and have often been blurred by ‘culturalist’ readings of 
both phenomena by a section o f the academia with a few notable exceptions from a heterodox 
and predominantly Marxist perspective like Mohanty (2002), Desai (2004) and Bagchi (2002). 
Like fascism in the 1930s, Hindutva is part o f  a wider international resurgence o f right wing 
forces since the 1980s. Though varied in form and intensity, in their development in the last two 
decades, they manifest broad similarities in social basis, political imperative, strategy and 
tactics. In the last two decades again, the coming together o f the Christian fundamentalist right 
with the Zionist lobby in the USA is a potent example. The same period saw the strengthening 
o f Likud in Israel, o f Hyder in Austria, the revival o f neo-Nazism in Germany and Britain, the 
rise o f Berlusconi in Italy, the Danish People's Party in Denmark, Le Pen's National Front in 
France and the rise o f  the xenophobic right in Australia.
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What these forces have in common is a commitment to the ‘market’, just as much as the 
fascism o f the 1930s, professed a commitment to the ‘state’ as the central institution for the 
reorganisation of society and the accumulation processJVlussolini (1935) stressed the 
importance o f the state and accepted the role o f  the individual only in so far as his or her 
interests coincided with those o f the state. He argued that the state stands for the conscience 
and the universal will o f man as a historic entity. As opposed to classical liberalism, which 
denied the State in the name of the individual, fascism reasserted the state as the supreme 
organisation (Mussolini 1935),_It is argued to  stand for a princip le  w hich becom es the 
central m otive o f  man as a m em ber o f civilized society, sinking deep down into his 
personality ; it is supposed to dwell in the  heart o f  the man o f  action and o f  the thinker, 
o f the artist and o f  the man o f  science (Ibid). B aker (2006) points out that fascist 
policies o f  the 1930s m anifested  a radical extension o f governm ent control over the 
econom y w ithout w holesale expropriation o f  the m eans o f  production. Fascist 
governm ents nationalised  som e key industries, m anaged their currencies and m ade large 
scale state investm ents. They also introduced price contro ls, w age controls and 
instituted state-regulated  allocation o f  resources, especially  in the financial and raw  
m aterials sector.
In contrast, the entire gam ut o f  econom ic policies in Italy espoused by the 
Berlusconi governm ent w ere aim ed to speed up privatisation , fac ilita te  tax  cuts for 
corporate houses, d ism antle the state pension system  and ensuring labour m arket 
flexib ility . This was coupled with a com m itm ent to European protectionism  against 
com petition  from  developing countries, passing harsh anti-im m igration  legislation and 
jo in ing  the U S-led ‘coalition  o f  the w illing5 to send troops to Iraq (B londel and Segatti 
2003). It was another m atter that none o f  these policies could be pushed through to their 
fru ition  because o f  po litical resistance that finally led to the  fall o f  the governm ent, 
K itschelt and M cgaan’s (1996) in-depth analysis, based on the tra jec to ries o f  the neo- 
fascist parties in A ustria, D enm ark, France, Germ ay, Italy, N orw ay and B ritain reveals 
that these forces couple a fierce com m itm ent to free m arkets w ith au thoritarian  racist 
m essages.
In India, the B JP ’s V ision D ocum ent released on M arch 31, 2004 advocated: ‘in 
the econom ic sphere, the governm ent should progressively  w ithdraw  from involvem ent 
in non-priority  sectors. It should create m ore avenues for en trep ren eu rsh ip ...it should 
reduce its role in m anufacturing and services business, w here the private sector can 
serve people b e tte r . . .’ (BJP 2004).
Thus neofascist forces in India are deeply committed to neoliberalism. In this aspect, 
there is a total convergence in the ideological doctrine o f the Congress that had introduced the 
shift to a neoliberal agenda and the BJP which then carried it forward with zeal. This
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commitment persisted even as it was becoming clear that neoliberal policies had failed to
deliver.
In 1991, when the IMF-World Bank prescribed economic reforms were announced in 
India under the Congress government, there had been a euphoric response from a large section 
o f the upwardly mobile classes in India, backed by broad sections in academia and the 
mainstream media. The neoliberal justification for these changes in the literature and at the level 
o f actual political argument have often been based on evaluations o f the nature o f growth and 
structural change in India since independence (Ahluwalia 2002). Ten years later in India there 
was a remarkably low-key approach to the issue.
Today, when the reforms have completed ten years o f  existence, no 
hosannas are being sung to their achievement. (Patnaik, 2001: 3, emphasis 
added).
The reasons were not far to seek. Growth has been hinged on commercial borrowings; 
budget deficits and debt financed the import-led consumer boom rather than any strident export 
effort (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). The growth rates o f output in commodity production 
have been lower in the 1990s than preceding decades (Chandrasekhar 2001). The rate o f food- 
grain production has been lower than the rate of population growth in this decade (Swaminathan
2000). Industrial recession has led to increase in urban unemployment. The phenomenon of 
‘jobless growth’ in manufacturing has been noted up to the mid 1990s (Bhalotra 1998). Existing 
wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers had worsened (Nambiar et al 1999). 
Growth in rural employment was at its historic low in the entire post-independence period. The 
annual rate o f growth o f rural employment fell to as low as 0.67 per cent over the period 1993- 
94 to 1999-2000. This is less than one-third the rate o f the previous period 1987-88 to 1993-94 
(Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2001). It is less than half the projected rate o f growth o f the labour 
force in the same period. In fact,
...this is the lowest rate o f  growth o f  rural employment in post-Independence 
histoiy  (Ghosh 2001, emphasis added).
The rural poverty ratio had stopped declining in the post-reform period (Chandrasekhar
2001). Patnaik (2004) has highlighted one of the more startling but less discussed features of 
Indian development over the past several decades in the decline in per capita calories 
consumption, which is revealed by the official National Sample Surveys. Average calorie 
consumption was already low by international standards and it has actually declined despite 
apparently high aggregate economic growth. The National Sample Survey (NSS) 55th round of 
data on calorie consumption is not comparable with earlier rounds. Along with estimates of 
consumption expenditure, estimates o f food consumption are likely to be overestimates when 
compared to earlier rounds due to changes in the parameters o f  measuring consumption. Even 
this inflated data indicated a decline in per capita calorie consumption for rural India in 1999- 
2000. The more significant trend is the long-term decline since the early 1970s. In addition
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there appeared to be a convergence between rural and urban patterns o f  calorie consumption in 
the most recent period (Patnaik 2004). Ray (2007) documents the decline in cereal consumption, 
especially in the urban areas, and provides evidence that suggests an increase in the prevalence 
o f undernourishment over the period 1987/88 to 2001/2002.
Paradoxically, the Government under the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
was sitting on a massive stockpile o f unsold food grain. All o f this led to an apprehension o f the 
dreaded ‘wage good constraint5 of the colonial period and the first two and a half decades after 
independence re-emerging. The financial system was extremely fragile since the 1990s with 
periodic ‘scams5 traced to ‘private sector banks exceeding prudent norms o f capital exposure5, 
interlocking with mutual funds and dot com companies in league with ‘b ig5 stock-brokers (SEBI
2002). The last two decades have been marked by an intensification o f the process o f uneven 
development across states, and has led to increased contests in the realm o f centre-state 
relations.
Neoliberalism in India has operated in a society already heavily weighed against women. 
Gender disparity was already encoded in family and social institutions which colonial 
capitalism strengthened and used for the purposes o f labour deployment and control. A complex 
process o f myth formation has constructed gender in Indian society in the last two hundred and 
fifty years that was crucial to the social reproduction o f class in India (Bagchi 1995). Five 
decades o f state-led capitalism preserved patriarchy in every sphere. The process of 
liberalisation has brought in its wake newer forms o f gender exploitation and gender 
disempowennent (Elson 2002), in both the economic and social spheres, leading to increased 
violence against women. Market fundamentalism has bred religious and social fundamentalism 
as well, with disastrous consequences for many sections in society and especially women. The 
general conclusion from the literature that has evaluated the impact o f liberalisation on women 
has established quite forcefully how large sections o f women have been significantly 
disempowered by neoliberal economic reforms (Hirway 1999). Sen (2001) observed that the 
recent sectoral shifts in the economy have been on clear gender lines. Women were losing many 
o f their earlier occupations, being crowded into less stable employment and being pushed to the 
margins o f the economy. This is in spite o f  the lofty ideas o f the Policy for Women announced 
in 1994 and the multiplicity o f schemes for women5s development (Human Development 
Report, Maharashtra 2002).
The significant increase in employment for urban women is concentrated among women 
from higher labour status, the section o f people who have greater access to jobs. A socially 
advantaged family background and family education status have been much more important 
determinants o f  job access and mobility than skill levels (Harriss Kannan and Rodgers 1990; 
Kingdon 1997). This finding defies all the spurious modelling based on undifferentiated social 
categories and adaptations o f the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that still predict a convergence in 
wages for ‘skilled5 and ‘unskilled5 labour in the wake o f liberalisation as long as ‘capital can be
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freely  transferred between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sector (see M arjit and Acharyya 2003). 
Moreover, when just 3% o f men and 1% o f women have access to college education (Velkoff
1998), the very premise o f the links between the effects o f reforms on the labour market 
establish the stratified structure o f the labour market in terms o f social differentiation.
Moreover, research reveals diverse outcomes for different classes o f women. 
Liberalisation led to the increasing marginalisation of vast sections o f women, especially 
workers, in the agricultural sector (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2001). Certain sections o f women 
have economically benefited from it, both in the formal and informal areas o f  the service sector, 
though the nature o f these benefits has been disputed. The heterogeneous gender effects o f 
marketisation policies during these twenty years clearly point to a class dimension (Hirway
1999).
The link between caste and class is established quite firmly in the link between the 
changes in the structure o f production and the ‘driving out’ o f Dalit occupations out o f the 
market without any substitute in terms o f employment opportunities. Thus the status o f Dalits in 
rural India is overwhelmingly that o f landless, migrant workers (Franco 2002: 5). All o f these 
areas of poor performance and divergence from the promises o f the neoliberal dream have 
opened up areas o f resistance and opposition to the reform agenda. Nevertheless, the path 
charted out by the neoliberal reformists is still firmly embedded in state policy in India.
1.7 Towards an Understanding of the Shift to Neoliberalism in India
The issues discussed in the previous section have been the focus o f much o f the literature 
critical o f neoliberalism and seeking alternatives to it. It has been concerned with how 
marginalised sections o f the unorganised working class, the smaller organised working class 
that is often the ideological target o f  both neoliberals and some o f  their opponents, the 
heterogeneous rural peasantry, the rural and urban working poor and the 300 million strong 
Indian petty-bourgeoisie are affected by and responding to the ‘rollback’ o f  the state. That neo­
liberalism did not work for the poor, for the working class, for small, marginal and landless 
peasants and for women is fairly established (Harriss et al 1990; Unni 1999; Bagchi 1998). But 
in many ways a far more important question is how far and in what ways lias neo-liberalism 
worked for the dominant classes in India? Stern (2003) has characterised India’s transition from 
colonialism to the political and economic development of the ‘Indian U nion’ as a ‘bourgeois 
revolution’ following Barrington M oore’s definition o f development o f capitalism and 
parliamentary democracy. This eulogistic work that reads like a ‘celebration’ of India skims 
over the surface o f a range o f complex questions and studies the process o f embourgeoisement 
by defining the bourgeoisie and other classes in terms o f income distribution data. Such 
definitions occlude the social relations that underscore the stratifications in society.
The Indian states’ complex relationship with capital has been relatively understudied. 
This explains the weakness o f  the neoliberal (and heterodox) analysis trying to explain the shift
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to neoliberalism as the preferred ideology o f the Indian state and sections o f  capitalists over the 
last two decades. Several related questions emerge around this theme. In whose interest was it 
to push for a rollback o f the zones o f  state-intervention and why? Who were the people who saw 
in neo-liberalism rather than state-led developmental ism a better coercive guarantor o f social 
order, property relations, stability or contractual predictability? Why did they believe so? What 
did they expect to achieve out o f this in a decade or so? Who have been the beneficiaries o f this 
neo-liberal shift? Are the benefits sustainable? Are landord-capitalist and proto-capitalist 
interests converging or diverging as a result o f  this shift?
Clearly, the analysis o f the shift to neoliberalism is contingent on an understanding o f the 
Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy. Neoclassical economics starts from the pronouncements o f the 
‘failure’ or ‘demise’ or ‘inadequacy’ of the earlier growth patterns in the economy based on the 
Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy. Thus justifications for the shift to neoliberalism in the ‘new 
political economy’ literature have been based on the ‘state failure’ argument (Bhagwati and 
Desai 1970, Krueger 1974). Critics of this interpretation have argued that neoliberalism 
emerged not because o f a ‘failure’ o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy, but because the strategy 
ran out o f steam due to some o f its internal contradictions (Patnaik 1984) and because o f the 
adhocism o f  the strategy after the second plan period (Bagchi 1982, 1998). Similarly the 
‘market experiment’ has also triggered a set o f contradictions without resolving the earlier ones 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). The employment neutrality o f growth under neoliberalism 
(Bhalotra 1998; Ghosh 2001), the erosion o f food security (Swaminathan 2000; Ray 2007), the 
regressive changes in social relations emerging out o f the ‘driving out’ o f  Dalit occupations 
(Franco 2002), and the increased marginalisation o f women workers ( Hirway 1999) are some 
o f the new problems that have emerged under the ‘market experiment’. (Please see section 1.6 
for a detailed treatment). The inability o f the state to intervene in any significant way to reverse 
the trends in terms o f basic development indices in spite o f increasing number o f policies 
advocating ‘targetted intevention’ has emerged as a new contradiction. The fact that such 
targeted outlays are not translating into outcomes have been recognised by the current central 
government (Government o f India 2006). More importantly, the domain o f the state over which 
purposeful action can be taken to fulfil socio-economic goals has been subverted even as 
economic growth rates continue to register high figures (Patnaik 2000, 2001b). This argument is 
treated in detail in Chapter Two (Section 2.1). A quarter o f a century o f reforms can now be 
subject to historical scrutiny and a comparison with the earlier period is possible. The extensive 
literature assessing the impact o f neoliberalism in India has seldom established that there have 
been any benefits from the economic reforms for the majority o f the people (Singh 1993, 
Nayyar 1996). The period from 1965 to 1980 has gone relatively unaddressed in this literature 
even though the social transformation during this period triggered o ff high growth rates from 
the 1980s in a context o f intense political turmoil and growing struggles over the processes o f 
state-led accumulation by ‘private’ players. This was reflected in constant, often inconsistent
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and seemingly ad hoc changes in policy throughout the period. These policy changes are better 
understood as outcomes o f political struggles concealing and responding to a changing process 
o f accumulation.
The intellectual critique that has emerged out o f resistance has pointed out repeatedly that 
neoliberal treatment o f the state has confused symptoms with cause. The radical literature made 
it a point to reinstate the social context and emphasise the social categories of analysis. It has 
been argued that economic policies are not unambiguous choices between states and markets. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence to show that the construction o f developed capitalist markets, if  
that is the ‘national aim* in the case o f late-industrialisers and ex-colonial societies, is achieved 
only through state intervention o f some form or another (Chang 2002). But this is where the 
heterodox agreement on the state ends. The ‘role o f the state’ is extensively debated within a 
very narrow instrumental vision o f  a technocratic, ‘developmentalist’ state based on an idea that 
the state can be developmental only if  it has the ‘will’ to do so (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004), 
often bypassing the question o f  the sources and limits o f  state power and agency. This literature 
has grown in resistance to neoliberal minimalist views o f the state, but is often based on a ‘neo- 
mercantilist’ approach (Patnaik 1999b) and advocates ‘lessons’ from East Asia that cannot be 
replicated in India as the social conditions, historical epoch and geopolitical considerations are 
very different in the sub-continent (Saith 2000). The attempts to link the polity and the economy 
in India are limited by a very fundamental problem; the absence o f an adequate analytical 
framework for studying state-society relations that addresses the processes o f capital 
accumulation and its links with the state
The next chapter is devoted to the exercise o f explicitly rejecting the theoretical 
contentions on ‘globalisation’ that argue that nation-states have become irrelevant in the current 
epoch. An analytical framework is developed to examine the relation between state and capital 
from a Marxist perspective and to analyse the causes o f the shift from ‘dirigisme’ to 
‘neoliberalism’ in India over a span o f less than fifty years since independence.
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Chapter Two
State and Capital in Independent India: The Problematic
The purpose o f this chapter is to locate the methodological framework o f this thesis 
within the debates on the role o f the state in the age o f globalisation. Several definitions of 
globalisation have been advanced in the literature. The relevance o f these definitions to the 
project o f capital in general and especially in India needs to be assessed. This is important as the 
role of the state and its relationship with capital is undermined in the mainstream literature on 
globalisation. Further, the relevance o f a Marxist analysis based on the social relations of 
production needs to be spelt out keeping in perspective the recent academic and political attack 
on such analysis which has been described in Chapter One.
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.1 discusses how the different 
theses on globalisation have addressed the role o f the state. We establish that it is the nation 
state that must perform the delicate balancing act between opening borders to global capital and 
deterring a kind and degree o f integration that might go too far in levelling social conditions 
among labour markets and creating conflicts that threaten the political stability o f countries. 
Section 2.2 addresses the academic debate on the relationship between state and capital in India. 
The problematic o f studying the post-independence Indian state is developed through a critique 
o f the different analytical frameworks through which different strands o f academic analysis 
have studied this relationship. We argue for an analysis in which the capitalist class figures as 
an active social agency in the decisions made within the structures o f  state power that moulded 
the relations o f private property and defined the linkage between the public and private spheres 
of the economy and the market and the state as mutually linked spheres o f accumulation. 
Section 2.3 is devoted towards development o f a Marxist methodological framework to study 
the relationship between state and capital in India. The question o f a suitable definition of the 
state is discussed. We stress the historical specificity o f the rise o f nation states and the 
specificity o f state formation that cannot be disassociated or abstracted from any reading of 
state-society relationships. We argue that a historicised analytical method which examines 
every question from the standpoint o f how the given phenomenon arose in history and what 
were the principal stages in its development, to examine what it has become today is the best 
way forward in studying state-society relations.
2.1 State and Capital in The ‘Globalisation Thesis’ I n, -W j
‘Globalisation’ has emerged as the dominant political, social and economic issue o f the 
current epoch (McChesney 1998). The ‘globalisation thesis’ o f the 1980s came after a decade of 
stagflation in ‘developed’ market economies, structural problems o f underdevelopment in 
developing countries and slowing down of growth rates in the ‘actually existing’ socialist world 
that was on the verge o f collapse. Proponents o f globalisation attribute the term to Levitt’s 1983 
article in the Harvard Business Review titled ‘The Globalization o f M arkets’ which studied the 
emergence of standardised, low-priced consumer products. Levitt defined globalisation as the 
changes in social behaviours and technology, which allowed companies to sell the same 
products around the world.
. The bulk of the early assessments o f globalisation in India were based on the premise 
o f globalisation as either a ‘desirable’ or an ‘undesirable’ revolution in ‘communication 
technology’. This was the basis o f state-led expansion o f communication technology in India in 
the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi, also discussed in Chapter One. The appeal o f  the first phase of 
deregulatory reforms in India from the 1980s, in an attempt to allow the ‘free play o f market 
forces’, was based on the idea o f ‘globalisation’ as ‘integration into the world market’ through a 
‘communication revolution’ enabling an unleashing o f pent-up demand for ‘metropolitan 
commodities’. It encompassed supply side deregulation o f import and investment controls to 
satisfy this demand, promoted by the international financial institutions and supported by the 
metropolitan financial hub o f the international capitalist system. This was done through private 
lending and borrowing practices that became unsustainable in less than a decade. This has also 
been discussed in Chapter One.
The political economy o f globalisation has been a contested arena. In the neoclassical 
literature, the current epoch o f ‘globalisation’ is about integration into the world market through 
trade and investment based on comparative advantage (Fischer 2003). Thus ‘globalisation’ 
merges with the rationale for ‘neoliberalism’ based on one integrated global market. In the field 
o f economic writing, a common view from the neoclassical school is that o f conceptualising 
globalisation as the integration o f  economies often through trade based on the vague notion of 
‘openness’ that is assigned parametric measures (Sachs and Warner 1995) based on myriad 
factors.
If  globalisation has to be a concept that explains the specific developments in the world 
economy since the early 1970s, then trade expansion as an indicator o f globalisation would be a 
futile exercise as trade has been expanding secularly since the end o f the Second World War 
(Kenwood and Lougheed 1999). This expansion o f trade was based on the ‘protectionist’ trade 
regimes that developed in the post-war period especially in agricultural commodities in LDCs 
(Agarwal 1983). Growth in the volume o f manufactures based on capital movements, 
technological breakthroughs and a rise in labour productivity explained trade growth between 
1950 and 1990 (Heilbronner 1986) contrary to the direction o f causation implied by the 
proponents of trade liberalisation (Tybout 1992). The bulk of such trade increase was between
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countries o f  the ‘North5. The ratio o f exports to GDP roughly doubled from 1960 to 1990 
among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 
under 10 percent to over 20 percent (Tabb 1997).
The rise in trade among countries o f the ‘South5 was less phenomenal till the 1980s. 
South-South Trade increased from 3.5% in 1977 to 7.1% in 1980 (Nayyar 1997). However 
South-South trade grew much faster since the 1990s with a growth o f 14.2% between 2000 and 
2003 compared to 5.2% for world trade as a whole (UNCTAD 2005). The share o f trade in 
manufacturing increased while that in food-grains decreased. Mainly, this trade was intra- 
regional. Similarly, South-South FDI flows have also increased phenomenally in the last 
decade. From Table 2A below, we find that FDI flows between countries o f the South as a 
percentage o f total FDI flows to developing countries accounted for 36.4% in 2000 compared to 
6% in 1994.
Table 2A: South-South FDI Flows
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Billions o f US $ 4.6 15.3 25 57.4 56.6 49.7 53.9
As % o f Total 
FDI Flows to 
developing 
countries
6 16.2 22.3 38.7 36.8 31 36.4
Source: Table 3, UNCTAD 2005: 12
This was despite the fact that trade was limited by an unequal world distribution of 
income and low purchasing power, and unequal distribution o f income within less developed 
countries (LDCs). Given the limited ability o f the South to meet its own demand for 
intermediate goods and capital, growth required trade with rich countries to meet the 
industrialisation needs o f poor countries (Nayyar 1997). In patterns o f North-South trade, 
‘developed countries5 increasingly controlled trade in foodstuffs especially cereals. Food output 
in LDCs grew faster than the developed countries but lagged behind the demand generated by 
rapid population increase and increases in incomes. So LDCs often were net importers o f food 
and exporters o f cash crops. In such a situation, export diversification became difficult. Prices o f 
foodstuff grew faster than cash crops. Thus LDCs suffered due to a decline in terms o f trade. 
This pattern has only reversed in a few countries that could attain ‘self-sufficiency5 in food like 
India in the period o f ‘intervention5 and ‘protection5 before the 1980s. However, reversal o f this 
situation with food imports rising since the 1990s is characteristic o f the increasing ‘openness5 
to trade in India. In the twenty years o f trade liberalisation since the 1980s in 90 developing 
countries, both positive and negative correlations o f ‘trade openness5 and growth have been 
found based on hypotheses derived from ‘new growth models5 (Greenaway 1998).
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The neoclassical justification o f the ‘neoliberal reforms’ in India adopts measures of 
‘openness o f economies’ to argue that there are large gains from achieving greater openness in 
terms o f productivity gains and uses this as a justification for ‘integrating into the global 
economy’ (Bhagwati 1969, 1987). These arguments have become politically persuasive in spite 
o f the critique by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and many others o f  the weak methodological 
basis o f measures o f ‘trade openness’. According to the neoclassical perspective, ‘openness’ 
creates competitive pressures and the potential for technology transfer so as to lead to 
productivity gains and restructuring o f an economy towards its comparative advantage (Batra 
and Khan 2005:1). Thus what is often termed ‘globalisation’ is an extreme vision o f the 
Walrasian ‘market utopia’ discussed in Chapter One and a rationale for a set o f neoliberal 
economic policies as the ‘means’ to reach this ‘utopia’.
As refinements to the trade-based definition o f globalisation, some have defined
globalisation as the ‘knowledge economy’, others have stressed ‘the satellite-communication
revolution’ or developed the myth o f  the ‘global village’. The history o f the period between
1870-1913, the ‘heyday o f imperialism and colonialism’ has also been re-written to make it
appear as the period o f ‘universal growth’ and ‘catch-up’ by poor countries (Milanovic 2002),
Dissident voices, such as Wood (1998: 136) have, however, continued to point out the social
changes that have underpinned some o f the gains from globalisation:
Globalisation simply means that subordinate economies must be made 
vulnerable to the dictates o f the capitalist market, by means o f certain social 
transformations -  such as, for example, the transformation o f peasants into 
market-dependent farmers, as subsistence agriculture is replaced by 
specialisation in single cash crops (while, o f course, the metropolitan powers 
protect their own domestic agriculture by huge subsidies and import controls).
The neoliberal economic perspective regards profit maximisation and the free flow of 
goods and more importantly capital as the cornerstones of an efficient and viable economy in 
the epoch o f ‘globalisation’. This sets apparently clear reform priorities for nation-states like 
India making the transition from low to middle income economies. The negative effects o f such 
neoliberal globalisation on basic human development indicators in low and middle-income 
countries are well established (Weisbrot et al 2001).
Comparisons o f similar episodes o f ‘globalisation’ in terms o f increases in movements 
o f  goods, people and capital in the history o f capitalism reveal two very prominent departures in
the international economic structure during the last three decades (Nayyar 1997). The first is the 
contradictions created by the increasing fluidity o f capital movements across boundaries of 
nation states. The second is the growing strictures and boundaries imposed on the movement of 
labour.
Most economists now acknowledge that the ‘free movement o f  capital’ can open up 
economies to high degrees o f vulnerability after the experience o f  the East Asian financial 
crisis. Moreover, many economists having diverse views on ‘neoliberal globalisation’ have 
argued that the flow o f capital led by the ‘chaotic’ signals o f a highly integrated but anarchic
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market can often be ‘irrational’ (Lopez-Mejia 1999; Shiller 2000). In fact, ‘irrational 
exuberance’ was a phrase coined by Alan Greenspan (1996) chairman o f  the US Federal 
Reserve as a feature o f advanced country financial markets. The ‘irrational’ aspects o f 
speculative and herd behaviour even in sophisticated and competitive financial markets have 
been implicated in the financial crisis following the ‘Black M onday’ crash o f 1987 and the 
financial crisis in Japan that started with a share price collapse in January 1990. The same 
assumption informs the official IMF line on resolving and preventing crisis in the quote they use 
(removed from its context o f  the nature o f monetary systems and credit from the 17th to the 19th 
century) from Charles Mackay
Men, it has been well said, think in herds: it will be seen that they go 
mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one (IMF 
2001 : 1).
However, while the (occasional) irrationality o f financial markets is now widely 
accepted in mainstream academia, its explanation has largely been based on an ahistorical 
analysis that focuses on the behaviour o f small investors and does not permit any historical or 
structural analysis (Foster 2002). Apart from Marxists writers (Foster 2002; Tabb 2001; Patnaik 
1999b, 2001b), two commentators on the East Asian crisis provide accounts, which challenge 
this simplistic analysis o f  mainstream economics. One is Joseph Stiglitz, previously Chief 
Economist at the World Bank. The other is Paul Krugman, trade adviser to US governments. 
They argue that many o f the features o f the ‘globalisation5 o f the current epoch are the results o f 
politics. The reduction o f national controls on capital movements were driven by political 
pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation, the US 
government and the metropolitan banks interlocked with metropolitan trans-national companies. 
They both argue that it was their interest and intervention that created the financial structure 
responsible for the disastrous outcome o f the 1997-98 financial crises in East Asia and Russia 
(Stiglitz 2002; Krugman 1999).
Private credit increased in international finance since the mid-1960s with private capital 
from OECD countries emerging as key lenders. The Organisation o f the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was a less important lender, but ‘petro-dollars’ were channelled into the 
international debt market through European banks (Bhaduri 1999). The growth o f global 
lending and capital flows in the 1960s was not smooth. The most important contradiction arose 
from the international ‘reserve currency’ status o f a national currency -  the US dollar, leading to 
the breakdown o f the Bretton-Woods system o f fixed exchange rates between 1971 and 1973. 
For developing countries, a further shock came with the ‘debt trap’ created by the lending policy 
of trans-national banks in Third World countries (Pereira and Seabrook 1994).
The IMF itself recognises that
In recent years one of the most spectacular manifestations of 
globalization has been the rapid expansion o f  international private capital 
flows—investments and loans from one country to another. These flows have
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brought significant economic benefits, but they have also exposed countries to 
periodic crises o f confidence when inflows o f capital are suddenly reversed. 
(IMF 2001:1)
But ‘crisis’ in this reading is considered the sole preserve o f  the economies o f the 
‘South’. What goes unsaid is that there have been about 70 financial crises in the past two 
decades. Since 1980, three quarters o f IMF members have experienced financial crises. O f the 
70 or so crises, one third has taken place in developed economies (Kregel 1996).
This context o f fluidity o f finance has often been the crux o f  the Marxist debate on 
‘imperialism’ and the ability or inability o f all states to ‘intervene’ have been related to the 
development o f this form o f ‘fluid finance capital’ distinct from the Lenin-Hilferding thesis o f 
an emergent finance capital based on a growing inter-locking o f banking and industrial capital 
which had decisive national characteristics. For example, Chase Manhattan Bank financed 
Standard Oil on the eve o f the First World War. Both corporations had a distinct American 
identity as part o f the Rockefeller group. Thus the interlocking o f banking and industrial capital 
to amalgamate and produce ‘finance capital’ was a sign o f the times. The inter-imperialist 
rivalry o f Lenin’s times was based on competition between these amalgamated forms of 
‘finance capital’. Finance capital today is not divorced from this amalgamation and national 
identity, though some authors contend that ‘rivalry’ between different factions o f national 
capital has replaced collaboration and unity in purpose (Patnaik 1999b).
But the main difference with Lenin’s analysis lies in the mobility o f today’s finance 
capital in forging quick but short-lived interlocking through direct mergers, predatory 
acquisitions and indirect investment through derivative financial instruments in the international 
capital market. This is argued to be the source of power that makes all states subservient to 
capital mobility and volatility. According to Patnaik (2000), any autonomy in the choice of 
economic policies or o f  the overall economic regime is threatened by this fluidity o f finance 
capital. The domain of the state over which purposeful action is undertaken to fulfil socio­
economic goals has to be relatively insulated from the effects o f simultaneous actions by other 
powerful agencies. The fluidity o f capital, and its proneness to being pulled out o f the economy 
in accordance with the mood in international financial markets tends to destroy the possibility o f 
having a ‘controlled area’ o f the state. This subverts any meaningful state intervention (Patnaik
2000). Thus the social legitimacy o f capitalism gets undermined by the existence and 
functioning o f a state sector under neoliberal tenets (Patnaik 2001b). This view demarcates the 
limits of ‘sovereign economic intervention’ in the era o f financial fluidity.
However, this is distinct from the view that the role or scope o f the state for intervention 
has withered away and nation states have become irrelevant in the epoch o f globalisation in the 
creation o f an ‘empire’ without ‘boundaries’ based on the ‘ontology o f  production’ structured 
by ‘huge transnational corporations’ (Hardt and Negri 2000). The central theme in such readings 
o f ‘globalisation’ is that nation-states have lost control o f their national economies, currencies, 
territorial boundaries, and even their cultures and languages and that macroscopic forms of
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power were shifting from the nation-state to the global market, transnational corporations, and 
globalised channels o f communication (Barrow 2005).
Production by transnational corporations (TNCs) outside their country o f origin has 
undoubtedly become important. Dunning (1981) established that in 1978, some 430 of the 
world’s largest TNCs accounted for three quarters o f overseas affiliates and direct investment. 
Relatively small numbers o f firms dominate the economy when the analysis is broken down to 
sectors pointing to huge concentration in captive markets (Dunning 1981). Yet, domestic 
corporations still produce 85 percent o f industrial output in a single geographic location (Tabb 
1997). Transnationals account for about 15 percent o f the world's industrial output. It is often 
argued that globalisation has led to a restructuring o f the production process as capital will go 
anywhere in the world seeking the lowest possible wages. But this is at best an 
oversimplification. It misrepresents the actual investment patterns o f  TNCs. Three-quarters o f 
foreign investment and production by U.S.-based transnationals is in Western Europe, Canada 
and other high wage countries and this investment is overwhelmingly to service these markets 
from local production sites. As for capital leaving the United States, it is important to recognize 
that since 1990 the United States has been a net importer of foreign direct investment, as the 
TNCs o f  other nations have located production in the US (Tabb 1997).
A postscript to this debate is the assertion that increased internationalisation has
obliterated the difference between the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. For example, Berger (1994:
267-268) in pointing out the historical specificity o f ‘globalisation’ argues
While a historical approach to the rise o f East Asia calls into question prevailing 
conceptions o f  a ‘Third W orld’, the existence, and even the expansion, o f ‘Third W orld’ 
conditions within the borders of the so-called ‘First W orld’ further undermine the 
notion o f a ‘Third W orld’. The ‘internal colonialism’ which has characterised the 
history o f the United States and Australia, for example, has consigned native Americans 
and Australian aborigines to circumstances which mirror the conditions in which the 
rural and urban poor o f ‘Third W orld’ countries live. Mike Davis’s recent history o f Los 
Angeles seriously qualifies any attempt to view the USA as simply a ‘First W orld’ 
country. For African-Americans and Chicanos, and recent arrivals from Latin America, 
life in Southern California is little different from the urban poverty south o f the Rio 
Grande. At the same time, countries like South Africa have always presented a 
particular problem for anyone attempting to talk about a ‘Third W orld’. In South Africa 
the white minority enjoys a standard o f living comparable to any other industrialised 
country, while the black majority lives in ‘Third W orld’ conditions.
In spite o f a convincing argument for specificity, this view, which is quite popular 
among many ‘Left’ intellectuals, attributes ‘Third World’ to a set o f conditions o f poverty, 
squalor and misery. However, the use o f the term in its historical context signified those 
countries that, after the Bandung Conference, claimed a separate identity in 1956 based on non- 
alignment with the greater powers (Agarwal 1983). These nation-states emerging out o f anti­
colonialism and anti-imperialism carved their ‘identity’ as the Third World based on a decision 
by significant sections o f the new ruling classes’ reluctance to align with either the First world 
o f  imperialist states or the Second World o f ‘actually existing socialism’.
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A variant on similar lines is the separation o f ‘poverty5 from capitalism. As Kitching
(2001) points out, most o f the contemporary literature on globalisation and the Third World or
globalisation and developing countries or globalisation and the South focuses on one question:
Is globalisation, on balance, damaging or enhancing the situation o f the poorest countries o f the
world? Kitching contends that the hypersensitive silence about class differences in much o f the
writing on globalisation is subtly and deeply connected to nationalism and nationalist
approaches to the understanding o f global capitalism and o f its history. Thus the way forward is
to assess the impact o f globalisation on the poorer regions and the peoples o f the world, in each
of its dimensions (production, trade, labour migration, finance and communication). The
differential impacts o f  each o f these dimensions are important. The globalisation process may
itself vary from region to region, or even from country to country within regions.
‘Globalisation’ may be improving the conditions o f the poor in some regions and not in others.
This view comes very close to the Fund-Bank project o f ‘making globalisation work for the
poor’ (Dollar and Kray 2000) even when it has been failing systematically for well over two
decades now (Milanovic 2002; You 1998-99). Harriss-White (2007) has emphasised the
systemic nature o f poverty entailed in the fact that capitalism creates poverty while it creates
wealth and productive assets. She identifies nine ways in which this takes place. These are the
creation o f  the pre-conditions for capitalist relations, petty commodity production and trade,
technological change and unemployment, petty commodification, the creation o f harmful
commodities and waste, pauperising crises, war, climate change related pauperisation, and the
unrequired, incapacitated or dependent human body under capitalism (Harriss- White 2007: 5),
The nature o f today’s new capitalism is such that the political reach o f the ‘imperial
power’ o f dominant economies cannot be mapped to a single logic o f  economic hegemony. But
the ties between giant oligopolies, big finance and the dominant capitalist states are not difficult
to trace. The influence and connection o f the US treasury in the appointment o f the chief
economist and associated staff o f the World Bank is a case in point (Wade 2001). Wood (2003)
points out that the inability o f weaker nation-states to exercise control over capital has also been
regarded as the strongest sign o f withering away o f the nation-state and the emergence o f a
‘global state’ namely the US that manages the world economy through a network o f
international financial institutions. This is true despite the fact that
.. .power in capitalist societies is so diffuse that it is difficult to identify a target 
for opposition. It is much harder to locate a point in capitalist society where 
power is concentrated in such a way that resistance and opposition can be 
effectively directed against class domination by capitalists in general, or against 
the logic o f the capitalist system, which puts ‘profits before people. (Wood 
2003: 127)
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The supposed withering away o f the state is also supported by those like British ex- 
Prhne Minister Tony Blair who has been at the forefront o f projecting British power abroad. He 
argues that
What is called globalisation is changing the nature o f the nation state as 
power becomes more diffuse and borders more porous. Technological change is 
reducing the power and capacity o f government to control its domestic 
economy free from external influence’ (Financial Times 20 March 1996).
Such views can also be found amongst the neo-conservatives in the 
Bush administration (Bush 2002).
Wood (2003) argues in contrast that the global economy is administered by a system o f 
multiple local states, policed in turn by the most disproportionately powerful military force the 
world has ever known. The latter’s global policing role has lately been justified by a new 
military doctrine o f war without end, in purpose or time. Wood comprehensively articulates the 
importance of the nation state in the post-Soviet Union, new global order based on the 
belligerent imperialism o f the neoconservative US government:
No institution, no transnational agency has replaced the nation state as 
a coercive guarantor o f social order, property relations, stability or contractual 
predictability or any other basic conditions required by capital (Wood 2003: 
17).
For Wood, globalisation does not mean the decline o f  the nation state. The new 
‘imperialism’ is more than ever an imperialism that depends on a system o f nation-states. 
Because the imperialism o f globalisation depends on extending ‘purely economic hegemony’ 
and ‘market imperatives far beyond the reach o f any single state’, it is dependent on a plurality 
o f subordinate states to enforce those imperatives and to create the climate of legal and political 
order, the stability and predictability, that capital needs in its daily transactions. This analysis 
comes close to the reading o f role o f nation states under the aegis o f globalisation put forward 
by the dominant sections o f the organised Left in India (AIDWA 2002: 11).
In a similar argument, Barrow (2005) argues that nation-states are the principal agents 
o f globalisation as well as the guarantors o f the political and material conditions necessary for 
global capital accumulation. Countering the arguments o f those who see a nebulous logic of 
empire, a network state, or even a global state as the repositories o f a new sovereignty, he 
suggests that globalisation, in its current form, is actually a new form o f American imperialism, 
a tool to extend the reach o f imperialist relations in the carving o f new empires. In this 
imperialism, globalisation is as much about preventing as it is about promoting integrated 
markets. It is the nation state that must perform the delicate balancing act between opening 
borders to global capital and deterring a kind and degree o f integration that might go too far in 
levelling social conditions among labour markets and creating conflicts that threaten the 
political stability o f  countries. One example is the tightening o f immigration policies in the 
USA, Western Europe and the G ulf countries (Kitching 2001).
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The debates about liberalisation in India and the integration o f  India into the process of 
‘globalisation’ have to be understood in the context o f these broader debates. Our position is 
closer to that o f Wood. We want to understand the specific role that the Indian state and Indian 
capital asserted for themselves in the new order that began to emerge in the 1980s.
2.2: The Problematic of State and Capital in India
To address the questions raised by globalisation and the role o f liberalisation, we need 
to address some fundamental questions about the interests o f capitalists in developing countries 
like India. The emergence, survival and growth o f developing country capitalists appears to 
depend on many restrictive activities o f their states even when many capitalists strongly oppose 
these strategies. On the other hand, free movements o f  capital in developing countries have 
often been the source o f financial crisis rather than industrial development (Patnaik 2001b; 
Kregel 1998). Large and rapid movements o f capital in free markets are often based on 
perceptions informed by hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance (Minsky 1986), rather than 
‘economic fundamentals’. However, neoclassical approaches assume that economic 
fundamentals can be discovered by risk assessment agencies and rational capital flows can be 
achieved.
In reality, most low and middle-income countries that are today opening up to the 
global economy are characterised by balance o f payments difficulties, domestic social or 
political turmoil, the vagaries o f capital movements that force national governments to comply 
with the needs o f globally mobile capital or face ‘economic purgatory’ (McChesney 1998: 2). 
For countries like India, there is a threat o f capital flight from their own nationals since the 
1990s (Macroscan 2002). This puts further limits on the powers o f such states to contain capital 
flight. Macroscan sums up the problem in the following way:
...today the most significant aspect o f this conflict has to be located in the 
sphere o f finance. The inability o f the nation-state to act in defence o f its autonomy 
derives in large measure from the fact that the antagonist is an intangible entity and 
includes many o f the country’s own nationals who are not motivated by any 
malevolence but are merely responding to the dictates o f capitalist decision-making. 
(Macroscan 2002: 2)
Clearly, the ‘restrictions’ imposed by the Indian state after independence was achieved in 
1947 were largely driven by these types o f fears, and the imperatives o f  developing and 
deepening the productive capitalist sector. The decisive shift to liberalisation came only in 1991 
though the move towards a market-led growth process can be traced to the 1980s. We will argue 
that this shift was driven and desired by significant sections o f  Indian capital. The strategic 
ideological shift o f a significant section o f the Indian ruling classes was in keeping with the 
emerging unipolar world economy and polity. The collapse o f the Soviet Union around about 
the same time was not a coincidence in our view. The emergent policy was definitely 
constrained by the nature o f  the relationships o f Indian with international capital. The choice
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regarding the nature o f intervention was not just one of tactical choice by the ruling class but a 
deeper structural and ideological choice (Patnaik 1999b).
The change in international context only explains the imperialist pressures to conform 
to neoliberalism, it does not explain the actual process o f transition in India. The starting point 
o f our enquiry is to assess how a capitalist class emerging out o f colonial production and 
exchange processes and bound by the limits o f ‘technology gap’ and ‘capital scarcity’ in the 
post-independence period could dictate significant policy changes that affected the power o f the 
state to constrain the allocation o f capital. Framed in another way, how did the balance o f class 
power shift so radically in favour o f (sections of) capital in India in less than fifty years?
This directs us to the first methodological question o f how to develop an analytical 
narrative o f the relationship between state and capital within the changing international structure 
o f capital in the last five decades. According to Brenner (1998), it is the class structures o f 
peripheral regions that account for their place in the world economy and capitalist competition 
acts as the compulsive force that determines development. However, an alternative view 
suggests that the structure o f global capitalism itself acts upon the class structures o f peripheral 
economies (Amin 1997; Galeano 1997) and determines the limits o f capitalist competition and 
the ‘forces o f development’ that it may potentially be in a position to unleash. Wood (2003) 
distinguishes the nature o f power very clearly in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. In 
capitalist societies, capitalists ultimately depend on coercion by the state to underpin their 
economic powers and their hold on property, to maintain social order and conditions favourable 
to accumulation. But there is a clear division o f labour between the exploitative powers o f the 
capitalist and the coercive powers of the state. For Wood, the clear line of distinction o f ‘non­
capitalist’ societies from ‘capitalist’ ones lies in the fusion o f economic and political powers of 
coercion.
However this distinction is difficult to operationalise in the context o f Indian society 
where capitalist industrial and trading enclaves already existed in the Indian economy at the 
time o f independence. At the same time, in 1947 there was also an array of dominant groups 
basing their dominance not only on class, but also on religion, caste, race and gender. Thus 
capitalist enclaves existed since colonial times but were also amalgamated with non-capitalist 
relationships (Patnaik 1999; Bagchi 1972).
The state has been acknowledged to have a degree of relative autonomy (Ghosh 1998). 
The extent o f relative autonomy, however, depended on the terrain o f contests o f the dominant 
interests outlined in the previous paragraph, which were often contradictory or uneasily 
reconciled in the prolonged transition since 1947. The separation o f  social, economic and 
political power in the public domain raises the question o f ‘relative autonomy’ and how power 
relationships emerge within and between social categories that are sources o f differentiation in 
inegalitarian societies. Poulantzas (1978) traced the relative autonomy o f the ‘state’ in its 
institutional separation from capitalist production. This basis o f relative autonomy is
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inapplicable for the Indian state after 1947 as the state was not just a participant in the domain 
of capitalist production but was invested with powers to lead and direct the process. The 
development o f the economy was one o f the aims o f the Indian state if  not the only aim. Indian 
entrepreneurs, stunted by the impacts o f colonialism were small in number but held a strategic 
political space in the formation o f the post-colonial Indian state (Chibber 2003). The role o f the 
state in this economic transformation was specifically determined by its relationships with 
business and industry in India and also by the demands o f other classes and class fractions, 
sometimes from ‘above’ (other ruling classes) and sometimes from ‘below’ (Byres 1996).
We also need to locate these internal dynamics within a context o f global accumulation 
processes. Some analytical work has, o f course, recognised the importance o f crisis and 
opportunities in key sectors o f advanced economies in determining the direction of economic 
development in developing countries (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). Similarly, according to 
Bagchi:
Actual historical change cannot be explained without bringing in conflicts and 
collaborations within and between various classes, both within the confines and across 
nation states, as capitalism is probably far more o f a contaminatory system than all 
systems that preceded it (Bagchi 1989: 5).
This discussion allows us to locate the method o f this study against other approaches in 
the literature. The debate on the determinants o f policy, policy changes and the drive to 
liberalisation in India can be classified into four distinct analytical frameworks. The first and 
simplest approach is to distinguish between right and wrong policies as a technical issue, 
ultimately attributing wrong policies to the poor understanding o f some leaders and their 
advisers. Protectionism came from the (wrong) structuralist paradigms o f development 
economics dominant in the post-war development consensus (for instance Bhagwati et al 1984). 
In this literature ‘planning’ and ‘export pessimism’ were the straw men for all the ills o f the 
economy. Neoclassicism thus found two pegs to hang all its different coats (Harriss 2001). The 
neoclassical assessments on planning and state intervention on India draw strength from certain 
generalisations about the entire period o f planning that preceded 1991 or 1980 depending on the 
author’s view o f when the ‘Hindu’ rate o f growth ended (Panagariya 2004).
According to Baru (2006), the process o f state led accumulation was essentially one 
which imposed a consumption squeeze on the working people and financed increased capitalist 
‘appropriation’ even as government expenditure continued to benefit the middle and upper 
classes. This view has won some credence but leaves the main question unanswered. Was this a 
‘mistake’ and if  so, why did the state make this mistake for so long? Also there is no distinction 
in outcomes between the period from 1950-1966 and the period from 1966-1980 in such an 
analysis while there were significant differences in the domains o f state intervention and non­
intervention in the two periods. In the face of uneven development, regional differences in 
investment and growth unfurled a process o f  struggle over specific forms o f state power and 
patronage not just at the national level, but very significantly at regional levels -  a development
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that has been discussed within the ‘interest group’ literature and in Baru’s own writings (Baru 
2000; Nayar 2001).
The second view focuses on ideology and changes in the dominant ideology to explain 
both the ‘socialist’ period and the transition to liberalisation. This view ascribes pre­
liberalisation policies to ‘socialist ideology’ and dogma and to the ‘visions’ o f key political 
functionaries like Nehru. The moves towards ‘deregulation’ and ‘liberalisation’ are then wholly 
explained by a series o f crises and contingencies that brought about necessary changes in 
ideological perceptions. The explanation in this approach has been mainly in terms of studies o f 
ideology and individual vision in the transition from Nehru to Indira Gandhi (Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2004). For example, Khilnani (2003) has argued that Nehru's achievement was to 
insinuate the idea o f  the state into the core o f Indian society. According to this reading, the state 
in the post-independence period became enlarged and its ambitions inflated. It was transformed 
from something distant and alien into a ubiquitous source o f  jobs, ration cards, education, 
security and cultural recognition. Thus the state etched itself into the imagination o f Indians in a 
way that no previous ruler had ever done.
Khilnani repeatedly asserts that Nehru's original vision has been parodied and 
democracy had been reduced in the next two decades to its basest definition: the winning of 
elections. For Khilnani, at the bottom o f it all is the disappointing failure o f  the tightly 
controlled command economy, which has proven to be, in the author's words, “grandiose, 
irrelevant and even destructive”. He argues that the profusion o f  controls has failed to create a 
productive public sector. “It has squeezed out private enterprise and given the state access to 
resources used not for welfare but as pools o f patronage.” Thus this approach has much in 
common with the policy error approach already discussed.
If  state ideology could drive wrong policies, the state must have been autonomous 
enough to resist all the signals coming to it about the consequences o f these policies. Indeed, 
many analysts who focus on policy mistakes to explain intervention argue that the Indian state 
enjoyed autonomy in the interventionist period that was lost subsequently. An example is 
Nayar’s (2001) explanation based oil the political events o f the period. He argues,
...the domestic constraints had become more salient with the effective entry of 
the masses into the political arena during the 1960s, as witnessed in the food riots and 
agitations and in the popular reprisals inflicted on the Congress Party in the elections. 
Social mobilisation had advanced substantially compared to that o f the earlier years 
during which In d ia ’s distinctive economic strategy was initially formulated. Societal 
actors -  whether in the shape o f the farm lobby, business groups, mobs or even chief 
ministers -  had become more active, reducing the earlier autonomy o f the state, not only 
in relation to society but ultimately also to the international system. The immediate 
pressures for reform may have originated in the western powers, but the proximate 
cause was the unacceptability o f the contemporaneous economic situation to Indian 
society. The remote cause, however, was the particular combination o f the economic 
strategy, and the political framework, for it brought on in the final analysis both the 
economic crises in terms o f shortages o f food and consumer goods and the dependence 
on foreign powers for resources. (Nayar 2001: 104).
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For Nayar, in his Rostowian periodisation of India’s ‘growth take-o ff, the year 1975-76 
marks the beginning o f liberalisation o f the Indian economy and the end o f the ‘H indu’ rate o f 
growth (Nayar 2006). This is based on the idea that the state lost its relative autonomy since the 
1960s. Nayar’s (2001) analysis rests on an assessment o f the conventional analysis o f ‘failure’ 
o f socialist ‘command economies’ applied to India, quite oblivious to the all-important question 
that Thavaraj (1972) put very aptly as to ‘who controlled the command economy’ in 
independent India. Nayar’s analysis is untenable as the ‘interventionist’ measures o f the early 
1970s clearly established a relative autonomy in the policy sphere that we will argue was an 
outcome o f the balance o f class power underlying the different sources o f  capital accumulation 
that were outside the purview o f ‘intervention’ but related to the terrain o f both the ‘state’ and 
the ‘market’ as sources o f primary accumulation o f capital.
The third approach is to analyse interventionist economic policies from a materialist 
perspective as a set o f ‘pragmatist’ policies for a capital scarce economy and the economic 
constraints facing economies emerging out o f colonialism (Chakravarty 1987,). According to 
Kohli (2004), it was the fragmented multi-class nature o f the Indian state that accounted for its 
lacklustre economic performance. This would then beg the question whether this fragmented 
multi-class nature o f the state changed in the last two decades so as to explain either 
liberalisation or the growth acceleration from the late 1980s. These approaches do not provide 
an analysis o f the changes in social forces that could explain changes in state policies. At best 
these approaches refer to a series o f ‘patron-client’ networks o f the ‘elite’ in explaining the 
economics o f ‘dirgisme’ in India (Rudolph and Rudolph 1998, Kohli 2004).
A class based perspective was expounded by Raj (1973) based on Kalecki’s (1972) 
concept o f the dominance o f intermediate regimes in economies that have not made a complete 
transition to capitalism entailing the relative weakness o f both the capitalist class and the 
proletariat. In the face o f this relative weakness, intermediate classes were argued to have 
dominated the state and structured the intermediate regime. Kalecki (1972) stressed the 
difference between accumulation processes in such intermediate regimes and the accumulation 
patterns in early capitalism. He traced this difference to the role o f the state as the main terrain 
o f accumulation in intermediate regimes. However, this analysis completely occluded the social, 
economic and political power o f the ‘big bourgeoisie’ in India that had been central to the 
trajectory o f the post-independence Indian state (Namboodiripad 1973; Byres 1997). Chibber 
(2003) provides further evidence on the role o f the organised political power o f  the capitalist 
class in India in the shaping of the policy structure o f the post-independent state. This thesis 
adds further evidence to not only establish the dominance o f the organised capitalist class at 
independence but also traces the increase in its political and economic power in the post­
independence period. Harriss-White and McCartney (2000) have pointed out the conceptual 
obfuscation o f class in the analysis o f intermediate regimes based on an economic scale o f gain 
and loss rather than a social relation emanating from the mode o f production.
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One explanation within this tradition that goes against the tide o f such obfuscating 
narratives is Chibber’s (2003) argument that the policies emanating out o f the state structure at 
independence made the state subservient to the power o f capital. The Nehru-Mahalanobis 
paradigm strengthened this political power o f the capitalist class by endowing it with the 
convenient position o f being politically strategic and economically unaccountable (Chibber 
2003). Chibber traces the subservience o f state policies to organised capitalist interests through 
the developments in and around the National Planning Committee. It is, however, questionable 
whether the simplistic dichotomy that Chibber poses between the policy regimes around import 
substituting industrialisation in India versus export led Industrialisation in South Korea, as the 
causal explanation for the difference in state-capital relationships in the two countries, is a 
sufficient explanation for the failure o f the state to discipline the capitalist class in India and the 
concurrent success o f the South Korean state in achieving it. Pakistan pursued exportled 
industrialisation even earlier than South Korea, but the power o f capitalists to capture 
‘unproductive’ rents in Pakistan led to failure o f the strategy (Khan 2000, 2002). This indicates 
that there may be other causal explanations for the subservience o f the Indian state to the power 
o f capital. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002) have argued that for Indian capital to break into 
export markets on its own, it was necessary to have not only very substantial backing of the 
state but also a massive effort on the part o f Indian capital itself. It was incapable o f making 
such an effort, partly because o f its unwillingness to accept a certain minimum discipline, a 
point which Chibber also makes, but also because the export prospects o f Indian capital
remained limited (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002; Patnaik 2000; Saith 2000). For ‘big’
capitalists, the incentives o f import substituting industrialisation guaranteed a protected market, 
access to subsidised finance and underwriting and absorption o f risks by the state. So even 
though there were early pressures to liberalise e.g. the formation o f the ‘Forum for Free
Enterprise’ (Shroff 1966), it did not find many takers.
Finally, a significant body o f literature from a historical materialist perspective has traced 
changes in economic policies to the contradictions evolving out o f the anti-colonial struggle, 
with the growth o f a subjugated but nevertheless emerging class o f Indian capitalists and the 
modalities o f their expansion and social power in the post-independence period. In this 
approach the capitalist class features as an active social agency in the decisions made within the 
structures o f state power. These structures moulded the relations o f private property and defined 
the linkage between the public and private spheres o f the economy, the market and the state as 
mutually linked spheres of accumulation (Patnaik 1984; Desai 1984; Bagchi 2002; 
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002; Mukherjee Reed 2001). The methodology o f this thesis 
follows this analytical framework based on social relations.
The question o f  the link between state and capital entered the mainstream o f political 
debates in India once the Hazari report came in 1967. The Hazari report established empirically 
what had been perceived as a social phenomenon -  the immense concentration o f wealth among
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the top ‘business houses’ in India. This brought the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy and the role of 
the state in the economy under academic scrutiny. The explicit political debate on the nature of 
the relationship between state and capital in India took place not in academia though academics 
made significant contributions to it, but in the course of the formulation o f the programmes of 
the Communist movement in India (Byres 1998). The debate was premised on the 
understanding o f the role o f the Indian bourgeoisie and its relationship with the dominant class 
o f landlords and the relationship o f  these two classes with the state. This debate led to two 
significant splits in the Communist movement, the first in 1964 that led to the formation o f the 
Communist Party o f  India (Marxist), CPI (M), that broke away from the Communist Party of 
India, CPI, and later the split in 1967 from the CPI (M) with the emergence of the ‘M aoist’ 
movement around Naxalbari.
The developments around the Communist movement are beyond the scope o f this 
research, but the concepts that this debate was geared around are directly relevant. The debate 
from the 1950s that culminated in the 1964 split was about whether the Indian bourgeoisie after 
independence could be considered a ‘national bourgeoisie’ as argued by the CPI and dubbed as 
the ‘Moscow line’ and could be relied on as a force that was still anti-imperialist and interested 
in progressive nation-building, and thus an ally in the process o f the ‘national democratic 
revolution’ (Ranadive 1990, 2000). The alternative analysis was that the Indian bourgeoisie was 
essentially a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’, a bourgeoisie entirely subservient to the cause of 
imperialist capital. This was the assessment o f the Naxalites who constituted the CPI (ML) that 
later split into diverse Maoist groups. The CPI (M) developed a line based on the concept o f the 
‘big bourgeoisie’ that pointed to the monopolistic character o f capitalist development in India. 
The stratification o f the capitalist class and the power o f the top layers o f the bourgeoisie over 
the state and the barriers created by this ‘big bourgeoisie’ to pursue the cause o f  ‘progressive 
nation building’ meant that a ‘people’s democratic revolution’ had to be forged against the 
monopolistic ‘big bourgeoisie’. Section 5.1 of the CPI (M) programme states that
The present Indian State is the organ o f the class rule o f the bourgeoisie and 
landlords led by the big bourgeoisie, who are increasingly collaborating with foreign 
finance capital in pursuit o f the capitalist path of development. This class character 
essentially determines the role and function o f State in the life o f  the country.
What was common in all three readings was the recognition of the ‘bourgeoisie’ and the 
‘landlords’ as the dominant classes. The debates in the 1960s led to different approaches to the 
question o f  ‘programmes’ for the party in building up the movements geared towards the 
respective ‘democratic revolutions’ and the role o f parliamentary politics in achieving such an 
aim.
These debates have often been dismissed as crude and the key activist-organiser figures 
involved in the debates much maligned by later official biographers o f  Indian capital and labour. 
But these are the extensive debates that took place on the question o f the specific nature o f the 
relationship o f state and capital in India from a Marxist perspective. This thesis derives its
64
central question from this debate by tracing the relationship between state and capital in India in 
the shift in the dominant policies o f global capital from the neo-mercantile ‘development 
consensus’ o f the post-W ar period to the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ and beyond. The 
central question o f the thesis is to address the relationship between state and capital in the 
evolution of dirigisme in post-independent India, the crisis o f dirigisme in the face o f expanding 
accumulation and the subsequent turn to neoliberal policies o f the state. Thus the focus is on 
developing an analysis that assesses the shift from dirigisme to neoliberalism in India through 
the lens o f the relationship between state and capital to ascertain the key changes in this 
relationship.
2.3 Formulating a Methodological Paradigm
Any discussion on the state inevitably starts with a definitional problem (Byres 1997). 
Marx and Engels traced the relationship between the ‘development o f the bourgeoisie’ in 
Europe and the ‘corresponding political advance o f that class’ as follows:
An oppressed class under the sway o f the feudal nobility, an armed and self- 
governing association in the medieval commune; here independent urban republic (as in 
Italy and Germany), there taxable “third estate” o f  the monarchy (as in France), 
afterwards, in the period o f manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the 
absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, cornerstone o f the 
great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of 
Modern Industry and o f the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern 
representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive o f  the modern State is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs o f the whole bourgeoisie (Marx and 
Engels 1998: 37).
This was an analysis historically rooted in the transformations o f European states with the 
emergence o f capitalist relations as dominant and the bourgeoisie as the key ruling class. Marx 
in the third volume o f Capital also points to the historical specificity o f  state formations and its 
relationship with social relations by arguing:
...It is always the direct relationship of the owners o f the conditions of 
production to the direct producers -  a relation always naturally corresponding to a 
definite stage in the development o f  the methods o f labour and thereby its social 
productivity -  which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis o f the entire social 
structure, and with it the political form o f the relation o f sovereignty and dependence, in 
short the corresponding specific form o f state. (Marx 1986: 791).
Further in the Critique o f the Gotha Programme, Marx argues that while one can 
generalise about ‘present society’ across national boundaries, it is impossible to do so about the 
‘present state’. Thus whereas a ‘capitalist society’ could be found in all ‘civilised countries’ and 
varies only in degree o f development, the form o f the state changes with each country’s 
border...and differs between the Prusso-Gennan empire and Switzerland and ‘different in 
England from that in the United States (Marx 1968: 312). Mandel (1980) also stresses the 
specificity o f state formation in arguing that every attempt to define the class nature of the 
capitalist state, which abstracts from the historical origins o f that state, i.e. which rejects the
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genetic method, conflicts with historical materialism. This is our methodological starting point. 
The nature o f states that emerged as material outcomes o f anti-colonial struggles have specific 
histories and developed specific historical imperatives in their general task. However, in general 
the nation state has been an indispensable instrument in the process o f capitalist development, 
not only in the sense that the military power o f European nation states has carried the 
dominating force of capital to every corner o f the world, but also in the sense that nation states 
have been the conduits o f  capitalism at the receiving end too (Wood 1995).
The state’s role as a leader o f the accumulation process has been characterised as 
‘capitalism from above’ (Byres 1996). This is useful in terms o f understanding the imperatives 
o f a capital accumulation process that is directed from above by the state. This also suggests that 
in such accumulation regimes, state and society (civil or otherwise) have a relationship that is 
hierarchical as the state achieves political power to direct the method o f accumulation through 
its interventions in society. But often this proposition is misunderstood to mean that the state is 
above the divisions in society and in some ways a supra-class entity leading to the debate on the 
nature and extent o f the ‘embeddedness’ o f states (Herring 1999). In our study, we examine the 
processes o f accumulation originating both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ to ascertain the 
extent to which the state was able to control and direct the accumulation process
The state can be invested with substantial power to mould the economy and civil society 
without being a supra-class entity (Patnaik 1999b). Indeed, the very proposition that the state 
has to be invested with this power suggests an agency or agencies that are in a position to invest 
such power. Niebyl (1946) argued that
...the meaning  o f seeing things as a whole lies in the ensuing capacity to act in 
line with reality thus understood. This capacity o f man is a reflection o f  the fact that he, 
man, produces himself, is producing society, and that he is not doing so consciously. In 
doing so man changes the forms o f social reproduction.
The second and more intense debate is about the nature o f this agency that has the means 
to invest and divest authority to the state as representatives of ‘society’ and in turn allows the 
state to represent society. This is where the construct o f ‘civil society’ permits a range o f such 
agency to be the locus o f power — but the stress in a bourgeois social formation is always on a 
separation o f social, political and economic power in the public domain. Kohli and Shue (1994) 
argue that such exercises are best pursued not by a primary focus on that state’s organisational 
characteristics, but by tracing the manner in which state and society are linked.
Certain abstract propositions have been made towards resolving these debates, but none 
o f these abstractions can be applied without certain analytical questions related to praxis.
The first proposition relates to the primacy o f class in the Marxist paradigm. In the Indian 
context, variegated structured social formatios like caste, denominational community and 
religious structures constitute what Patnaik has termed an amalgam o f the modern and the 
archaic (1999). The lack o f a bourgeois revolution in the classical sense has often been the 
focus o f debate around the persistence o f non-capitalist relations in Indian society. Why the
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bourgeoisie did not radically transform the social relations o f the pre-modern period is a 
question that would take us beyond the scope o f the thesis. However, it might be noted that this 
debate has been addressed in various ways. One strand o f the argument has stressed the absence 
o f a complete ‘bourgeois revolution’ in the classical Wesern European sense in colonised 
societies (Mukherjee 2000). A ‘caste in class’ approach has been advocated by Mukherjee 
(2000) rather than a ‘caste and class’ approach which had been dominant in the works o f leading 
sociologists like Srinivas (1962) and Beteille (1966). Another strand has stressed the general 
role o f  such social relations in the entire cycle o f labour central to the capitalist mode o f 
production and reproduction (W olf 2007). Taking cognisance o f the theoretical problematic 
around the question of social formations and agency, we devote our sudy to trace the modes of 
social organisation o f Indian capital. In this sense, we do attribute a primacy to class in our 
analysis. In this we follow Wood (1995), who argued that the primacy of class is
...not because class is the only form o f oppression or even the most frequent, 
consistent, or violent source o f social conflict but rather because its terrain is the social 
organisation o f production which creates the material conditions o f existence. (Ibid: 
108)
The second qualification relates to the lack o f a general theory o f the state that has often 
been considered a ‘problem’. The debate on the ‘developmental state’ (Woo-Cummings 1999) 
actually established the historical specificity o f the rise o f nation states and the specificity o f 
state formation that cannot be disassociated or abstracted from any reading o f state-sodety 
relationships (Amsden 1989, 2001). It is necessary to examine each state on its own terms rather 
than look for models o f the state.
It is incorrect to adopt an essentialist approach to the state and that one must 
always engage in a complex process o f analysis and synthesis in order to comprehend 
‘present states’ and change them (Jessop 1982: 24).
However a broad range o f institutions that are common to the constitution o f the 
‘modern’ state is worth mentioning (Byres 1998). According to Byres, the state could be said to 
be a set o f institutions like the bureaucracy, public corporations, central bank, sub-central organs 
o f power, representative assemblies, police, army, law courts, judiciary etc and personnel who 
exert authority over a territorially distinct area In a Marxist framework that locates class as a 
social relation distinct from the treatment o f class as a stratification or a layer in the hierarchy of 
society defined by economic criterion like income or occupation (Wood 1995), these sets o f 
institutions underwrite the maintenance o f social order and reproduction o f class relations. In 
this sense, the state is an instrument o f class rule. However it is the premises o f ‘nationhood’ in 
a nation-state that demarcates the rights and boundaries of the people it ‘represents’ and 
‘governs’. For countries that emerged as ‘nation states’ from anti-colonial liberation struggles, 
the premises o f ‘nationhood’ are dialectically linked to the social basis o f the struggle. This is a 
complex topic because o f the inherent complexity o f the social processes that characterised the
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period and the immense literature around it that has emanated since the 1970s that can obfuscate 
any attempt to answer the central question in the research. While the question is important in 
terms o f the political developments in India, especially with regard to Kashmir, several north­
eastern states, the brief interlude o f  the Khalistan movement in Punjab and the various 
movements in india for more regional autonomy, we note that the challenges to the overall 
legitimacy o f the Indian state in its right to govern in the post-independence period has not 
really had any major impact on the relationship between state and capital In India and thus has 
been kept out o f the purview o f this thesis. However, the regional basis o f accumulation is one 
o f the central themes o f the study.
The third qualification arises in the context o f the literature on ‘developmental state’ 
based on the accumulation and growth patterns in East Asia where the states are characterised as 
interventionist but not dirigiste, the successful implementation o f land reforms and the role and 
achievement o f universal adult literacy (Amsden 2001). In this context, the interventionism in 
East Asia is believed to be pragmatist, while dirigisme is associated with dogma by neoclassical 
practitioners (Lai 1983). The question o f geopolitical considerations o f American support in 
bolstering the fight against Communism in Asia by creating a market for exports from East Asia 
has been made again and again in the literature (Bagchi 2002). Similarly Patnaik (1999b) argues 
that the post-war Japanese miracle could not have occurred, if the United States, for strategic 
reasons (having to do with the containment o f Communism) had not provided such substantial 
market access to Japanese exports. The same can be said o f the other successful East Asian 
countries.
Equally important is the question o f the relative power o f the state over capital in 
exercising methods o f ‘discipline’ in East Asia. This was a product o f the specific histories of 
the rise o f the ‘bourgeoisie’ in each o f the East Asian nation-states. The historical compulsions 
of operating within the paradigms o f discipline laid out by the state have been traced to limits on 
political power o f the capitalist classes in each o f these countries (Khan 2000). In the sub­
continental context, the rise o f indigenous capitalism in the face o f  a crisis o f Empire stemming 
from the rise o f rival imperialist capital, and the direct and indirect link o f the indigenous 
capitalists with the mainstream o f the leadership o f the national liberation struggle in the last 
decade o f colonialism ensured their political power (Bagchi 1972; Ray 1979; Chibber 2003). 
Our research, starting from these premises, traces the contours o f political development o f the 
Indian capitalist class in the post-independence period to establish the continuities and changes 
in its relationship with the state.
The fourth qualification arises in the use o f a Gramscian approach to study ‘hegemony’ 
and ‘consciousness’. The developments in Indian society after independence has often been 
characterised as a ‘passive revolution’ based on a Gramscian paradigm (Chatterjeee 1997). 
Chatterjee (1997) has argued that as a historical model, passive revolution is in fact the general 
framework o f  capitalist transition in societies where bourgeois hegemony has not been
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accomplished in the classical way, that is, through a successful bourgeois revolution. This is 
based on the interpretation that Gramsci regarded passive revolution as a blocked dialectic, an 
exception to the paradigmatic form o f bourgeois revolution. This interpretation in itself is has 
been regarded as compelling, but we argue that the application o f the concept o f passive 
reolution that follows from this approach has serious limitations.
Let us examine the political economy basis o f Gramsci’s characterisation o f the passive 
revolution. Gramsci in the concluding paragraph o f his Notes on Italian History observes:
There is a passive revolution involved in the fact that -  through the legislative 
intervention o f the State and by means o f the Corporate organisations-relatively far 
reaching modifications are being introduced into the country’s economic structure...; in 
other words, that socialisation and co-operation in the sphere o f production are being 
increased, without however touching (or at least nothing beyond regulation and control 
of) individual and group appropriation o f profit. (Gramsci 1971: 119-120)
On the basis o f this socialisation, Gramsci had argued that in the concrete framework in 
Italian social relations, the only solution would be to develop the productive forces o f industry 
under the direction o f traditional ruling classes, in competition with more advanced industrial 
formations o f countries which monopolise raw materials and have accumulated massive capital 
gains. This was the political economy basis o f the passive revolution o f corporatism in Italian 
social relations under fascism.
Chatterjee’s (1997) arguments on the ‘passive revolution’ in India is based on 
integrations o f the politics o f vote banks and the rhetorical commitments to community 
development in Indian planning. For the second, Chatterjee merely asserts it without any kind o f 
evidence. There is no historicised account o f these processes for the fifty-year period after 
independence. But most importantly, the entire analysis does not address the question o f capital 
accumulation and profit trends in post-independence India. This was after all the central 
question that led Gramsci to develop the concept o f the passive revolution. Our research shows 
that in the Indian context, socialisation and co-operation in the sphere o f production has 
retreated in the last three decades while individual and family based appropriation o f profit has 
increased. Thus invoking the concept o f the ‘passive revolution’ without situating it in the 
concerete framework o f accumulation regimes in Indian social relations would be an exercise in 
futility.
In developing a theoretical basis for studying any state,
.. .the most reliable thing in a question o f social science, and one that is most necessary in 
order really to acquire the habit o f approaching this question correctly and not allowing oneself 
to get lost in the mass of detail or in the immense variety of conflicting opinion-the most 
important thing if  one is to approach this question scientifically is not to forget the underlying 
historical connection, to examine every question from the standpoint o f  how the given 
phenomenon arose in history and what were the principal stages in its development, arid, from 
the standpoint o f its development, to examine what it has become today (Lenin 1964: 5).
This historical approach is undertaken within a framwork o f Marxist political economy. 
In studying the development o f capital accumulation under the aegis o f the state, a number of
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theoretical concepts are involved which informs the entire narrative o f  the thesis. Here, we 
briefly summarise the concepts that are our major preoccupation in the form o f analytical tools.
The first concept is that o f primary or primitive accumulation. Marx (1976) in his study 
o f the development o f the capitalist mode o f production in Capital (Volume One) established 
that the transition to a capitalist mode is marked by a process o f accumulation based on 
expropriation and dispossession o f the peasantry. Thus in tracing the early development o f the 
capitalist mode in England, the origins o f capitalism are to be found in the transformation of 
relations o f production on the land. In countering the idea of ‘previous accumulation5 in Adam 
Smith that was argued to be a result o f abstinence, Marx stresses the brutality o f  the process of 
such accumulation, which he terms ‘the secret o f primitive accumulation5 (Marx 1976: 873), in 
the expropriation o f the peasantry from the land and its transformation into a class o f wage 
labourers in both agriculture and industiy. Our use o f the term ‘primitive5 or ‘primary5 
accumulation encompasses the appropriation o f means o f production from outside the capitalist 
sector. The source o f  such ‘primary accumulation5 are varied and not just restricted to 
agriculture. In fact, we demonstrate later that a major role o f the state in the post independence 
period was to facilitate the primary accumulation o f capital. Marx (1976) also distinguished 
between primary or primitive accumulaton and centralisation or concentration o f capital in 
which he spelt out the processes through which capital accumulation expands within the 
capitalist mode o f production. This concentration o f capital in post-independence India is 
central to our analysis o f regional accumulation patterns in Chapters Five and Six.
In this research, we assess the developments o f the post-independent Indian state in the 
construction o f dirigisme and then focus on the changes that led to a shift to neoliberalism. The 
term dirigisme is used to underline the active economic particpation o f the state and the 
emergence o f a state directed process of development. In this, we follow Toye (1981) and 
Patnaik and Chandrasekhar (1998) who studied the structure o f dirigsme in India and stressed 
the increasing role o f  public sector enterprises in infrastucture and basic services. The dirigiste 
state was not only highly interventionist, but was an active economic agent in the fostering of 
capitalism.
We focus on the role of financialisation as one of the causal factors in the shift from 
dirigisme to neoliberalism. In this, the role o f rentier finance has been examined in detail, 
Keynes (1936) had defined rentier as the functionless investor who generates income through 
ownership o f capital based on its scarcity value. Marx (1986) however had stressed the role o f 
the owners o f the credit system in the centralisation o f capital, commented on the class of 
‘parasites5 who wielded fabulous power and highlighted the dangers posed by the class in their 
separation from the process of production. Lenin had pointed to the interlocking o f such capital 
with industrial capital in the construction o f finance capital in early 20th cetury. Epstein and 
Jayadev (2005) have established that starting in the late 1970s, the advent o f monetarism and 
then neoliberalism led to the re-emergence o f  a rentier class in finance. Our analysis follows
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from Marx, Lenin and Epstein in stressing the role o f rentier finance as an active agency in the 
construction of neoliberalism in India.
In this research, we argue that populism was one o f the responses to the crisis of 
dirigisme since the mid 1960s. Kohli (1990) in his study o f populism in South Asia had 
emphasised populism as a response o f the political leadership and emphasised the personl 
aspects o f the phenomenon. In contrast, Jalal (1995) looks at populism as a political 
programme to address the status o f  the dispossessed and downtrodden rather than 
empowernment through political mobilisation and organisation based on systemic class analysis 
o f  social inequities. Our emphasis in addressing populism is also on the political content of 
programmes and policies that were specific in their response to addressing poverty and 
unemployment beginning from the 1970s. Some o f the measures initiated in the 1970s persist in 
the present, but populism as the key thrust o f political strategy lost steam by the 1980s.
As outlined earlier, this research is based on a Marxist a political economy frame work. 
The exact nature of the framework is defined by the problematic -  that o f historicising a 
relatively recent period o f Indian history, namely the post-independence period. The task is to 
trace the defining features o f the relationship between state and capital in the shift from one 
distinct framework o f state policies to another, namely dirigisme and neoliberalism The 
framework o f policies associated with the pre-neoliberal period in India has been characterised 
as ‘dirigisme’. The analysis is focussed on the sources and social modalities o f such 
accumulation with an attempt to identify the contradictory pushes and pulls o f the relationship 
that led to the shift from ‘dirigisme’ to ‘neoliberalism’. The effectiveness o f the Indian state is 
mediated by a series o f inter-relationships, both political and economic between various 
contestants in the accumulation process. The effort is to highlight the social relations of capital 
and the continuities and changes in the accumulation process that was characteristic o f post­
independence ‘development’ and formed the material basis o f ideology formation and 
ideological change.
Two problems need to be addressed right at the beginning. The first has to do with the 
wide scope o f  the research theme in terms o f historical time and the second in the number of 
sub-themes that need to be covered to come up wth meaningful conclusions. This relatively 
wide canvas o f  the research requires a narrative structure that can straddle multiple methods 
within a methodological approach which we have defined in Marxist terms in the earlier part o f 
the chapter. We call this narrative structure based on political economy an ‘analytical narrative’. 
This can be understood as a methodological exercise to address the predominant challenge that 
emerges in any critical study o f contemporary history -  the lack o f standard archival soures 
because most private and some public documents are not in the public domain as they are not 
classified as historical material. Our analytical narrative combines four distinct field exercises -  
study o f historical material, analysis o f quantitative and qualitative data, case studies based on 
business histories and primary information collected through surveys and interviews. Without
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being termed so, the straddling o f  the first two exercises in developing analytical narratives has 
been used in many o f the accounts in Indian political economy. Some recent examples are 
Frankel (2005), Chibber (2003), Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002) and Nayar (2001). O f course, 
this is by no means an exhaustive list. This research is based on three parallel exercises: the 
significant developments in the economy in the post-independence period in terms o f structural 
change or the lack o f  it, study o f the policy framework o f the state and its relationship with 
organised capital and the continuities and changes in the capital accumulation process that was 
characteristic o f post-independence ‘development’.
For the first two parts, a wide range of standard sources is available. First, there is a huge 
secondary literature that has been used consistently throughout the thesis. Second, published 
and unpublished material is also widely available. These consisted of a variety o f material 
extracted from various parliamentary debates over the period 1947-1980; key speeches and 
writings o f votaries o f neo-liberalism, leaders o f organisations of capitalists like chambers of 
commerce and other associations and state functionaries; and policy documents o f the 
Government o f India. This rich store-house o f material lends itself to varying interpretations. 
However, official documents also occlude the unrecorded voices in terms o f responses to or 
independent assessments o f the same issues and problems. Thus ‘dissent’ is more difficult to 
capture in official documents. Detailed interviews of representatives o f various organisations 
o f  industry  and  business, trade-unions and political parties and structured surveys o f  
business groups and w orkers in the pharm aceutical sector were conducted to address the 
debate and dissent around issues which arose from the examination of the standard sources.
For macroeconomic data, we have used the National Accounts Statistics (NAS) from the 
Ministry o f Statistics from 1950-51 to 1999-2000 and the EPW Research Foundation (EPWRF) 
from 1950-51 to 2001-2 and a compilation o f Annual Surveys o f Industries (1973-4 to 1997-8) 
from the EPW Research Foundation. The difference between the NAS data and the EPWRF 
compilation is that it provides a linked series that makes the data more comparable apart from 
the fact that it covers two additional years. At this point, one should note that the reliability of 
these statistics has been questioned and it has been argued that as measures o f  aggregate output, 
they are underestimated because they completely ignore the informal sector and the black 
economy. In addition, they underestimate the work done by women (Chandrasekhar 2001, 
EPWRF 2002b). For the purpose o f  this analysis, the prospect that the magnitudes o f the social 
process of accumulation and investment might be even greater than the published national 
accounts, does not undermine our overall argument and in some aspects actually strengthens it. 
For example, we have observed that there was a significant growth in gross domestic capital 
formation and net additions to stocks between the period 1950-55 and the next period 1956-65 
(See Chapter Four). We have demonstrated that even before the state had worked out the 
detailed nature o f support to capital formation through planning and tariff support, the capitalist 
class was being supported through the licensing policy and credit from national financial
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institutions in the first plan period. However, it was only after the intervention by the state 
through its planned strategies into the arena o f  public investment in the development o f 
transport, communication, irrigation, education, research and development that domestic capital 
formation showed a visible spurt. The possibility that the magnitudes o f domestic capital 
formation and output were higher than the official estmates does not affect our argument, but 
may actually strengthen it. However, to trace the social modalities o f  expansion o f capital, two 
problems had to be overcome -  data on gross capital formation is available only at the national 
and state level classified as private and public. But, to develop an account based on the role of 
family and the holding structures in terms o f  business houses as the key agency in the expansion 
o f capital, this data is grossly inadequate. Thus business history, as a rich source of material was 
used to develop case studies on business groups. Second, due to the contemporary nature o f the 
historical exercise, evidence pertaining to important developments like holding structures of 
capital by business houses, financialisation o f  capital and flexibilisation o f the labour force was 
collected from two surveys: one o f  100 workers in the pharmaceutical sector covering 10 
companies in New Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai and a survey o f 50 family run business houses in 
Kolkata. This was supplemented by interviews o f important political functionaries who have 
been known to have a defined ideological position on the processes o f capital accumulation that 
have been central to the shift to neoliberalism. The choice o f studying business groups in 
Kolkata may be questioned as the main seat o f capital now has shifted to Bangalore, Hyderabad, 
Chennai and Delhi apart from the old centres around Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Baroda. 
However, Kolkata business houses were chosen as they have a continuous history from the late 
colonial period and thus provide an insight into the major changes in the post-independence 
period. The developments in the other metropolitan centres have been studied through business 
histories and region-specific developments. The survey o f pharmaceutical workers in New 
Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata may also be questioned as the main centres o f the pharmaceutical 
industry are in Maharashtra, Gujarat and to a lesser extent in Hyderabad. But the focus o f the 
survey was to identify the flexibilisation o f the non-core section o f the labour force namely in 
sales and service and this extends beyond the centres of production.
In our analysis, institutions o f the state and its capacity to formulate and enforce policy in 
relation to capital emerges as a key sub-theme. The extent o f dependence o f the capitalist class 
on the state to discipline labour as opposed to systems o f internal labour control also emerges as 
significant. Key political and social organisations -  parties, mass fronts and the associations of 
capitalists are analysed as agencies o f either continuity or change.
The basis o f the periodisation that we follow -  1947-1956, 1956-1966, 1966-1980 and 
1980-2005 has been discussed in detail in the introduction. However, it must be noted that the 
social role o f these agencies and that o f  the state varied widely in the four distinct periods that 
we study. Similarly, in the introduction, the problems o f a comparative region specific study 
over this entire historical period have been laid out. But, the regional specificities o f the role of
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various social agencies in the process of accumulation in different periods runs as a parallel sub­
theme throughout the thesis.
Our main contention is that the effectiveness o f the Indian state is mediated by a series o f 
inter-relationships, both political and economic between various contestants in the accumulation 
process. The effort is to highlight the social relations o f capital and the continuities and changes 
in the accumulation process that was characteristic o f post-independence ‘development’ formed 
the material basis o f ideological change from dirigisme to neoliberalism. To identify these 
processes, we need to begin by tracing the relationship between the growth o f  the capitalist class 
in the colonial period and the links o f this process with ideology formation. The next chapter is 
devoted to this exercise.
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Chapter Three 
Independence and Emergence o f State-led Capitalism
This chapter is a study o f the emergence o f specific forms o f  state-led capitalism in 
independent India as a result o f policies that came to be characterised as ‘Nehruvianism’ in 
popular parlance. This ideology and its relation with the small but politically powerful capitalist 
class in India’s ‘formal sector’ is the subject o f our enquiry. This chapter aims to arrive at a 
political economy perspective o f the defining factors in the relation between state and capital 
that led to the formation o f the Congress-led state ideology - the core o f ‘Nehruvianism’. 
Although this ideology was primarily directed at the formal capitalist sector, we will also argue 
in later chapters that the policy had important implications for capitalist accumulation in sectors 
not directly targeted by the policy. Here we provide a short historical account o f  the relationship 
between material processes and bases o f ideology formation that defined the relationship 
between capital and state in the decades preceding the formal transfer o f  administrative power in 
1947. The analysis in different sections o f the chapter weaves backwards and forwards between 
the 19th and the 20th century. This is unavoidable if  we are to establish the various dimensions of 
the developments in the trajectory o f Indian capital in different historical periods within the 
making o f  the national liberation struggle that resulted not only in independence but also the 
paradigm o f state led capialism.
Chibber sums up the importance o f this relationship when the ‘spectre o f communism’ 
was enormously significant in Asia:
This massive nation o f almost four hundred million, with its enormous diversity 
and history o f conflict, was choosing to push forward within a bourgeois democratic 
framework -  a fact that was o f some significance in a continent which already boasted 
two large nations committed to Communism, hence making the Indian experiment all the 
more significant to the capitalist world. India was to be an exemplar, demonstrating the 
possibility that planning need not presuppose the abolition of property, but could in fact 
be harnessed to the engine o f capital accumulation. (Chibber 2003: 2)
This chapter locates the ideological basis of this ‘exemplar experiment’ and the 
emergence o f state led capitalism as the cornerstone o f economic policy in independent India 
within the historical developments in the decades preceding independence that shaped the 
relation between state and capital. In our attempt to develop an understanding as to why social 
and political organisation in the late colonial period remained structured on pre-modern forms 
like caste, religious sect and denominational community in spite o f the expansion of the 
capitalist mode o f production, we rely on Ahmad (2000) for a political economy approach to the
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question. This provides a materialist basis to the social forms o f identity and organisation in 
contrast to essentialist explanations based on ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ offered by Chatterjee 
(1993). The chapter is divided into six sections followed by a conclusion. We begin with a 
historicised account o f ideas as this has been the source o f major debates in the post-colonial 
assessments o f the period. Our main aim is to demonstrate that the ideas about modernisation 
and nationalism were clearly linked to the ambitions o f  indigenous capitalist development 
manifest in major policy decisions o f  the Congress-led state after independence. The early 
development o f  the indigenous capitalist class in India was characterised by acceptance of 
strictures imposed by colonial policies. The submission to and acceptance o f colonial rule was 
the norm. The occasional petition to the state was marked by basic loyalism. This has been 
noted as supplicance to colonial rule (Bagchi 1972; Ray 1979, Sarkar 1983). Section 3.1 
discusses the key aspects o f supplicance and nationalism and the relationship o f  these ideologies 
with the limits o f power o f the Indian capitalists under colonial rule. 3.2 is an analysis o f the 
contradictions and collaborations o f  the Indian bourgeoisie with the colonial state and the 
sources o f its underlying ideological conservatism. 3.3 traces the rise o f the Indian capitalist 
class within capitalist enclaves that was a product o f the social relations under colonialism. The 
sources o f  primitive accumulation are located within the opportunities and limitations arising 
out o f the political, and economic structures o f colonial society. 3.4 is a discussion on the forms 
o f  political organisation that emerged out o f the changing social relations under colonialism. 3.5 
discusses the power struggle within the Congress about the ideological role o f the state in 
independent India in the face o f rising militancy both within the mainstream Congress and the 
increasing power of socialists and communists along with rise o f organisations based on 
community. It provides an account o f the struggles within the Congress over the ideological 
precepts of the independent Indian state in the run-up to freedom from British rule. 3.6 discusses 
the impact o f the consensus in development economics after World War II on nationalist 
economic thinking in the formulation o f state ideology.
3.1 Locating the Power o f Indian Capital: Supplicance and Nationalism
A large part o f culturalist evaluations o f Indian society and polity under colonialism has 
remained preoccupied with the ‘making o f nationhood’ during the colonial period. These 
discursive studies, o f which Chatterjee (1993) is one o f the best known, have made a significant 
contribution to our understanding o f formation and ‘construction’ of nationhood in India. But in 
separating the ‘elite project’ o f  the formation o f the Indian nation-state from the project o f 
capitalism, and replacing it with ‘modernity’ traced to the Enlightenment as we have argued in 
Chapter One, such renderings have undermined the significance o f both the organised and the 
informal power o f  capitalists in the inter-war and post-war period. Corbridge and Harriss (2000) 
in their review o f ‘India in 1947’ have pointed to the ‘limited structural transformation’ under 
British rule, but not really engaged with specific question o f  where the capitalist class was
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located in the political turn o f events that determined the path o f  state policies in Independent 
India. Our analysis supplements Corbridge and Harriss (2000) by focussing on the economic, 
social, political and ideological trajectory o f Indian capital under colonial rule. The rise in the 
economic and political power o f the fledgling capitalist class had immense impact on the 
contours o f the direction o f not just ‘economic policy’, but the specific social relations that 
defined the contours o f state led capitalism in independent India (Bagchi 2002). The aim o f 
fostering capitalism was one o f the central aims o f the project o f ‘nation building’ if  not the only 
aim.
In spite o f the contentions o f some historians o f imperialist history writing about 
colonial priorities and the caste and community based priorities o f the Indian elite (as in the 
Namierite readings o f the Cambridge school and some of the subaltern studies initiatives), there 
is a broad consensus in the literature based on political economy that colonial rule in India was 
mainly about using India as a source o f  surplus and a market for staples for Britain (Moosvi 
1997). British enterprise dominated in Eastern India in jute, tea and mining. Large British 
industrial interests like cotton textiles, shipping and engineering and British banks shared the 
larger imperial interests o f maintaining stability within the British empire till 1914 (Bagchi 
1972; Kidron 1965). The expansion o f the railways was based on the utility o f  railways for 
expanding the market for British goods, increasing the demand for railway manufactures and 
increasing the flow o f exports, all o f which was the preserve o f colonial capital (Bagchi 1972).
The political space for radical activities was confined by an extensive network of 
‘surveillance’ o f the colonial state (Chattopadhyay 2006) and industrial development was 
constrained by the nature o f colonial rule (Bagchi 1972; Ray 1979). In this context, many 
organisations that took ‘m odern’ forms were structured along forms o f  collective action already 
existing in ‘premodern’ society such as ‘denominational community, religious sect and caste 
associations’ (Ahmad 2000). Please see Section 2.3 on the theoretical implications o f this social 
phenomenon for this work. In the course o f the national liberation struggle, contradictions and 
conjunctures within the struggle led to the adoption of particular ideologies and political 
structures o f organisation as the basis o f the independent Indian state. The bourgeoisie did not 
necessarily ‘sweep’ away the ‘fetters’ o f the non-capitalist modes o f  social organisation. Thus 
capitalists in the colonial period were organised in terms o f community and caste apart from 
organisations based on class like the apex bodies o f  commerce and industry along with the 
development o f capitalist social relations in the material basis o f organisation o f business
‘Modernisation’ and ‘economic nationalism’ became the dominant ideological core of 
the nationalist leadership in the course o f the anti-colonial struggle (Patnaik 1999b). ‘Economic 
nationalism’ as an ideology dominated all strands o f the struggle whether it was the Gandhian 
strand that argued for a ‘self-sufficient village community’; or the modernising Nehruvian 
vision that argued for ‘self-reliance’ on the basis o f a massive project o f state-led 
industrialisation; or the socialist idea based on such industrialisation along with an extensive
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‘socialising o f  the means o f production’ through radical changes in the structure o f property 
rights (Sarkar 1990). Each o f  these ideas o f ‘self-sufficiency’ was a direct reaction to the history 
o f economic plunder in the early phase o f colonial rule and the discrimination based on race that 
characterised colonial attitude and policy not only towards indigenous capitalist development 
(Bagchi 1972), but also to the general pauperisation, destitution and dehumanisation associated 
with colonial rule (Dutt 1992).
‘Modernisation’ through industrialisation emerged dominant in the political contest as 
different strands o f  the liberation struggle became locked in ideological battle. This was 
concomitant on the rise in mass mobilisations against colonialism and imperialism by all the 
different strands from the 1930s onwards (Namboodiripad 1975). But the project o f  this 
modernisation was far removed from the ‘pristine’ ideals encapsulated in N ehru’s writings and 
was tempered and cut to size based on the rise in political power o f Indian capital within the 
Congress and the economic clout o f different ‘foreign capitals’ that had penetrated the Indian 
market in the inter-war period. The historical analysis o f different ideological strands in Indian 
nationalism would be beyond the scope o f this research. However for the sake o f establishing 
the relationship between state and capital that emerged with the formal transfer o f power, a 
review o f  the political economy o f the relationship o f capital to ideology and political 
organisation is necessary.
The specificity o f the capitalist path in the ‘modernisation’ project o f the Congress-led 
state was summed up in three major policy decisions after independence -  the decision to 
protect the sanctity o f private property, the use o f indicative planning in allocating resources for 
development (Chibber 2003) and an assurance o f a ‘level playing field for foreign capital’ by 
Nehru in 1949 in the debates leading to the provisions o f non-discrimination against foreign 
capital in the Companies Act o f 1956 (Chenoy 1985). These were decisions that were upheld 
by the leadership o f the Congress in India and endorsed by leading capitalists involved in the 
higher echelons o f Congress organisation and other ‘social organisations’ o f capital (Sarkar 
1983).
The first development that is important for our analysis is that the nascent Indian 
capitalist class profited and found avenues o f economic expansion in the inter-war period in a 
number o f ways. This was directly linked to the crisis o f  the British Empire in the inter-war 
period. With the industrial rise o f Germany and the USA, by the eve o f the First World War 
close to one-fifth o f imports into the British economy were no longer paid for by the export o f 
goods. By the Second World War with the rise o f Japan, two fifths o f British imports were no 
longer compensated by exports. In the build up to the First World War, this adverse balance of 
trade was covered by overseas income from foreign investment, financial commissions and 
shipping. By World War II, even this overseas imperial income could not finance the balance of 
payments crisis facing the British state (Dutt 1949: 23-24).
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The second crisis o f British capital in India came from the threat o f penetration o f the 
captive colonial market in India by competing foreign goods. It was in this context that in 1905, 
with the establishment o f a new Department o f Commerce and Industry under Lord Curzon, the 
first Industrial Conference was held. By the beginning of the First World War, the American 
state had finished its comprehensive survey for entry into the ‘mass market5 in colonial India. 
The US department o f Commerce's Special Consular report stated
In doing business (in India) with the upper and middle classes it is possible to 
secure a rather wide margin of profit, but the sales must be comparatively small. In 
doing business with the great masses o f the people the margin o f profit must be 
extremely small; however the sales and collective profits may be enormous. (Baker 
1915 quoted in Ray 2002: 119-120)
The fear o f losing the Indian market was expressed by Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of 
India between 1910 and 1916, in his observation that India would become ‘the dumping ground 
for the manufactures o f foreign nations5 (Dutt 1992: 151), an activity that had been the 
prerogative o f British capital since the late 19th century (Bagchi 1972). The weakening of 
imperial capital in the inter-War period followed by the imperatives o f  World War II led to the 
penetration o f  American capital through trade into India. The value o f American exports to 
India rose phenomenally between 1938 and 1947 from 42.8 million dollar's in 1938 to 399.7 
million dollars in 1947 (Dutt 1949: 51).
Historians widely agree that the first priority o f the British state was the maintenance of 
stability in the imperial system (Bagchi 1972). The interests o f individual industries in Great 
Britain and British industrialists in India were subordinate to that objective (Panikkar 1959; 
Bagchi 1972; Markovits 1985). Nevertheless, the crisis o f empire created niches for the 
development o f Indian capital with a strong argument for the introduction o f a system o f tariffs 
to protect the Indian market from foreign competition. This system o f tariffs mainly aimed to 
protect British capital in the inter-war period and maintain ‘stability5 in the British empire but it 
also provided limited concessions and protection to Indian capital (Markovits 1985) as a result 
o f the imperative on the colonial state to accommodate basic demands from Indian capital and 
maintain it as an ally in the face o f a rise in labour militancy since the 1920s (Chandravarkar 
1994; Basu 2004). The concessions to Indian capital, however, were arbitrary, discriminatory 
and often short-lived. The Tariff Board received a series o f applications from Indian capitalists 
after iron and steel were granted protection in 1924 for three years, after which the subsidies 
were abolished and tariffs and basic duties were lowered. In the majority o f  cases, the most 
important being cement and paper, the applications were rejected. However the match industry, 
which was the preserve o f British capital in India, was granted protection (Dutt 1992: 153).
The Indian capitalist class on the whole remained an imperial supplicant during this 
period, but many o f the mill-owners o f Bombay and Ahmedabad also pledged their allegiance to 
Gandhi. It was only with the rise in momentum o f the national liberation struggle and the 
commitment o f the Congress leadership to the sanctity of property that this supplicant attitude
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changed in favour o f a socially conservative economic nationalism based on a leadership role 
for the state in developing capitalism after independence. The social conservatism was reflected 
in the non-engagement o f leading Indian capitalists with the material basis o f caste and gender 
oppression even though programmes o f social awareness against ‘untouchability5 were part o f 
the Gandhian agenda.
3.2 Political Economy and Ideology in India in the Late Colonial Period
The constitutional reforms o f the Government o f India Act, 1935 laid the structural 
foundations o f the independent Indian state that would gain ‘dominion status5 on 15* August 
1947 (Desai 2004: 15). This is distinct from the argument that there was no difference between 
the state in independent India and the colonial state as has often been put forward by many 
postcolonial authors. However the administrative structures in the 1935 Act were geared 
towards a ‘transfer o f power5 whose contours and limits were still controlled by the British 
state. The legislative, executive and judicial structures along with the Constitution and right o f 
sovereign administration which, would distinguish the post-independent state from the previous 
one were yet to be shaped depending on the internal developments within the Congress and the 
settlement with the Muslim League within the colonial framework o f ‘dyarchy5 in adopting a 
programme on the social basis o f the state. The Congress leadership's freedom to alter the 
existing social structure was also limited by the power o f landlords and ‘big5 capitalists 
(Namboodiripad 1975). With the attainment of full ‘sovereign5 status as a republic on 26th 
January 1950, one could argue that political independence and the fostering o f a bourgeois form 
o f democracy characterised by universal adult franchise was completed. Thus the transfer o f 
power and the achievement of full sovereign status took three years after ‘formal independence5, 
the culmination o f almost a decade o f power struggles and the modalities o f partition. 
Nationalist historians have pointed out that the ideology o f the new state derived its legitimacy 
to a significant extent from a vision o f improvements in living standards in an economy that had 
seen less than 1% growth for decades preceding independence (Tripathi 1990). But this ‘vision5 
o f adopting a capitalist path was hardly a representative one as each o f the institutions including 
the constitution was primarily adopted by individuals representing the propertied classes 
(Bettelheim 1968).
According to Ahmad,
...the emergence o f modern forms o f power, in the shape o f the state and of 
colonial capital, required the emergence o f corresponding political forms through which 
the colonized could represent themselves; however in blocking collective representation 
in the form o f equal citizenship rights and universal suffrage, the colonial state 
fragmented the emergent nation into its social units and greatly accentuated the 
cleavages, even though the fact o f being governed by the same colonial state gave to 
each o f these units a certain investment in nationalist rhetoric and some rudimentary 
form o f nationalist consciousness. (2000: 9, original emphasis)
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The Indian landed classes were a weak plank in the nationalist movement. The British 
adopted one o f three land revenue systems: landlord-based systems (also known as zamindari or 
malguzari), individual cultivator-based systems {raiyatwari) or village-based systems 
{mahalwari) (Banerjee and Iyer 2002). These revenue systems covered all o f colonial India 
through the Permanent Settlement in 1793 in Bengal and similar institutionalisations o f land 
ownership in other parts o f the country through the Zamindari system in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa 
and parts o f the Presidency o f  Madras or the minor variation in the Mahalwari system in the 
United Provinces and parts o f Northern India and the Raiyatwari system in all other parts of 
British India (Patnaik 1999). These systems mainly defined who had the liability for paying the 
land tax to the colonial state and by default designated who had “property rights'’ on land.
In spite o f the differences in the different kinds o f land settlement in various parts o f 
British India, the systems institutionalised property rights to Zamindars and raiyats respectively 
in exchange for heavy rates o f land revenue in cash (Patnaik 1999). If  the holding failed to pay 
its revenue arrears, it was taken over by the state and sold to the highest bidder. This burden o f 
land revenue, the clutches o f the moneylenders and sahukars (merchants or traders) who pushed 
through the production o f commercial crops, led to transfers o f estates and land to a propertied 
class. This in turn resulted in rack-renting that led to the extensive pauperisation o f small, 
marginal and landless peasants (Bhattacharya 2005). These land settlements initially aimed at 
establishing proprietary control over land weakened the old aristocratic elite in India by the 
beginning o f the twentieth century (Desai 2004). Merchants and moneylenders penetrated into 
rural areas by becoming conduits for loans to both declining landlords and to impoverished 
tenants.
Peasants, traders, and merchants participated in the exchanges that 
transferred goods from the fields to the marketing centres o f the region. By its 
very nature, in other words, the local marketing system had many points o f 
entry for men o f enterprise and means to stake out roles as agents o f exchange 
(Yang 1998: 223).
These ‘agents’ gained control over agrarian products and in some areas like Bengal, the 
heart o f the colonial experiment, they bought Zamindari estates which had become 
commodified because o f arrears in land revenue and thus could be bought, mortgaged and sold 
by individual owners. The Mahajan who often was a jo tdar  (rich peasant) in Bengal, the 
moneylender, and the trader became the main providers o f finances to pay these cash revenues. 
Based on legal bourgeois norms, they secured command over crops and land. The British legal 
system, money and the market economy, monetary and fiscal policy helped them to gain 
economic ascendancy (Desai 1984). It must be noted that the commodification o f land was not a 
uniform feature in British India but rack-renting in land was common. However this in itself did 
not necessarily entail capitalist social relations. The bulk o f the peasantry was tied in to tenancy 
and debt relations that often entailed ‘forced’ labour and hereditary employer-labour 
relationships (Patnaik 1972).
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Landlessness was also a feature o f the colonial period. One could argue that 
landlessness was in evidence in the Mughal period and was the basis o f an active internal labour 
market in India with massive movements o f  people in the so-called military labour market o f 
late medieval India under parts o f the Mughal Empire in Northern and Western India (Kolff 
2002). Habib (1975) also provides evidence o f a large rural proletariat consisting o f the menial 
and untouchable castes in the first half o f the eighteenth century. The zamindars and the upper 
peasants had their farms or khudkasth holdings cultivated by labourers, who were paid wages in 
cash as well as grain, and who in some areas, like parts o f Bihar and southern India, were held 
in conditions o f semi-bondage. But the colonial state’s massive reorganisation o f land rights and 
rent arrangements intensified the creation o f a growing class o f dispossessed people all over 
British India that saw dual origins in pre-capitalist hereditary employer-labour relationships on 
one hand and peasant pauperisation, hunger and famine on the other (Patnaik 1999).
Some o f the dethroned princes, the zamindars and other big landlords who lost their 
landed property, and the heads o f religious and caste institutions, saw in the colonial 
transformation brought about by the British rulers, a threat to the continuance o f  their rule. 
While some collaborated with the colonial rulers, many o f them were uncompromising in their 
opposition to foreign rulers and were using every means, including firepower, against the enemy 
(Namboodiripad 1975). This formed the backdrop o f the first war o f independence in 1857. The 
militant nationalism in these early stages o f the struggle against British colonialism was based 
on a strand o f revivalism that saw in the restoration o f the Mughal empire the route to liberation 
from the ‘foreign’ yoke. Revivalism in the mid to late nineteenth century especially after the 
subjugation of the 1857 uprising was the preserve of the old ruling class that was slowly 
collapsing. After 1857, the British state pursued a policy o f renewing and consolidating its links 
with princes, zamindars and other notables (Sarkar 1983). In the context o f the rise o f 
nationalist politics since the late nineteenth century, the landed aristocracy lost further ground 
due to the collaboration o f those that remained with or renewed their ties with colonialism.
From 1855 to 1920, the British state was faced with the rebellion of militant adivasi 
movements against the erosion o f joint property systems because o f the entry o f moneylenders, 
traders, land-grabbers and contractors. This started with the Santhal rebellion and was followed 
by episodes o f revolt spread over Chhotanagpur, Cachar, Gujarat, the Deccan and Madras 
Presidency. These anticolonial movements were ‘rebellion from below’ often articulated in 
ideologies o f internal religious and socio-cultural reform (Sarkar 1983). The ‘ulgulan’ led by 
Birsa Munda between 1899 and 1900 based on a militant agrarian, political and religious idiom 
was pitted against the commercialisation process that impinged on the life and collective 
property rights o f  adivasis. Birsa died in jail in 1900 after the rebellion was put down with a 
heavy hand and 350 o f his compatriots were tried, hanged or deported for life. But by 1910, the 
collective (khuntkatti) rights o f Santhals in Chhotanagpur was recognised and baithbegari, a 
form o f hereditary tie to employers was officially abolished (Singh 2002). Anti-colonial revolts
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thus were not just the preserve o f the dominant classes. Seventy-seven ‘lower class’ peasant 
rebellions against the British in India have been documented (Gough and Sharma 1973) that had 
elements o f ‘reform ’ as well as ‘revivalism’ but the rebellions always had a material basis in the 
oppression o f the land ownership and revenue systems.
A second plank o f nationalist ideology developed in the context o f the development of 
different strata o f capitalists and petty-bourgeois interests from the 1930s. The opportunities 
created for Indian business by World War II brought prosperity to Indian big business houses. 
At the same time, it increased mass suffering with ‘rampant inflation, widespread corruption, 
chronic shortages and vigorous ‘black’ markets, especially between 1942 and 1945, culminating 
in a devastating famine that ravaged Eastern as well as parts o f  Western and Southern India 
(Basu, Bhattacharya and Keys 1999: 2). Some variants of nationalist ideologies were finessed 
and developed by an urban petty-bourgeois leadership inspired by religious nationalism and in 
some cases fascism as in Golwalkar’s (1939) definition o f nationhood exclusively in terms o f 
the myth o f a ‘Hindu race’. This resonated among sections o f the
...bewildered petty bourgeoisie, harassed and endangered by processes o f 
remorseless economic change beyond their control, torn from their familiar moorings, 
tossed without compass, in the storms of a period o f transition and conflict, and vainly 
seeking the comfort o f some rock o f ancient certainty (Desai 2004: 623).
This formed the social premise o f popularity o f an idea o f a ‘Hindu’ nation in the 
structures o f the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) that gained 
ascendancy in the 1930s. Even provincial Congress committees in Northern India were 
dominated by Mahasabha members up to 1939 (Gondhalekar and Bhattacharya 1999). In 
contrast, Gandhi was an advocate o f reconstructed ancient Indian civilisation which stressed 
‘syncretism’ as opposed to Hindu chauvinism, but invoked ‘Hindu’ idioms adapted to the limits 
o f ‘modern’ conditions possible in a society o f the colonised, based on a renovated village 
economy and with limitations on industrialism. These limits were dependent on the ‘self- 
control’ o f  businessmen who would act as ‘trustees’ o f the nation’s wealth-making processes. 
But big business also had close links with revivalist Hindu ideologies. The first ban against the 
RSS was imposed after Gandhi was assassinated in 1948. Among the mediators who worked to 
lift the ban included G.D. Birla, the doyen o f  the biggest ‘business house’ —  a fact that 
symbolises the links between the RSS and a section o f the capitalist class in the period around 
independence (Kanungo 2002). During the rise in militant strikes in the 1920s in Calcutta and 
Bombay, attempts by capitalists to break strikes by divisive measures based on religion have 
also been noted (Chattopadhyay 2005).
Different strands o f  the Indian liberation struggle had different ideas o f what economic 
policy in free India should be. For capitalists the main problem under colonialism was 
discriminatory commercial policy and lack o f state assistance and that is what they lobbied and 
argued for. For socialists and other constituents the goals was much wider. That the British state 
was not just a force that had dehumanised and brutalised society, but also stunted the growth
83
and power o f the earlier ruling elite replacing it with a new class o f  people with origins in 
mercantile and industrial capital along with the landed rich. This analysis identified a new 
configuration o f ruling classes that were subservient to colonial interests and operated under 
colonial strictures. However, as the liberation struggle gathered momentum, their interests 
became pitted against colonial capital. According to Bagchi (1989: 27), the extension o f the 
bourgeoisie in this colonial context had a dual aspect -  an increase in the power o f the class as a 
whole and the erection o f barriers to keep it contained - without in the process losing its 
capacity to extend its control over resources. The key mechanism o f containment was racial 
discrimination that drew the informal and formal boundaries for the Indian capitalist class.
3.3 Indian Capital under Colonial Rule
The links o f the capitalist class with pre-capitalist forms o f  control was intrinsic to its 
growth and expansion in the colonial period.
The various forms o f  class subordination had accumulated and mutated 
sometimes under the impact o f capitalism from the colonial period to produce 
an amalgam o f the modern and the archaic (Patnaik 1999: 181).
Alavi (1982) argues that theories of “modernization” are explicitly or implicitly 
theories o f capitalist development, in as much as they are premised on the creation and 
maintenance o f the basic structures and institutions o f a capitalist society, which may be 
contrasted with the notion o f revolutionary change that would aim to make a decisive break with 
the internal structures and the international framework o f global capitalism. Both would involve 
the dissolution and transformation o f pre-capitalist social and economic structures, but each in a 
different way. According to Alavi (1982:289), in “modernizing” societies, the direction o f such 
change is towards their subsumption under peripheral capitalism. The possible extent o f this 
subsumption depends on the extent o f capitalist social relations beyond the capitalist enclaves in 
the colonial economy. This is the social basis o f the observation that few among the ‘modern5 
bourgeoisie in India were particularly modern (Ahmad 2000). The bourgeoisie in their 
economic practice deferred social conservatism. They accepted the equal rights o f Indian 
‘machine-made’ cloth, and Gandhi’s Eleven Points programme o f 1930, which was an extensive 
advocacy o f capitalist trade, industry and finance (Dutt 1992: 629).
State policy under the British in the later part o f the 19th century promoted European 
enterprise through railways under the guarantee system and allotment o f  vast tract o f lands to 
tea planters in Assam at nominal prices. The organised money market was under white control. 
The monopoly over the bulk o f external trade was most pronounced in Eastern India because o f 
the early British hegemony over indigo, tea and coal. Western India was more difficult to 
penetrate till the construction o f the railways and due to Maratha rule upto 1818 and the survival 
of native states (Sarkar 1983).
Capitalist enclaves set up by settler capitalists such as plantation owners characterised 
the colonial economy by early 20th century. Within these enclaves, through the contradictions of
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colonial policy, oligopolistic Indian capitalism emerged in a few specific sectors. The railways, 
plantation and mines, ju te mills, banking, insurance, shipping and export-import companies, 
promoted through managing agency firms was the direct innovation o f colonial rule in India. 
The most influential foreign capital in India, the British managing agencies, emerged as the 
commercial agents o f British industrial enterprises. Later, they ventured into manufacturing 
themselves, but its scale and spheres were limited by the agencies’ function o f marketing goods 
produced in the metropolitan countries (Malyarov 1983: 2). This created capitalist enclaves in 
the economy combining financial, commercial and industrial activities under foreign control. 
British control over the decisive sectors o f the economy inhibited indigenous capitalist growth 
till the 1910s (Sarkar 1983: 37-38).
The British state indirectly and sometimes directly curbed indigenous manufacturing, 
merchant and money-lending classes, depriving them o f both foreign and domestic inter-urban 
trade and commerce (Desai 1984). However, the grip o f indigenous commercialism could not be 
easily detached in the rural areas. The second half o f the nineteenth century saw a proliferation 
o f Indian traders and moneylenders all over northern, eastern and central India. Their status has 
been defined as ‘dependent collaborators’ and it remained so till the First World War (Desai 
1984: 40). Before the First World War, modern factories in India constituted an ‘enclave’ 
economy with only two major centres o f industrial production -  Calcutta and Bombay (Bagchi 
1972: 424).
Calcutta was dominated by British capital while Bombay and Ahmedabad were the 
preserves o f relatively autonomous Indian merchant capital often traced to Parsi and Gujarati 
ethno-linguistic origins. In Bombay and later in Ahmedabad a genuinely indigenous capitalist 
textile industry developed. The primary accumulation o f capital for the development o f this 
industry has been traced to merchant capitalist accumulation in the trade with China in opium 
and yarn (Bagchi 1972; Sarkar 1983). This opium trade was one of the key sources of revenue 
for the colonial state accounting for 15% to 17% o f total public income (the principal 
constituent items as percentage o f total gross revenue o f the Government o f India) between 
1858-59 and 1870-71 (Bhattacharya 2005: Table 1.1: 326).
Not surprisingly, the literature on the nature of capitalism in India before independence 
have characterised the economy up to the beginning o f World War I in 1914 as an economy 
consisting o f capitalist enclaves (Kidron 1965; Malyarov 1975). Calcutta and Bombay were the 
major industrial centres. Indian entrepreneurs were concentrated in Bombay and Ahmedabad. 
The source o f their primitive accumulation apart from comprador trade gathered momentum in 
the scarcity conditions during the period o f World War I. Gandhi advocated village based small 
enterprises in handloom as a solution to the growing pauperism in rural India in 1908. By his 
own admission when the Satyagraha Ashram was founded in Sabarmati, handlooms were 
introduced but no one knew how to operate a handloom as
.. .all o f us belonged either to the liberal professions or to business; not 
one o f us was an artisan (Gandhi 1927: 450).
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Even more significantly, though the ‘khadi’ and the ‘charkha’ became symbolic for 
Congress workers, the cotton-mill industry in Bombay and Ahmedabad grew substantially in the 
twenty years before 1914 (Dutt 1992). The small but cautious set o f Indian capitalists were 
finding niches o f  operations within the limits set on them by the colonial system o f production. 
Demands for fiscal autonomy and tariff protection became stronger during and after World War 
I coming from both British industrial and financial interests and Indian capitalists in the context 
o f the economic turbulence o f the inter-war period (Bagchi 1972: 422). The landlords were 
sometimes against tariff protection as they feared adverse terms o f trade in agriculture but this 
was case-specific as they often invested in industry and were producers and suppliers o f 
agricultural raw materials. Thus, tariffs often worked in their interest (Bagchi 1972: 427). In the 
late colonial period capitalist and landowner interests in terms o f demands for protectionist 
policies from the colonial state did not necessarily conflict. The main motto was caution: to seek 
safe profits, remain supplicant to the colonial state and prevent any stirring o f the social order 
(Bagchi 1972; Ray 1979).
Between the first and second World Wars, the first wave o f economic diversification 
took place. Once the example o f  potential profits in manufacturing had been established, Indian 
entrepreneurs who had made their money in trade and finance began to invest in industry. 
Between 1914 and 1939, the share o f Indian capitalists in modern industry grew rapidly. Indian 
industry attained self-sufficiency in the production of consumption goods like cloth, sugar and 
matches. Small business in cotton presses, rice and oil mills and other small units developed and 
grew even before World War I.
The social origins o f new entrepreneurs who came to the fore in the economic 
diversification o f the inter-war period were traced to trade and finance rather than the 
westernised professional classes (Bagchi 1972). Large-scale units in consumer goods industries 
catering to the home market emerged in textile, sugar, match and paper industries. By World 
War II, the sugar mills based in Bihar and the United Provinces in Northern India catered to 
internal demand.Cotton mills expanded from Bombay and Ahmedabad to Kanpur, Madras, 
Madura, Coimbatore and Delhi. The small-scale sector in industry was mainly in cotton gins 
and presses, jute presses, rice mills, khandsaris (open pan process o f sugar manufactures), and 
small powerloom and handloom manufacturing set up since World War I (Bagchi 1972).
Bombay emerged as a centre for producer goods like iron and steel, cement, shipping 
and chemicals. However the development o f capital goods was meagre. It was primarily 
restricted to the environs of the productive base around capitalist enclaves (Ray 1979). With one 
or two exceptions, capital requirements were sourced from the local economy in the small-scale 
sector. The separation o f the formal banking system under British control from the sphere of 
commercial operations o f Indian capital led to a massive structure o f informal credit systems 
that formed the bulwark o f money-commodity relationships. Capital shortage became an
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endemic feature o f the economy after 1914 limiting the diversification o f the Indian economy 
(Kidron 1965).
The nascent working class in India grew in the early part o f the 20th century though it 
was miniscule. The percentage o f total population employed in organised industry was 0.69% 
according to the census o f 1911. However, indentured labour in tea plantations in India was part 
o f the ‘modern’ economy, along with the working class in mines and factories. Together, they 
constituted the new Indian working class at the turn o f the last century (Sarkar 1983: 41-42). 
The modern industrial sector in India from the first half o f the 20th century up to the First World 
War consisted mainly o f cotton, jute, coal and tea industries, o f which the first was controlled 
by Indian capital and the others remained overwhelmingly under British management and 
control. Cotton and jute were characterised as major industries while paper and wool were 
considered minor industries in terms o f size and production techniques (Saini 1978, Table VII: 
157).
By 1939, India became nearly self-sufficient in the production o f cotton textiles and 
became a major exporter during the Second World War. The sugar industry was large enough to 
cater to domestic demands. Steel and cement emerged as large industries during this period. 
However, India in 1939 was almost entirely dependent on imports for machinery, machine tools 
and chemicals. The beginnings o f an industry producing modem cotton textile machinery can be 
traced to the Second World War when the Birla Brothers floated the Textile Machinery 
Corporation in 1941 (Sarkar 1983). But capital goods industries did not develop and industry as 
a whole was heavily dependent on European technical expertise and imported machinery 
(Bagchi 1972). Foreign capitalists also controlled the trade in staple industries and international 
cartels indirectly controlled much o f Indian industry through the managing agency houses 
(Bagchi 1972: 440-442).
Nevertheless, new Indian entrepreneurial groups emerged through their access to trade 
or construction and the opening up o f opportunities in different fields and regions. The new 
groups o f entrepreneurs did not always belong to specific castes. Most entrepreneurial groups 
coming from different castes had been connected with trade or construction before entering 
industry (Bagchi 1972: 433-434), A classic example is the family o f  Bhai Mohun Singh who 
were to emerge as owners o f Ranbaxy -  a major pharmaceutical enterprise in about forty years 
time. The founders o f the family made their fortune in construction during the Second World 
War in undivided Punjab and the North West Frontier (Bhandari 2005).
With the proliferation o f these miniscule capitalist enclaves, the industrial working class 
also grew in numbers though just 6% o f the population was employed in factories and could be 
said to have a status o f ‘formal’ employment. This population was predominantly male. The 
livelihoods o f a majority o f both men and women remained in the informal sector. Thus, a huge 
informal economy characterized the Indian economy from the colonial period. Colonial
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capitalist labour relations used informalisation as a tool based on ‘coolie gangs’ in construction 
works in railways and factories and as ‘temporary labour’ in tea, rubber and coffee plantations.
However, unionisation and organised dissent among workers based on both political 
and economic demands began to be articulated by the end o f World War I.
According to Basu (2004: 3),
...between 1918 and 1920 Bengal witnessed widespread industrial 
strikes that provided a powerful momentum for organizing the Khilafat non­
cooperation movement. Political parties now began to see the advantages of 
developing links with, and establishing a foothold among, the jute mill 
labourers.
By the 1930s, trade unions were fast becoming a political force to reckon with in 
Bengal and Bombay Presidency and an organised working class made its presence felt through 
militant strikes (Basu 2004). This class o f  workers in the organised sector became one o f the 
most radical voices o f  class based organisation in Indian politics till both state-led capitalism 
and ‘neoliberalism’ began to portray it as a ‘barrier’ to economic ‘progress’ as we shall see in 
later chapters.
The period between 1919 and the government o f India Act o f 1935 saw three changes: 
first, the British government in London decided not to interfere with problems affecting Indian 
finances as long as the Central legislature in India and the Government in Delhi were in 
agreement under the system o f dyarchy introduced by the Montague Chelmsford ‘Reforms’ 
(Panikkar, 1959). The second was the acceptance o f the policy o f limited protection for Indian 
manufactures reflected in a cautious policy o f tariff that were extended to steel, sugar, cement, 
silk and with some hesitation even cotton (Panikkar 1959). The third was the inter-locking of 
Indian banking and insurance with the colonial banking system during this period, a departure 
from the earlier policy o f not interfering in the ‘indigenous informal sphere o f credit’ (Ray 
2000). What this amounted to was a recognition that with the strengthening o f Indian capital in 
the inter-war years, there were areas where Indian and British capital could co-operate to the 
benefit o f the colonial power (Ray 2002).
Thus, the British administrative machinery had on the one hand limited the economic 
development o f India by separating the link between economic and political power. This meant 
that emerging Indian capital could only develop in and around the ‘capitalist enclaves’ in a 
society where non-capitalist social-relations still dominated. On the other hand, the Indian 
commercial classes were protected from the wrath and struggles o f the exploited strata through 
the ‘rule o f law’ enforced by a huge police force and judicial structure. The British provided 
convenient means o f depriving the rural masses o f  their crops, resources, customary security 
and personal protection. Economic resources were thus created and can be argued to have 
furthered the basis o f primary accumulation by emerging Indian capitalists.
The political interests o f Indian capital therefore remained subservient to imperial 
interests till the end o f the First World War, Indian business was cautious in its demands and
was (Ray 1979: 426) content with a framework o f limited tariff protection even when tariff 
policy was blatantly racist in its identification o f sectors o f protection. However between the 
two World Wars, capitalist groups grew in strength. In spite o f variations in attitudes and 
conflicts between short-term and long-term interest that asserted themselves in national politics 
in the 1930s and in constitutional discussions, the role o f organised Indian capitalists in the 
nationalist movement gradually became more important.
By mid 1932, a faction o f big business saw dyarchy under the Government o f India Act 
as a positive development through which they could further pursue their interests and hoped that 
Gandhi would decide in favour o f accepting office. This coincided with a period of 
disillusionment with civil disobedience in the broader nationalist movement and the rise o f the 
radical left wing within the Congress. The broad Left was organised around their support for 
labour and kisan (peasant) organisations and their struggles mainly in the princely states o f  the 
time. The Left in this period included the ‘Congress Socialists, the followers o f M.N. Roy, and 
the ‘illegal’ Communist Party of India that worked through the Congress Socialist Party5 
(Sarkar 1983: 370). These conflicts also created new opportunities for Indian capitalists to play 
a leadership role in the nationalist movement in ways that would be more acceptable to the 
colonial power.
The supplicant attitude o f Indian capital to the British state that Sarkar (1983) noted in the 
early support o f Indian capitalists within the Congress to British rule changed with the prospect 
o f Congress provincial governments being formed after 1935 and the defeat o f the Congress 
socialists in the leadership struggle at the highest echelons of the Congress organisation - the 
Working Committee. This was the outcome o f the ideological conflict between the ‘Right’ and 
the ‘Left5 within the Congress from the Tripuri to the Haripura sessions o f the Congress 
between 1938 and 1939 (Tripathi 1990). With the ascendance o f the Right, blessed by Gandhi, 
clearly evident by 1939, the major decisions affecting the modalities o f the ‘state to be’ became 
the preserve o f the new ‘ruling class’ to be. Chibber (2003) locates the installation o f the 
capitalist class as the key driver o f state policies in the workings o f  the National Planning 
Committee. But this was a somewhat foregone conclusion with the decisive win of the right in 
the Tripuri Congress in 1939. The anti-colonial and anti-imperialist liberation struggles now led 
to a demand for power and participation in ‘governance5 and the formation o f provincial 
ministries by Congress in 1936-37 under the provisions of the Government o f India Act 1935. 
This strengthened the political clout o f Indian capital in the last decade o f the struggle for 
independence (Ray 1979). However many other forces were at play that also made the emerging 
capitalists very dependent on state support to preserve their leadership role. The Congress 
decision to resign from ministries at the outbreak o f World War II (Ahmad 2000); the extension 
o f the Quit India movement far beyond the limits envisaged by the Congress leadership; and the 
legalisation o f the Communist Party made capitalist organisations even more dependent on the 
colonial state for the protection and stability of ‘business’ and property in the face of rising
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militancy o f the Kisan Sabhas and the strike-waves by workers in the Bombay Presidency and 
Bengal (Rasul 1989; Sarkar 1990).
The emerging Indian capitalist class was not only a highly dependent one; it also 
supported ideologies that were far from modernising. They remained orthodox in social and 
religious matters. The family firm remained characteristic o f business units. Caste and ties based 
on ethno-linguistic affinities along with the joint family set-up remained vital to business 
organisation and expansion. In spite o f the contradictions faced by Indian capitalists within the 
colonial economic structure, the class remained overwhelmingly loyalist till the 1920s (Sarkar 
1983: 63-64). Capitalist groups in different regions were at different stages o f  development and 
there were conflicts over control o f resources and markets. These conflicts were one o f the 
crucial factors in the growing support for Partition within the capitalist class.
The characteristics o f nation-states that emerged out o f anti-colonial liberation struggles is 
thus linked to the specific history o f colonialism and imperialism (Patnaik 1984) and to the 
specific imperatives and limits that emerged out of the mass struggles against the colonial state 
(Bhambhri 1998). The key fact according to Ahmad (2000: 1) is that the rise o f modern politics 
in a colonial context in India was not based on rights o f common citizenship. So the basis o f 
bourgeois democracy through popular representation, the right to vote, when it did come in 
colonial India meant that only the ‘propertied educated’ could vote. This added to the 
strengthening o f the ‘voice’ o f  the organised platforms o f Indian capital in the outcomes of 
elections before independence. Not surprisingly, these facts help to explain the privileging o f 
the interests o f  private property and the characteristics o f capital accumulation from the inter- 
war period onwards.
The dominant fractions o f Indian capitalists were supporters o f Gandhi. Either as 
Congress functionaries or as representatives o f ‘business interests’, many were involved in the 
direct policy making apparatus o f  the state-to-be like the National Panning Committee (Chibber 
2003), They were also represented in the Economic Policy Committee o f the Congress (Chenoy 
1985). They formed an important part o f  the decision-making apparatus at the provincial level 
along with the landed gentry after the Congress ministries were formed in 1937 (Malyarov 
1975). In this politics o f representation in policy making at the highest levels possible for 
Indians before independence with limits on the right to vote confined to the educated propertied, 
and the nature o f organisations that could be ‘legal’, they became relatively more powerful than 
the declining landed aristocracy. This was because o f their proximity to the central institution of 
the Congress, the Congress Working Committee and its undisputed leader Gandhi. Thus they 
exercised a more direct say compared to the upper strata o f the rich landed peasantry that had 
gained political power at local levels o f  Congress organisation (Rasul 1989).
Nevertheless, there were internal disagreements about the extent o f state involvement in 
the economy within the Congress. The organised platforms o f capital like the different 
chambers of commerce and industry overruled the adherence o f Gandhi to his theory of
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‘trusteeship’. The bigger oligopolistic ‘family owned business houses’ reached a consensus on 
the role o f the state as a protector o f property, the sanctity o f ‘personal laws’ based on religion 
to define the legal entity o f  the Hindu Undivided Family (Sachdeva 1987), the security of 
business ventures and primary accumulation to develop large scale modern industrial 
development (Sen 1975).
The relatively big capitalists based in Bombay initially led by Modi tried to form the 
Reforms Party based mainly on commercial and industrial interests to counter the threat posed 
by the rise o f a ‘powerful’ left wing within the Congress, their disappointment with the liberals 
in their vacillation in accepting the new constitution and the growing influence o f rural interests 
in Congress politics (Markovits 1985). However Birla and Thakurdas lobbied firmly for the 
Congress to take office and by 1935 it was clear that dyarchy would be accepted. This forged 
the unity o f  the Bombay business class behind Congress mainly because o f a British policy of 
drastic budgetary cuts and a threat o f a possible change in tariff policy (Markovits 1985).
The ambivalent attitude o f Indian capital towards a planned and protected economy 
emerged out o f the complex interplay o f national and provincial factors between 1937 and 1939. 
However, the overall dominance o f the National Planning Committee by capitalist elements 
soon led Nehru to acknowledge that ‘constituted as the Planning Committee is, we can hardly 
begin tackling the question on a socialist basis’ (Markovits 1985). ‘Development’ would take 
place within this economic framework o f bourgeois democracy and the state would lead through 
a process o f indicative planning. Freedom came in the form o f a historical compromise with the 
partition and the perpetuation o f overseas capital in India. According to Malyarov (1983: 5) in 
1948, the number o f companies registered abroad but operating in India accounted for 63 per 
cent o f the total foreign direct investment in the country. Another 21% fell to the share o f the 
Indian subsidiaries o f foreign companies in which the share o f Indian capital was just 5 per cent 
(Malyarov 1983: 7).
3.4 Political Organisation till Independence
In the colonial context, till the First World War, political organisation arose under
severe legal restrictions. Elite groupings arose initially as supplicants to the colonial state and 
remained so as long as they could follow two-track policies o f radical rhetoric and supplicant 
action (Ahmad 2000: p 13). The development o f class based politics remained weak due to the 
colonial blockage o f industrial development through discriminatory tariff and excise policies, 
active promotion o f European enterprise and white control over the organised money market 
(Sarkar 1983: 39). Till the end o f  the First World War, the proletariat remained small as 
discussed above and so did the bourgeoisie. Organisations arose on the basis o f community, 
religion, sect and caste. However some organisations based on class appeared on the political 
horizon quite early.
Bhattacharya (2005: 7) provides an extensive survey o f the characteristics o f political 
organisation under the term ‘pressure groups’ in colonial India. Myriad forms o f organised
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associations o f capital emerged from the mid to late 19th century. Europeans dominated the 
Chambers o f Commerce in Calcutta, Madras and Karachi. The Bombay Chamber o f Commerce 
was more representative o f Indian businesses especially the Parsi business houses o f the 19th 
century. The chambers o f commerce were mainly interested in tariffs, duties, and land 
regulations affecting plantations. Traders associations had a more limited agenda - that of 
obtaining tax relief (Bhattacharya 2005).
In 1895, five engineering firms, all members o f the Bengal Chamber o f Commerce and 
Industry, came together to form the Engineering and Iron Trades Association (EITA) with the 
aim o f pressurising the colonial government to place government orders for iron and steel and 
engineering goods with companies based in India. At that time the practice was to place all 
government orders with firms based in Britain. The change in name from EITA to Indian 
Engineering Association (1EA) was in keeping with the association’s decision to exclude traders 
from its membership and concentrate on promoting the cause o f manufacturers. By their own 
account, this reflected the association’s commitment to the development o f a production base 
and to dissociate itself from the short-run interests o f trade. Till 1942, IEA was the only all- 
India association o f the engineering industry and represented mainly big engineering 
companies, particularly British firms. This led to a situation where the interests o f the smaller 
Indian firms, which could be characterised as medium and small-scale, were not sufficiently 
represented. This led to the formation o f Engineering Association o f India by Indian firms in 
1942 as an affiliate o f the Indian Chamber o f Commerce (Tyabji 2000).
It must be noted that the division o f interest between traders and industrialists existed in 
the 1940s in spite o f the efforts o f  the Federation o f Indian Chambers o f Commerce and 
Industiy to bridge this divide. Visvesvaraya’s All India M anufacturer’s Organisation (AIMO) 
representing mostly small and medium scale enterprises had suggested that FICCI’s opposition 
to the taxation measures proposed by Liaqat Ali Khan’s budget proposals in 1947 were due to 
its predominant support base consisting o f  ‘businessmen’ seeking quick profits, and not ‘true 
industrialists’ (Tyabji 2000).
An ‘early socialist nucleus’ came into being in the early 1920s (Chattopadhyay 2005) 
drawing inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and based on an 
understanding o f  colonialism as ‘imperialism’ defined as the highest stage o f monopoly 
capitalism in keeping with the Lenin-Hilferding thesis. With the formation o f the Communist 
Party o f India in the 1920s, spheres o f  influence and links with the working class soon emerged 
leading to a series o f strike waves in the late 1920s. The rising tendency o f socialism with 
varying degrees o f clarity, understanding and interpretations (Zachariah 2005) won wide and 
‘increasing support within the national movement, especially among the younger generation’ 
(Dutt 1992: 623).
Simultaneously, apex bodies o f industrial organisations and associations (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1998: 31) became politically active as Indian capital gained economic strength at the
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beginning o f the twentieth century. The Associated Chambers o f Commerce and Industry, the 
representative body o f white colonial capital came into being in early twentieth century. Their 
elected presidents, permanent secretariats, and sponsored research organisations and 
publications had a say on industrial relations, wage policy and productivity issues. The 
Federation o f  Indian Chambers o f Commerce and Industry (FICCI) was founded in 1927 with 
the support o f Gandhi. The commercial and industrial bourgeoisie were also a part o f the 
Congress and shared a close relationship with Gandhi and other nationalists like Sardar Patel. 
The section o f capitalists in FICCI, propelled by requirements o f survival and possible 
expansion opportunities, forged dual relationships. They supported mass struggles for extracting 
concessions from the colonial state, and exerted pressure to restrain such struggles for fear o f 
the growth o f radicalism (Sarkar 1990). The coming o f  the popular provincial governments 
under the Government o f India Act 1935 and the relative weakening o f the British economy due 
to the Depression increased the opportunity for Indian capitalists to influence policy.
The era o f mass politics combined with organised peasant struggles led by the Kisan 
Sabhas emerged in various parts o f India in the 1930s. The expansion o f the bourgeoisie and the 
intensification o f class struggle around the world because o f the events o f  1917 in Russia 
provided two alternative paths to the national liberation movement in India (Desai 1984:102). In 
the next two decades, the anti-colonial struggle was widened with politics from below in terms 
o f mass participation and an ideological widening with the assertion o f socialist and communist 
strands. However, the Second World War; the heightened contradictions o f  the liberation 
struggle; the politics o f communal divide, aided and abetted by the colonial state; and the 
strategic defeat o f the socialist section o f the Congress leadership by the Congress right between 
the Haripura (1938) and Tripuri (1939) sessions, took its toll. Further, the ensuing bloody 
history o f partition and war over Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan soon after Independence 
emerged as the most striking precedent and immediate result respectively o f the birth o f the 
Indian state.
3.5 Struggle within the Congress over State Ideology
The Congress national leadership was drawn from the upper echelons o f the
predominantly Hindu upper caste propertied and professional classes. This leadership 
represented a mix o f Brahmanical and Westernised cultures (Desai 2004: 15). In the 1880s,
Congress demands put forward in the form o f gentlemanly resolutions 
at staid annual sessions, which still eagerly asserted their basic Ioyalism, could 
find as yet no resonance amidst the peasant millions.
(Sarkar 1983: 2)
However, in the next fifty years, the Congress leadership went beyond its confines to 
lead the biggest chunk o f the mass movement that was the Indian liberation struggle. The 
struggle for freedom had brought to positions o f leadership men and women drawn mainly from 
the intelligentsia and professional groups, but whose political philosophies ranged from the
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strongly conservative to support for socialism. The ideological ambiguities pulled in different 
directions on the basis o f mobilisations both within the Congress and outside it (Sarkar 1990).
The professional elite and capitalist leadership of the Congress gained ascendancy as 
the logical inheritors o f the independent Indian state after their strategic win in the struggle 
against the socialists in the Congress, which began at the Haripura session in 1938 and ended in 
the Tripuri session in March 1939 (Frankel 2005: 59). The Kisan Sabha even in the early period 
o f its existence was demonstrably a militant mass organisation in a number o f provinces and 
regions upholding the class interests o f kisans (peasants) as against the exploiting interests o f 
landlords and sahukars (moneylenders) which were represented by the provincial Congress 
leadership in general. (Rasul 1989: 28).
The Congress leadership had an uneasy relationship with the class basis o f the Sabha 
mobilisations. The session o f the National Congress at Haripura in Gujarat in February 1938 
banned the rallies o f kisans when thousands o f kisan marchers arrived. While the Congress was 
leading the ministry in Bihar, the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee entered into an anti- 
kisan agreement with the zamindars. In the ensuing struggle, the Congress Working Committee 
supported the provincial committee making it clear that the class agenda o f the ‘kisan struggle’ 
would not have any endorsement from the national leadership o f the Congress (Rasul 1989:18).
While reiterating its support for the anti-imperialist activities o f  the Congress, the All 
India Kisan Committee condemned the
... wanton, undignified and mischievous attacks levelled persistently at 
Kisan sabhas, Kisan workers and Kisan activities by some responsible Congress 
leaders who are being reinforced in their campaign by zamindars, sahukars and 
other allies o f the British. (Rasul 1989: 19).
A powerful campaign developed in Bihar in July and August 1938. The Congress 
Ministry dreading the mood o f the irate kisans against the agreement issued an order banning 
the carrying o f lathis in processions and meetings for 10 days in the face o f a huge rally o f 
kisans in Patna on 15th August 1938.
By 1945, in the Netrakona session, the Kisan Sabha leadership noted
...the scarcity and mal-distribution o f controlled essential commodities 
such as cloth, kerosene, salt, sugar and agricultural implements due to
inadequate supply and black-marketing. It also launched the save Bengal
campaign after the Bengal famine. (Rasul 1989:120).
In 1942 the Communist Party was finally legalised and by 1945 the Kisan Sabha
leadership was dominated by communists. Meanwhile, disenchantment with the provincial 
governments was growing. Although Congress took office in 1937, the October meeting o f the 
All India Kisan Sabha passed a resolution attacking the ministries for the ‘piecemeal, superficial 
and perfunctory manner’ in which they were dealing with peasant grievances (Frankel 2005: 
59). Congress socialists like Indulal Yagnik, N G Ranga and Swami Sahajanand became
alienated and ‘depressed’ about the developments in the peasant mobilisations led by
communists though the communists assured the separation o f party and mass front. This was
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reiterated in Muzaffar Ahmad’s presidential address atN etrakona session in 1945 (Rasul 1989). 
By 1947, the leadership o f  the biggest mass front o f the Congress, the Kisan Sabha, was 
dominated by Communists in Bengal, Hyderabad and Bihar. By July 1948, 2,500 villages in the 
south were organised into communes as part o f a peasant struggle that erupted into the 
communist led Telangana uprising. Simultaneously the Andhra Thesis for the first time 
demanded that the ‘Indian revolution’ follow the Chinese path o f protracted people’s war. In 
June 1948, a leftist ideological document the ‘Andhra Letter’ laid down a revolutionary strategy 
based on Mao Tse Tung's New Democracy (Rasul 1989).
The prospect o f  transition to a socialist or even ‘socialistic’ system was never a serious 
agenda for the Congress leadership after the victory o f the Congress right in the Tripuri session. 
Gandhi’s theory o f state-regulated trusteeship emphasising voluntary reform through the moral 
regeneration o f the exploiting classes was his answer to the Marxist claim that class war was the 
only effective weapon o f  social revolution (Pandya 1994:11). The industrial bourgeoisie while 
swearing allegiance to Gandhi’s ideology and leadership never permitted it to stand in the way 
o f its requirements. Ideology however was always bent on opportunism as illustrated by the 
early financing o f the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha by powerful sections of the 
capitalist class who had direct links with the Congress either as members or supporters 
(Gondhalekar and Bhattacharya 1999),
However, the twin daggers o f  communist challenge and socialist dissent within the 
Congress loomed as a threat and forced Congress towards a dialogue over the form of 
‘development’ that would be most suitable for the Indian state. The National Planning 
Committee was a step in this direction.
Gandhi’s theory o f state-regulated trusteeship was never taken on board very seriously 
even by the capitalists who were close to Gandhi. It was very clear to Nehru as early as in 1939 
that planning need not pre-suppose socialist aims. The aim o f  the Congress was to create a 
nationalised sector in basic industries, banking and services based on the Karachi Resolution of 
1931. The other aim o f planning for Nehru was to ensure a balance between production and 
consumption and limit the ‘profit motive’ in production. But it was clear to him that this ‘was 
perhaps not possible’ within the ‘present social structure’ and he felt it would be wrong to 
challenge the structure. He expressed these views in a letter to K.T. Shall, the Secretary o f the 
National Planning Committee on 13th May 1939 (Nehru 1984: 373-374). So it was hardly 
surprising that the modern Indian capitalist class assured by these guarantees threw its weight 
behind the National planning Committee set up after the Industrial Planning Conference in 1938 
(Dutt 1949: 629). The colonial institutions within which the class had to operate made them 
arrive at the consensus opinion that the state’s developmental role was important and could not 
be reduced to the Smithian one o f guaranteeing property rights and maintaining a competitive 
market.
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Parliamentary democracy was widely accepted by the Congress neither as an ideology 
nor as a set o f immutable “rules o f the game” but only as a workable modus operandi for 
resolving conflicts over distributions o f power and pelf. It was acceptable to those sections, 
which enjoyed or could aspire to power, wealth and status. No group or alliance o f classes could 
aspire to a monopoly o f political power as political majorities were only transient class 
coalitions o f  minorities in India (Yang 1998).
3.6 Post World War Consensus on Development and Indian Capital
The tradition o f nationalist economics began to develop in India from the 1870s. The 
nationalist critique directly related the abysmal and growing poverty o f India to certain 
deliberate British policies, particularly to the ‘drain o f wealth’ through an artificial export 
surplus, destruction o f handicrafts followed by hindrances to modern Indian industry, and 
excessive land revenue burdens (Naoroji 1962). The ‘drain o f wealth’ theory provided the core 
o f the Indian critique o f  British domination in all ideological strands o f the heightened anti­
colonial struggle in the first four decades o f the twentieth century (Sarkar 1983: 86-88).
Ideas about how the state could act as the leader o f a planned investment strategy as 
incorporated later in the Mahalanobis model were widely shared by economists o f the time. The 
Indian economists and planners who shared this consensus after World War II included for 
instance, Bhabotosh Dutta, Sukhamoy Chakravarty, and Bimal Jalan. An entire generation o f 
post-Independence Indian economists wrote within a statist framework o f ‘developmentalism’. 
The underlying causes o f  structural backwardness in India like the shortage o f capital, the low 
level o f savings, structural limitations preventing the conversion o f savings into investment 
were accepted by the dominant economic thinking o f the time (Nayar 2001: 60). Elements o f the 
Lewis and the Harrod-Domar models were apparent in the structure o f the Mahalanobis model.
The Prebisch Singer hypothesis about the secular decline o f the terms o f trade against 
countries exporting primary products and importing manufactures had an important impact. The 
theories based on rural unemployment (Lewis 1954) and underemployment (Nurkse 1955) also 
informed a wide range o f economic policies. Developments in economic theory reinforced these 
ideas as in theories o f  the ‘big push’ (Rosenstein-Rodan), o f the take o ff (Rostow), the 
minimum critical effort (Leibenstein) and backward and forward linkages (Hirschmann). The 
set o f policy conclusions from this literature supported state-led regimes based on protection, 
planning and industrialisation within the theoretical frameworks o f the ‘unbalanced growth’ 
school. Much o f this theory was based on general models o f a ‘typical developing country’. 
However, based on the general theory, economists and policy makers in specific nation-states 
formulated specific strategies o f state-led capitalism even though neoclassical economics began 
to ‘refute’ these theories by the 1960s (Schultz 1964).
The first plan drawn up between 1950 and 1955 reflected the centrality of the state in 
facilitating growth, accumulation and investment and the strong argument in favour o f self­
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reliance as a strategy to ward o ff imperialist economic dominance. Not free trade, but the 
growth in the volume o f manufacturing explained the growth o f trade from 1945 to 1973 
(Nayyar 1997). The key drivers o f growth in the planning models were capital accumulation, 
technological progress and improvements in labour productivity. Much o f economic policy was 
generated within this framework of political economy. The planners and academia worked in 
close tandem and the idea o f ‘development’ driven by a ‘strong state’ was very much part o f the 
Third World consensus.
In fact, the actual process o f planning in India had started much earlier in the 1930s 
(Datta 1992). However, during the colonial period, technological dependence on foreign capital 
(not just British) and dependence on techniques o f production persisted. The shift into 
autonomous machine good production was not possible within the frameworks o f colonial 
policy. State support for moving up the technology ladder more rapidly even in the late period 
o f  colonialism when some protection in the form o f tariff structures were granted for the 
emerging capitalist sector was limited (Ray 1979). There was also a narrow base of 
technological personnel and skilled white-collar technicians were few and far between because 
o f colonial education policy. Large foreign firms like Unilever, IC1, Dunlop and General Motors 
had already started Indian subsidiaries (Bagchi 1972). Competing with these giant firms would 
not be possible unless the state sector provided suitable incentive structures. This was clear to 
the representative organisations o f capitalists (FICCI 1954).
The limits on the profits o f Indian capitalists at independence came not from any state 
strictures on profit but from the low productivity base ensured by colonial policies. No amount 
of private initiatives could be enough to break out of this structurally vicious circle. The only 
way out lay in the provision o f a broad range o f inter-related facilities by the state, the lack of 
which had till then rendered a whole range o f economic activities unprofitable (Ray 1979). This 
was the view o f capitalists involved in the National Planning Committee.
According to Frankel (2005: 71),
...after independence, two contradictory tendencies were already well advanced 
inside the Congress party. On the one hand, the national party executive endorsed 
principles o f state ownership, regulation, and control over key sectors o f the economy in 
order to improve productivity and at the same time curb economic concentration. On the 
other hand, the national Congress government pursued liberal economic policies and 
incentives to private investment that were justified in terms o f the sole criterion o f 
achieving maximum increases in production. The phenomenon reflected a serious 
attrition in the strength o f the socialist and Gandhian intelligentsia at all levels o f  the 
party organization, and the inability o f the national leadership to command effective 
support for the implementation o f official Congress policies on economic and social 
issues.
This meant that after Partition, it was clear to landlords and big capitalists that in order 
to serve their interests they had no better alternative than to support, if only from their purses, 
Congress and Congressmen. The ravages o f partition dealt a severe blow to the jute industry as 
the ju te growing regions became part o f Pakistan. A similar fracturing o f the structure of
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industry also affected cotton textiles but the import o f cotton cushioned this effect. Indian 
industrialists who combined financial and commercial functions moved over from one historical 
stage to another in the period between 1946 and 1956 (Frankel 2005). Indian capitalists mainly 
emerged out o f trading-houses and thus were as much traders and financiers as industrialists or 
potential industrialists. They were not in abstracto committed to industrialisation but supported 
it as a strategy o f increasing their profits (Markovits 1985:185). One o f  the central tasks o f the 
state-led path to capitalism was to design effective ways of transforming at least a part o f this 
predominantly mercantile capital into industrial capital. Indeed, one could argue that this was 
the most significant transformation being attempted in the post-independence period as we shall 
see in the next two chapters.
Patnaik (1999b) sums up the situation at the time o f independence.
India's was the classic case of bourgeois economic nationalism. The 
bourgeoisie was more developed as a class at the time o f independence from 
colonial rule than its counterparts elsewhere in Asia: it had a stronger 
productive base, owing to greater industrialisation in the colonial period, and a 
greater social weight because of this, as well as its association with the 
anticolonial struggle. Correspondingly, however, it also faced a more organized 
proletariat, a more vocal petty bourgeoisie and salariat, and a peasantry made 
militant by Depression-induced impoverishment. It used the state for relatively 
autonomous capitalist development, and asserted itself both politically and 
economically vis a vis imperialism: protection against foreign goods and capital 
(even while collaborating with the latter), non-alignment, a democratic polity, 
mid a strong state capitalist sector were the hallmarks o f  the Indian dirigiste 
strategy. (Patnaik 1999b: VI, original emphasis)
The bigger oligopolies reached a consensus on state-led capitalism as a conduit for 
protection, security and growth. In spite o f the political power wielded by this rising capitalist 
class, the private entrepreneurial base supporting this development was numerically very small. 
The wide ambit o f the ‘developmentalism’ o f ‘state-led capitalism’ meant that the independent 
Indian state was meant to create an economic structure conducive for a capitalist economy. 
However, there was reluctance to overturn existing social relationships based on caste, 
community and religion harnessed earlier by colonialism using the local dominant classes. The 
dominant classes after independence did not want these relationships to be harmed in any way.
Thus the amalgam o f the ‘modern’ and the ‘archaic’ in social relations and its contradictory 
ideological facets marked the ‘civil society’ in which the Congress-led state was expected to 
harness and lead the ‘engines o f growth’.
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Chapter Four 
Growth of the Indian Capitalist Class: 1950-1966
This chapter is a study o f  capitalist consolidation and diversification strategies and its 
relationship with the structural nature o f social relations from 1950 to 1966 in India during the 
first three 5-year plans after independence. This chapter will address the process o f growth 
through which the relation between the Indian state and the capitalist class emerged in the 
period o f the first three plans that ended in a major crisis within two decades. This crisis 
manifested itself in the form o f a severe balance o f payment crisis accompanied by high 
inflation and shortages o f wage goods by 1965-66. This crisis has been scrutinised thoroughly in 
the literature but it remains a critical turning point for understanding the nature o f the 
relationships between the emerging Indian capitalist class and the state. This chapter also 
studies the presence o f foreign capital in India, ventures abroad by Indian capital and the role of 
the state. It discusses the response o f First World states to the developments in India. The 
debates around the role o f labour are briefly traced and the nature o f political schisms and 
consolidations in the face o f the severe crisis that undermined the legitimacy o f indicative 
planning are examined. We examine the strategies o f organised capital in this period to establish 
that sections o f Indian capitalists had burgeoned to the extent that they were confident enough 
by the 1960s to themselves become exporters o f capital and technology to other developing 
countries. The preoccupation o f organised capital centred on ways to subjugate labour in the 
absence o f strategies to enhance productivity growth. Cracks appeared in the understanding 
between state and capital that had been achieved at independence and soon afterwards over 
debates around the Companies Act and the jurisdiction o f the Industrial Disputes Act.
In this chapter we follow the periodisation outlined in the introduction. Mukherjee Reed 
(2001) analyses the period from 1947 to 1985 in terms of a historical ‘interventionist’ model. 
However, this broad classification does not suitably indicate the decisive chages in the process 
of intervention by the state and its changing relationship with capital. Mccartney (2006) in his 
study o f growth in the Indian economy from 1951 to 2004, analyses the first period from 
1951/52 to 1964/65 to investigate the role o f the state in finance, production and institution 
building. A similar periodisation is also followed by Nayar (2001). This periodisation by both 
Nayar (2001) and Mccartney (2006) is based on one hand a stress on the observation o f a 
sustained spell o f economic growth, the structural break in this growth process at the end o f the 
period and the role of the state in planning, protecting and directing the process o f this growth. 
However, we argue that the relationship between state and capital from 1947 to 1967, the 
acknowledged period o f ‘planning’ and ‘protection’ can be periodised into two distinct phases,
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the first o f which is the decade from 1947 to 1956 and the second from 1956 to 1966. This 
distinction between the two periods is necessary as in the first decade, state policies were 
informed by liberalism while the institutions for state led development including the 
operationalisation o f indicative planning were put into place only in the second decade. For a 
detailed discussion on the basis o f  this periodisation, please refer to the introduction to the 
thesis.
There are three purposes o f this chapter. The first part o f this chapter from Section 4.1 to 
Section 4.3 presents a historicised account o f the relationship between state and capital that 
emerged in the period from 1947 to 1966. The most important argument is the shift from a 
relatively ‘liberal5 role o f the state to a more direct interventionist set o f policies in this period. 
This transition took place with the active support o f the capitalist class in spite o f a small section 
o f dissenters. The second part o f  the chapter from Section 4.5 to 4.6 is a detailed analysis o f 
how the operations o f foreign capital in India, ventures abroad by Indian capital, the role o f First 
World states and the structuring o f capital-labour relations figured in the process o f transition to 
dirgisme. The main point is to demonstrate that the operations o f international capital and 
expansion o f  Indian capital abroad were not necessarily constrained by the nature o f dirigisme. 
Similarly the structure o f  capital-labour relations that emerged was not necessarily pro-labour as 
the contours of the relationship was totally defined by the political power o f the two classes. 
The third part in Section 4.7 examines the source o f political schisms and the process of 
consolidation o f the power o f sections o f capital that were a result o f the severe crisis that 
undermined the legitimacy o f both the specific policies o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy and 
the foundations o f indicative planning as a whole in the design o f dirigisme.
Section 4.1 summarises the consensus that developed within the capitalist class about the 
necessity o f a state led path o f development based on protection. Section 4. 2 is a study o f the 
relationship between state and capital from 1947 to the end o f the First Plan period in 1956. 
Section 4.3 provides a similar analysis for the period from 1956-1966, which marked the full 
implementation o f  detailed indicative planning in the Second and Third Plans based on the 
blueprint o f the Nehru Mahalanobis model. Section 4.4 is a study o f foreign capital in India, 
ventures abroad by Indian capital and state assistance. Section 4.5 discusses the response of 
First World states especially the USA to India's ‘exemplar5 experiment. Section 4.6 challenges 
the notion o f a ‘labour aristocracy’ in the organised sector in this period by tracing the disputes 
and debates around ‘labour legislation’. Labour legislation was a product o f the political 
strength o f  trade unions rather than any settlement with capital. Section 4.7 identifies the nature 
o f the political schisms and consolidations in the face o f the severe crisis that undermined the 
legitimacy o f  not just the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy, but the foundations o f indicative 
planning as a whole.
4.1 The Consensus on State-Led Development
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In Chapter Three, we argued that the weakening o f colonial capital just before independence 
due to the ravages o f World War II and the rise in mass resistance in the last phase o f the 
national liberation struggle, created a new space for Indian capitalists. They used these 
opportunities to engage in a process o f expansion and diversification from the capitalist 
enclaves that had already begun to emerge in the inter-war period. In 1947, private industrial 
capital in India emerged out o f the war with huge profits, but was faced with a society scarred 
by war and partition and an economy in recession with very high rates o f inflation (Mukherji 
1988).
The consequences o f partition did affect some o f the emerging capitalists, but veiy 
differently from its effects on the general population who suffered from displacement, poverty, 
trauma and misery during the Partition (Menon and Bhasin 1993; Butalia 1993). For instance, 
the founder o f Ranbaxy, Bhai Mohan Singh’s history during this period is significant as an 
illustration o f how emerging capitalists could deal with partition in a relatively painless way. 
His father, Bhai Gian Chand was a landlord and moneylender who accumulated a significant 
amount o f wealth as a government contractor in Rawalpindi during World War II building 
Prisoner o f War camps, airfields and a highway to Rangoon from Assam. At partition, the 
family chartered a plane from Rawalpindi to fly in to India, with most o f their wealth intact by 
paying a ransom tax o f  Rs 5 crore (a very big amount those days) to the emergent Pakistan 
government. In Delhi, they checked in at the Imperial Hotel on Janpath. Within two decades 
Mohan Singh was an established moneylender in Delhi and also invested in several bungalows 
the first being on Prithviraj Road. To this day, much o f this properly' remains intact (Bhandari, 
2005). The family moved on to lead India’s pharmaceutical development in later years. This and 
other case studies will be followed up in later chapters.
At independence, it was clear to Indian business interests that they were financially not 
significant enough to take upon themselves the responsibility of participating in a big way in 
major sectors like heavy industry or infrastructure (Basu 2004). This is also supported by the 
position taken within the largest chamber o f commerce representing Indian capital (FICCI 
1956). There were limits to this process as the capitalist class was reluctant to take on the ‘risk’ 
and ‘discipline’ that could have led to a state guided neo-mercantilist transition that happened in 
South Korea (Chibber 2003). They were, however, in a political position to reap the advantage 
o f an independent Indian state as a site o f primary accumulation. Thus the expansion o f capital 
could be furthered within an evolutionary framework of state-society relations that guaranteed 
the sanctity o f individual property and social channels o f capital accumulation (Bagchi 1972; 
Desai 1984).
According to Patnaik (1984), the historical reasons for the adoption o f the Nehruvian 
vision o f building a ‘modern society’ as state ideology and its ‘developmental’ agenda of 
fostering state-led capitalism lies rooted in the specific context o f the formation o f the Indian 
nation-state. Freedom for a large section of the political leadership meant freedom from the
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domination o f metropolitan capital and metropolitan commodities in the economy (Patnaik 
1994). The specific task of nation-building in independent India assigned a major role to the 
State in building up infrastructure, expanding and strengthening the productive base o f the 
economy, setting up new financial institutions and regulating and co-ordinating economic 
activity. The capitalist class was content as long as profitability was guaranteed in its 
predominantly mercantile and secondarily industrial ventures. Capitalists on the whole were 
always cautious about any upsetting o f the social order by communists and socialists who still 
formed the biggest chunk o f the opposition to the Congress even after their political defeat in 
the Tripuri Congress discussed in Chapter Three.
The choice o f the bourgeois democratic framework facilitated a radical rhetoric while the 
political economic parameters o f social transformation remained pinned to the protection and 
furthering of capitalist interests as a way o f developing the economy. Nehru identified ‘political 
democracy’ and ‘economic justice’ as the fundamental precepts o f  the new Republic (Nehru 
1963). Congress’s one party dominance was initially a legacy from the emergence o f Congress 
as the biggest platform for the movement for Indian independence. The underlying inclinations 
o f the Congress under the Nehru-Mahalanobis paradigm had been primarily disposed to a notion 
o f ‘welfare’ that did not emerge from neoclassical definitions o f welfare economics. The 
Congress definition o f welfare was predisposed towards the discouragement o f class conflict 
using the state machinery o f law and order, the protection o f  property, the encouragement of 
upward social mobility and state support for increasing agricultural and industrial production.
Direct intervention to alleviate poverty through anti-poverty programmes was not 
considered a priority as the ‘trickle down’ hypothesis reigned (Bhatia 1965). The three basic 
functions o f the state: law and order (an euphemism for repressing challenges to property and 
propriety'), economic stability (the protection and reproduction o f  the social structure) and 
ideological legitimacy (ensuring the acceptance o f dominant values and normative assumptions) 
were conceived within this framework o f state-led development (Desai 1984: 34). Just four 
months after independence, Nehru was assuring the representatives o f big industrial houses that 
the ‘just redistribution o f existing property would be kept in the realm o f idea’ in his address to 
the First Industrial Conference in December 1947 (Nehru 1995: 64, emphasis added).
Chibber (2003) in his work has argued that because o f the nature o f Import Substituting 
Industrialisation (ISI) as an investment model -  in Indian conditions, there was ample 
opportunity for profits without state discipline. Bhagwati (1987, 1993, 1998) has explained 
India’s trade policy through the conventional neo-liberal logic o f extensive bureaucratic controls 
over production, investment, and trade. Huthseeing summed up the arguments o f why the 
capitalist class saw ISI as desirable and its relation with desired growth o f exports very 
precisely.
The backlog o f unemployed o f 9 million in the Second Plan will inflate 
to 12 million in the Third Plan. The level o f underemployed has been estimated 
to be 15-18 million. In this perspective, we have to make a clear choice between
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greater employment and higher wages, based on its cumulative effect on 
income and employment in the long run. This choice (ISI) also has relevance to 
the cost structure which will influence our capacity to export and our ability to 
earn the necessary foreign exchange to finance the import content o f investment 
and production. So the priorities are in the apportioning between the 
distribution o f a given level o f income and better distribution o f an increasing 
income. The industrial history o f other countries proves that greater production 
eliminates the more acute tensions associated with inequality, and that 
increasing aggregate output is an alternative to distribution and even to 
reduction of inequality.
One would think this was a statement on behalf o f the state but it was Huthseeing’s annual 
address as President to FICCI (1962: 9) in the period o f the Third Plan.
Chibber (2003) has argued that the situation as it presented itself to Indian business at the 
end o f the War in early 1945 was bursting with opportunities. The years immediately following 
Independence 1947-1951, according to Chibber, constituted a critical conjuncture, in which a 
strong developmental state was the result o f an elite consensual political agenda (Chibber 2003: 
8). He goes on to assert based on the report o f the National Planning Committee that any future 
policy would have to centre around state support to industry; based on the decision to set up an 
elaborate system o f tariff protections for local industry in the new economic policy -  and indeed 
this was to be a centrepiece o f future policy.
The bourgeoisie initially had mixed feelings about the aspects o f the ‘mixed economy5. 
This was reflected in the insecurity among certain sections such as the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce in Calcutta, which represented foreign capital in India and certain representatives in 
FICCI, the biggest forum o f Indian capital. This drew reassurances from Nehru on 18th 
December 1947 at the first Industrial Conference after independence about the sanctity of 
private enterprise and no discrimination against foreign enterprise (Nehru 1995: 66).
The majority o f  FICCI members were in favour of regulated capitalist development. This 
had been agreed in the National Planning Committee report so long as the parameters o f the 
planned economy were defined in consultation with capitalists (Chibber 2003). In a situation of 
low development o f private finance capital (Rudolph and Rudolph 1998: 25), the commercial 
and industrial bourgeoisie in India at Independence were dependent on state patronage and 
protection for its profits and capital accumulation. From the Annual Reports and Presidential 
addresses o f the All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers from 1954 to 1959, it is clear 
that every annual conference was an exercise to determine these parameters as well as to 
express the persistent concern o f Indian capital with the problem o f ‘disciplining’ labour.
While Congress was clearly committed to a strategy o f development driven by the 
capitalist sector, its compromises with other sections o f the population were resented by the 
veiy capitalists emerging under its patronage. By 1959, twelve years after independence, the 
Swatantra Party was formed to articulate the interests o f a section o f  private capital in industry 
and commerce and landed property in agriculture. According to an interview with Jagannath 
Sarkar, Ex-Member, Bihar State Committee, Communist Party o f India, this reflected the deeper
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cracks within the ruling class about the direction o f India’s political economy since 
independence. This observation is corroborated by Rudolph and Rudolph (1998: 25). The 
effectiveness and legitimacy o f the Swatantra Party was however limited. The lobbyists for 
organised capital and individual business houses found the strategy o f directly influencing 
government departments, bureaus and commissions much more useful. Business interests in 
India had adopted pluralist forms and methods to influence state policy and public opinion 
through industry associations and apex bodies (Kochanek 1971). Thus business ‘interests’ in 
India, while not publicly represented directly in competitive party politics, were better 
represented than those o f organised labour in bureaucratic, parliamentary and (informal) party 
processes (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1998).
While the modalities o f political role of organised capital in this period has been 
addressed by Kochanek (1974), in the following sections, among other things, we establish the 
key political preoccupations of capitalists. Thus, unlike Kochanek who dwelt on ‘how ’ 
capitalists organised as interest groups, we analyse the role o f political mobilisation o f capital in 
the context o f the expansion o f capital accumulation and the increased confrontation with 
labour, elaborating on ‘why’ capitalists organised politically as a class in this period.
4.2 State and Capital: 1947-1956
The state sponsored and guided path to capitalism in the first ten years after 
independence was faithful to the idea o f the state restricting itself to Smithian duties: ensuring 
order and providing infrastructure. The state was working to guarantee the continuation o f the 
existing system o f property rights and to make markets work better. In the period under 
consideration, all wartime controls were removed from foodgrains and the liberalisation of 
controls in the market for food was a significant policy move (Ghosh 1998). Some import 
controls were periodically enforced but on the whole there was no substantial policy push 
towards import substitution. The most important initiatives aimed at protecting the interests o f 
the propertied classes were those incorporated in the legal and institutional framework o f the 
political order in the preservation o f personal laws defining the holding and transfer rights o f 
property.
Strategic industries, such as defence and communication, remained under state control 
through the provisions o f the Industrial Policy o f 1948. Under the Industrial policy o f 1948, 
only three industries were reserved for the state and another six were kept in the domain o f the 
‘public’ sector (Government o f India 1948). The Industrial Policy resolution in 1948 gave 
assurances to the classes owning business and industry that no existing enterprises would be 
nationalised. The policy o f 1948 categorically ruled out the take-over o f existing private 
industry by the state for at least ten years (Chenoy 1985). The first five-year plan document also 
made it clear that new ventures were to be exempt from all possibility o f public acquisition for a
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period o f ten years (Government o f India 1951). The government assured foreign firms that they 
could continue to operate under the same conditions as Indian-owned enterprises. No action was 
taken to break up the big business houses either domestic or foreign, that exercised managerial 
control over scores o f firms through the managing agency system. On the contrary, negotiations 
were set in motion with the major British business groups to attract additional investment 
(Frankel 2005: 77).
In an assessment based on Reserve Bank of India (RBI) figures, Bose (1965: 526) found 
that 18.1% of foreign capital was invested in branches o f foreign companies, 70.8% was 
invested in foreign controlled companies and 10% was invested in Indian companies controlled 
by Indians as on 31st December 1955. Total foreign investment, o f which 95% was invested in 
branches and subsidiaries o f  foreign companies amounted to a total o f Rs. 4112 millions. This 
amounted to 38.7% o f  gross capital formation in the economy based on the National Accounts 
Statistics (NAS) data for 1955. The profits from foreign investment were shared between 
foreign and Indian investors in a ratio o f 15.9:1 (Bose 1965).
On 6th April 1949, in his statement on foreign investment in India, Nehru assured 
foreign investors that their investment would be treated at par with similar Indian enterprises 
(Chenoy 1985: 16). This met with severe protests from the Federation o f Chambers o f 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) though they had not been particularly in favour o f  ‘swadeshr 
prior to Independence. These protests came in spite o f support o f the state policy o f non­
discrimination towards foreign investment from certain representatives o f ‘big’ capital like G.D. 
Birla (Chenoy 1985). According to the assessments o f Mukherji (1988), state policies in this 
period reflected an even more liberal attitude towards the private sector and ‘foreign interests’ 
than under British rule.
Until 1950, the government took a series o f key decisions on constitutional 
arrangements that set very narrow limits on the Centre’s power to implement social and 
economic reforms as it could never violate the fundamental right to property (Frankel 2005: 77). 
Thus the possibility o f  a central programme o f land reform beyond the ‘abolition o f Zamindari’ 
retreated into oblivion in spite o f  the political impact o f the Telengana peasant uprising in 1948 
and the Tebhaga movement in Bengal in 1946, and despite the passing o f  the Bargadar Act 
limiting the crop share o f landlords in Bengal by the League Ministry in Bengal just prior to 
independence. In the First decade between 1947 and 1956, the state pursued a policy o f non­
interference in the realm o f social relations fearing it might upset the delicate social balance o f 
contesting and competing elements.
Existing economic structures were accepted almost in its entirety especially in 
agriculture. The unwillingness o f the new rulers o f India to do anything concrete about changing 
production relations in agriculture ensured, that in most parts o f India, except in areas with 
militant peasant or left-wing political movements, even the much celebrated tenancy reform and 
land ceiling laws, enacted in however diluted a form, would never be implemented beyond the
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minimum abolition o f intermediaries between the state and the cultivators through abolition of 
Zamindari and Jagirdari (Bandopadhyay 1988). These two systems had already become 
redundant as a systemic source o f social power. Even this abolition came with forms of 
compensation to the Zamindars and the right to retain Khudkasht (owner-cultivated) land 
(Kliusro 1965). This opened up the possibility o f retaining huge areas o f land that were shown 
on paper to be ‘owner-cultivated’ by a variety o f coercive means (Kongar 1978).
Minimum land reforms constituting the abolition o f intermediaries after Independence 
remained woefully inadequate. Nevertheless, it turned large sections o f middle caste tenants in 
Zamindari areas into owners, bringing them on par with corresponding groups in the rest o f the 
country, where they had historically been owners. Thus all that zamindari abolition did was to 
remove the nominal revenue collecting rights o f  zamindars. Their real control of land had long 
disappeared. The transformational significance o f the abolition was therefore in most cases 
negligible and symbolic. Land became a commodity, crops were transferred to the market 
through powerful intermediaries and a strong class o f owners with massive money-power 
emerged in significant parts o f India (Desai 2004: 15).
This class o f middle and upper caste big farmers and landlords combined patronage 
rooted in pre-capitalist structures o f surplus extraction with the transformational structures of 
the independent Indian state. For example agrarian class relations in Bihar were embedded in 
caste. Whether a person owned or controlled land was conditioned by that person’s caste status. 
Caste and class were thus very closely related and one reinforced the other (Mohanty 2002). 
Dumont’s characterisation o f caste as a ‘structure o f ideas’ was based on material relationships 
in land and associated assets. After a point, according to Bandopadhyay (1988), policymakers 
comforted themselves into believing that further agrarian reforms were unnecessary. This 
ensured the domination of the agrarian structure and structures o f the state by a class of 
landlords whose existence was rooted in pre-capitalist structures o f surplus extraction (Das 
1983). Collectively, they formed a significant center o f political power in their ability to resist 
or circumvent any measure aimed at changing agrarian relations (Kongar 1978).
The First Plan was a string o f budgets designed to finance projects in areas such as 
irrigation and power, which were already in the blueprint stage (Kurien 1969). Kurien (1969) 
has argued that it was a plan without any overt strategy o f growth. In his evaluation o f the first 
five-year plan, Kurien argues quite convincingly that there was a theory o f growth implicit in 
the assumptions o f the plan document, which were based on historical correlations between 
capital formation, savings rates and growth in the USA (1870-1900), Japan (1900-1930) and the 
USSR. Thus the plan was based on a Harrod-Domar type o f post-Keynesian growth models 
(Kurien 1969: 89-90). However, a plan based on a Harrod Domar model reliant on calculations 
o f necessary capital output ratios and savings ratios to achieve target growth rates is not 
necessarily a plan with a strategy elaborating the domains of intervention by the state to ensure 
the achievements o f  such targets.
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R. K. S. Chetty, Minister o f Finance, 1947-48, in his budget speech in 1947, spelt out the 
short-term financial priorities o f the state. The state was dealing with the economic 
consequences o f partition. Through the Partition council, state representatives had to deliberate 
and decide 011 the division and allocation o f resources with Pakistan, including the national debt, 
the railways, the assets o f  Reserve Bank, the stores held by the Army, and to encourage the free 
movement o f trade between the dominions and decide on taxes and duties.
The food position was grave. Prices were rising due to decreases in agricultural and 
industrial production as a consequence o f the Partition (Lok Sabha 1947: 746-761). The state 
had very limited budgetary revenues o f Rs 171.15 crores from customs and income tax while 
budgeted expenditure were Rs 197.39 crores in 1948. The largest allocation o f Rs.92.74 crores 
went to defence, followed by the civil accounts o f refugees, food and administration. This 
budget had a revenue deficit o f Rs 26.24 crores. A survey o f budgetary allocation in the period 
between 1947 and 1951 shows that the state’s professed objective o f leading the capitalist 
transformation was not reflected in its own financial allocation processes (Lok Sabha 1947, 
1951).
This does not mean that the state did very little for a capitalist transformation during this 
period, as budgetary allocations are not the only ways in which the development o f capitalism 
can be supported. For instance, support for the development o f capitalist capacity can be 
provided through the repression o f wages, through the support o f different types o f primitive 
accumulation or the creation o f a variety o f ‘rents’ that assists capitalist accumulation.
National income rose in the First Plan period from 1951 to 1956 by 18%, an average annual 
growth o f 3.6% according to calculations based on the official NAS data. Average per capita 
income between 1946 and 1954 was estimated to be Rs 253 (Mukerji 1965: 702). The First Five 
Year Plan laid down that an abrupt increase in wages was detrimental to the economic stability 
of the country, as it would get reflected in the costs o f production and consequently in a rise in 
the prices o f products (Government o f India 1951). Thus in the First Plan period, the state 
policy o f encouraging depressed wages continued unhindered from the late colonial period 
(Kuzcynski 1965). Capital operated without many strictures after the brief interlude of 
economic uncertainty for two or three years due to the partition and War.
From Table 4A below, it is clear that there was a simultaneous process o f capital deepening 
and diversification o f  capital in industry during this period. There was intensive growth in the 
old sectors like cement, steel, paper and sugar whose expansion dated back to the period since 
World War I. This was the process o f ‘deepening’. But this was far outweighed by the extensive 
growth reflected in the index o f industrial production in the ‘new sectors’. This diversification 
process was pronounced in the rapid growth o f ‘new’ industries like diesel engines, bicycles, 
sewing machines, soda ash, caustic soda and super-phosphates reflected in the indices of 
production. Thus both the deepening and diversification o f capacity dominated the 
accumulation o f industrial capital in this period.
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Table 4A: Index o f Industrial Production (Base: 1946 = 100)
‘Old Industries’ 1951 1955
Cotton Textiles 101 127
Jute Textiles 80 94
Steel 116 132
Cement 207 286
Paper and Paper Boards 124 174
Matches 140 147
Sugar 121 173
‘New In d u strie s’
Machine Tools 52 82
Diesel Engines 1532 2124
Bicycles 266 1143
Sewing machines 726 1658
Electric Motors 311 549
Soda Ash 396 644
Caustic Soda 508 1181
Super-phosphates 1356 1598
Source: Shroff 1966:25,
In an assessment o f the two decades o f ‘change’ since independence undertaken by the 
Government o f India, the Minister for Finance, K.C. Pant (1968) was not over-stating anything 
when he argued that the industrial structure o f the economy has been greatly strengthened with 
the development o f many key consumer industries, which were non-existent only a decade ago. 
Yet he attributed it to the process o f  planning (Pant 1968), when it is clear that this process 
preceded any kind o f planned model o f diversification.
State policy also supported industrialisation through its licensing policy that implicitly 
created rents for Indian capitalists by limiting entry into Indian markets. Licensing as a policy 
existed from the colonial period, but before if  became an instrument for directing investment 
into particular sectors in the Second Plan period, it first worked simply as a mechanism for 
enhancing the profitability o f investment and the direction o f credit. The records o f licenses 
under 1DRA in the period from 1952 to 1955 show that 1440 applications were made, and 1142 
were granted. Out o f these, 363 were for new schemes, 657 for expansion schemes and 122 for 
organisational changes without additional capacity (Hazari 1967). Not all o f these licenses were 
used, as Hazari’s (1967) study would reveal in a few years’ time. This process o f pre-empting 
capacity, undermining the effectiveness o f licensing as a tool o f allocation but establishing its
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importance as an instrument for creating rents, was thus a feature that preceded the detailed 
allocative role o f planning in the economy.
The Industrial Finance Corporation o f India Annual Reports show that under the stipulation 
o f the first Industrial Policy Resolution o f 1948, the total amount o f loans sanctioned rose from 
Rs 9.5 crores in 1951 to Rs 43.20 crores in 1956 (Industrial Finance Corporation o f India (IFCI) 
1951, 1956). From the office o f the Registrar o f Joint Stock Companies, companies registered 
and in actual operation rose from 22,675 in 1947-48 to 29,779 in 1954-55 (Shroff 1966: 26). 
Thus even before the Second Industrial Policy and the ‘Period o f Planned Development’ from 
1956 was ushered in, the capital deepening and diversification process in the domestic economy 
had already started.
The findings presented above corroborate the argument that even before the state had 
worked out the detailed nature o f support to capital formation through planning and tariff 
support, the capitalist class was being supported through the licensing policy and credit from 
national financial institutions in the first plan period.
Far from a strong ‘developmental’ paradigm, however, this period was more a ‘free 
market’ as far as the allocation o f investment was concerned. The relation between state and 
capital was also defined by an ideology o f liberalism as far as domestic and foreign capital was 
concerned. But most important, this period o f  ‘liberalism’ during the First plan period did not 
make any big difference to the capital formation in the economy as a percentage o f GDP as 
shown in Table 4B below. Capital formation hovered between 12 and 17% o f GDP. The change 
in the stock o f capital was below 0.5% in three out o f five years. Thus ‘liberalism’ ensured a 
political status quo in terms o f property relations, but also meant a status quo in capital 
formation.
Table 4B: Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) as Percentage o f  GDP, 1950-55
Year GDCF as % o f GDP at Market 
Prices
Change in Stock as % of 
GDP at Market Prices
1950-51 14 1.7
1951-52 17 1.5
1952-53 13.8 0.3
1953-54 12 -0.7
1954-55 13.5 0.3
Source: Table 11, p78, EPWRF 2002b
The state’s ‘politics o f accommodation’ emerged during this first decade. (Jannuzi 
1990: 25). The displacement o f metropolitan capital’s direct links with the Indian economy was 
a process that continued until the mid 1960s though it found many new ways o f maintaining its 
existence. One immediate strategy was the formation of subsidiary entities. In any case, the 
displacement o f metropolitan capital was only peripherally on the agenda o f the state in this
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period and displacement only happened on a significant scale in the period between 1966 and 
1980. It was not even a key feature o f Nehruvian development during the Second Plan.
4.3 State and Capital 1956-1966
In 1956, with the adoption o f the Second Industrial Policy and the implementation of 
the Second Five Year plan, the state moved into the implementation o f the ambitious premises 
o f the Feldman-Mahalanobis model (Chakravarty 1987). This was a significant departure from 
the previous decade and encompassed all the major policy issues that were associated with 
giving the state in independent India a major role in building up infrastructure, expanding and 
strengthening the productive base o f the economy, setting up new financial institutions and 
regulating and coordinating economic activity.
In terms o f  the strategy elaborated at that time, the State would ensure a sharp increase in 
the rate o f savings in the system, an enhanced allocation o f those savings to the heavy industrial 
sector in general and machine tools in particular, so as to reduce the economy's dependence on 
international capital and commodity markets (Patnaik 1984). This was perceived as necessary 
for building capitalism itself. This was the essence o f  the Nehruvian strategy in its pristine form 
as an ‘idea’ (Khilnani. 2003). The state was also responsible for the expansion o f the domestic 
market through increasing expenditures. This was one vital aspect o f the stress on releasing the 
wage-goods constraint in the economy that existed since the colonial period. The terms o f trade 
between agriculture and industry were another crucial instrument due to the existence o f the 
wage goods constraint. Thus, a number o f instruments were perceived as necessary for building 
capitalism by creating the conditions for primitive accumulation appropriate for a post­
independence nation-state.
The state’s role in guaranteeing social order and protecting existing property relations 
continued to be important. This is most suitably illustrated in the continuation o f the state’s non­
efforts to implement land reforms in agriculture beyond the very minimal progress in the 
abolition o f intermediaries in spite o f  land reform legislation in many states. This remained one 
o f the primary zones o f ‘non-intervention’ by the state.
However the state faced many more complexities in the terrain o f industrial relations. The 
All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers was visibly upset about the provisions o f the 
Industrial Disputes Act and the Companies Bill proposed as an Act in 1956 (Annual Report, All 
India Organisation o f Industrial Employers, 1956.) But they could not do much as the state 
needed to accommodate the organised section of workers due to the rising strength o f the trade 
union movement (Ranadive 1990). Thus the state was a terrain o f contest for the dominant 
classes and class factions with diverging interests and uneasy but symbiotic relationships.
There were two new interventions in the Second Plan. First, ‘indicative planning’ was 
used together with licensing to influence the allocation o f critical resources, in particular, 
savings and foreign exchange (Bagchi 1988). Second, the sheltering o f Indian capital from
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excessive foreign competition was accomplished through a detailed system o f tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers. This was put in place without excessively antagonising powerful international 
capitalist interests through the stipulations o f non-discrimination against holding and subsidiary 
companies o f multi-national corporations under the Companies Act 1956. The interests o f big 
capitalists articulated by the Chambers o f Commerce dominated the import-substituting (ISI) 
model in the design o f  tariffs and import restrictions (Bagchi 1988). To facilitate the economic 
expansion o f capital, public investment was directed towards the development o f transport, 
communication, irrigation, education, research and development.
The Congress led state thus chose to pursue a capitalist path o f development based on 
‘mixed economy’ postulates and sought its implementation through indicative planning (Desai 
1984: 25; Chakravarty 1987). The choice o f  this path implied three things. First, it meant that a 
lot depended on the state’s success in achieving enhanced resource mobilisation and then 
succeeding in influencing the priorities o f allocation o f these resources in various fields and 
sectors. Second, the strategy determined the classes on whom reliance for economic growth was 
placed and the conditions needed for strengthening their economic, social, political, cultural and 
ideological power. Third, it shaped the policy o f the government to provide special inducements 
and encouragement to classes who were viewed as ‘agents’ o f development (Desai 1984: 24). 
Thus ‘capitalists’ as a class were the key agents o f transformation o f society in the 
implementation o f developmental goals based on the mixed economy.
Domestic industrial interests remained secure within the import substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) policy and tariffs and import restrictions. The big trading houses, in the face o f reduced 
profit margins due to high import duties on final goods shifted to manufacture under the license- 
subsidy schemes. A significant number o f big trading houses entered the realm o f production in 
this period. The capitalists themselves argued that breaking into export markets was impossible 
(FICCI 1956). The nature and direction o f world trade based on a principle o f comparative 
advantage calculated on the basis o f factor endowments hardly seemed a convincing argument 
to any section o f the capitalist class in that period (Agarwal 1983). The fact that multinational 
companies had a level-playing field through holding companies added to the reluctance to build 
up competitiveness. We shall see later in this chapter that there was a considered move by top 
sections o f Indian capitalists to model themselves as trans-nationals through joint ventures 
abroad, but little evidence o f  any support for liberal trade to cut down trade barriers to allow 
production on the basis o f conventional comparative advantage.
All o f the state’s resources were deployed to increase production in the new areas identified 
in the Plans (Kurien 1994). In the heterodox literature on rent and rent-seeking, this has been 
conceptualised as a process where the state was trying to accelerate productivity increase by 
creating ‘learning rents’ for new industries through protection but it failed in creating associated 
systems o f compulsion to ensure that rents were not wasted (Khan 2000). In another view, this 
was attributed to the inability o f the state to impose even a minimum measure o f discipline
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because o f  the political power o f capitalists that was exercised both formally and informally 
within the ruling party (Chibber 2003). No yardstick for such discipline was envisaged within 
the policy strictures. The profit motive combined with the state's role as ‘risk-absorber’ were 
judged to be sufficient incentives for the model to work, and not much attention was given to 
the importance o f compulsions for capitalists.
One important break from the earlier period was the weakening o f British Managing 
agencies that had held sway over the industrial clusters that had been the preserve o f foreign 
capital. Restrictions on managing agencies through the new Companies Act o f 1956 came into 
being. This led to a further weakening o f British managing agencies that had already started to 
decline during the Second World War (Malyarov 1983). This opened up new opportunities for 
Indian family businesses. Indian family businesses acquired holding companies, plantations and 
jute mills. The Associated Chamber o f Commerce (ASSOCHAM), which was the preserve of 
what remained o f British capital, was opposed to the abolition o f managing agencies. So were 
some representatives o f Indian business (FICCI 1955) as this would have involved a 
restructuring o f their own businesses as a few managing agency houses had come to be owned 
by Indian businessmen at the end o f the colonial period. Nehru once again assured 
ASSOCHAM o f ‘no discrimination' in the organisation o f business in the run-up to the 
implementation o f the Industrial Policy o f 1956 (Chenoy 1985).
Nevertheless, the state through its planned strategies moved into the arena o f  public 
investment in the development o f transport, communication, irrigation, education, research and 
development. Public sector enterprises were started with the objective o f providing a steady 
source o f capital and intermediate goods to sectors that were capital constrained and had long 
gestation periods in terms o f  profitability (Frankel 2005: 128-134). Public funding of 
technological institutes to provide the necessary personnel was also a feature o f this period.
The second and third plan period also witnessed an unprecedented fiscal expansion to 
stimulate demand, public investment in basic industries and creation o f ‘loan’ capital through 
financial institutions to stimulate private investment. The stepping up o f  loan capital for 
industry through state initiatives was in response to industrial lobbying to widen the sources of 
credit. In real terms, the state directly granted protected markets through its complex network of 
tariffs and quotas. It also facilitated the supply o f capital and intermediate goods to the private 
manufacturing sector and took up the difficult task o f co-ordinating markets for industrial and 
agricultural goods through its pricing policy. External assistance and taxation were the two 
most important sources for plan financing. Due to the feeble direct tax effort, the burden of 
taxation fell on indirect taxes, which doubled from 1948-49 to 1963-64 (Government o f India 
1971). Thus part o f the cost o f financing this industrialisation effort was directly passed on to 
the general population. These policy measures gave a tremendous boost to those industrialists 
who already had an established hold over the ‘old5 and ‘new’ industries enumerated in Table 
4A.
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It is evident from Figure 4.1 that there was a very gradual shift in the share o f GDP from the 
private sector in favour o f the public sector. The share o f the public sector increased marginally 
from 9% to 13% in six years between 1960/1 and 1965/6. The share o f  the private sector on an 
average was 88.1% o f GDP. This has to be seen in the context o f a non-existent ‘public sector’ 
until 1950. Bhagwati’s accusation of ‘a substantial public sector, going well beyond the 
conventional confines o f public utilities and infrastructure’ (Bhagwati 1993) is thus hardly a 
tenable criticism for this period. Beyond utilities and infrastructure, the state set up public sector 
units in fertilizers, chemicals, steel and oil and natural gas exploration, sectors in which the 
private sector was incapable o f venturing into in spite o f its diversification measures, FICCI 
welcomed these measures as vital for private enterprise in dyestuffs, paints, medicines, 
antiseptics and so on, and appreciated the need for ‘vertical integration’ through the creation of 
‘linkage enterprises’ (FICCI 1956). G.D. Somani as President o f the All India Organisation of 
Industrial Employers, a key body within FICCI argued in 1956
...w ould it not be better if  the expansion o f the public sector is viewed not 
as an end but as a means? (FICCI 1956: 6)
He went on to argue:
...the State has a purposive role to play in economic affairs, but this role should not 
be equated with or identified with the expansion o f the public sector only. It should be 
much more pervasive in the sense that, within the framework o f social objectives, 
constructive individual effort is helped and an atmosphere is created for the flow of new 
talent. (FICCI 1956: 7)
So the biggest representatives o f capital did not envisage the role o f the state in investing in 
the public sector as a problem at the beginning o f the Second Plan period. This empirical
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evidence also refutes the generalisation by Nayar (2001) that the representatives o f FICCI were 
opposed to the expansion o f the public sector. The public and private sectors were not pitted as 
competing elements in the economy. Capitalists within FICCI asserted that production beyond 
the most primitive type was capitalist wherever it obtains in any part o f the world with any 
political system within the postulates o f a mixed economy (FICCI 1956).
The fact o f the matter is that today every national economy is a mixed 
economy in varying proportions. (FICCI 1956: 7)
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Capital formation in the public sector increased substantially from 1959/0. Fig 4.2 shows 
that between 1950/1 and 1959/0, the rise in capital formation in the corporate and household 
sector followed more or less the same cyclical pattern. From 1960/1, the cyclical patterns 
diverged and household sector capital formation reached a peak when the corporate sector 
reached a low and vice-versa.
According to an appraisal o f this period carried out by researchers at the NCAER on 
behalf o f the state in 1966, the performance o f the industrial sector was described as ‘tardy’ 
compared to the explicit targets set in the five-year plans. Industrial production increased by 
36% against the planned target o f 70% in this period. The major causal factors that were cited 
were the non-availability o f raw materials and more importantly, the persistently high import 
content o f industry (NCAER, 1966). Shortage o f foreign exchange was cited as a crucial 
constraint and the country’s export earnings were not sufficient to provide for the imports. 
Imports o f industrial minerals increased hugely both in relative and absolute terms. The relative 
plan outlay in agriculture had not changed, although the absolute outlay grew in the Third Plan. 
The same was true for power, while the outlay on irrigation declined relatively (Negandhi 1966: 
Appendix I). The failure to allocate sufficient resources to agriculture, which employed more 
than two-third of the labour force and produced more than 50% o f  GDP, remained a 
shortcoming o f  the indicative planning o f the Third Plan (Chakravarty 1987). This failure was
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even more remarkable as policy makers claimed that they had rectified the neglect o f agriculture 
in the Second Plan (Government o f India 1961).
The Congress government in 1966 benchmarked the economic growth in this period to 
the pre-independence decades, when growth rate was around 1% per annum and claimed that 
this had been an ‘era o f rapid change’. Echoes o f this view are found in K. C. Pant’s article as 
Union Minister for Finance in 1968 when he cited these figures to argue on behalf o f the 
government that
The present economic difficulties o f the country especially o f the past 
two years, may sometimes tend to blur one’s view o f  the progress India has 
made during the twenty years since Independence... The country has made 
many-sided progress under the first three Five-Year plans...A  strong wind o f 
modernism is blowing over the agricultural sector, with increasing demand for 
fertilizers, pesticides, improved varieties o f seeds, power for irrigation and 
other inputs that go to increase agricultural productivity...Education and 
medical facilities are reaching more people today than at any time in the past. 
(Pant 1968: 37)
The optimistic prose underwrites the idealism inherent in the idea o f physical planning. 
It never really acknowledged that the process o f capitalist diversification in an impoverished, 
capital constrained economy where agrarian relations saw little change was bound to face 
structural constraints sooner or later.
National Income increased by 21% during the Second Plan period between 1956 and 
1961, an average annual growth o f 4.2%. Moreover, the share o f agriculture in GDP fell from 
58% to 53% between 1950/1 and 1960/1, though GDP measured at 1993-94 prices from 
agriculture reached a level o f Rs 109254 crores from Rs 81069 crores in the same period 
(EPWRF 2002:32 Table 3 A). The Third Plan envisaged an investment programme o f Rs 10,400 
crores over the period 1961/2 to 1965/6. Out o f this, the target o f investment in the public sector 
was fixed at Rs 6100 crores. The targets for generating resources were also laid out at Rs 7500 
crores for the public sector and Rs 4100 crores for the private sector (Hanson 1996). The 
resource mobilisation envisaged in the public sector was expected to cover the cost o f its 
investment programmes and current expenditure and also transfer Rs 200 crores to the private 
sector to assist selected investments in agriculture, industry, housing etc (NCAER. 1966:7). In 
the Third Plan period between 1961 and 1966, National Income grew by 14%, an annual 
average o f 2.8%. The slowdown in manufacturing was much higher. Table 4C shows that the 
annual percentage o f gross domestic capital formation hovered between 15.7 and 21% in this 
period with a steady increase in the period o f the Third Plan. The net addition to stocks was 
between 1% and 2% for most o f the period except for 1955-56 and 1958-59 when it was below 
1%. Thus capital formation in the economy showed a break in its pattern from the period o f the 
First Plan if  we compare the figures in Table 4B and 4C. This is also reflected in the patterns o f 
capital formation in the public, private and household sector illustrated in Fig 4.2.
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Table 4C: Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) as Percentage o f  GDP, 1955-65
Year GDCF as % o f GDP at 
Market Prices
Change in Stock as % of 
GDP at Market Prices
1955-56 16.3 0.6
1956-57 20 1.7
1957-58 21 2
1958-59 15.7 0.1
1959-60 17.5 1.2
1960-61 18.9 1.9
1961-62 18.6 1.3
1962-63 19.5 1.6
1963-64 20 1.2
1964-65 20.7 1.3
Source: Table 11, p78, EPWRF 2002b
However, the slowdown became perceptible by the mid 1960s. By 1964-65, growth 
rates in GDP had slowed down. This was combined with high levels o f inflation and balance of 
payment problems that assumed crisis proportions by 1965-66 and accompanied the slow down 
o f economic growth. Explanations in the literature emanating from state functionaries o f the 
period had initially underplayed the structural nature o f this slow-down and attributed it to bad 
weather conditions and stagnation in agriculture in three out o f five years during the plan period 
along with the conflict with China in 1962 and the war against Pakistan in 1965 (Economic 
Survey 1968-69). These factors may have been important, but on their own, they failed to 
explain the long structural retrogression in the economy that started from 1965-66 (Shetty 
1994). Neoclassical assessments have argued that the problematic for India was the lack of 
dynamic capitalist growth based on commensurate productivity increase (Bhagwati 1993).
One argument in this context relates to the fact that development planning began in 
India with no radical redistribution o f assets. The vast mass o f rural unemployed and 
underemployed remained as before. Even though output growth increased substantially in the 
post-independence period, the gap between the unemployed and the employed, the gap between 
those employed in the organised sector and those employed in the unorganised sector, the gap 
between blue and white collar workers within the organised sector, and above all the gap 
between workers o f all descriptions and the propertied classes increased in the period between 
1947 and 1967 (Patnaik 1984). The ‘elite’ designed and ‘elite’ benefiting nature o f the 
development process could be seen in the consumption patterns of a majority o f the fractile 
groups o f  the population who experienced reduced proportions o f consumption o f industrial
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goods in 1964-65 compared to the Second Plan Period (Patnaik 1994, Table 3 and Table 4: 41- 
42), reduced consumption o f items o f government current expenditure and in the continued 
feeble direct tax effort (Roy 1998).
The literature relating to this period cites many basic impediments like shortfalls in 
agricultural production (Vaidyanathan 1994), faulty planning to absorb large volumes o f aid in 
the face o f  foreign exchange shortages and lack o f trained technical personnel (Srinivasan and 
Narayana 1994), faulty premises o f plan schemes (Bhagwati 1993) and inadequate employment 
growth (Chakravarty 1987; Shetty 1994). K N Raj (1994: 51) in his study o f  gross investment 
between 1951 and 1966 established that a strong correlation between the build up o f unutilised 
capacities and the slowing down o f growth between 1964 and 1966 was not tenable. He 
emphasised the narrow base o f demand that led to a constraint on the demand for wage goods 
due to the inability o f the state to release the demand constraint in the economy. This work 
hinted at the lack o f agrarian redistribution by the state and its inability to tax the rich as the 
source o f the demand constraint. According to Raj, the state needed to ‘tackle the problem at the 
root even if  it implies facing squarely the power groups that are in the way’ (Raj 1994: 64).
According to Chakravarty (1987), for Nehru and his colleagues planning was a positive 
instrument for resolving conflict in a large and heterogeneous subcontinent. The principal aim 
of planning according to Chakravarty, was to overcome the shortage o f capital in relation to 
availability o f employable persons. Public sector earnings did not increase proportionately to 
private earnings; investments relied on borrowing from households. Chakravarty’s assessment 
was that planning benefited Indian capital in the first two decades after independence as a 
structural break in the economy was achieved by the mid 1960s. This is reflected in the analysis 
put forward by Kirloskar (FICCI 1965: 5) that
Indian business w as...a  partner in the economic development o f  the 
country and for the first decades a beneficiary o f the regulatory system that was 
put in place.
However, Chakravarty also pointed out that the process o f planning was unable to 
generate sufficient employment opportunities and ensure adequate production o f  the basic 
necessities o f life.
At the same time, the capitalist class was caught in a peculiar ambivalence towards the 
material needs o f a state-led process o f capitalist transition. In a context where many overseas 
markets were opening up as national liberation struggles in Africa led to formation of 
independent nation-states, the prospect o f state regulation and control would only have appeared 
as a massive hindrance to the expansion o f businesses into new and bountiful lines. Chibber 
(2003) argues that G.D. Birla him self was going over to the other side, railing against the 
consequences o f controls and government regulation o f industry, and demanding greater 
freedom for private enterprise. Yet in spite o f their public speeches, voicing their defence o f free 
enterprise, the big capitalists always recognised the necessity o f the state-led process in this 
period. Their main preoccupation lay in the political opposition to a progressive taxation policy.
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Further, capitalists saw the licensing and regulatory process as an irritant even though they had 
seen the need for it in the late 1940s. This tension lay behind the growing capitalist 
pronouncements against ‘control’.
Hazari’s (1967) work makes it clear that capitalists like the Birlas, Tatas and the 
Thapars took full advantage o f the licensing policies to build huge monopolistic empires 
throughout this period. These policy measures gave a tremendous boost to those industrialists 
who already had enormous resource power. While state policy professed to hold a balance 
between the big capitalists and the emerging smaller ones, R.K. Hazari’s official study 
conducted in the late sixties showed that the big business houses had been able to circumvent 
certain provisions specifically meant to prevent further concentrations o f  economic power.
As the state got enmeshed in a growing fiscal crisis (Roy 1998), it resorted to fiscal 
management. The Second Parliament passed more than 300 acts o f which 5 were in respect o f 
amendments o f the Constitution and more than 100 related to fiscal matters and finance. By 
1965, the state faced either inflation or balance of payment problems or both (Raj 1994). To 
maintain the tempo o f growth in the economy it increased the squeeze on large sections of 
workers through greater indirect taxation, hikes in administered prices that were ‘passed on’ and 
inflationary deficit financing (Patnaik 1994). But by the mid 1960s, to keep this inflationary 
squeeze in check, it was cutting back on its own investment and thereby undermining the 
expansion o f the economy. The BOP crisis came to a head in 1966 and India borrowed from the 
IMF for the first time.
The dynamism o f Indian capitalist development depended crucially on a continuous 
expansion o f public investment. The expansion o f the state sector was an essential stimulant for 
the continued expansion o f the capitalist sector (Patnaik 1994). The capitalist argument from 
FICCI was intent on confining the ‘role o f the state’ to Keynesian aspects o f demand 
management except for ‘progressive taxation’ and leaving supply related aspects to the ‘free 
market’. Singhania (FICCI 1959) took this further to argue that
...there is a tendency to introduce rigidity e.g. in the field o f revenues 
for the Railways or the General Exchequer. Additional levies are imposed 
based on plan assumptions or other reasons. If costs and prices are pushed up 
by regular increments in taxation, this is bound to have adverse consequences 
o f a cumulative kind. Since the cost o f living will rise, there will be a demand 
for increased wages and salaries; the demand for goods and services will not 
keep pace, and the main hope and spring o f economic expansion which lies in 
stimulating demand will receive a setback. A forward looking tax policy like a 
forward looking price policy must aim to secure larger revenues and profits on 
a larger turn-over (FICCI 1959: 9).
To summarise, the Nehruvian model o f state-led capitalist development was focussed 
on increasing production without the requisite structural transformation in social relations to 
make the process sustainable. A strong argument emerges in the heterodox literature that the 
state’s crisis from the mid 1960s was due to assumptions o f fiscal omnipotence and failure to 
generate tax revenues (Patnaik 1984). This was directly linked to the state’s inability to exercise
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any control or discipline over the agricultural and industrial elite. The public sector was unable 
to expand beyond a certain capacity to generate adequate funds for state activities. So it was not 
a crisis o f economy, but a crisis o f the state’s sustainability as a site for primary accumulation of 
capital. This can be attributed to the state’s inability to discipline the capitalist class not only to 
raise taxation as has been argued by Patnaik (1994) and Patnaik and Chandrasekhar (1995) and 
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002), but also more importantly to raise productivity growth as 
argued by Khan (2000).
Ideological opposition to Nehruvian ‘ developmental! srn’ once it ran into crisis came from 
the Communists and Socialists on the Left and the short-lived Swatantra party representing 
capitalist and landed interests including the deposed ‘princes’ on the Right. But the social 
premises o f  the two forms o f resistance were very different. The Communists subsequently 
weakened due to a historical split, but were a force to contend with due to their mass 
organisational activities and movements uniting workers, peasants and the petty-bourgeoisie in 
parts o f India. The Socialists appeared as fragments, reappeared as reconstituted fragments, and 
finally disappeared in the 1970s. Opposition parties based on jati or caste and community were 
particular to a region. The base o f Hindu nationalism widened as independence also saw a shift 
in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) strategy with the formation o f a political front in 
the shape o f the Bharatiya Jan Sangh ending its so-called confinement to the field o f  culture. 
Besides, there was the emergence o f a mass front, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, to 
organise students. It also set up in 1955 its trade union wing, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh 
(BMS) to organise workers (Kanungo 2002).
However, the Congress patched together its pluralities and majorities from India’s vast pool 
of heterogeneous interests. Held together in fragments and factions, its dominance was 
gradually undermined from within and by the push and pulls o f external political turmoil 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Congress governments had commanded majorities o f 70-80% 
of seats in the Lok Sabha on popular vote pluralities o f 40-49 per cent. In 1967, a 4 percent loss 
in Congress’s popular vote cost the ruling party more than 15 percent o f its seats in the Lok 
Sabha (Frankel 2005). Thus a significant aspect at the end o f  the period was a crisis o f 
legitimacy for the Congress as a ruling party.
While the overall strategy faced serious constraints, and did not in the end amount to a 
strategy o f capitalist transformation that could be sustained, it did create pockets o f very 
successful capitalist growth. We shall see in the next sections that the state-led process had 
worked in favour o f a small group o f ‘big capitalists’ so well that they were diversifying into 
establishing units abroad.
4.4 Foreign Capital in India and Indian Capital’s Early Ventures Abroad
The number o f foreign collaborations in India increased dramatically from 81 to 302 during 
the period between 1957 and 1964, the peak era o f planning (see Table 4D).
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Table 4D. Listing o f Foreign Collaborations in India 1957-64
Country 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
UK 17 34 52 120 126 79 70 76
USA 6 4 10 61 77 57 67 55
West
Germany
2 13 58 67 42 48 58
Japan 1 nJ 8 39 30 24 32 24
Switzerland 2 1 13 19 19 19 17
France 2 1 2 9 6 14 16 11
Italy 4 4 4 9 13 11 6 5
E Germany 1 5 4 5 10 19
Holland 1 6 10 7 4 5
Sweden 1 1 13 6 1 2
Denmark 2 6 4 2 oJ 7
Belgium 2 4 2 4 o2> 5
Austria 1 J 5 4 2 4
Canada 1 1 J 6 2
Poland 1 6 J nJ
Total 81 103 150 380 403 298 298 302
Source: Table 3, Appendix 1, Negandhi 1966
The data in Table 4D is corroborated by the Annual report o f ASSOCHAM in 1966 which 
estimated the number o f foreign firms in India to be around 300 (ASSOCHAM 1966: 24). 
Outstanding and new foreign business investment in India was concentrated in manufacturing. 
The UK was still the leader but its share was declining and that o f the US was increasing 
(Kidron 1965:241-243).
A powerful myth that is often propagated about this period is that the Indian economy 
became technologically constrained because it was tied into low productivity growth under low 
grade Soviet technology as a result o f its rejection of assistance from the West. On 13th October 
1949, Nehru in his address to the House o f Representatives and the Senate in the US explicitly 
stated that assistance in machinery and technology would be overwhelmingly welcome in ‘New 
India' on a basis o f ‘mutual advantage' (Nehru 1995). External assistance in the form o f aid 
towards technology and machinery import was mainly provided by the US in the period 
between 1957 and 1964. It provided Rs 7.7 billion out o f  a total o f Rs 19.9 billion. In contrast, 
despite India’s close relationship with the USSR the latter provided only Rs 200 million in the 
same period (Lok Sabha 1965: 73; Negandhi 1966: 36).
Foreign collaborations were mainly in the field o f industrial machinery. Foreign capital was 
also welcomed in heavy chemicals, pharmaceuticals, synthetic oil, heavy machinery, iron and
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steel and aircraft manufacturing. In 1957, the first o f a series o f tax concessions were granted to 
foreign firms affecting salaries, wealth tax and super-tax (tax on super-profits). This was 
followed by the announcement that the ‘51 per cent rule’ requiring majority Indian ownership 
was no longer required. Double taxation avoidance agreements were signed with a number of 
Northern European countries, Japan and the USA by 1964 (Kidron, 1965).
In building capitalism, the state required the assistance o f foreign capital and thus developed 
a dependence on the First World for technology and finance. According to an interview with 
P.K. Ganguly, a leading member o f the CITU, responsible for the organisation o f the informal 
sector, this was due to the scarcity o f capital within the nation-state in spite o f the diversification 
o f the capitalist class. The scarcity o f technological capacity may have been even more binding. 
But why foreign capital may have been interested in operating in India in this period is clear 
from Table 4E below. On the one hand, in spite o f the tax concessions, taxation rates as a 
percentage o f profit was high. But on the other, earnings ratio (earnings per share as a 
proportion o f the current price o f shares) after tax was much higher compared to other countries. 
We must take into account that the earnings ratio can be misleading as an indicator of 
profitability. This is because the ratio depends on what happens to the share price. In countries 
with high risk, the share price may be depressed below fundamental value or replacement value 
and give a high earning ratio. This is good news for bargain hunters in international equity 
markets, except that at that time this was not a possibility in India because o f tight financial 
controls. But it is not good news for existing investors in such companies. The underlying return 
on the original investment may be low. Here, we are reliant on Negandhi’s figures where it 
might be difficult to ensure comparability o f the data. However, the comparisons are based on 
foreign companies operating in different countries and provide a basic comparison based on tax- 
benefits and declared profits o f foreign companies in India. These are much more robust in 
terms o f reliability o f data.
Foreign investors at that time regarded economic growth and stability', market potential and 
profitability, socio-political conditions including labour policy, government attitude towards 
private investment, remittance and repatriation policies as favourable factors in India according 
to Negandhi’s case study based on interviews in 1966. However, the unfavourable factors, 
according to them, were the government decision-making apparatus, rigidity in private foreign 
investment policy, and the tax structure. The Indian capitalist class or at least a section o f it 
agreed on many o f  these issues but differed on the very premise o f  concessions to ‘foreign 
business’.
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Table 4E. Taxation and Profits o f Foreign Companies 1962
Country Tax Rate (as % of Profit) Earning Ratios after Tax
India 67.5 20.6
Japan 44 9.1
Australia 49 11.8
New Zealand 50 o r  n
UK 53.75 10
South Africa 35.25 17.9
Philippines 35.25 18
Malaya 40 9.1
Canada 51 7.1
Venezuela 45 6.1
Peru 49.5 13.5
Colombia 43.6 4.3
France 57.5 6.3
Italy 38 7.5
Netherlands 47 5.3
Source, Table 37, pi 18, Negandhi, 1966
Significant imports o f foreign investment and technology took place, even in Schedule A 
and B industries which normally should have been banned to the private sector. Whereas 
foreign capital accounted for 29 per cent o f fixed investment in the private corporate sector 
between 1948-53, this relative proportion increased to 32 per cent in 1960-61 (Negandhi 1966). 
Thus the tie o f private corporate sector with foreign investment was quite significant in the first 
two decades after independence. However, Indian monopoly capital had another ambitious 
strategy in mind -  that o f capital and technology exports. The export-oriented industries were 
still controlled by foreign capital (Kidron 1965). The only way in which the state could offer to 
level the field was through protection and expansion o f industry. Apart from reaping the 
benefits o f state protection and industrial expansion, however, the top sections o f Indian 
capitalists were trying to set up industrial units in other Third World countries.
The efforts o f Indian capitalists to find opportunities abroad were directed not only to 
export capital equipment, which was only beginning to feature in Indian exports, but also to 
explore the scope for financial and technological participation, especially with other developing 
countries. In the early phases o f granting approval, a detailed framework for clearing proposals 
did not exist. In fact Agarwal (1984) argues that the policy evolved as a result o f pressure from 
Indian enterprises.
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Under the foreign policy doctrine o f ‘non-alignment* and Third World solidarity, a 
comprehensive strategy o f expansion through joint ventures was launched. The Indian 
Industrialists’ Goodwill Delegation (September-October 1964) to African countries, under the 
leadership o f A M M Murugappa Chettiar, a former President o f FICCI, observed that
...in  her own self-interest, India can no longer rely on conventional 
methods o f trading’ and that ‘the newer techniques o f trade demand that we 
must actively participate in setting up joint industrial ventures in as large a 
measure as possible (FICCI 1964: 9).
The first Indian joint venture abroad was sanctioned as early as 1959. The Birla group was 
given permission to set up a textile mill in Ethiopia. Indo-Ethiopian Textiles was set up in 1960 
near Addis Ababa (Agarwal, 1984). In 1962, an assembly plant for sewing machines was set up 
in Sri Lanka which was functioning until the 1980s. Until the mid 1960s, Indian enterprises 
received permission to set up units in Iran for investment in manufacture o f hosepipes, electric 
motors, transformers, bicycles, automotive components, electric fans etc. Only a few o f them 
went into production. One unit for spare parts and automotive components was commissioned 
in 1969, but stopped operations in 1971 (Agarwal 1984: 43).
Soon after Kenya’s independence in December 1963, industrial units were set up by Indian 
entrepreneurs for textiles, gripe water, printing ink and allied products, woollen textiles, light 
engineering goods, and paper and pulp. Some had to wind up relatively soon, but quite a few 
made good progress. Some important destinations were Nigeria and Nepal though in Nepal the 
investments were mainly in trades and hotels. The only venture into Latin America was in 
Colombia for the manufacture o f twist drills but it was soon to prove unsuccessful. Other 
destinations were Libya for a RCC pipe plant and a hardboard factory in Canada which Agarwal 
regards as ‘very successful for a few years’, and sugar and jute products in Uganda. More than 
50% o f total Indian equity overseas was accounted for by the leading business houses o f Birla 
(17 projects), Tata (4), JK (4), Thapar (5), Godrej (4), Kirloskar (8), Sarabhai (2), Mafatlal (1), 
Shriram (1) (Agarwal 1984). By 1970, it was clear that in the initial phase o f  enthusiasm, 
similar to the cases o f internal licensing, many permits were obtained to set up joint ventures 
abroad, but the licences gathered dust on shelves and were never utilised (Agarwal 1984).
4.5 First World Response to the Indian Experiment
The leading capitalist countries were not hostile to India’s ‘exemplar’ experiment in 
state-led capitalism and were willing to go along with it driven by the imperatives of 
‘developmental aid’ characteristic o f the Cold-War period. The 1950s and 1960s were years of 
significant ‘foreign aid’ to India. First World states, the USA being the chief among them, along 
with the Bretton-Woods institutions were willing to support the Indian effort at long-term 
development because stability in the capitalist world economy called for a certain level o f 
overall growth. Even more powerful was the incentive to keep a big country like India from the 
possibility o f  going over entirely to the Communist camp given the revolution in China in 1949
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and the potent threat o f peasant militancy in significant areas o f  India in the 1950s. Until 1949, 
US aid to India was negligible. On 28th December 1950, a general agreement on technical co­
operation under the ‘Point Four’ programme was signed between the two countries. Under this 
agreement, India received direct aid from the United States in the form of grants. By 1952, 
following the ‘Technical Co-operation M ission’, American technicians and professional persons 
started working in India (Tewari 1977).
The purpose o f Public Law 480 was to encourage the sale and export o f surplus 
American agriculture commodities. In the words o f an official USAID presentation to the 
American Congress in 2000,
U.S. support for overseas food aid was formalized in the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act o f 1954, also 
known as P.L. 480 Food for Peace. The basic legislation, which has 
been modified many times, establishes the U.S. policy o f using the 
country's abundant agricultural resources and food processing 
capabilities to enhance food security in the developing world... 
(USAID 2000).
In 1951, the US extended a loan o f $189.7 million towards two million tonnes o f wheat 
imports (Tewari 1977). By 1953-54, the largest part o f US aid to India under the name of 
‘Development Assistance’ was under the title o f Public Law 480 or the more common version 
PL 480, where the aid was repayable in rupees (Hanson 1966: 162), After Nehru’s visit to the 
US in 1956, another $350 million was transferred by the US to buy wheat from the US. The
amount o f ‘assistance’ under PL 480 in 1960 was $1276 million, in 1962 $539.8 million and in
1964 $225 million (Tewari 1977:112).
By 1963, according to Nehru, Indo-American relations were at their closest and 
friendliest. This was a direct outcome o f the support extended by the USA during India’s border 
dispute with China (Nehru 1963 in Government o f India 1995). However, the relationship with 
the USA was not always smooth.
By the late 1960s, Indian rupees in US accounts piled up unspent as a result o f the PL 
480 agreement. This became a source o f conflict to such an extent that despite her humiliation, 
Mrs Gandhi was forced to renegotiate the conditions o f PL 480 during her visit to the US in 
1971. Finally in February 1974, in the context o f ‘radical’ developments within India with the 
nationalisation o f banks and restrictions on profit repatriation o f multinationals in the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), there was a public renunciation o f the conditionalities o f PL 
480 (Nayar 2001). At that stage, the US wrote off part o f the PL 480 loans under the advice and 
initiative o f Henry Kissinger (Tewari 1977).
There were other minor irritants to US-India relations such as the Indian state’s 
proclaimed preference for a socialistic pattern o f society under Nehru and the economic and 
technical support it got from the Soviet Union along with Soviet support for its active military 
intervention in the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971. However, trade restrictions and 
other protective measures adopted by India did not invite any retaliatory action; on the contrary,
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from time to time the major capitalist states proved willing to bail India out o f food scarcity, 
foreign exchange crises and other economic problems (Kurien 1994: 33).
We have seen that foreign capital remained in India and expanded through the provisions o f 
the 1956 Company Act. Food dependency defined India’s relationship with developed countries 
through aid and trade in foodstuffs especially cereals. Food output in India grew faster than the 
developed countries but lagged behind the demand generated by rapid population increase and 
increase in incomes. Therefore India remained a net importer o f food and an exporter o f cash 
crops. This made export diversification difficult but export o f capital through joint ventures 
abroad were attempted.
4.6 Capital, Labour and State: A Tripartite Struggle
The particular framework o f ‘state-intervention’, through which the Indian capitalist class 
followed a process o f  diversification, was replete with contradictions. This has been a 
characteristic o f many late industrialisers. However, contrary to the assertions in the literature as 
in Krueger (1975), it was not so much the process o f planning and ISI per se, but capital’s 
relationship with labour, in an ideological climate that was hostile to capitalism, that, defined 
the contours o f the capitalist class’s relation with the state. Since the state failed to successfully 
implement policies that raised profitability through productivity growth, the maintenance of 
profitability through restrictions on labour acquired greater importance.
Within an overall aim o f profitability rather than ‘productivity gain’, the process o f planning 
and 1S1 were important in the relationship between state and capital, but it was the capitalist 
class’s relation with organised labour which defined the contours o f  the capitalist class’s 
relation with the state. Neoclassical arguments represent the state in this period as a pro-labour 
entity (Debroy and Bhandari 2005). However, we will argue that it was the organised power of 
trade unions that forced the state to come to a tri-partite settlement about basic working 
conditions in the organised sector and give it a ‘formal’ shape.
It must be noted that there was only marginal chage in the structure of the workforce 
between 1951 and 1961. In 1951, industrial workers numbered around 10 million and 
constituted 6% o f the total workforce and 17% of the non-agrarian sector (Breman 1999). The 
share o f industrial work force in the total work force was 9.49% in 1951, 9.95% in 1961 and 
9.98% in 1971. However, the compound annual growth rate o f factory employment increased 
from 1.7% in the First Plan period to 5.7% in the Third Plan period (Patnaik 1979: 11). But, the 
total employment in mines and factories in the private and public sector increased at an average 
rate o f only 1.7% between 1966 and 1977. Thus the maximum relative growth o f  livelihoods in 
the formal sector co-incides with the period o f the first three plans. Breman (1999) argues that 
the period from 1968 and 1984 marked an accelerated flexibilisation o f  the labour force which 
has further accentuated since the 1990s.
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After independence, the capitalist class was dependent on the state in the ‘disciplining of 
labour’ -  the other class that had developed legitimacy and power through the plurality o f trade 
union organisation since the 1920s. This is not a problem that is particular to India. However, 
the collective rights o f labour had emerged as a socially legitimate cause. Out o f the total labour 
force in the mines and factories, only a fracton was trade unionised. Statistics on trade union 
membership for this period is hard to come by and often difficult to estimate. However, the 
records o f the Ministry o f Labour based on information from trade unions filing returns 
provides some official statistics. These statistics possibly underestimate the number o f trade 
unions as unions that have not filed returns are not included. According to this dataset cited by 
the Second National Labour Commission Report (Government o f India 2002), the number o f 
Trade Unions increased to 6813 in 1961 from 2002 in 1951. The membership increased from 
1.76 million 4.01 million In the same period. The strength o f the trade union movement did not 
lie in its numbers, but its militancy and politicisation. According to Breman (1999), in this 
respect, the Indian trade union movement has played an emancipatory role. The dependence of 
the Congress on its own trade union wing for legitimacy combined with the growth o f rival 
political trade unions especially on the Left gave organised workers a new' significance ( 
Government o f India 2002), even though the majority o f workers in the economy remained 
outside the fold o f the trade union movement (Breman 1999).
On 24th October 1953, the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance w'as promulgated 
providing for the regulation o f lay-off and retrenchment compensation. This was in direct 
response to the concern over the crisis that had arisen in the textile industry due to accumulation 
o f stocks and the consequent threat o f closure o f one or more shifts o f mills. This process 
involved lay-off or retrenchment o f a large number o f workers. The capitalists w'ere unhappy 
w'ith the provision o f the Act. They felt that the problem o f accumulation o f stocks could be 
solved through other means than insisting that the units remain open, a demand that had come 
from the concerned trade unions o f w'orkers (All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers, 
1954).
They were also unhappy with the adjudication process, w'hich they thought needed 
overhauling. M.L. Shalt, a reputed industrialist and the President o f the All India Organisation 
o f Industrial Employers (AIOIE) in 1954 argued that the reconciliation process through 
collective bargaining and negotiation was preferable to adjudication procedures involving the 
state machinery in settlement o f  labour disputes in opposition to trade union demands of the 
state as an arbiter. By 1956, it was clear from the political strength o f trade unions that the 
adjudication machinery would involve the state in some way or the other. So the members o f 
AIOIE demanded that tribunals be approved by High Court or Supreme Court and not by 
Government (AIOIE 1956). G.D. Somani, a leading voice of capital within FICCI argued that if 
needed a separate cadre should be created within the judiciary to handle labour disputes.
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The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 had applied to all cases where one person was employed 
by another irrespective o f the type o f employment, the resources o f the employer and his income 
from his business. Thus in the period o f liberalism between 1946 and 1955, an Act had actually 
envisaged the formalisation o f all employer-employee relations in India at least on paper. Indian 
capitalists wanted this to be changed and industry needed to be defined very specifically. The 
1953 amendment did not include this even though there was pressure from the organised 
sections o f the industrial top brass to do so (FICCI 1954). Due to pressure from the leading 
trade unions (Ranadive 1990), the Act widened the definition o f “workmen” to cover 
supervisory personnel drawing up to Rs.500/- per month. Capitalists cited serious difficulties for 
the management, particularly o f medium and small units. Once again taking the examples o f the 
USA and Canada, they argued that ‘in almost all the advanced countries industrial disputes 
legislation does not cover persons employed in confidential and supervisory capacity. In USA, 
‘employee’ excludes any individual as supervisor. In Canada it excludes any person who 
exercises supervisory powers or is employed in a responsible capacity’ (FICCI, 1956). So, 
according to FICCI in 1956, supervisors should have been able to organise themselves into their 
own unions rather than joining the worker’s union.
By 1956, labour militancy had reached a peak, not just in textile but in many other industrial 
sectors. The capitalists in the face o f  this ascendancy o f the trade union movement felt that the 
Act provided unending opportunities for disputes. In 1956, they insisted that amendments 
should be introduced to set time limits within which a workman or an employer could file an 
application for settlement o f an industrial dispute (AIOIE 1956).
The capitalist class were wary of the process of adjudication. The views of Indian and 
foreign capitalists converged on this issue. They felt that collective bargaining should be 
encouraged (ASSOCHAM 1960) and the role o f adjudication should be streamlined (FICCI 
1960). By 1956, the state had introduced the last o f the legislations in the industrial field and 
had assured the ‘organised representatives o f business’ that no other Acts or laws would be 
introduced. But the adjudication process itself did not necessarily work in favour o f the 
capitalist. The decisions o f  Tribunals and o f the Supreme Court according to Singhania (AIOIE 
1962) and Huthseeing (AIOIE 1960) continually increased the ‘burden’ on industry. By 1960, 
they felt that the judiciary was enforcing payment o f gratuities (a form o f ex-gratia payment at 
retirement based on number o f years of work) along with payments under the Provident Fund 
scheme (a lump sum payment on retirement based on contributions from employees and 
employers and managed by the State through regional level Provident Funds Commissioners) 
even though in 1952, the then labour Minister Shri Jagjivan Ram had given assurances to 
employers that when the Provident Fund was introduced employers would not be called upon to 
bear the burden o f gratuities (FICCI 1952). The capitalists in individual cases as well as through 
FICCI argued that the Provident Fund should be deemed as a substitute for gratuities and both 
schemes should not run concurrently.
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By 1960, Wage Boards for the cotton textile, cement and sugar industries were investigating 
the working o f  these industries so as to fix an appropriate wage structure and their reports had 
also been published.
Shah in 1954 as President o f the All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers argued:
The multiplicity o f  trade unions is a serious obstacle to smooth industrial relations. 
Any 7 persons can join together and get themselves registered as a trade union under 
existing legislation. So there are as many unions as there are political parties. No sooner 
than the employer has settled a dispute with one Union, workers belonging to another 
union put up fresh demands, these demands being naturally higher than those already 
conceded (AIOIE 1954: 7).
Numerous statements and reports by the All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers 
held ‘mounting indiscipline’ o f workers due to trade union rivalry, illiteracy and political 
influence responsible for worsening industrial relations. The President o f the Congress led trade 
union 1NTUC committed to FICCI that his union will keep itself independent o f political 
influences (FICCI 1957). In spite o f such promises, by 1957, the trade unions were on the 
offensive.
Factory employment increased by 59.9% between 1950 and 1963. The largest increase was 
in electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances. Employment in the textile industry showed 
the least growth, although it was the largest and oldest industrial sector. The number of 
industrial workers was 7 million out o f the total labour force o f 154 million in the country in 
1956 (Annual Survey o f Industries 1957).
There were major industrial strikes in that one-year alone. A brief summary o f major strikes 
went as follows: Jamshedpur (14 days, 45000 tonnes o f steel production lost), Premier 
automobiles (110 days), dock workers’ strike at all major ports (16 days -  disrupted the 
economy, called o ff after Prime M inister’s intervention), Calcutta Tramway (42 days) strike and 
strikes in Kerala plantations (with participation o f many trade unions) (FICCI 1957, AITUC 
1957).
However, given the political situation, the capitalists could not possibly call for either the 
banning o f multiple political parties or trade unions. They depended on the 1NTUC, the 
Congress affiliated trade union to keep the more militant trade unions on the Left in check 
(FICCI 1960). In the last three years o f the Third Plan period, it was agreed that industrial 
establishments should consider the possibility o f formally setting up joint councils of 
management on a voluntary basis. The state formulated a Code o f Discipline which was in 
response to the capitalist call for ‘disciplining labour’, the only class they felt needed to be 
‘disciplined’. This was a landmark in the history of relations between capital and labour in this 
period as the state sided with the capitalist class in declaring the need to tame labour militancy 
not only in the private sector but also in the state sector. The code came into effect on 1st June 
1958. When Nehru deplored the strike in Heavy Electricals in Bhopal as “a stab in the back of 
the nation”, he expressed a sentiment which resonated with employers in the private sector. For
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the first time, the State and the private capitalist sector shared a common ‘spirit and purpose’ as 
embodied in the code which placed the maintenance o f ‘discipline’ on the ‘parties concerned’ 
i.e. capitalists and workers.
The capitalist class did recognise that this was an open war with labour. They saw the 
‘imperative that a close watch is kept on day-to-day developments on the labour front’ (FICCI 
1962). They called for the strengthening o f  their own organisations and associations by 
increasing membership and ‘extending active support’ (FICCI 1962 emphasis added).
In the period after the second general election the impact o f the labour movement 
showed in the process o f tripartite processes concerning capital-labour relations. The Second 
Parliament passed 20 acts concerning labour o f which three were in respect o f industrial 
disputes, four in respect o f wages and two in respect o f Employees Provident Fund. To these 
must be added the incidence o f labour awards and of the pressures o f  executive directions and o f 
work-a-day circumstances.
The biggest resistance from capitalists came in addressing labour demands for wage 
standardisation and social benefits. Industry spokespersons like Singhania, the President of 
AIOIE argued that ‘in the past decade o f planning, we have made some impressive progress, but 
it is not enough to initiate any large-scale programmes o f social benefit as understood and 
extended in advanced industrialised countries’ (FICCI 1962). The success o f the second plan 
‘production bonus’ according to Birla was a substitute for minimum wage (FICCI 1960). 
Huthseeing, the President o f AIOIE argued that ‘the labourer must be worthy o f hire. Basic 
technical training for students should be provided immediately after their high school studies. 
There should be emphasis on increasing productivity’. From this point in history, the link 
between education and productivity became the strongest argument against the standardisation 
of wages and granting of social benefits to workers in the capitalist sector.
The First Five Year Plan laid down that an abrupt increase in wages was detrimental to 
the economic stability o f the country, as it would get reflected in the costs o f production and, 
consequently, in the rise in prices o f products. From the Second Plan period, however, wages 
had come to be determined by industrial tribunals whose approach reflected the growing 
strength o f the labour movement. So by 1960, the doyens o f industry were already appealing to 
members o f parliament and legislatures to ‘bend their legislative energy to review and 
rationalise the present Acts and regulations’ (FICCI 1960).
To contest the increase in wages recommended either by Industrial Courts or even by 
the Wage Boards, the demand to measure productivity was launched by the employers’ 
organisations as they argued that there were anomalies between earnings and work performance. 
They lobbied in favour o f the Government o f India’s proposal to set up a National Productivity 
Centre but this was ‘challenged by the labour side o f the ILO’ because o f inadequate reflection 
o f labour concerns.
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The most important development in 1961 was the constitution o f the Bonus 
Commission to study the payments o f bonus based on profits to workers in industrial 
establishments. The various capitalist associations argued that it would be wrong to have a 
uniform formula applicable to all industries when the conditions, as much as practices, were 
varied. But they also felt that the emoluments in a particular undertaking or industry could not 
be far out o f alignment with the prevailing standards o f the country. They actually argued on the 
basis o f  the Lewis model that public policy must have in mind not only the improvement o f the 
conditions o f  living o f the industrial worker, but also the massive labour force on the farms and 
other sections o f the community. (FICCI, 1961, Indian Chamber o f Commerce, 1961) The 
Labour minister Gulzarilal Nanda gave the assurance that only the unanimous recommendations 
of the Commission would be implemented.
The net result from all this was the reinforcement o f the capitalist dependence on the 
state not just for disciplining labour, but for laying the institutional contours in a ‘democratic 
framework’ in which the state would formulate the rights o f organisation, representation and 
formulation of ‘industrial relations’. The struggle between capital and labour in India was not 
very different from that in other countries. Marx describes in Capital Volume 1 how the 
regulation o f working conditions was an indispensable part o f the institutional framework in the 
first capitalist transition. However, the account above is important for dispelling the myth that 
the state was benevolent towards labour and granted concessions. Every little benefit to labour 
was the outcome o f the political struggle between capital and labour within the terrain o f the 
state’s power as adjudicator.
4.7 State and Capital: Contradictions and Cracks
One inevitable result o f  this strategy o f  growth was asset concentration (Chandrasekhar 
and Ghosh 2002: 1-2) and consolidation in terms o f size and market share for big Indian 
capitalists (Hazari 1967). The nature o f  state intervention was such that India’s capital 
represented by the top ten business houses could consolidate and expand their oligopolistic 
positions in the first two decades after independence (Yechury 1992). While state policy made 
an attempt to hold a balance between the big capitalists and the emerging smaller ones, the 
official study conducted in the late sixties by R. K Hazari showed that the big business houses 
had been able to circumvent certain provisions specifically meant to prevent the concentration 
o f economic power especially in the total undermining o f  the licensing policy o f the state 
(Hazari 1967).
The ability o f the state to garner resources for the continued expansion o f the state capitalist 
sector without resorting to an increasing rate of surplus extraction was limited. The state’s 
ability to tax the rich shrank progressively through tax evasion and failure to implement a policy 
based on direct taxation (Roy 1998).
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Cracks began to appear in the understanding between state and capital that had been 
achieved at independence and soon afterwards. One issue that was cause o f rancour for 
capitalists was the restructuring o f managing agencies. The passing o f the Companies Act in 
1956 marked a distinct effort on the part o f the state to define legal structures for corporations 
and business houses. The Indian capitalists believed that the ‘Minister for Commerce and 
Industry was charged with the task o f protecting and developing the private sector’ (FICCI 
1956). They were very unhappy with ‘legislations like the new Companies A ct’ and felt that 
these ‘should be reviewed as quickly as possible’. Although G. D. Somani, the President o f 
FICCI publicly complained that ‘the company law of no other country contains so many 
restrictions and checks in regards to various matters pertaining to company formation and 
management’ (FICCI 1956), their main problem lay with the threat to the managing agency 
system. Mohanlal Shall in 1954 argued that
...the important role which the managing agency system has historically performed 
in our industrial development and services which the managing agency houses even 
render today to their managed companies must be noted. Managing agencies are not 
feudal and disliking them is not enough reason to scrap them. (FICCI 1954: 10)
The other source o f uncertainty for capital lay in the ideological climate o f the 1950s. 
Justifications o f ‘profit making’ and ‘capitalism’ had to be made repeatedly. The capitalist class 
in spite o f its increasing economic power through the state-led diversification process felt 
morally shunned and not regarded as part o f  the ‘people’. The balance o f social forces was such 
that the capitalists continuously felt the need to justify their own existence. G D Somani in his 
Presidential Address on 4th May 1956, in New Delhi at the Annual Conference o f the All India 
Organisation o f Industrial Employers expressed these sentiments very precisely when he stated 
that ‘in certain influential quarters, private enterprise has become an epithet o f reproach’. He 
stressed that
.. .Those engaged in industry and trade are o f  the people and with the people. 
(FICCI 1956: 9)
The need to justify the existence o f the class was a characteristic o f  this period. Sometimes 
they argued in defence o f big enterprises. Citing examples from the USA, Shah argued that
...the larger the corporation or the company, the more active it is in matters far 
removed from profit making. An inductive study of the growth and behaviour o f some 
50 large corporations shows that General Motors now makes charitable grants o f 4.5 
million dollars to higher education. Westinghouse Electric makes atomic reactors for 
the Government at nominal profit. I have referred to America because o f the common 
notion that in the land o f private enterprise there are only possessors and pursuers of 
wealth for private gain. (FICCI 1954: 11)
Opposition to the Industrial Disputes Act reverberated with the class as a whole as it 
entitled ‘any worker’ to raise ‘any industrial dispute’. Fear was expressed that by the wide 
definition o f industry,
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.. .a university, a hospital, a restaurant, a boarding house, a shop, a circus, a theatre, 
a zoo, a charitable institution and even an educational institution have come within its 
scope. I f  a liberal interpretation is given to the definition, it will be within the law to 
include a church, a temple and a mosque or other places o f worship and a private 
dwelling house. (FICCI 1954: 9)
It is clear from this view that the adjudication machinery had made a serious effort to cover 
the entire area o f labour exploitation encompassing the informal sector under the Industrial 
Disputes Act. However, resistance from capital, big and small led to multiple amendments that 
significantly reduced the scope o f adjudication based on a narrowing of the definition of 
industry and confining it to the formal sector. This went a long way in ensuring the 
informalisation o f chunks o f  the labour force without any adequate legal option for taking 
retributive action.
To preserve the hegemony o f the state and the ruling classes (which were not always 
united), the pressures from below generated by the aspirations created by the anti-colonial 
liberation struggle had to be addressed to preserve the legitimacy o f control. The political 
leadership on the one hand had to assure accumulation and on the other hand had to maintain 
legitimacy (Nayar 2001). This is a common feature o f the capitalist state in all countries. 
However, the relative autonomy o f the state was fragile and collapsed in times of crisis due to 
pressure and agitation from below. From Independence until the decade o f the 1970s, peasant 
struggles, workers movements and general strikes, the food movement, movements for 
statehood on the basis o f language and finally the JP movement in 1974 undermined this 
legitimacy again and again. The state in defence of its ‘developmental agenda’, closed ranks 
repeatedly against people it perceived as a threat in different ways.
But from the late 1960s, cracks had begun to appear within the capitalist class. Prices o f 
foodstuff grew faster than cash crops. Thus, although ISI made sound economic and political 
sense in the Post World War II international order, the food crisis undermined the legitimacy o f 
this model o f development (Agarwal 1983). The strategy was also limited by its structural 
inability to generate sufficient savings to maintain high levels o f investment, and it inability to 
discipline capitalists to achieve high levels o f productivity growth. Yet the results were not a 
failure compared to colonial growth rates, and as we have seen, sections o f  Indian capitalists 
had burgeoned to the extent that they were confident enough by the 1960s to themselves 
become exporters o f capital and technology to other developing countries. This is where our 
account significantly differs from Chibber (2003). Mukherjee Reed (2001) has established that 
it was the profitability question that was most crucial to corporate expansion. She established 
that there was no chronic crisis o f profitability and profit strategies relied heavily on state 
policies. Our findings about the trajectories o f expansion of the capitalist class are closer to 
Mukherjee Reed’s analysis. Unlike Chibber (2003), who stressed the limits o f  ISI policies as the 
central explanation o f the limits on productivity in this period, our account o f the period traces 
the expansion o f the capitaist class in this period to establish the cracks in the relationship
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between state and capital by the mid 1960s even as concentration o f capital took place in 
significant ways in this period.
The growth and accumulation o f the capitalist class in the era o f planning up to the 1960s 
led to the concentration o f oligopolistic structures in the industrial sector. At the same time, the 
commercial success o f  rich fanners, traders and financiers was resulting in the emergence o f a 
new class o f capitalists in southern and western India and later in northern India as well (Baru 
2000; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). In the three decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, the 
most important development relevant to our enquiry was the fact that the concentration of 
capitalist enclaves started breaking down. New capitalists were emerging in diverse sectors o f 
the economy. These new capitalists are often referred to as the ‘regional bourgeoisie’ in the 
literature. This term can be misleading since it evokes a binary distinction with the already 
powerful sections o f the capitalist class often referred to as the ‘national bourgeoisie’ which is 
historically loaded in terms o f debate (see Chapter Two).
The ‘new’ bourgeoisie started emerging in various parts o f the country as capitalist 
accumulation found localised channels of expansion. This emergence was no historical accident 
and was an outcome o f social changes driven both by the types o f intervention and non­
intervention o f the state. These new capitalists pursued a very different strategy in their 
relationship with the state. The struggle between the regional and national capitalist class has 
been explored to a limited extent in the literature (Baru 2000; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002; 
Desai 2004). The relation between growth and diversification o f the capitalist class however 
warrants more analysis as the central dynamic o f Indian political economy in the next three 
decades since the 1960s. This is the subject o f the next two chapters.
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Chapter Five
Continuity and Change in Capital Accumulation: 1966-1980
This chapter looks at the sectoral nature o f accumulation and growth since the balance 
o f payment crisis in 1965-66 till the liberalisation policies o f the 1980s. It traces continuities 
and change in the accumulation process in the period under consideration. In this chapter, we 
show that a distinct break in the pattern o f public expenditure led growth is evident after 1975- 
76. We find that neither the ‘populist’ policies since 1972, nor the subsequent reforms led to any 
major change in the sectoral structure o f the economy. The significant question at the core o f 
this part o f our thesis is what happened in the period o f stagnation that enabled a break from 
growth funded by public expenditure. We find that new aspirants to the capitalist class saw the 
abuses o f the licensing system by the clique of ‘insider’ capitalists in the 1970s as a threat. 
Economic pressure stemmed from the emergence o f the new business groups, which saw the 
regime o f internal controls as an impediment to their own ascent to profitability and power. The 
rise o f these ‘new ’ business groups were linked to the different regional characteristics o f the 
economy. With the rise o f new capitalists, there were also significant developments in the 
capital market an increase in ‘rentier’ finance, which sought to decontrol the market for finance 
and ensure a ‘delocking’ from production as it saw profit opportunities in the asset market. In 
the face of these developments, the dirigiste strategy of growth, dependent on expanding public 
investment, entered a cul-de-sac and lost social support even as metropolitan capital— and, in 
particular, finance capital— stepped up its offensive against this strategy through the Bretton 
Woods institutions, and later the WTO, in a world where the crucial support coming from 
socialist countries had disappeared.
Section 5.1 discusses trends in growth and structural change in India since 1965-66. It 
summarises the literature on the period and points out the major trends in sectoral shares in the 
economy over a fifty-year period based on National Accounts Statistics (NAS) time-series data. 
Section 5.2 expands on this analysis to trace the recovery patterns after the ten-year recession in 
regulated manufacturing from 1965. The important findings relate to the growth of trade and 
unregulated manufacturing during this period. Section 5.3 highlights regional difference in 
patterns o f growth in the economy and shows the importance of the relationship between state 
and capital in determining investment. It demonstrates the effects o f abandoning national 
planning and considerations o f the ‘national good’ in guiding investment patterns in the 
economy. Section 5.4 argues that a de-linking of finance from production was a feature specific 
to this period and questions o f ‘scale’ assumed political importance due to the ‘restrictions’ on
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‘monopoly’. Section 5.5 highlights the political outcomes of the accumulation processes 
discussed in the body o f the chapter. It discusses the declining legitimacy o f  the Congress as a 
party o f the ‘people’ amidst a rise in asset concentration and declining public investment.
5.1 Structural Change in India since 1965-66
The period from 1965 to 1980 has been the subject o f an impressive amount o f academic
literature (Chakravarty 1987, Patnaik 1994, Nayyar 1996). The literature that addresses the 
period o f acknowledged recession in Indian manufacturing from 1965-66 has discussed a wide 
array o f factors. The sources o f constraints on the investment ratio, the limits o f import 
substituting industrialisation in the Indian context due to the inability o f  the state to ‘discipline’ 
capitalists, the inability o f indicative planning to ensure a balanced distribution o f investment 
and resources and the merits o f India’s growth performance in a comparative perspective have 
been analysed in detail. Numerous studies have debated the cause o f the recession that set in 
from the mid-1960s. The short term analyses o f the slow-down in growth attribute it to the wars 
o f 1962, 1965 and 1971 which diverted potential public investment into unproductive uses and 
the successive droughts o f 1965-66 to 1966-67, and later 1971-71 to 1972-73 which restricted 
the supply o f raw materials and the demand for industrial goods from the agricultural sector 
(Government o f India 1969). However, longer term analysis with the benefit o f hindsight has 
stressed that these factors could not account for the persistence o f stagnation long after the 
disappearance o f the shortterm  problems (Shetty 1994; Nayyar 1996). The literature addressing 
the long structural retrogession since the mid 1960s in the Indian economy have focussed on the 
stagnation in the demand for important mass consumer goods, the stagnation in the demand for 
elementary producer goods leading to a crisis in engineering production, the fall in public 
investment, the fall in agricultural output and an adverse movement in the terms o f trade o f 
industry against agriculture which had impact on profits through enhanced wage costs in the 
industrial sector (Bagchi 1998).
Sifting through this literature, it becomes apparent that the state in this period was a 
terrain o f contest for the dominant classes and class factions with diverging interests and uneasy 
relationships. There were significant changes in the realm o f state-society relations since 1966. 
By the early 1960s, the contradictions o f  the Nehruvian state had weakened it significantly. 
However it had served its purpose o f creating an economy led by capitalist sectors and saw its 
fruition in the expansion o f a capitalist class aspiring for increasing shares in the diversifying 
economy. However, their aspirations required modifications in the basis o f dominant Indian 
nationalism that had remained essentially unchanged till the mid-1960s.
The state had to provide the social conditions o f primary accumulation for the local 
bourgeoisie and the terrain o f contest was multi-layered. Some authors have argued that the 
relationship between the private and the public sectors o f the economy changed from one of 
complementarity to one o f contest as public investment slowed down (Nayar 2001). The
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functionaries of the state also kept up their reluctance to any upheaval o f social order and radical 
change in existing property relations. This is most clearly illustrated in the reluctance and non­
efforts o f state functionaries to implement land reforms in agriculture beyond the very minimum 
abolition o f intermediaries except in states like West Bengal and Kerala that had a strong 
communist base amongst the peasantry that brought to power Communist-led Left coalition 
governments (Kongar 1978).
Another way o f explaining the gradual irrelevance o f indicative economic planning in India 
is to examine the evolution o f import substituting industrialisation (ISI). Chibber (2003) argues 
that institutions o f planning were dissolved by the political clout o f the capitalist class and he 
establishes the increasing irrelevance o f the institutions o f planning. According to Chibber, this 
was a roll back o f the scope o f state intervention.
Two elements structured the reform process in the Shastri interregnum: the 
institutional marginalization o f the Planning Commission and the commitment to roll 
back the scope o f state intervention in industry. Both o f these were continued resolutely 
by Indira Gandhi in the initial years o f her Prime Ministership. This appeal's to be at 
variance with the well-known populism and peculiar brand o f “socialism” that Gandhi 
came to espouse in the 1970’s, and in some ways it is; in her early years, however, 
Gandhi had no intention o f  lurching in the direction o f the populist state capitalism that 
she eventually chose. Indeed, the turn back to intensified ISI came largely as a response 
to a failed attempt at greater liberalization in the early years o f her rule. The eventual 
return to ISI, however, was not a return to the regime that her father had constructed. 
One aspect o f the “reform episode” remained in place and untouched: the further 
parcellization and fragmentation o f the state economic apparatus, which Shastri had 
initiated and Gandhi consolidated. Through all the twists and turns o f the later years, 
the Planning Commission would never again be an important factor in policy formation, 
and its demise put paid to the idea that industrial policy ought to be directed by a nodal 
agency (Chibber 2003: 217).
Three causal factors emerge in this literature as significant explanations o f the 
slowdown in manufacturing in India since the mid sixties; first, the slowing down o f public 
investment (Patnaik 1984; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2001); second, the inability o f the state to 
discipline the capitalist class resulting in the building up o f pre-emptive capacities (Chibber 
2003); and third, the demand deficiency in the economy due to the reluctance o f the state to 
break the structural constraints in agriculture (Raj 1994). While Baru (2000) and Chandrasekhar 
and Ghosh (2002) provide a summary o f the modalities o f product driven expansion o f ‘new 
business’, very few studies have actually examined the processes through which capital 
accumulation continued and expanded in the later part of the slowdown.
The time-series data from 1950-51 to 2000-01 adjusted with 1993-94 as base from the 
Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation reveals certain major breaks in the trends 
described in the literature o f this period. In the next section we will analyse these trends based 
on time series data on growth, sectoral shares and capital formation in the main sectors o f the 
economy as defined in National Accounts Statistics (NAS) classification. It has been observed 
in the literature that stagnation in regulated manufacturing after 1965 led to a growth process 
mainly led by public administration and defence expenditures (Roy 1998). Our analysis in Fig
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5.1 shows that the share o f public expenditure reached a peak o f 10% o f GDP in 1975 and then 
showed a falling trend. A distinct break in the pattern o f public expenditure led growth is 
evident after 1975-76.The significant question at the core o f  this part o f our thesis is what 
happened in the period o f stagnation that enabled a break from growth funded by public 
expenditure.
The chapter traces this break to the social origins o f the accumulation process that came 
into being due to specific interventions by the state, along with clearly demarcated zones o f non­
intervention. There was an important set o f continuities, as well as departures in the structure of 
the accumulation process in the economy and the nature o f state intervention throughout the 
1970s compared to the earlier period. Together, these led to the new alignments and 
realignments o f business interests and led to further stratifications within the industrial capitalist 
class through the institutions o f family controlled business groups.
One significant departure from the earlier period was that the state under Indira 
Gandhi’s prime-ministership in the 1970s adopted a mixture o f populist policy in expanding the 
scope o f public expenditure in rural areas (Sen and Ghosh 1993) combined with an attempt to 
gain control over the banking sector through nationalisation. But it also took the first steps at 
deregulating the capital market in a last ditch attempt to resolve the inability o f  the state to 
regulate and allocate capital to various sectors in the economy through planning and regulatory 
legislation.
In the face o f  uneven development, regional differences in investment and growth 
unleashed new political contestation over specific forms o f state power and patronage not just at 
the national level, but also at regional levels -  a development that has been discussed in the 
‘interest group’ literature (Kochanek 1983, Rudolph and Rudolph 1987) and in the framework 
o f Marxist political economy (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002).
To substantiate these arguments, we need to analyse the structural change in output and 
investment in the economy to establish the context o f state intervention in the period of 
industrial stagnation. We follow four lines o f  enquiry - a detailed sectoral analysis o f 
accumulation processes, an analysis o f  the regional characteristics o f this process, the 
institutional structure through which this accumulation took place and the role o f the state in 
sustaining this process.
5.2 Structural Changes in Output and Investment
The failure to generate adequate employment and improving aggregate productivity of 
labour in the Indian economy rather than just in a few chosen sectors like heavy manufacturing 
in the period o f dirigisme and software, food-processing etc in the neoliberal period has been the 
most obvious symptom o f the lacuna o f the Indian economic development process. In sectoral 
terms, in spite o f the prioritisation o f industrialisation by the state since the Industrial Policy o f 
1956, the share o f the industrial workforce in the total workforce hardly changed between 1951 
and 1961. In 1951, the industrial workforce accounted for 6 % o f the total workforce (Breman
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1999). In 1961, this was 8.45 % and declined to 7.41 % in 1971 (Patnaik 1979). This increased 
to 10.7% in 1983. About 72% o f the workforce was deployed in agriculture in 1951. By 1972- 
73, this increased to 74%. There was a small decline in the share o f agriculture in the labour 
force since the 1980s, but these trends have been reversed since the late 1990s (Government o f 
India 2001). Thus the distribution o f the workforce between agriculture and industry remained 
largely unchanged till the early 1970s. A trend o f tertiarisation o f the labour force started in the 
1980s and continued through the 1990s (Unni 2002 ). The overwhelming dependence o f more 
than 60% o f the labour force on agriculture in face o f declining share o f output from the sector 
(23% in 1999-00) points to the failure o f the development process in altering the structure of 
employment and underemployment in the entire post-independence period. However, the 
process o f accumulation and investment leading to growth has undergone systematic and quite 
dramatic changes in the post-independence period.
The first step in understanding the nature o f the dirigisme that emerged out o f the state-led 
capitalist model is to examine the chain o f  growth and accumulation over time to evaluate the 
contradictions that became constraints and led to crisis at certain conjunctures. The next step is 
to examine the linkage between ‘public’ and ‘private’ players in the structures o f accumulation 
and expansion o f capital to ascertain the extent to which these two sectors were complementary 
or contesting entities in the economy.
A technical approach to identifying the characteristics o f structural change is to use 
social accounting matrices to identify changes in the linkage between sectors, institutional and 
functional categories and also within household groups by size (EPWRF 2002b). But the CSO 
data that we have are not suitable for such an exercise in the period that concerns us due to 
changes in definitions and coverage o f major economic categories. Despite these limitations, the 
data provide evidence on the sectoral differences in the growth o f output and helps to identify 
some broad patterns o f structural change. The dependence o f private enterprise not just on 
public investment but also on the exercise o f state power more generally can only be understood 
in terms o f the history o f social processes through which accumulation, growth and 
diversification took place. The time-series data provides the vital evidence corroborating our 
claim that there were fundamental continuities in the capitalist accumulation process right 
through the stagnation o f the 1960s and 1970s.
We can put India’s growth and structural change in perspective by looking at the rate of 
growth or decline o f major sectoral shares in the economy. We use broad National Accounts 
Survey classifications together with sectoral growth rates for output from 1950 to 2001 based on 
the new series that has been compiled by the EPW Research Foundation. Table 5A provides 
sector wise growth rates for five yearly periods between 1951 and 2000 calculated from the 
NAS data at 1993-94 prices. This is followed by figure 5.1 illustrating growth or decline in 
sector shares for the periods 1950/1-1965/6, 1965/6-1980/1 and 1980/1 to 2000/1.
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Table 5A: Average Annual Growth rates o f GNP at 1993-94 prices
Year
1951-
1955
1956-
1960
1961-
1965
1966-
1970
1971-
1975
1976-
1980
1981- "  
1985
1986-
1990
1991-
1995
" 1996- 
2000
Agriculture 321 3.22 -0.49 5.77 2.21 0.89 34 2 3 92 2 58 2.96
Mining -4 07 3.28 7.62 1.20 5.91 4 88 7.80 12.08 4 6 2 3.90
Regulated
M a n u fa c tu re 6 8 6 9.49 9 9 8 -5.47 2.49 5.65 1005 9 98 9 4 9 4 87
Unregulated
M a tm fa c tu rin 6.25 4.78 4 97 3 30 5.05 4 58 53 5 9 00 5.46 6 52
Electricity, 
Gas S W ater 10.28 15.17 16.52 11.51 7.72 7.92 10.27 11.61 7.38 7.42
Construction 7.31 7.03 7.77 4 70 1.26 5.34 2.60 7.73 3.81 7.61
Trade 5.20 6.30 5.98 4 6 0 4.44 4 79 6.68 6.57 8 81 7.56
Hotels & 
R estauran ts 5.05 6.64 581 4 54 4.48 4 93 6.16 8 60 11.52 10 73
Railways 3.34 7.02 6.12 3.10 3.76 3.25 5.37 4.89 2.75 4 70
Transport 5.48 8 29 7.27 6 04 9 34 7.20 6 0 3 7.10 9.19 7.26
Storage 1.89 3 62 2.63 3.23 10.89 11.15 5 77 1.61 3.05 06 9
Com m unicati 
... . on 7.70 6 84 10.76 6 20 6.65 8.05 6 73 6.89 17.61 2073
Banking & 
In su ra nce 10.07 6 3 4 7.31 7.39 5.49 9 4 2 13 98 16 68 14 77 11.21
Real Estate & 
B u s in e ss 2.33 2.31 2.66 2.78 3.29 3.30 1006 10 04 7.64 7.25
Pub Adm in & 
Defence 36 9 7.83 1065 7.82 40.44 -882 7.07 7.61 3.77 1078
Other
S erv ices 2.95 3.54 4 61 38 7 3.12 3.15 5.49 7.49 5.57 11.18
Source: Table 3A, EPWRF 2002a and 2002b
Fig 5.1
1950-51 -2000 -01 : Transformation ty Mapping Sector Shares (NAS N ew  Linked Series 
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Source: Table 5B below
Figure 5.1 based on data from Table 5B presents the structure o f  the Indian economy in 
terms o f sector shares from 1950-51 to 2000-01. There are broadly identifiable patterns in terms 
o f sectoral shares o f output between 1950-51 and 1965-66, the period o f planning. The share of 
agriculture in total output declined quite rapidly from 58% to 44% in the fifteen years between 
1950-51 and 1965-66. This is the period widely recognised as the most successful period for the 
state-led strategy o f growth. Over the same period, the share o f mining improved from 1% to 
2%. The share o f regulated manufacturing showed a very rapid growth from 5% to 12% in the 
economy. Unregulated manufacturing also expanded from 4.5 % to 5% in the economy. The 
share o f electricity, gas and water supply remained constant at 1%. Construction expanded from 
4% to 6%. The share o f trade increased from 9% to 10%. The share o f railways, transport, 
storage and communication was virtually unchanged. Real estate and business services declined 
from 5% to 4%. The share o f public expenditure and defence expenditure went up from 3% to 
4%. The share o f other services declined from 8% to 6%.
Thus, in the first period, the decline in agriculture was associated with a rapid rise of 
manufacturing and a gradual secular rise in the share o f other sectors dominated by public 
services. Public expenditure as a percentage o f GDP actually declined from 5.5% to 4.4% of 
GDP. This strategy sought to expand the market through current and capital expenditures. It 
cushioned the domestic capitalist class by investing in crucial infrastructure and basic industries 
and directed household savings to finance private investment through the creation o f banks and 
financial institutions for industrial development like the Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
(IFCI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation o f India (ICICI) (set up with World 
Bank assistance) and the Industrial Development Bank o f India (IDBI).
In the next period from 1965-66 to 1975-76, the pattern o f sectoral growth changed quite 
significantly. The share o f agriculture registered only a very slight decline from 44% to 42%. 
The share o f regulated manufacturing declined from 12% to 7%. Construction declined by 1%. 
The share o f all other sectors virtually remained the same. The share o f public administration 
and defence increased from 4% to 10%. Thus the period between 1965-66 and 1975-76 saw a 
process o f growth mainly driven by public expenditure and defence. This has been noted in the 
literature on this period (Roy 1998).
If  we survey the main difference between the first period from 1955/6 to 1965/6 and the 
second period from 1966/7 to 1975/6, it is clear from Table 5A that growth was led by different 
sectors in the two periods. The first period was primarily led by regulated manufacturing (both 
private and public), the expansion o f public services like electricity, gas and water-supply and 
the expansion o f state-led infrastructure development like railways and other transport, storage 
and communication. In the period between 1970 and 1975, the crisis in regulated manufacturing
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(low growth rates and reduced sectoral share) meant that growth was now more dependent on 
public spending and defence expenditure despite the slower rate o f growth o f public investment 
(Bharadwaj 1994; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2002). There was a secular decline in the share of 
agriculture from 58% to 40% between 1950-51 and 1980-81. Agriculture presented a persistent 
trend o f stagnation before the 1970s.
In the period between 1975/6 and 1980/1, two further changes are remarkable. There is 
a rapid fall in the share o f public administration and defence from 10% to 5%. The decline in 
share o f  agriculture is 2% in these five years. The share o f trade increases by 2% in the same 
period. There is a secular expansion by 1 % in all other sectors. So, there is yet another definitive 
difference in terms o f changes in the structure o f GDP comparing the period from 1975/6 to 
1980/1 with the previous period up to 1975/6. From this, we can argue that the reading o f the 
economy as that o f relative stagnancy accompanied by the end o f state expansionism through 
public expenditure applies only to the first ten years from 1965/6 to 1975/6. From 1975/6 a new 
trend was setting in with declining rates o f public expenditure. This is not reflected in growth 
rates (Nayar 2006) but does point to a departure in patterns o f accumulation and investment in 
the economy. This co-incides with the two-year period o f the Emergency and the subsequent 
interlude o f  the Government run by the Janata coalition for three years before the return of the 
Congress under Indira Gandhi. Thus this trend that started during the Emergency continued 
during the span o f Janata rule. Patnaik (1984) has suggested that it was the failure o f the Indian 
state to garner resources through revenues (especially tax revenues) that led to the subsequent 
failure to maintain the rate of growth o f public expenditure. The overall decline in share of 
public expenditure in GDP in this period needs problematising that is beyond the scope o f this 
thesis. What is important for our account is to recognise that by 1975, the factors behnd the 
growth performance since 1980 had less to do with public expenditure and were dependent on 
the changing patterns o f accumulation and investment.
These observations help us to make sense o f the patterns o f accumulation and 
investment that led to the growth o f the 1980s. The patterns o f state-involvement in the process 
o f capital accumulation were changing and overall economic stagnation was led by the 
stagnation in regulated manufacturing. A different pattern is evident in the growth of 
unregulated manufacturing and trade from the latter part o f the 1970s, and this deserves more 
scrutiny. While growth in regulated manufacturing increased between 1976 and 1980, there 
was a steady growth in the output share and growth rates o f unregulated manufacturing from 
1970-1980 (Table 5A and Table 5B). The other major trend was the rise in the share o f trade in 
GDP. These sectors together contribute significantly to the trend line o f aggregate growth rates 
in Fig 5.2.
It is clear from the sector shares shown in figure 5.1 and plots o f five yearly moving 
averages o f aggregate growth rates in the economy from 1950/1 to 2000/1 in fig 5.2, that neither 
the ‘populist’ policies since 1972, nor the reforms led to any major change in the sectoral
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structure o f the economy. The highest aggregate growth rates are for the period between 1985- 
86 and 1990-91. the period preceding the structural adjustment programme (Fig 5.2). This has 
been observed in many studies on growth (Mahendra Dev 2000: Mahendra Dev 2002: Rodrik 
and Subramanian 2004). These observations question the myth propagated by neoclassical 
economists (Ahluwalia 2002) that the policy package o f structural adjustment programmes had 
much to do with the growth-acceleration o f the economy. What concerns us more is the nature 
o f the capital accumulation that drove India's growth from 1980-81 and continued through the 
decade o f the 1980s.
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The changes in sectoral shares in the economy are laid out in Table 5B and Figure 5.1. 
Apart from regulated manufacturing, trade was the only sector that registered a continuous rise 
in its sectoral share over the fifty-year period after independence. The only other sector 
registering a significant increase in its share was public administration and defence in the early 
part o f the 1970s. Other sectors that registered smaller increases were transport, communication, 
banking and insurance, electricity, gas and water (Table 5B). Clearly the diversification towards 
a ‘service* based economy has been a characteristic feature o f the entire post-independence 
period except for the brief interlude o f industry-led growth provided by the Nehru-Mahalanobis 
strategy for a decade. The diversification away from agriculture into various non-agricultural 
sectors was a gradual and broad-based diversification, involving different sectors in different 
periods in these fifty years.
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Table 5B Percentage Shares o f Sectors in GDP: 1950-51 -  2000-01 (Five-Year Intervals)
Year 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01
Agr 57.5 56.0 52,9 42.8 46.3 41.6 39.7 36.3 32.2 28.0 24.2
Min 1.5 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.9 2,1 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.3
Regulated
Manufacturing 4.3 4.9 5.9 12.4 7.6 6.9 8.1 9.5 10.5 11.9 11.2
Unregulated
Manufacturing 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.1 5,8 5.7 6.1 6.0 6.0
Electricity, Gas 
& Water Supply 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.5
Construction 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.9 6.1 5.3 6.1 5.4 5,5 5.1 5.3
Trade 8.2 8.6 9.2 9.9 10.3 10.2 11.5 12.0 11,8 13.1 13.6
Hotels & 
Restaurants 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0,7 0.9 1.0
Railways 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1,4 1.2 1.1
Transport 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 3,0 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.3
Storage 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Communication 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.2
Banking & 
Insurance 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.3 3.1 4.2 5.6 6.6
Real Estate &
Business
Services 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.0
Pub Admin & 
Defence 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.6 4.2 10.4 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.2 6.1
Other Services 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.0 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.3 7.5
Source: Calculated from EPWRF, 2002b, Table 3A and CSO 2002
In regulated manufacturing, there are a few definitive characteristics (see Fig 5.3 and 
5.4) that help to explain these trends. Gross Capital Formation is measured as the gross 
additions to fixed assets and increases in stocks o f commodities during a period o f  account. 
Such accumulation is made up o f outlays o f producing units that do not enter into immediate 
consumption in the same period. Gross Fixed Capital Formation represents additions to fixed 
assets comprising fresh construction and acquisition o f machinery and equipment (EPW 
Research Foundation 2002a: 44-45),
The ten-year expansion from 1955-56 to 1965-66 in output (Fig 5.3) can be directly 
attributed to the accumulation and investment process kick-started by the Nehru-Mahalanobis 
strategy. All through the period up to 1990-91, the proportion o f fixed capital formation in 
regulated manufacturing was high relative to gross capital formation even during the stagnant 
years of manufacturing in the 1970s (Fig 5.4). Our aim is to explain the growth in the 
investment share in regulated manufacturing since 1975-76 which was only partially reversed in 
1995-96.
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Fig 5.3
Regulated Manufacturing
o. 14.00
O 12.00
® 10.00 
2
« 8.00 
 ^ 6.00 
4.00 
§ 2.00 
® 0.00
1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 
SI 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 01
Year
Fig 5.4
Regulated Manufacturing: 1950-51 -2000-01
2 160000 
S _  140000 
a  - 2 120000re o
0  2 -c 100000
1  3 ^  80000
™ — s  60000
| o a  40000 § re 20000 
E n
in 8 5 COCO CO T - r- oo COoo 05 s o
o m o m o m o in o m om in CO & r". h- 00 oo 05 05 o05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 o
Year
CM
 GDP
 GFCF
GCF
Within the significant overall increase in manufacturing output, the structure o f 
manufacturing went through a number o f different phases o f change. In the early 1950s, 
consumer goods accounted for 60% o f total output; within that, textiles were the largest single 
manufacturing industry. By the late 1970s, consumer goods accounted for 30-35%. basic and 
capital goods for 50% and intermediate goods accounted for the rest o f the value added 
(EPWRF 2002b). This structural change has been evaluated in terms o f ownership patterns of 
the public and private sector to often argue that the public sector in basic and capital goods grew
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at the cost o f the private sector in consumer goods in India leading to the ills o f rent-seeking, 
distortions, disincentives which together led to the prescription for a reduced role for the public 
sector (Rosen 1987).
However this account fails to explain the secular expansion in private capital formation 
in manufacturing and trade all through the period after 1975-76 up to 1989-90 (Fig 5.4 and Fig
5.7). Trade, including hotels and restaurants, registered a steady and significant growth in its 
share right from independence (See figure 5.5 and 5.6 below) with a marked increase since 
1980-81. One problem with the trade data from the CSO is that hotels and restaurants were not 
classified separately from trade up to 1980-81 by the CSO. So the data for net capital formation 
is not comparable for the two categories for the fifty-year period since 1950. The spurt in 
growth for hotels and restaurants is very much a 1990s phenomenon as is evident from the GDP 
data from 1950 plotted in Fig 5.8 below. Unlike trade, hotels and restaurants have not seen a 
significant increase in sectoral shares. In fifty years, the share o f hotels and restaurants in GDP 
increased from 0.48% to 1.03% (See Table 5C below).
Fig 5.5
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Table 5C: Hotels and Restaurants as a Share o f GDP
Year
Sector Share o f Hotels and 
Restaurants in GDP
1950-51 0.48
1955-56 0.50
1960-61 0.54
1965-66 0.58
1970-71 0.60
1975-76 0.59
1980-81 0.68
1985-86 0.69
1990-91 0.73
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1995-96 0.89
2000-01 1.03
Source: Estimated from Table3A. EPWRF. 2002b and CSO 2002
Trade output demonstrated a relatively steady growth since 1950-51 with a surge from 
1980-81 (See figure 5.6 below). What is remarkable about the development o f domestic trade is 
the big spurt in capital accumulation since the mid-1970s (Figure 5.7). Given the different 
trajectory o f investment patterns in hotels and restaurants and its nominal share o f GDP. we can 
argue that the notable rise in capital formation in the trade sector in the 1970s should be treated 
separately and the dynamics o f this accumulation process in trade since the mid 1970s is a 
phenomenon that requires analysis hitherto missing in the literature.
Fig 5.6: Trade Output Since 1950-51
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Fig 5.8
Hotels and Restaurant: GDP at 1993-94 prices
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Within the services sector, the share o f trade, hotels and restaurants increased from 12.5 
% in 1990-91 to 15.7 % in 1998-99 compared to an expansion o f 10.5 % to 10.8 % from 1965- 
66 to 1975-76. But the share expanded from 10.8% to 12.5 % in the period 1975-76 to 1990-91. 
The share o f transport, storage and communications has grown from 5.3 % to 7.6 % from 1990- 
91 to 1998-99. but the share o f transport has seen a steady rise o f 5% in every 5 year period, the 
share o f storage has remained the same at 1% and the share o f communication has registered a 
rise o f more than 2% in the post-1991 period (Table 5B and Fig 5.1). The share o f construction 
has remained nearly the same during the period while that o f financing, insurance, real estate 
and business services has risen from 10.22% to 11.44% in the post-1991 period (Various CSO 
publications).
In agriculture, the state intervention o f the 1970s was confined to the state 
acting as a direct player in the market through the provision of support prices without any direct 
intervention in the production process except for the gradual abolition o f intermediaries in land 
revenue collection and some regulation o f tenancy (Rao and Storm 1998. Patnaik 1999). The 
chain o f retail trade and intermediaries in the agrarian economy developed unimpeded, only 
limited by the size o f the harvest (Harris-White 1986). Between 1950 and 1980. the entire rural 
economy in agricultural produce had been drawn into the structure o f money-commodity 
relationships and almost 100% of commercial crops and 40 to 60% o f the food crops were 
brought to the market and sold as commodities. According to official statistics. 85 to 93% of 
rice and 50-60% of wheat grown was brought to regulated markets (Bulletin on Food Statistics 
1979. All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) 1980).
We have also argued in Chapter Four that ISI worked with a narrow aim o f diversify ing 
and deepening the industrial base o f the economy until 1965-66. By the mid-1960s, the 
continuation o f growth faced a crisis. The ability of the state to continue the stimulus to growth
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was undermined by its inability to raise adequate resources to keep up rates o f capital 
accumulation through public investment in the face o f  inflationary and fiscal pressures. Failure 
to achieve productivity increases that could sustain the growth process was equally relevant.
This was not a short-term crisis because its root lay in the power o f  a handful o f capitalists 
to prevent and subvert any attempt at economic discipline, in the general ‘reluctance’ o f the 
upper classes o f India to pay direct taxes and in the lack o f political will to carry out a rapid 
structural transformation in the agricultural sector in the post-independence period. These were 
the antecedents to growth deceleration leading to the ‘secular stagnation’ of the 1970s 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). The long period from 1964-65 to 1978-79 was characterised 
by a relative stagnation in manufacturing output combined with a decline in the rate o f growth 
o f public investments (Bharadwaj 1994).
The correlation between public investment and industrial growth was clear to state 
functionaries in the Congress. K.V. Ganesh, Minister o f State for Finance on March 25 1972 
told Parliament
...right from 1962 when public investment decreased, there had been 
stagnation in industrial growth. Public investment and industrial growth have 
somehow become correlated as far as economics is concerned (Lok Sabha 
March 25 1972:12).
This adversely affected a number o f  industries that catered to mass consumption or those 
with strong linkages to public investment. In addition, the sluggish rate o f public investment 
contributed to infrastructure constraints affecting private economic activity. It must also be 
noted that the nature o f stepped up public expenditure had not been solely geared towards 
enhancing growth in the existing industrial structure. According to M S Sanjeevi Rao, a 
Congress Member o f Parliament from Kakinada, the state stepped up investment in nuclear and 
space research programmes with increased annual lay-outs for accelerated space research 
projects, procurement o f  uranium concentrates and increases in operational costs o f nuclear 
projects (Lok Sabha 1972: 16). But it faced severe fiscal constraints caused by the strong 
resistance o f the upper classes in India against direct taxation o f any form and their attempts at 
passing on the fiscal burden to people whose incomes were below the minimum exemption limit 
for income tax purposes (Bagchi 1998; Roy 1998). The particular problem o f the failure o f the 
state to tax agriculture except for income from plantations has been a matter o f central 
significance (Toye 1981) since the 1950s. Mathew (1968) established that the higher income 
groups within the agricultural sector were largely ‘undertaxed’ relative both to those of 
comparable income levels outside agriculture and low income groups within agriculture. In fact, 
the most successful effort o f the rich peasants apart from keeping property rights intact and 
maintaining agricultural prices (which we discuss later) was ensuring that agriculture remained 
outside the tax base o f the state. It took the intense repression o f the period o f the Emergency to 
put down the social conflicts stemming from the inflationary outcomes o f the previous decade,
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and to harness the opportunities of a good harvest in 1975-76 to step up public investment and 
the production o f capital goods (Bagchi 1998; Chandra 2003).
The literature on this period has focussed on the macroeconomic implications o f India’s 
fiscal constraints and the implications for growth. In our next section, we argue that if we look 
at regional patterns o f industrial investment and growth, we see further elements o f continuity 
and change in ‘reform1 processes since 1965.
5.3 Regional Patterns o f Industrial Growth
The general pattern o f industrialisation up to the 1970s shows a deepening of
manufacturing enclaves India inherited from the colonial period. New upstream and 
downstream small and medium-scale enterprises were developed, but their fortunes were tied to 
the large-scale units and thus dependent on central government investment policies within the 
limits o f the state-led process. Although the choice o f public sector enterprises that were 
developed was often quite ad hoc (Bagchi 1982, 1988), there is substantial evidence that public 
sector enterprises assisted the trade and state-led economic expansion in Southern and Western 
India. Investments were often in entirely new areas like petrochemicals, software and 
biotechnology. These investments assisted the diversification and consolidation o f the 
pharmaceutical, cement and chemical industries from the 1980s (Rosen 1988).
West Bengal and Maharashtra, the early seats o f colonial and industrial capital, remained 
more closely tied to the industrial sectors that had already developed. In this respect, they were 
exceptions in terms o f the emerging structure o f industry elsewhere in India. The structure of 
post-independence industrial development was mainly based on medium and small-scale 
enterprises until the 1970s in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh (Rosen 1988). The 
evidence from Andhra Pradesh cited later is also one o f expansion o f medium scale enterprises.
We have argued (see Table 5A above) that growth was sector specific and by the late 
1970s, some analysts have argued that growth was mainly based on the expansion o f public 
expenditure and defence (Srinivasan and Narayana 1994; Roy 1998). Our table shows that these 
sectors grew faster, not that growth as a whole was based on the expansion o f these sectors. 
However, within these broad patterns, there were remarkable disparities in growth between 
states and in the nature of their economic diversification.
In 1960-61, industrially advanced states such as Maharashtra, West Bengal and Gujarat 
headed the list o f developed states, but by 1970-71, Punjab and Haryana, the two states which 
underwent rapid agricultural growth, displaced Maharashtra and West Bengal. Maharashtra 
regained its position through further industrial diversification within the state and a thrust into 
agricultural production in the dry regions, where cotton and sugarcane had been grown since 
colonial times. Within the state itself, there were large disparities in growth e.g. Marathwada 
and Vidharbha lagged behind in Maharashtra (Banerjee and Ghosh 1988). Similarly there were 
huge disparities in growth and accumulation patterns between North Bihar and South Bihar, 
which later became Jharkhand (Prasad 1986). West Bengal saw a long process o f de­
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industrialisation attributable to the decline o f colonial capital, the crisis in the ‘jute enclave’ and 
the lack o f new investment in the post-independence period, except for heavy industry in steel 
in Durgapur and Burnpur and some light industry development around Siliguri.
The case o f Bihar illustrates the contradiction between the nature o f private and public 
investment. Mining and basic industries were important in South East Bihar that is now 
Jharkhand. A steel plant was set up in 1917 at Kalimati by the Tatas, which later became 
Jamshedpur. Dhanbad was known for its cement, iron and coal controlled by a local mafia that 
reached the height o f  its operations in the 1970s and 1980s even after state take-over o f the coal 
industry. There were 8 cement factories in Dalmianagar and Dehri-on-Sone. Barauni was 
developed in the post independence period as an industrial centre based around a public sector 
oil refinery. There were a handful o f  super rich families like the Birlas, Dalmias, Tatas and the 
Modis who led investments in steel and cement in Bihar. Tata Iron and Steel Company 
(TISCO) developed its capacity in the post-independence period as a beneficiary o f the 
licensing Policy. The Tata-owned automobile company TELCO, Modi Steel and Bihar Sponge 
Iron Limited were also products o f the Nehruvian promotion o f the private sector in industry. 
The major beneficiaries were all big capitalists. Apart from mining, the other major industries 
in South Bihar were iron and steel. Thus, heavy industrial expansion in South Bihar continued 
in the 1970s. Medium scale firms were mainly in sugar. In 1974-75, sugar co-operatives 
accounted for over 40% o f the total sugar output in Bihar. However, the conclave nature of 
industrial development meant there was not much ‘trickling down’ o f employment to the vast 
majority o f the local population, though some ancillary units did develop in the Ranchi- 
Jamshedpur industrial belt.
In the same period, major public sector enterprises were also set up in Bihar. These 
included units o f the Heavy Engineering Corporation in Ranchi, Bokaro Steel Ltd, Bokaro, 
Indian Aluminium in Muri, Fertilizer Corporation of India in Sindri, Hindusthan Fertiliser 
Corporation in Begusarai, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited in Muzaffarpur and 
Bharat Wagon in M uzaffarpur and Mokamah. Apart from this, the state also invested in leather, 
construction and eighteen agro based industries (Ministry o f Industry, Government o f Bihar, 
various years). In Bihar, industry was concentrated in Singhbhum, Dhanbad and Hazaribagh. 
Dalmianagar developed as a base for sugar, paper and cement factories. Thus, the growth o f 
industry in Bihar was led by a combination o f  public sector expansion and big private business 
houses benefiting from industrial licensing. The result was a mixed social structure driven by 
industrialisation on the one hand and the increasing oppression o f unreconstructed agrarian 
exploitation on the other (Prasad 1986).
In Gujarat between 1951 and 1962, thirty-one major new industrial projects were started 
in the private sector and thirty-seven industrial enterprises expanded their activities. A hundred 
units o f significant industrial capacity were also established in the small-scale sector. The main 
industries were textiles, general and electrical engineering, vegetable oils, chemicals, cement
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and pharmaceuticals. During the Second Plan, ‘Atul Products’ near Bulsar, the Cement factories 
in Sevalia, Dwarka and Jamnagar, soda-ash factories at Porbandar, about six or seven solvent 
extraction plants, the salt research institute at Bhavnagar, Tata Chemicals at Mithapur and 
Dharangdhra, chemicals and pharmaceuticals at Baroda were milestones in Gujarat’s industrial 
development.
In Andhra Pradesh, which became a separate state in 1956 as a result o f the States 
Reorganisation Act, the important and oldest organised industry in the state was the cotton 
textile industry. Out o f  the twenty one units in 1967, three were composite mills o f large size 
with 936,136 spindles, 716 looms and 200 power looms, eight were large spinning mills, four 
were medium sized spinning mills (with a varied capacity o f 5504 and 18,000 spindles) and the 
remaining six were weaving mills (14 to 128 looms). The form o f organisation varied with five 
proprietary concerns including partnerships, two co-operatives, two private limited companies, 
eleven public limited companies and one unlimited liability company -  all in the private sector. 
In addition, there were two hosiery units o f medium size. There was one textile unit producing 
artificial silk yarn taken over by a managing agency in the late 1960s. The former Hyderabad 
government had invested Rs 9 million accounting for 29.97% o f its paid-up capital besides 
guaranteeing a loan o f  more than Rs 30 million (NCABR 1962).
In the sugar industry, there were twelve units whose crushing capacity ranged from 300 
tonnes to 3750 tonnes per day. The largest was a public sector unit, the biggest cane sugar 
factory in Asia along with a large-scale farm followed by another private sector unit with 2500 
tonnes and the rest varying between 1000 and 300 tonnes. In 1966-67, five fresh licences were 
issued to set up co-operative sugar factories with capacities from 600 tonnes to 1000 tons and 
plans for two more as part o f the Third Plan. Power alcohol and carbon dioxide gas manufacture 
developed as subsidiary industries. There were two public sector units manufacturing alcohol, 
one power alcohol plant in the public sector, and four in the private sector o f  medium size. The 
structure o f the carbon dioxide gas industry was similar with one public sector unit o f large 
capacity and three private sector medium capacity units.
There were four medium to large jute mills in Andhra Pradesh all controlled by 
Calcutta-based ju te enterprises with registered offices in Calcutta. Two were taken over by 
Calcutta based members o f the Indian Jute Mills Association while British Managing Agents 
controlled the other two. There were three smaller jute presses also owned by British managing 
agents, but connected to each other through inter-locking directorships controlled by entrenched 
interests in Calcutta. The structure o f industry was not necessarily linked with ‘local capital’ in 
the states that we have surveyed except for Gujarat where a strong mercantile class predisposed 
towards medium scale investment in consumer goods existed since the pre-independence 
period.
A techno-economic survey o f Andhra Pradesh commissioned by the government of 
India in 1962 argued that the factors inhibiting development in Andhra Pradesh included the
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ia c k  o f venture capital’ and the relative absence o f an entrepreneurial class (NCAER 1962). In 
the Andhra region, private investment in industry was largest in sugar, followed by vegetable oil 
refining, textiles, chemical fertilisers, salt making, jute, mica mining and ceramics. If  we 
consider the data on joint stock companies between the period 1931-32 and 1945-46 for regions 
that later became Andhra Pradesh, most o f  the public and private limited companies were 
trading companies, chit fund companies, hotels, cinemas, road transport companies, oil mills 
and rice mills whose individual paid up capital rarely exceeded Rs 50, 000.
Table 5D provides a rough idea o f installed industrial capacity in Andhra Pradesh for 
1979-80 and 1989-90 measured by investment in fixed capital based on a two-digit industrial 
classification. The main change over this period was the relative decline in investments in basic 
chemicals and chemical products (the sectoral share o f fixed capital in these sectors dropped 
from 14.14% to 7.27%) and the huge increase in non-metallic and mineral products (whose 
sectoral share o f fixed capital increased from 3.18% to 12.49% between 1979-80 and 1989-90) 
within the industrial sector.
Table 5D: Andhra Pradesh: Investment in Fixed capital in Industry
Fixed Capital in Rs 
‘00,000 Sector Share (%)
NIC Code Andhra Pradesh: Fixed Capital 1979-80 1989-90 1979-80 1989-90
20-21 Food Products 9241 30078 5.92 3.97
22 Beverages, Tobacco and Tobacco Products 1796 10754 1.15 1.42
23 Cotton Textiles 3302 18949 2.11 2.50
24 Wool, Silk, man-Made Fibre Textiles 261 4889 0.17 0.65
25 Jute and Other Vegetable Fibre Textiles 580 1947 0.37 0.26
26 Textile Products 103 1325 0.07 0.18
27 Wood and Wood products 192 985 0.12 0.13
28 Paper and Paper products 7405 23541 4.74 3.11
29 Leather, Leather and Fur Products 277 1237 0.18 0.16
30 Basic Chemicals and Chemical Products 22081 55055 14.14 7.27
31 Rubber, Plastic, petroleum and Coal products 1973 30104 1.26 3.98
32 Non-Metallic Mineral products 4963 94576 3.18 12.49
33 Basic Metal and Alloy Industries 7290 26272 4.67 3.47
34 Metal products and parts 540 5003 0.35 0.66
35 Machinery, Machine tools and Parts 5284 11631 3.38 1.54
36 Electrical machinery 7413 23916 4.75 3.16
37 Transport Equipment and Parts 3536 16120 2.26 2.13
38 Other Manufacturing Industry 352 7942 0.23 1.05
40 Electricity 78239 390173 50.11 51.53
41 Gas and Steam Generation and Distribution 574 96 0.37 0.01
42 Water works and supply 0.00 0.00
74 Storage and ware housing 746 1066 0.48 0.14
97 Repair services 0.00 0.00
39 Repair o f capital goods 1464 0.00 0.19
Total 156148 757123 100.00 100.00
Source: Technoeconomic Survey O f Andhra Pradesh 1962
But the overall pattern o f industry showed no significant structural change although 
overall growth rates were recovering for industry in a situation where only a small portion o f the
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workforce found work in the ‘formal sector’, while the majority o f  the population were confined 
to the ‘informal sector’ o f small trade, production and services.
Three observations can be made about the regional nature o f capital accumulation in 
India since the mid 1960s. The first point to be noted is that the neoliberal literature has 
focussed on estimates o f under-utilised capacity during the planning period to bolster their 
argument that planning caused inefficiencies that resulted in low productivity (Srinivasana and 
Bhagwati 1999). However, most o f these estimates left out small- scale enterprise (Raj 1994) 
and, in some cases, even medium scale enterprises. The evidence o f growth and the constant 
sectoral share o f  the ‘unregulated’ manufacturing sector presented in the earlier section (Table 
5A and Table 5B) strengthens our argument that the large share o f small and medium scale 
industry were not taken into account in the neo-liberal studies.
The second point important to our analysis is that industrial investments by big business 
houses in India were regionally concentrated. The growth o f the big business houses in West 
Bengal and in eastern India as a whole led to attempts at diversification away from the eastern 
region to Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Madras and Uttar Pradesh. This along with a rise o f  ‘new’ 
capitalists in Gujarat, once again, predominantly in medium scale industry led to changes in the 
regional composition o f industry. In Maharashtra, sugar and textiles were the staple medium 
scale industries in the 1960s (Banerjee and Ghosh, 1988). The textile industry dated back to the 
pre-independence period, but the rapid growth o f the sugar industry was a product o f the early 
IS1 period through co-operative holding structures. Investment in eastern India was in jute and 
cotton textile, tea manufacturing, chemicals and electrical engineering in the 1960s and 1970s 
predominantly in West Bengal. The large-scale manufacturing sector was dominated by family- 
owned business houses (Birla, Jalan, Goenka, Bangui's etc) and subsidiaries or branches of 
foreign companies like Hindustan Lever and Philips India Limited. Birla had the lion’s share o f 
investments in West Bengal. Thus industrial growth in West Bengal was related considerably to 
the investment and accumulation patterns o f this particular business house (Banerjee and Ghosh 
1988).
Between 1959 and 1966, the Birlas applied for investments in Bihar, Assam, Orissa and 
West Bengal to the tune o f Rs 2414 million whereas the amount applied for in respect o f other 
states was Rs 3315 million (Banerjee and Ghosh 1988:126). Thus there was a concerted move 
to diversify geographically. Diversification of big capital from the Eastern region and the 
inability o f smaller groups to compete led to a deindustrialisation process accompanied by the 
proliferation of a trade and service based economy.
There were a few state take-overs o f sick business conglomerates through equity 
transfers, the most notable being the 49% acquisition o f Andrew Yule in 1974 with another 2% 
in 1979. The long de-industrialisation o f West Bengal was not just confined to the central 
government’s reluctance to allow investment in West Bengal. Bengal being the heart o f colonial 
capital saw a long period o f decline in capital accumulation with the take-over o f British capital
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by Indian ‘business-houses’ whose primary seats o f operation spread to Western and Northern 
India in the three decades after independence. Added to this was the feature o f big business 
houses generally applying for more licenses than they had either the intention or the capacity to 
exploit. Thus the differences in success ratios pointed to the pre-emptive capacities o f ‘big 
business’ rather than any significant move towards a conceited industrialisation process.
Independence also brought the Freight Equalisation Policy o f 1948 in coal and iron-ore. 
This served the needs o f the Western region. The eastern region, in particular, had been a victim 
o f the old policy o f freight equalisation, which meant that West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa were 
artificially denied the comparative advantage o f proximity to mineral resources. Post-1991, 
freight equalisation has been abolished. Under the freight equalisation policy, while the 
comparative advantage o f the location o f raw materials like coal and iron-ore in the Eastern 
region was effectively nullified, there was no freight equalisation for the raw materials needed 
in the Eastern region. Thus since independence, upto 1991, the natural advantage o f the Eastern 
region as a whole was nullified. This was one major cause of de-industrialisation in the region 
with shifts o f capital to Western India.
De-industrialisation in Bengal, the failure of the central government not just to bolster 
export performance, but also to counter concentration in industry (Banerjee and Ghosh 1988) 
led eventually to emphasis on a different process o f industrialisation. This was based on small- 
scale development as a model o f ‘growth’ promoted by the Left Front government that came to 
power in 1977. This came into effect from the mid 1980s after the implementation o f land- 
reforms through Operation Barga (Roy Chaudhury 2005). A substantial growth o f small-scale 
unorganised sector manufacturing has been noted in West Bengal since the early 1980s. Share 
o f unregistered manufacturing in the manufacturing SDP o f the state doubled from an average 
o f 30 percent in the early 1980s to 60 percent in the late 1990s (Banerjee 2002). However this 
small-scale industry was dependent on the agrarian economy for the realisation o f value 
(Kongar 1978) and catered to the ‘local market’ under the regulatory framework o f the state 
government’s industrial policy (Banerjee 2002).
In contrast, in Tamil Nadu, Kurien argued that there was a very weak linkage between 
small-scale industry and agriculture. The new small-scale manufacturing firms neither produced 
inputs for use by the agricultural sector, the most important activity in the state, nor processed 
the outputs o f that sector (Kurien 1981). Similarly, in Karnataka, at independence, the private 
sector industrial base was mostly in small and medium scale textiles. From the 1960s, the state 
set up industries like Hindustan Antibiotics Limited and later Hindustan Machine Tools, which 
were the key industrial enterprises that sustained the urban economy around Bangalore 
(Heitzmann 2004). The growth o f the small firms in and around Bangalore was directly linked 
to large-scale manufacturing units that provided inputs and markets for their products (Ibid). 
Whether such linkages were more general phenomenon could be worth exploring for the states 
that we have surveyed so far, but tracing these linkages are impossible because the data is not
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uniform in terms o f time period and more importantly incomplete in terms o f an input-output 
mapping to establish the linkages.
The third important factor was the question o f the ‘technology gap’ that remained, in 
spite o f the attempts at self-sufficiency through large-scale investment in research within the 
ambit o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis period. The state functionaries by the early 1970s had admitted 
defeat in the project o f ‘catching up’ with nations o f the First World. This was evident in Indira 
Gandhi’s address to FICCI on March 31, 1973 when she conceded:
No matter how much we run, we find that science and technology 
give such an advantage to the already advanced nations that with all our 
running we are unable to close the gap. (Government o f Indial 984: Vo
II)
This marked the formal end o f the particular ‘developmental’ dream o f  climbing up the 
technology ladder using interventionist policy.
However, neither Indian industry nor the state ever put in any serious strategy to do this. 
Even in the 1950s the turnkey nature o f contracts never had any clause for technology transfer 
because the only consideration sought from foreign suppliers was credit. In steel, fertiliser, 
machine tools and pharmaceuticals, the process o f technology absorption, adaptation and 
upgrading remained dependent on the state’s dependence on foreign loans and grants (Bagchi 
1998).
By the 1970s, the failure o f the Nehruvian strategy to become self-sustaining created a 
new dynamic whose significance has not been properly assessed and recognised in the literature. 
Instead o f a sharp break in the 1990s marked by a transition to liberalisation, the more relevant 
break is a much more gradual one that began in the 1970s where instead o f trying to catch up 
with advanced countries using the licensing system and the Nehru-Mahalanobis industrial 
policy, the effective strategy o f the state became to respond to new demands from an emerging 
new capitalist class using lower grade technologies in the domestic market that were not directly 
dependent on the licensing system. This strategy depended on the existing distribution of 
capitalist capacities across India’s regions, but by responding to these existing capacities, 
regional differentiation was exacerbated. The paradox of the emerging new capitalists lay in the 
fact that although they were not directly the beneficiaries of licensing, they were often indirectly 
the product o f  the licensing system and often closely related to investment in big firms in the 
public and private sectors which created markets for small firms and in some cases provided 
their inputs. While big capitalists like the second generation o f Birlas dominated diversification 
strategies in the licensed sectors, the ‘new’ sectors became the domain o f  aspiring proto­
capitalist groups emerging from below.
The state’s policy o f keeping its role confined to the formal sector created a space for 
new capitalists to grow and proliferate in a space that existed outside the interventions o f  the 
‘license/control’ regime that was based on informal and unorganised labour. Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh (2002) have noted the emergence o f new ‘factions’ within the capitalist class in this
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period. The diversification through trade saw the emergence o f a new set o f capitalists who were 
‘new5 in the sense that their accumulation was outside the immediate strictures o f ‘license- 
control5 but linked to the industrial expansion led by the public sector. These new sections were 
often concentrated in a particular region, and slowly local power centres with local political 
agendas gained ground seriously undermining the earlier nationalist basis o f the ruling state 
ideology.
Indira G andhi's period of prime-ministership between 1972 and 1977 was fraught with 
rhetoric about the ‘national good5. A ‘Plan week5 was celebrated in 1973 after the demise of 
detailed planning from the period o f the Third Plan. To celebrate the occasion of Plan week, on 
14Ih November, 1973 -  Indira G andhi's message was:
The present situation is an exceedingly complex one. It is easy to lose 
one's bearings and to resort to impatient action for sectional good. However, if  
the nation as a whole suffers because o f strikes and other forms o f work 
stoppages, no section can genuinely benefit, even in the short run. Therefore, 
just as it is wrong for the Government to look for an easy way out o f the present 
difficulties, it is equally wrong for other organisations to seek short cuts to what 
are in reality the fundamental problems o f growth. I appeal to the good sense 
and patriotism o f our workers, farmers, Government employees, businessmen 
and others to consider the issues affecting them in the wider national 
perspective...This is a time when each one o f us has to make a sacrifice for the 
sake o f a better future. (Government o f India Vol III 1984)
However, the rhetorical appeal to the ‘national good5 which had legitimacy in the Nehru 
period no longer proved to be effective. The tensions created by the contradictions of 
development in previous decades led to the increased participation o f agrarian and industrial 
proto-capitalists in the political process and had an impact on state policy in the context o f 
fragmentation o f social, political and economic interests that took regional dimensions.
5.4 Delocking of Finance From Production and Questions Around Scale
We will identify some o f the processes o f accumulation through which these new 
groups o f proto-capitalists emerged through the mid 1960s and the 1970s in the next chapter, 
but it is important to note here that the pressure to turn away from the old style o f dirigisme in 
India came from a number o f different, but related, directions. One was from new aspirants to 
the capitalist class, who saw the abuses o f  the licensing system by the clique o f ‘insider5 
capitalists in the 1970s as a threat. Congress appeared not to be able to guarantee that the 
licensing system would assist the primary accumulation o f new aspirants as it had assisted the 
first generation o f capitalists. Asset concentration in the hands o f the latter group appeared to 
have established a class o f big capitalist ‘insiders' who could manipulate the licensing system to 
the disadvantage o f  newcomers. The tensions between insiders and outsiders within the 
capitalist class have not been adequately recognised in the analysis o f the social pressures 
towards liberalisation in India. A second and related source o f pressure was economic in nature, 
stemming from the emergence o f the new business groups, which saw the regime o f internal
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controls as an impediment to their own ascent to profitability and power. Newcomers who had 
accumulated outside the licensing system did not benefit from it and indeed found many 
restrictions that created rents for some capitalists as impediments to their own profitability. The 
third was related to the developments in the capital market with an increase in ‘rentier1 finance 
which sought to decontrol the market for finance as it saw profit opportunities in the asset 
market. As these forces consolidated, the growth o f the ‘new1 business groups was further 
accelerated by the state's over-all preservation o f an import substitution policy, while emerging 
pressures forced the state to moderate resource transfers to the ‘monopolists1 who had already 
been identified in the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act (Goyal 1979). A 
separate but related phenomenon was the emergence o f small-scale enterprise as a viable model 
o f employment-generating growth based on informal labour. The growth o f small 
manufacturing enterprises in India was noted as a ‘recent development’ in 1963 by the 
International Perspective Planning Team o f the Ministry o f Industry sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation. ‘Engineers, merchants, metal workers and former agriculturists were the prominent 
founders o f new firms many o f which were profitable and growing based on the skills o f a 
machinist and the savings o f a local trader1 (Government o f India, 1963).
The rapid growth o f  the small-scale sector within regulated manufacturing was a direct 
outcome o f the state policy o f reservation o f 870 products and the directed credit through the 
nationalised banks. Thus the phenomenal rise of small-scale industries is also a very important 
feature o f the decade o f the 1970s. Price controls in steel and cement made these sectors 
unattractive to the established corporates and reservation meant that buying components and 
intermediaries from the small sector could not threaten competition from ‘big business1 based 
on backward integration (Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 1995), However, the expansion o f small 
and medium capital was very contingent on periodic booms from the 1980s. The 1980s marked 
the turning point when diversification reached a stage where new sectors o f capitalists were 
strong enough to begin to intervene in the polity and change the course o f the accumulation 
process. These interventions pushed the zones o f intervention and non-intervention much 
beyond the paradigms envisaged by any o f  the contenders in the 1970s.
In the span of three decades, however, there have been several changes in definitions of 
what constitutes small-scale. In 1963, small-scale was defined to be a manufacturing 
establishment having fixed capital under Rs 500, 000/- with some exceptions. What must be 
noted is that a ‘factory5 at this point was based on the definition o f the Factories Act, as a unit 
which at some time during the year employed 10 or more persons if  using power and 20 or more 
persons without using power. In 1960, 36, 400 such registered factories with fixed capital of 
less than Rs 500, 000/- accounted for 92% o f all registered factories. These factories employed 
13, 30,000 workers and accounted for 38% o f  total registered factory employment. These units 
accounted for 33% o f total output, 25% o f value added and 17% o f the total fixed capital in the 
registered factory sector (Annual Survey o f Industry, 1960).
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Agro-based manufacturing o f food products, grain milling, ginning and pressing o f 
fibres and textile weaving and finishing, account for the biggest output, investment and 
employment in the registered small sector, followed by metal works and machinery. A third set 
o f industry groups based on direct conversion o f primary resources and centred on construction 
goods accounted for a large part o f SSI in 1960. (See Table 5E) From this growth process 
emerged the phenomenon o f medium scale industrial ‘clusters’, e.g. bicycles in Punjab. This 
was identifiable in the expansion o f Hero cycles, a brand that monopolised the expanding 
market for bicycles since the 1980s.
Table 5E: Small Registered Factories: Employment. Output and Investment
Code Description
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209
Msoellaneous Food 
Preparations 10.2 10.3 17.4 20.1 87.2 496 47 51.2
205 Gran Mil Products 11.7 69 8.0 14 8 956 861 841 788 *
231
Textile Spinning, 
Weaving and Finishing 84 11.0 5.7 88 833 127 5 4 13.3
350
Metal products exoept 
Machinery and 
Transport Equpment 5.7 4 6 5.0 5.1 97 66.2 41.5 60
.
10 G ang and Pressing 7.7 7 8 7.0 4.9 957 919 936 881 ♦
360
Machinery except 
Bectrical Machnery 7.1 5.9 7.4 4.5 95 51.8 35.1 464
220 Tobacco Products 7.0 10.2 1.3 4.1 953 74 8 343 43 ***
319
Msoellaneous 
Cherried Products 27 3.2 3.4 3.9 896 47.1 19.9 286
341 Basic Iran and Steel 19 3.3 2 5 3.5 84 9 313 2 7 162
291 Tanneries and Leather 1.1 1.2 0.7 3.2 974 77 637 88 8 *
280
Printing PUdishng arc 
/Wed Industry 6 8 5.1 6.7 3.1 96.3 60 5 474 50.2
399 Lhdassified 28 23 3.2 2 2 96.8 83 5 76.9 825 *
342 NbrvFerrous metd 0.7 0.6 1.1 20 91.7 366 13.9 41.2
250 Weed and Cod, except 4 3 3.0 2 2 2 0 978 819 68.7 822 •
370 Bectricd Machnery 1.3 1.9 4.2 1.9 83.2 288 25.1 21.1
339 Mcn-metdlic mnerd 20 25 1.6 1.7 95.7 76.2 52 632 **
384 Motor Vehde Repar 3.2 29 3.1 1.6 94.7 725 553 73.4 ♦
300 Rubber Products 0.7 1.1 3.3 1.5 921 382 41.5 23 9
239 Textiles 21 20 0.9 1.5 96.5 867 62 776 *
311 Base Irriustnd 0.6 0.7 i d 1.4 769 182 3.4 179
331 Stmdird Qay 1.7 3.2 5 0 0.8 945 704 532 50 "
332 G ass and cf ass 0 6 1.9 0.7 0.7 88.6 67.1 248 499 —
other 9 5 84 8 0 6.8
Totd 100 10Q 100 100 921 37.9 17.5 320
Source: Annual Survey o f Industry, 1960. 1966, Government o f India
The economic role and interests o f factory enterprises and small-scale enterprises w ere 
not necessarily identical or even similar. Small-scale enterprises were left out in the USAID 
estimate o f 1965, mainly on the grounds that they did not consume much foreign exchange, but 
this meant that the possibility o f their facing fatal competition as a result o f  the additional 
imports to be made available to the factory sector through foreign aid. did not receive the 
attention it deserved (Raj 1994).
158
The argument for deregulation involves an assumption on the part o f neoliberal 
economists that India's comparative advantage lies in its indisputably low cost o f labour. The 
literature based on this view (Debroy and Bhandari 2005) has made the oft-repeated argument 
that state regulation had ‘distorted’ this natural advantage o f the market. This take on the 
economy has been based on the false dichotomy of the state and market. So once again, state 
regulation is supposed to have ‘distorted’ this natural advantage o f the market and often it is 
argued that India's medium and small-scale industry was disadvantaged despite being more 
labour intensive. However, a very preliminary survey o f the capital-output ratios, based on time- 
series data from the National Accounts statistics, shows that capital intensity o f regulated and 
unregulated sectors did not show a huge difference after the mid 1960s. This is apparent from 
the graph below.
Fig 5.9 Sectorwise Capital Output Ratios
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Scale in the Indian context was determined by ‘asset structure' and not technology 
intensity. Yet the assumption that the large-scale sector was capital intensive and the small-scale 
sector was labour-intensive informs much o f the neoclassical literature (See Debroy and 
Bhandari 2005). In fact the Ford Foundation sponsored Government o f India report argued the 
reverse in 1963 and so did several other studies o f that period (Dhar and Lydall, 1961). By 
studying capital output ratios, they argued that small-scale industry was in no way capital saving 
and there was no evidence to suggest that small-scale industry in India could be characterised as 
either labour or capital intensive compared to the large scale sector.
Earlier in 1956. many o f the captains o f industry had asserted that productivity is linked 
with capital accumulation, population growth, technical invention, social innovation, attitude of 
mind etc (FICCI 1956). In 1959, they resisted the focus on labour-intensive industry as they
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argued that labour intensive industrial processes in the long run call for larger capital than 
originally envisaged. They suggested a planned  programme o f decentralisation o f industry led 
by the state to ensure ‘development5 (FICCI 1959). Small and medium scale industry came to 
be associated with employment generation based on labour intensive technology as a result o f 
recent neoclassical interventions.
The capital intensive and labour intensive industries were connected in a 
complementary linkage mainly through the reservation of products and targeted financing 
through banks and industrial financing organs o f  the state. The financing capacity o f the state 
for this twin exercise was through the control o f the banking system through nationalisation 
after 1971 and the use o f fiscal resources to the point o f debt driven inflation.
The same institutional modes that were used to subsidise rural development based on 
financing o f  loans for agrarian development were also applied to this aspect o f the state’s 
populist policy. In this sense, the shift o f emphasis to small and medium scale unis through the 
selective de-reservation o f products by both Indira Gandhi’s government and the Janata led 
Government in 1977 was considered a ‘reform’ in the literature of the period. As industries 
were de-reserved, medium scale entrepreneurs found new avenues o f expansion that were not in 
the ambit o f the ‘license-control’ nexus.
The source o f state-led primary accumulation depended on two kinds o f ‘entitlements’ 
by the state -  land and bank finance and often the two were connected. According to a Congress 
(I) MP, K Suryanarayana,
Financing by the nationalised banks, particularly the State Bank of 
India, to the fanners has failed... A man has secured 500 acres o f land in the 
name o f one dhannasangstha. He is a MLA and now minister in Andhra 
Pradesh. He belongs to my party. Taking advantage o f personal and party 
affiliations, he has secured 500 acres o f Government land and he has taken a 
crop loan also to the tune o f nearly Rs 5 lakhs without any property security. 
The Government on being asked said that according to the State Bank Act, the 
details cannot be revealed. (Lok Sabha, March 14, 1972:276)
This was in Tadepalligudam, a part o f Suryanarayana’s own constituency, which was a 
big commercial hub. The land did not even cost Rs 500,000. Further, it was an undeveloped 
submerged land and was actually government land taken on lease in the name o f a religious 
organisation. Nevertheless, a loan was given for raising crops. When Suryanarayana himself 
asked the bank for loan, however, they were not ready to give him a loan for growing tobacco. 
From his account, he did receive a loan from one bank, but another bank did not give him even 
Rs 10, 000 as crop loan to raise tobacco as tobacco prices had gone down (Lok Sabha, March 
14, 1972: 279-280). The account is interesting in two respects -  it provides credible evidence of 
the political tussle around bank loans. It also suggests that the expansion o f nationalised banks 
activities in rural areas in a context o f agricultural stagnation meant that land was sometimes 
used as a means o f primary accumulation not for gaining access to a means o f production, but 
rather to gain entitlements to bank finance. This example illustrates how bank loans could be
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captured by politically connected rent seekers without engaging in any productivity-enhancing 
investment.
Table 5F: Sector wise Direct Project Assistance by IDBI between June 1964 to June 1975
Sector Number o f projects Amount o f Project 
Assistance* (Crores 
o f Rupees)
Percentage to Total
Private 220 223.3 51.4
Public 13 37.5 8.6
Joint 44 156.8 36.1
Co-operative 11 17.1 3.9
Total 288 434.7
Source: Table 4.IV, p i 9, IDBI, Annual Report 1974-75
Note: Project assistance in the table comprises loans, underwriting, direct subscription and 
guarantee.
Even if  bank finance was not purely used for rent seeking, from Table 5F above, it is clear 
that the major share o f assistance from IDBI went to the private sector between 1964 and 1975. 
O f the 66 projects sanctioned for assistance in 1974-75, six were sponsored by technician- 
entrepreneurs. These were Modern Proteins Ltd, Uniloids Ltd, Brindavan Steel Ltd, Coastal 
papers Ltd, Drillco Metal Carbides (P) Ltd and Nagarjuna Steel Ltd. The main industries that 
were prioritised during this period were sugar, paper, cement, fertilisers and textiles. Thus 
development banking was geared towards direct finance and risk bearing for the private arena in 
the economy with chosen ‘lead’ sectors (IBDI Annual Report 1974-75: 6-17).
Thus many features o f  the 1980s can be traced to the ‘reforms’ carried out by the 
Congress and then the Janata led government beginning in the 1970s. The growing rural-urban 
gap and the phenomenon o f  ‘uneven development’ which emerged as a result o f abandoning 
guided development strategies, can be traced to the developments that began during this period.
The contention that the first IMF loan marked a fundamental break in the relationship 
between state and capital is questionable from this perspective. One could attribute all the 
developments since the 1980s to changes in the international economic and political pressures. 
However, two things would still remain unexplained -  the turn-around from stagnation to 
growth between 1965 and 1980 and the growth and proliferation o f the capitalist class through 
the emergence o f  ‘new’ family owned business houses. The fiscal crisis o f the state that 
emerged fully in the late 1980s was certainly more visible (Patnaik 1984) but the rapid and prior 
expansion of new sectors o f capital accumulation was even more important in driving the 
adoption o f a superficially ‘neoliberal’ vision o f ‘development’.
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Traders and Industrialists
It was in April 1974, recognising the crucial question o f access to technology and
keeping in view the common interests o f the Engineering industry in the country, the two 
associations -  the Indian Engineering Association and the Engineering Association o f India - 
merged to form the Association o f Indian Engineering Industry (AIEI). This was the section of 
industry that was struggling to recover from the stagnation o f the mid-1960s. They saw a direct 
clash o f interest with the traders and speculators and considered it a hindrance to the process of 
industrial growth (AIEI 1968). The roots o f this conflict can be traced back to different 
strategies o f anti-colonial struggle. Tariff protection was not enough after the 1930s as 
industrialisation depended on technological and financial access, in which the colonial state had 
an overtly discriminating policy towards ‘natives’. The two decades after independence was a 
period o f increased financial access through financial institutions o f the state but banking 
finance was still mired in crisis in the private sector and technology dependency continued 
through the two decades after independence.
This was overturned completely in the so-called decade o f  disappointment of the 1970s. 
New forms o f intervention were evident in the introduction o f  national patent laws, the 
tightening o f licensing policy through the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices act, 
widespread nationalisation o f  banks, insurance and coal mines, the selective intervention in 
agriculture, and the non-intervention or ‘withdrawal’ from trade and finance combined with the 
gradual dismantling o f ‘planning’ and preservation of ‘Hindu Undivided Family’ through non­
intervention in personal laws.
5.5 Political Outcomes of Changing Role of the State
It is clear from our analysis so far that the state in the period was the concentrated 
repository o f power in terms o f transfers to the capitalist class but it was also the repository o f 
critical powers to negotiate, control and limit the organised power o f  industrial labour (See 
Chapter Four). By 1967, the one-party rule o f the Congress was breaking down under its own 
contradictions and challenges. Contradictions o f planning, the very slow reduction o f poverty, 
the failure o f the Congress to accommodate the intermediate classes and factions in the 
development process and the hegemony o f the landlord and rich peasants within the Congress 
led to emerging alliances o f factions within Congress and with splinter oppositional parties 
which kept realigning all through the 1970s. For example, the first non-Congress coalition 
government in Bihar came into being in 1967-68. The anti-Congress coalition that came to 
power in 1967 had no cohesion. Similar trends were observable in other parts o f  the country 
where non-Congress governments came to power. The coalitions were unstable and alignments 
and realignments were the order o f the day, based on shifting calculations o f  factions fighting to 
be in power. This made it impossible for any political coalition to manage the primary 
accumulation o f capital in any orderly way.
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By 1974, however, there was the Nav Nirman uprising in Gujarat, which inspired the 
1974 JP movement in Bihar. It took a militant turn by March 1975. The state came down 
heavily on this movement (Chandra 2003, Frankel 2005), but it was clear that in the ten years 
from 1964 it was the plank o f ‘social justice’ on which repeated anti-Congress alignments bid 
for power at the level o f  state governments. The polity became contested on the basis o f 
regional agendas often linked to caste in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, ethnolinguistic and ‘son of 
the soil’ revivalism in Maharashtra, the Dravida movement in Tamil Nadu. Underlying all these 
movements was an intense dissatisfaction o f the unevenness o f the growth process up to 1975.
The absence o f thoroughgoing land reforms, a result o f  the bourgeoisie's compromise 
with landlordism, kept productive forces in agriculture arrested. The market for mass 
consumption goods remained restricted and grew slowly for this reason. Moreover, the ability of 
the state sector to keep expanding, and thereby to keep enlarging the market for the private 
capitalist sector, was progressively undermined. Low agricultural growth put a ceiling on the 
rate at which public investment could grow without squeezing the living standard o f the masses 
to an extent intolerable in a democracy. In addition, the ruling classes enriched themselves at 
the expense o f the public exchequer, a form o f “primitive accumulation o f capital”, which 
further curtailed the growth o f public investment. The dirigiste strategy o f capitalist 
development, dependent on expanding public investment, entered a cul-de-sac and lost social 
support even as metropolitan capital— and, in particular, finance capital— stepped up its 
offensive against this strategy through the Bretton Woods institutions, and later the WTO, in a 
world where the crucial support coming from socialist countries had disappeared (Patnaik 
1999a).
The role o f state intervention in facilitating the accumulation process that came into 
being with the rise o f ‘new’ capitalists in various parts o f India changed in unprecedented ways 
since the 1970s. The period from 1965 to the 1980s for the capitalist class in India was one of 
negotiating its complementary relationship with the state in the face o f  its own growth and 
diversification. The next chapter presents a detailed analysis o f these changes.
163
Chapter Six
Sources of Accumulation: State Intervention and Non-intervention
This chapter is a  survey o f the role o f state intervention in facilitating the accumulation 
process that came into being with the rise o f ‘new ’ capitalists in various parts o f India. We argue 
that the period from 1965 to the 1980s for the capitalist class in India was one o f negotiating its 
complementary relationship with the state in the face o f its own growth and diversification. This 
was separate from the other principal constituents o f society, which were also rising in 
discontent against the state in the mass strikes o f  1974, the petty-bourgeois discontent in Bihar 
and Gujarat and the movement for land reform in Bengal. Ironically, this discontent, often 
directed against inequities in terms o f asset concentration in the hands o f  ‘big’ capitalists 
unintentionally, mapped a process o f expansion by the capitalist class as ‘new’ capitalists set up 
business groups in various parts o f India. The process o f this expansion is the subject o f this 
chapter.
We establish in this chapter that economic policy was a mix o f increasing controls on 
one hand and deregulation on the other. Later this was combined with populist policies. So what 
constituted state autonomy is difficult to isolate at this level by use o f a false dichotomy 
between the public and private sectors, as is often presented in neoclassical analysis o f  this 
period for example in the writings of Bhagwati (1998). To understand the political dynamics of 
this period o f increasing or decreasing relative autonomy, one has to take into account three 
broad factors -  first, the social processes of accumulation both in the industrial and other sectors 
o f the economy, second, the changes if any to the structure o f  the economy, not just in terms of 
output but also in terms o f the social structures o f employment and labour organisation and 
third, the domains o f state intervention. We have already discussed the importance o f the state 
in imposing bridles on labour organisation in Chapter Four. This chapter analyses the first and 
third significant factors -  the social process o f accumulation in the industrial and other sectors 
o f the economy and the role o f the state in this process in terms o f  changes in the nature of 
intervention. Most importantly, based on several case studies, this chapter establishes the 
processes o f rise o f new entrants into the sphere o f capital accumulation and traces the different 
sources o f primary accumulation.
Section 6.1 is a discussion on the rise of capitalist lobbies in the political process and 
the resultant policies o f the state raising the question as to what really changed in the 
relationship between state and capital. Section 6.2 presents an analysis o f the zones of 
intervention and non-intervention in the state’s relationship with capital. Section 6.3 examines 
the role o f agrarian accumulation in the making and consequences o f  the Green Revolution and 
pricing policy. Section 6.4 assesses the nature o f asset concentration in the economy and its 
relationship with industrial policy. Section 6.5 analyses the rise o f new entrants into the sphere 
of capital accumulation and traces the different sources o f primary accumulation based on case
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studies. Section 6.6 analyses the domains and processes o f negotiation between institutions of 
the state and the representatives o f capital in determining the extent o f intervention. Section 6.7 
examines the consequences o f the steady expansion of capital since the 1970s.
6.1 Capitalist Lobbies and State Intervention
The period under scrutiny from 1965 to 1980 was characterised by sporadic economic 
‘reforms’ within a broad context o f political turbulence and challenges to the state. This was 
reflected in various ‘social movements’ and political struggles resulting in the formation of 
regional parties.
A schism developed within the ranks o f the Indian capitalist class between different 
sections o f industrialists who had developed during the peak years o f import-substituting growth 
and later entrants (Baru 2000; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). By 1965, the capitalist class 
was deeply divided. According to the key spokesperson of the Taissez faire’ approach A.D. 
Shroff (1966), apart from planning, the other state-created barrier to capitalist development lay 
in the Land Ceiling Act which imposed limits on holding size in urban and rural areas.
Pioneering entrepreneurs established the sugar factories, and the farms 
that were built around them (fully owned or some part being leased) have 
provided sugarcane with four times the national average in sugar yield. The
state government decided to take over these sugar factory farms for being
converted into cooperative farms or state farms. A reasoned case by the Deccan 
Sugar Factories Association against such takeover made no impact on the 
Government. But the government took it over up on the excuse o f mopping up 
‘adventitious profits (Shroff 1966: 43).
The rise o f this powerful sugar lobby whose cause Shroff was advocating became 
visible in electoral politics in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, becoming important both within 
the Congress and its adversaries in the ‘Grand Alliance’.
In Western India as opposed to the East, politics was contested on a different basis, 
given the gradual prosperity o f their growing capitalist enclaves. In contrast, in Northern and 
Eastern India, mass discontent was the norm. The 1967 political turmoil in Bihar and West
Bengal was the watershed, but it was the difference in political agency that marked the
difference in terms o f the aims o f the cross-class mobilisations that ensued in the period up to 
1977. Unlike Bihar where the JP movement was dominated by the urban petty-bourgoisie, in 
West Bengal, the Left in rural areas led a mass upsurge around land reform that was organized 
on much clearer class lines. In Gujarat, urban petty-bourgeois discontent in the form o f the 
‘Nav-Nirman’ movement was relatively easy to subjugate given the deepening o f emerging 
capital in industry, even though it led to the fall o f the Congress government in the state.
At the national level, a section of the capitalist class backed the direct participation of 
business in the 1967 general elections going outside the compromises necessary within the 
Congress Party (Nayar 2001: 106). Piloo Mody, the Swatantra MP from Godhra was one such 
person. In 1971, the grand alliance o f the liberal-oriented Swatantra party, the Hindu nationalist
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Jana Sangh and the old guard o f the Congress fought elections with abundant support from an 
alienated business class (Frankel 2005). By 1975, the Congress under Indira Gandhi had lost its 
unconditional backing from the industrial capitalists. Indira Gandhi told Parliament on May 9, 
1975:
We have been accused of serving the interests o f foreign monopolists 
or the Indian monopolists. There are some advocates o f  Indian capitalists and 
monopolists in this very House and most o f them are in opposition. They 
always try to run down our public sector and praise the efficiency o f the 
capitalist system. We want to run the economy in such a way that the interests 
o f the masses are safeguarded and the power o f  the monopoly is curtailed 
whenever it grows (Lok Sabha 1975: 35).
Thus the period from 1966 to 1980 saw the emergence o f capitalist lobbies based on 
political differences over the process o f planning, barriers to the development o f unfettered 
markets and the wider debate about the curtailment o f private monopolies. These debates got a 
new lease o f  life in the 1980s with the neoliberal turns o f state policy, but it is important to 
recognise that these debates formed the basis o f political alliances o f leading sections o f capital 
since 1966. In the literature on planning, it is acknowledged that the role o f planning as a tool o f 
state policy for allocation had been significantly undermined since the period o f the Third plan 
(Frankel 2005). Thus the key tool o f control over the command economy had been quite 
significantly eroded. But this still begs the question as to why the state in this period combined 
reforms that constituted periodic expansion o f the dirigiste role o f the state in some directions 
and contractions in others. As mentioned in Chapter Five, this was evident in the introduction of 
national patent laws, the tightening o f  licensing policy through the Monopoly and Restrictive 
Trade Practices act, widespread nationalisation o f banks, insurance and coal mines, selective 
intervention in agriculture, and non-intervention or ‘withdrawal ’ from trade and finance 
combined with the gradual dismantling o f  ‘planning’ and the preservation o f  the entity of 
‘Hindu Undivided Family’ through a clear policy o f non-intervention in personal laws.
6.2 State Intervention and Non-Intervention
From Nehrus’ death to the assumption o f  power by Indira Gandhi in 1966 when LB 
Shastri died in Tashkent, the economy was affected severely by poor harvests, food shortages 
and a balance o f payment crisis. This led to a growing imbalance in state expenditure and 
revenues culminating in a fiscal and balance o f payments crisis (Nayar 2001). This was the 
economic context in which the Government o f India devalued the rupee by 3% in 1966 and 
received food and monetary aid under the IMF-World Bank programme for the first time. This 
came with pressures on the state to ‘liberalise’ certain sectors in the economy.
However, the main difference in the role of the state in the period before 1965 and after 
was a widening in the nature o f interventions from manufacturing to bank-fmance and 
agriculture. The first twenty years o f  state policy had been geared towards propping up an 
import substitution policy for industrialisation with incentives in the form o f state subsidies,
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protective tariffs and import quotas. The banking system remained in private hands up to 1967 
with no big institutional change except the regulatory role o f the Reserve Bank o f India in the 
management o f money in circulation.
The state’s initial reluctance or inability to intervene in agriculture was due to the power 
structures o f the Congress and the state institutions, which were overwhelmingly controlled by 
‘landlords’ in rural areas. Three main interventions emerged out o f the political conflicts o f this 
period. First, a set o f new interventions emerged in agriculture through a package o f technical 
policy measures commonly referred to as the ‘Green Revolution’. These policy measures were 
adopted in the face o f an acute food shortage and dependence on US aid for food that was 
petering out. It was also fortuitous that a set o f technologies became available in this period that 
allowed improvements in agricultural output without directly attacking the interests o f powerful 
groups in agriculture. Second, the state was forced to intervene in a growing range o f areas to 
limit deteriorating capital-labour relations. Third, interventions emerged to tackle a number of 
problems emanating from the structure o f the capital market and the avenues o f primary 
accumulation. On each o f these issues, the representatives o f capital had very clear positions.
The interventions in agriculture came as a package o f policy measures supported by 
monetary aid from the US that were based on public investment and pricing policy to further the 
Green Revolution in agriculture. The fourth five-year plan placed greater priority on agriculture. 
Before its adoption, India had resorted to Annual Plans for a few year's, which had already 
reduced the importance o f  planning as a tool o f allocation. Thus the emphasis on agriculture 
came as a result o f the understanding that agrarian ‘problems’ were acting as a barrier to 
industrialisation. But the spread o f the Green Revolution had very little to do with traditional 
institutions involved in planning in India. The impact o f  the Green Revolution in particular in 
expanding the avenues o f  accumulation in the economy is analysed in the next section (6.3).
The mainstream public wisdom emanating from big capital was summarised by G M 
Modi, in his annual address to FICCI on 23rd April 1965 where he argued:
In a changing and dynamic context, those in industry must take a keen 
and active interest in the problems o f agriculture and contribute to their 
solution. Questions relating to agricultural production and productivity are far 
more complex than those connected with industry. We may have to depend on 
imports from other countries, every effort must be made to increase domestic 
supplies. The need for building up o f buffer stocks to meet emergency 
situations as well as to provide a salutary influence on prices cannot be 
overemphasized. Irrigation has improved but not effective drainage. This must 
receive the immediate attention o f our planners (FICCI 1965).
Thus the interventions to increase agricultural productivity had clear support from those 
representatives o f industry and commerce who had in mind the reduction o f dependence on the 
international grain market and work towards self-sufficiency. Paradoxically, the representatives 
o f industry no longer hankered after self-suffciency as a goal o f industrialisation anymore.
On the question o f a ‘social contract with labour’, the organised sections o f the 
capitalist class used the employment structure o f the economy to argue against any progressive
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wage policy measures undertaken by the state in the face o f  growing militancy from the 
organised working class.
On the one hand, population is growing at a phenomenal rate 
necessitating a progressive creation o f additional employment opportunities. On 
the other hand, the effort to maintain our competitiveness in world markets, to 
establishing capital goods producing industries, to take advantage o f the 
advancement in technology have all made it imperative to choose and adopt 
methods o f production which require greater capital per man employed. The 
emphasis has to be on accelerating the progress o f  growth itself and providing 
the highest stimulus for further investment. Our wage policies, much as they 
have to be motivated by social needs, cannot be separated from these larger 
national objectives (FICCI 1965).
For FICCI, the main political argument was against the concept o f ‘social justice’, which 
it argued had created a privileged class o f workers. Thus this was an argument made by the 
biggest chamber o f commerce in India, which later became a common refrain in neoclassical 
analyses o f the period. Employers wanted to argue that the improvements in living standards o f 
workers did notdepend on increased earnings alone.
Considerable sums are spent on things and pastimes which cannot be 
desirable. Workers should utilise this increase in wages to raise their economic 
and social position (FICCI 1965).
Employers futher complained that absenteeism had increased. ‘Political strikes’ like the 
Bombay Bandh led by Communists had resulted in the loss o f 7,300,000 man-days. This strike 
had been triggered by depressed wages along side huge price rises. Thus the thesis o f a 
‘privileged class o f  workers’ was totally contradictory to the actual political events o f the 
period. On the question o f the abolition o f contract labour - a long-standing demand o f all the 
big trade unions, the reluctance was also clear:
What we have to think o f is not abolition o f contract system as such but 
how to extend to contract labour the facilities which are enjoyed by regular 
workm en...(FICCI 1965).
On the restrictions on the capital market, FICCI had a clear position and argued for
‘liberalising’ the domestic market in capital.
Even industrial houses o f great reputation are finding it difficult to get their 
shares subscribed because the middle class which is the major investor does not 
have the money to invest. Banks do not freely advance money against equity 
shares. This has given a setback to the rate of investment thereby affecting the 
employment potential o f the industry (FICCI 1965).
The crux o f  the argument was that the license control regime was becoming a handicap 
for innovation and entrepreneurial initiative. The demand inside FICCI upto 1965 was mainly 
for internal liberalisation. Industrialists in FICCI proposed a sharp cut in public expenditure 
from Rs 160,000 millions to Rs 105,000 millions as the maximum feasible expenditure (FICCI 
1965). They advised the government to concentrate on the development o f  agriculture and social 
overhead projects and to leave industrial development to private enterprise in cooperation with
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foreign private capital through further relaxation o f controls, reductions in taxation and 
protective tariff for new industries (Frankel 2005: 304).
This was a complete turn-around from the position adopted by FICCI in 1949-50 
expounding the negative role o f foreign capital. But the idea o f competing in global markets and 
the relaxation o f trade barriers always remained a contested terrain. But decontrol o f the 
domestic market to allow investment by foreign capital now seemed to be the consensus among 
big capitalists. Apart from these sections o f  industrialists, there had been major voices within 
the state calling for devaluation as well as for the relaxation o f controls on investment, 
production, imports and prices. The report o f the Swaminathan Committee on Industries 
Development Procedures published on 10th June 1964 argued for delicensing a number of 
industries mainly involved in the import o f capital goods and raw materials on the grounds o f 
reducing delays (Government o f  India 1964). In 1966, some o f these industries were delicensed 
under a ‘reform 5 of the licensing policy. The Hazari Report published in 1967 argued that the 
existing licensing system was not serving the stated aim o f channelling investment into desired 
directions, and needed to be revised (Hazari 1967). A range o f interventions in trade and in 
capital markets were necessitated by some o f the adverse social effects o f robust primitive 
accumulation and the disparities that resulted from ‘normal5 capitalist accumulation. A 
significant share o f capital in India's ‘mixed economy5 operated in trade and finance. 
Commodities trade and especially trade in food grains were particularly important. However, 
the problem here was the ‘market failure5 that allowed hoarding and racketeering and in turn led 
to artificial shortages. The structural constraint o f low yields added to the shortages, 
necessitating bulk imports.
The crisis in the economy manifest in food shortage, concentration o f monopolies and 
deteriorating capital-labour relations led to waves o f political unrest that could only be put down 
after the imposition o f the Emergency. By 1967, food shortages became the biggest source of 
political discontent. The Left had led the Food Movement in West Bengal since the 1950s (Das 
and Bandopadhyay 2004) and in other parts o f the country, food riots became a regular 
occurence in the mid-1960s. Trader resistance to regulation was very strong and was reflected in 
swift changes in political alliances away from the Congress towards Swatantra and Jan Sangh in 
North India. This was the background to the implementation o f price controls and the takeover 
o f the wholesale trade in wheat in 1973. This was the first major direct intervention in trade, but 
the Congress had to overturn this policy just a year later, capitulating to intense pressure from 
rich farmers (Lok Sabha 1973, 1974). But price control measures had a populist appeal and 
were enacted. This did not lead to any major change in racketeering and hoarding, but the Public 
Distribution System was sporadically used as a safety valve to diffuse political discontent by a 
system o f cross subsidies to producers and consumers (Swaminathan 2000).
The rapid accumulation o f economic power in the hands o f finance capital began to ring 
alarm bells in some sections o f the Congress as early as the late 1960s. Interventions in capital
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markets began in 1969, with the nationalisations o f 14 banks. In 1971, another six banks were 
nationalised. This brought the major institutions of finance capital under the control o f the state. 
In 1970, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act regulating the activities o f 
business houses came into effect. The next year, 1971 was dominated by elections and the 
Bangladesh war. Nationalisation o f all insurance companies took place in 1972. In the same 
year, deregulation began through the modification o f the Industrial Policy Resolution o f 1956. 
The list o f industries under state control was redrawn. The only sectors that remained in the 
hands o f the state were power, transport and communications, and banking and insurance (basic 
and strategic industries). A wide range o f  intermediate industries was handed over to the private 
sector (Lok Sabha 1972).
By 1972, the rapid enrichment o f the already rich became socially visible -  a pattern, 
very similar to the period between the two World Wars. This was noted in debates in 
Parliament. Nathuram Mirdha, the Congress MP from Nagaur observed:
People who have become ‘lakhpatis’ and ‘karorpatis’ in the last five or 
ten years must be asked where there wealth is coming from and whether they 
can account for it. (Lok Sabha 1972:316)
According to the Wanchoo Committee report, tax evasion for the financial year 1968-69 
amounted to Rs 1400 crores. The estimate o f black money in the economy was in the region of 
Rs 7000 crores. Unpaid income tax alone amounted to Rs 550 crores. GDP at factor cost in 
1968-69 was Rs 36092 crores. Thus the estimates o f black money and tax evasion accounted for 
23% o f GDP (Government o f India 1971).
In 1973, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act controlling the extent o f profit- 
repatriation by foreign investment came into effect. There were major Trade Union strikes in the 
1970s and the state responded with severe labour repression. In 1973, another spate of 
liberalisations was undertaken. There was a further easing o f controls and restrictions and a 
tougher attitude towards performance of the public sector and resistance to taking over sick 
firms in the private sector (Nayar 2001:118).
While there was recognition for the first time in 1975 o f issues around gender 
inequality, little was done about it. ‘This is the International W omen’s year. We have many 
laws and regulations regarding the conditions o f service and facilities to be provided for women 
workers in industry’ (Indira Gandhi 1975). But there was no actual initiative on the part o f the 
state to intervene in any way to enforce these legislations in any sector o f the economy and 
address the gender disparity in the ‘formal’ private sector.
From 1969 to 1974, three types o f measures stand out, which imposed restrictions on big 
business becoming bigger, with the government trying to balance them by encouraging the 
accelerated growth o f new capitalists on their periphery. This strategy was to have important 
repercussions for the pattern of capitalist growth in India. Restrictions on big business in 
defining limits to their diversification and the abolition o f the ‘privy purses’ o f erstwhile
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princes, constraints on foreign business in expanding operations, and the nationalisation o f some 
intermediate industries (Nayar 2001:109-110) and of financial services were all examples of 
interventions that sought to limit the power o f the already established capitalists and some 
remnants o f the old social order. These measures were accompanied by deregulation and 
decontrol to widen the net o f  beneficiaries o f surplus accumulation.
The year o f the railway strike, 1974, was a watershed in the history o f  the resistance o f the 
politically organised working class in India. The 1974 rail workers' strike was a unique event for 
several reasons. It occurred at a time when labour militancy was at its highest in independent 
India: the number o f workdays lost owing to all industrial disputes in India touched 40 million 
in 1974, more than double that recorded in any single year during the preceding decade. The 
strike and the manner in which it was put down marks a turning point in labour's leverage with 
the Indian state (Sherlock 2001). The Emergency was imposed in 1975. This led to the 
weakening o f class organisation due to widespread imprisonment o f functionaries and activists. 
Indira Gandhi’s broadcast to the nation on July I, 1975, before the announcement o f the 20- 
point programme was steeped in the logic o f military discipline and entrepreneurial ethics -
There is only one magic, which can remove poverty -  hard work, sustained by clear 
vision, iron will and the strictest discipline.
At another level, after 1974 with the rising militancy o f different sections o f workers 
culminating in the railway strike and petty-bourgeois discontent leading to the Navnirman in 
Gujarat and the JP movement in Bihar and Eastern UP, and continuing agrarian upsurge in West 
Bengal, state functionaries had an autonomous agenda based on keeping wider political stability 
in the face o f rising political discontent and organised opposition. Since the first half o f the 
1970s, the state imposed restrictions on big business while opening up opportunities for new 
capitalists. This reflected the emerging power balance between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ business 
houses. The purpose o f this discussion is not present a detailed account o f the political unrest 
leading to the Emergency, but to highlight through the sequence o f  events that the state was 
both responding to and driving change.
A systematic study o f the economics o f the Emergency would be beyond the scope o f this 
thesis as it would be a full research project in its own right. However, we can trace a few 
important factors that were crucial turning points in the relationship between state and capital in 
the period starting from 1975. First, we have shown in Chapter Five that from 1975-76 to 1980- 
81, the sector share o f public expenditure in GDP declined quite dramatically from 10% to 5% 
(Table 5A). Second, we have also demonstrated in Chapter Five a secular expansion in private 
capital formation in manufacturing that started in 1975-76 and was sustained upto 2000-01 (Fig 
5.4). Third, we have also noted the dramatic rise in capital formation in trade since 1975-76 (Fig
5.7). These three observations together point to a significant departure in the pattern of 
investment and accumulation that is directly traceable to the period o f the Emergency. These 
were not short-term aberrations that reversed direction with the end o f  the Emergency, but
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displayed long term trends spanning the Janata, Congess, National Front and beyond. This 
brings us to posit that the changing structure o f accumulation which defined the relation 
between state and capital is directly linked to the long term changes that the Emergency entailed 
for Indian political economy. We discuss these changes in the next three sections.
1977 marked the end o f Emergency and the coming to power o f the Janata alliance. The 
Janata government suspended the Fifth Plan and the process o f  annual planning was again 
instituted. Thus, state policies lurched between supporting liberalisation in some areas and 
increasing control in others, revising zones and modes o f intervention and non-intervention in 
keeping with the changing structure o f accumulation and to maintain overall political stability. 
All through this period, there was a struggle over the process o f accumulation and growth 
represented in the tussle between the state and capitalist organisations and a simultaneous 
struggle over the distribution and redistribution process between the state and the organisations 
o f heterogeneous peasants, workers and intermediate classes. The two processes were linked 
closely. The process o f accumulation was heavily dependent on state transfers in the sphere o f 
intervention. These transfers faced two kinds o f problems: one was the mobilisation of 
resources by the state to fuel the accumulation process. But the other was the selection of 
beneficiaries to whom transfers could be made, and this was closely tied to the strength and 
issues o f political mobilisation o f different groups.
6.3 Agrarian Accumulation, Green Revolution and Pricing Policy
Food shortage was a continuous feature after independence. In 1959, it led to huge
demonstrations and the food movement in West Bengal, which was a significant factor in the 
mass acceptance and expansion o f the support base for the Communist Party in urban areas (Das 
and Bandopadhyay 2004). Between 1971 and 1973, food shortages and rampant inflation led to 
great urban discontent with food riots and mobilisation in Nagpur, Bombay and Mysore 
(Chandra 2003). The ‘shortage economy’ o f the 1960s and 1970s had a very important role in 
defining the ‘role o f the state’ and the nature o f ‘reforms’ in the subsequent period.
Devaluation in 1966 was a watershed event unleasing powerful reactions. Popular 
mobilisations against the government became the order o f the day. Demands rose from 
siginificant sections o f the opposition parties for the resignation o f the government with the 
Communists leading a massive march on Parliament. With the slogans o f  Bombay Bandh and 
Bharat Bandh, the communists also organised several successful general strikes (Nayar 2001). 
As prices rose sharply in the wake o f devaluation, and in the face o f  popular mobilisations from 
below, criticism also mounted within the Congress Party and among the intelligentsia.
The problem o f  ‘planning’ was erected as the straw man to explain the shortages. Big 
capitalists like Birla were still with the Congress but now arguing for an end to ‘bad’ economic 
and fiscal policies and ‘stupid’ planning. JRD Tata similarly argued against planning holding it 
responsible for inflation and shortages (Sen 1975).
The food shortage had specific ramifications for the role o f the state as a site o f primary 
accumulation. When the comparatively easy solution o f importing foodgrains, especially wheat,
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under PL480 ran out by the mid sixties (See Chapter Five), the role o f the state in managing the 
distribution o f food had to be redefined from the earlier paradigm o f relative non-intervention 
with basic regulations that had ruled since independence. The ‘free market’ in food had resulted 
in the ‘shortages’ with hoarding, pilfering and the development o f a black-market. This was 
linked to the annual fluctuations o f output and slow growth o f  agricultural output. The first 
major policy shift in 1966 as a result o f the pressures o f PL480 imports and the foreign 
exchange crisis was an ‘import substituting’ one. The concerns were not ‘efficiency’ or 
integration into the world market for food, but domestic self-sufficiency in foodgrain production 
(Ghosh 1998). The self-sufficiency policy was more out o f compulsion than choice in the face 
o f social and political mobilisation and unrest and the drying up o f  assistance under PL 480 
after the refusal by the US to honour the agreement o f payment in rupees.
The interventions came as a technical policy package to increase yields through the 
adoption o f high yielding varieties o f seeds, fertilisers and related inputs commonly dubbed as 
the Green Revolution. The success o f  the strategy depended on private investment by farmers 
with planned public investment in irrigation and infrastructure (Ghosh 1998: 313-315; Rao and 
Storm 1998). This saw a regional disparity as public investment was geared towards the wheat- 
growing regions o f Punjab and Haryana. While landowners had to respond and adjust to various 
forms of regulatory legislation for minimum tenurial reform, their scope for manoeuvring 
around or evading these laws was essentially determined by the local power structures based on 
class, caste, gender and religion. The Green Revolution helped lessen the wage goods constraint 
by imparting a greater degree o f stability to the supply of foodgrains and by helping concentrate 
assets and incomes in the hand o f  the more affluent sections o f  the peasantry (Bagchi 1998).
Within its limited paradigm o f increasing yields without adversely affecting established 
power structures or the extensive networks for marketing the surplus, it triggered o ff a 
phenomenon o f  rapid enrichment initially in Punjab and Haryana amongst the upper strata of 
land-owners and protocapitalist wheat farmers and then showed a lagged and weaker effect in 
Tamil Nadu through the Intensive Area Development programmes, where the technical package 
was implemented in selected areas, one by one. The surplus from Punjab and Haryana made its 
way into investment in the commodity trading hubs in and around Delhi.
This enrichment o f  the upper strata o f the peasantry and big landlords came at the cost 
o f an abdication by the state from extensive populist programmes o f community development 
and the co-operative movement in farming. The choice o f an intensive intervention through a 
technology-led model to increase productivity actually entailed an active policy o f non­
intervention by the state, by not only keeping intact the property rights o f rich farmers and 
landowners, but reneging on its promised support o f extending property rights to co-operative 
holdings benefiting the bottom layers o f the peasantry, and on measures to curb the asset 
concentration among the nouveau-rich proto-capitalist farmers. This contributed to the rise of 
powerful agrarian ‘lobbies’ in Indian politics in sugar and wheat. The demand for ‘marketing
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price guarantees’ was raised by these lobbies and articulated in parliamentary debates (Lok 
Sabha 1972) and in representations to the Agricultural Prices Commission.
The literature on food shortages has often highlighted the contradictions in the policies 
o f food pricing since the mid-1960s (Swaminathan 2000). The state had intervened in the food 
market by means o f  its procurement operations, import policy, public distribution through fair 
price shops, public stock operations and ‘food for work’ programmes. But the main role o f the 
state through the public distribution system was increasingly to play a role in the market as a 
guarantor o f increased procurement prices’ to ‘producers’ by intentionally ‘getting prices 
wrong’ and playing the role o f  ‘end-buyer’ and, reducing the distortions o f the earlier ‘free 
market’ in food. These policies reflected the rise in the political power o f  agrarian interests all 
through the 1970s and the increasing demands o f rich farmers (Swaminathan 2000: 53), 
shopkeepers and traders managing to form factional interests and achieving a political voice in 
the parliamentary process. By 1972, the demand for marketing price guarantee was strong 
within the Congress itself as well as the regional political forces emerging in Punjab and 
Haryana. These demands were placed in the March session o f Parliament by B.R, Kavade and 
Mohan Swarup o f the Congress and Birender Singh Rao o f the Vishal Haryana Party (Lok 
Sabhal972: 20-23, 24-25, 34-36). Both cited the well-being o f  ‘fanners’, ‘shopkeepers’ and 
‘traders’ in their demand for marketing price guarantee.
The political pressure to maintain profitability in the face o f rising capital output ratios 
(Rao and Storm 1998) in the relatively advanced regions was a critical factor inhibiting a more 
consistent agriculture pricing policy. The concentration o f marketed surplus in Punjab, Haryana 
and UP and subsidy diversion to ensure that this food was marketed determined the forms o f the 
emergent pricing policy and tipped the balance o f accumulation in favour of these ‘pockets of 
prosperous farmers’ in the three affluent states o f Northern India (Rao and Storm 1998: 153).
The impact o f agrarian contests on the political economy during the period of the Green 
Revolution and the accumulation process triggered by it merits more analysis based on the huge 
literature on the ‘Green Revolution’ (Patnaik 1972; Sen 1974; Hanumantha Rao 1975; Bhalla 
1976). One strand o f literature like Sen (1974), even while acknowledging the limits o f the new 
high yielding varieties o f seeds and the importance o f irrigation systems in the outcomes o f the 
Green Revolution strategy nevertheless advocated for it based on evidences o f aggregate 
increase in productivity and overlooked the role o f rural power relations in the making o f the 
Green Revolution. However Hanumantha Rao (1975) argued that tehnological changes had 
contributed to widening the disparities in income between different regions, between small and 
large farms and between landowners on the one hand and landless labourers and tenants on the 
other. Patnaik (1972) established that the introduction o f new technology was both land- 
augmenting and permitted multi-cropping. This along with the effects o f  the agrarian reform 
provided an impetus towards capitalist production for profit. But in some areas it perpetuated 
non-capitalist forms o f bonded and attached labour and in other areas reinforced falling real
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wages for labourers in spite o f shift to cash wage instead o f payment in kind. Patnaik’s (1972) 
observations based on field studies in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and 
Gujarat were corroborated by Bhalla’s (1976) findings for Haryana. For the puipose o f this 
research it is sufficient to note that the strategy o f the Green Revolution generated not only a 
new mode o f enrichment but also entry into the terrain o f state intervention for new political 
actors and it forged new alignments involving these actors. These changes were evident in the 
rising clout o f  ‘regional’ parties sometimes claiming to represent particular communities like 
Jats in Punjab and Haryana and both Jats and Yadavs in Western Uttar Pradesh, but which were 
actually embedded in powerful sections o f the upper layers o f the differentiated peasantry 
especially the politically emergent cultivating castes (Brass 1981). The power o f these sectional 
interests determined the extent o f ‘intervention’ in pricing o f agricultural commodities through 
their political representation in the Bhartiya Lok Dal in Uttar Pradesh since 1959 (Brass 1981; 
Sau 1994).
Pricing policy and the pressure on the state to ‘get prices wrong’ was not just the 
preserve o f the ‘new’ protocapitalist fanning in wheat in Northern India. Sau (1994: 43) 
provides evidence that rising food prices ate into the mass market for industrial goods based on 
National Sample Survey data. Thus food pricing was important for both agrarian and industrial 
capitalists in terms o f the balance between maintaining the agrarian profitability and ensuring a 
wider domestic market for industrial goods. This balancing act was continued in the agricultural 
price support policies o f the state.
6.4 Asset Concentration and Industrial Policy
In industry, by the mid 1960s, the license-control system in production had exhausted 
itself because o f the state’s inability to discipline the beneficiaries o f its own patronage, coupled 
with unutilised capacity and a crisis in finance as discussed in Chapter Four and Five.
The large integrated steel plants and heavy engineering complexes initially generated a 
considerable amount o f employment especially in the resource rich but industrially 
underdeveloped eastern and central regions o f the country (Bagchi 1998). In 1972, public sector 
investment amounted to Rs. 5400 crores (Lok Sabha 1972: 160). The politics o f power, 
patronage and accommodation determined policies o f  ‘location’ and often created 
contradictions. For example, a steel plant as a downstream industry for the alloy steel plant in 
Durgapur had been proposed in West Bengal but was ultimately allocated to Salem, Tamil 
Nadu, the parliamentary constituency o f the then Central Minister for Steel, Mohan 
Kumaramangalam. The setting up o f a petroleum processing plant at Mathura which was 
initially promised to Bihar created discontent among functionaries o f  the Congress in Bihar 
(Lok Sabha 1973: 104). Thus the location o f public sector units was itself a source o f political 
competition within the factions and groups inside the Congress.
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According to an estimate given by the then Finance minister to the Lok Sabha in March 
1972, there were 97 public undertakings with 14 projects in progress and at various stages of 
implementation marked by delays and disruptions. The important ones were the Bengal-Assam 
Refinery and Petrochemical complex and another aromatic and petrochemical complex in 
Koyali, Haldia Refinery (West Bengal), the fertilizer project in Korba (Madhya Pradesh) and 
Talcher (Orissa), an aluminium Project in Ramgundam (Andhra Pradesh), three steel plants in 
Salem, Visakhapatnam and Vijaynagram, a scooter project in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh), an 
expansion o f  the alloy steel plant and other steel plants in Bokaro (Bihar) and Durgapur (West 
Bengal), a copper project at Khetri, and a pump and Compressor plant at Allahabad (Lok Sabha 
1972: 10). Public sector steel plants in Vishakhapatnam, Hospet and Salem were approved in 
the 1970s. The Salem Steel Plant was commissioned in 1981. The Visakhapatnam Steel plant, 
under Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited was the country's first shore-based and its sixth public 
sector Integrated Steel Plant.
An examination of these ongoing projects suggests that state intervention was still 
aimed at expanding the production o f basic, capital and intermediate goods through the 
development o f the public sector through the period of the 1970s. In this sense, there was 
continuity in state policy from the Nehru-Mahalanobis period. What was different however was 
the selective but simultaneous opening up o f these sectors to private initiative.
The crisis in the earlier regulatory framework resulted in a stand o ff between sections o f 
the top business and industrial houses in India. The ability o f big business and corporations to 
benefit financially from the reservation policies, licensing and subsidies was an established fact 
by the mid 1960s. A public debate on the concentration o f wealth came to light with the 
findings o f the Hazari Report in 1967 and the Dutt Committee Report. The pre-empted 
unutilised capacities o f the ten top business houses and the resulting asset concentration opened 
up a Pandora’s box o f  capitalist ‘evils’ aided by the state. The Hazari Report, in particular, 
revealed the nature o f pre-emptive capacities built up by the Birlas (Hazari 1967). The 
legislation on monopoly restriction was a result o f political mobilisation that reflected debates in 
Parliament especially in the Rajya Sabha (Nayar 2001) about the implications o f this 
concentration o f wealth and licenses not just on economic growth but also on poverty.
The majority consensus in Parliament was to implement tighter controls on large firms 
(Rosen 1988: 62). The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) o f 1971 was 
introduced as a result o f this debate. The MRTP was a complex piece o f legislation that 
established a limit on expansion o f large private undertakings where the undertaking was defibd 
as itself and products, supplies and distributions that it controlled. An additional definition 
classified all undertakings that rendered one-fourth o f any services rendered in India. All such 
undertakings came under the purview o f the act. Large businesses were thus defined on the basis 
o f asset size and extent o f market control. The Act imposed restrictions on licenses for 
diversification by ‘monopoly houses’. It also placed restrictions on mergers, amalgamations and
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take-over. It also created mandatory systems o f inspection and disclosure o f information. This 
opened up the possibility o f ‘late entry’ to medium scale family run trading houses, for example 
the Ambani, Jindal and Bajaj groups, into industry. The representative association o f big 
business houses, like FICCI, did not welcome these moves and openly called for the ‘relaxation’ 
o f regulations on quantities o f production and how production is organised and ‘scrapping’ of 
the Industries Development and Regulation Act and the Monopolies and Restrictive Trades 
Practices Act (FICCI 1972).
Table 6A: Concentration o f Assets and Capital Formation by M ajor Business Houses 
(Rs Crores)
Business
House
Assets
1951
Assets
1965
Assets
1975
Assets
1980
Assets
1989-90
Tata 151.60 417.72 924.41 1538.97 8530.93
Birla 65.25 292.72 905.03 1431.99 8473.35
Reliance - - - 166.33 3600.27
Thapar 8.63 71.90 197.90 348.06 2177.15
Singhania 10.14 59.20 209.56 412.72 2139.00
Larsen & 
Toubro
137.69 216.03 1681.52
Modi 11.28 114.50 198.82 1399.37
Bajaj - 21.14 103.63 179.26 1391.06
Mafatlal - 45.91 244.23 427.54 1343.55
Chidambaram 16.77 28.05 43.81 1273.35
Total for Top 
22 houses
312.63 1326.15 4234.61 7155.90 34538.14
Total assets in 
the hand o f top 
twenty 
business 
houses as a % 
o f Gross 
Capital
Formation in 
the Economy
29.9% 32.5% 29.8% 26.6% 30%
Source: Yechury Table 1,1992: 43; EPWRF: Table 8B, 2002a: 72 
From Table 6A, we note that the total asset concentration as a percentage of gross 
capital formation in the economy hovered between 26.6% and 32.5% from 1951 to 1989-90 for
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the top twenty business houses. The change came with the rise o f Bajaj in the late 1960s, and 
Reliance and Chidambaram groups in the 1980s. Out o f these assets, less than 0.2% was 
accounted for by the actual investment o f the family group in the assets o f the group in the case 
o f the five top houses o f business -  Tata, Birla, Mafatlal, J.K, Singhania and Sriram (Yechury 
Table 3: 1992: 44). Thus assets remained highly concentrated even after two decades of 
restrictions under MRTP.
That big and medium trading cum industrial houses in India were not interested in an 
export led growth model has been established in the last chapter. For a class whose initial source 
o f income came from commodities trade, there was a growing problem. Importing manufactured 
goods like textiles and exporting primary commodities like, tea, spices and rubber proved 
unsustainable in terms o f costs due to higher import duties as part o f the import substitution 
policy regime. This was the economic basis for the phenomenon o f ‘traders turning into 
manufacturers’ and thus high import duties could be argued to be the ‘compulsion’ imposed by 
the state to turn traders into manufacturers. Import substituting production, if  subsidies and 
incentives from the state were available, was a logical resolution o f this problem as late as the 
1970s even when the licence-control process had run into major contradictions in terms o f pre­
empted unutilised capacities.
The literature on intervention has been confined to a critique o f the pre-emptive capacity 
o f groups like the Birlas and Tatas, especially after the publication o f the Hazari report. The 
Tatas and Birlas remained at the top o f  the ranking of business houses since 1951 to 1976 and 
asset concentration remained a key feature o f capitalist accumulation. But what went unnoticed, 
was a phenomenon o f existing medium scale trading businesses in durable consumer goods 
expanding and diversifying into production through the policy o f import substitution and the 
central licensing and subsidy scheme to cater to new markets based on the gradual increase in 
middle class purchasing power.
An important initiative by the state in the post-independence period was to perpetuate the 
‘Hindu Undivided Family’ (HUF) as an entity recognised by Section 2 o f the Income Tax Act 
1961. Thich preserved the patriarchal rules o f limiting inheritance rights o f women to property 
and assigned the ‘Karta’ as the patriarch o f the family with legal powers to represent and 
structure the holding o f property (Sachdeva 1987). The Hindu Succession Act makes provision 
for a Hindu Undivided Family to ensure that property remains with the male line o f descent. A 
son gets a share equal to that o f his father; a daughter gets only a share in her father's share. She 
cannot reside in the family home unless she is single or divorced, and cannot claim her share of 
property as long as the men of the family continue to live in it. A woman's right to agricultural 
property is also similarly restricted to "prevent fragmentation o f landholdings." And a Hindu 
woman has no right to her matrimonial home, unless she can prove that it was purchased with 
her earnings.
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It must be noted that a Hindu male can be a 4 kart a’ for more than one HUF accounts. 
Despite scores o f judicial decisions, the circumstances in which a HUF comes into existence has 
been the subject o f debate and controversy. Under the Income Tax Act, 1961, a HUF is assessed 
for income tax as a distinct unit o f assessment. IN case law, a HUF consists o f all persons 
lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters; 
while a Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body including only those persons who acquire 
by birth an interest in the jo in t or coparcenary property. A member o f  a HUF is not taxable at all 
in respect o f any sum which he receives as such member out o f the income o f the family, even 
though the family may not have paid the tax on its income. Thus the general principle o f tax law 
that income from an individual members' property thrown into the family coiffeur is taxable, as 
the income o f the jo in t family, does not hold for a HUF. All definitions and interpretations of 
HUF are based on Hindu personal laws. A Hindu Undivided family (HUF) cannot enter into a 
partnership with other persons, as it is not a legal person, but the karta o f a HUF can (Sachdeva 
1987).
No one can make a profit out o f oneself. This is axiomatic in tax law. The concept o f the 
Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is an exception to this principle. The same person can act as the 
karta o f the HUF and also make profits in his individual name. An HUF member cannot be 
taxed in respect o f any sum which he receives as such member out o f the income o f the family, 
even though the family may not have paid the tax on its income (Ramanujam 2006). According 
to Ramanujam (2006: 6), a former C hief Commissioner of Income Tax:
The HUF is an entity peculiar to the Indian tax law. The law recognises it and 
there is nothing sham about it. Surprisingly, the Government carries out any amount of 
amendment to the Hindu law without looking into the revenue loss caused by the 
recognition o f the HUF as a separate taxable entity. The HUF may be a boon to the 
taxpaying Hindu. But it is definitely a bane to government revenues.
Both ‘old’ and ‘new ’ capitalist business houses of Hindu origin used the provision o f 
HUF to consolidate family holdings and ensured the concentration o f capital within the family 
through transactions between the HUF and individuals within the HUF who held key positions 
in the share-holding and managerial patterns of the companies within the fold o f the business 
house. No such provision was available to business houses held by Muslims or other religious 
minorities.
6.5 ‘New Entrants’ and Modes o f Primary Accumulation
One o f the most important aspects o f the accumulation process between 1967 and 1977 
was the social impact o f the institutional changes in the form o f bank nationalisation, the 
development o f  the stock market and other institutional attempts to ease financial constraints.
The MRTP Act provided an incentive for the transformation o f  asset structures for 
business houses, which were large, but not large enough in terms o f  declared assets to come
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under the restrictions imposed by the Act. The process o f import substitution to deepen and 
diversify the productive capacity o f  the private sector in the Indian economy continued 
throughout the 1970s. Thus the MRTP Act actually made import substituting capitalist ventures 
a viable strategy for ‘new’ entrants to industry, thus resolving one o f  the contradictions o f the 
Nehru-Mahalanobis model.
The evidence for this phenomenon o f diversification from trade into industry 
throughout this period can be analysed through case studies o f several business houses. 
Jamnalal Bajaj, the leading Congress leader and adherent o f Gandhi started business life in the 
import trade. In 1945, Ms Bacharaj Trading Corporation Limited was registered under the 
Companies Act and it started sales in India in 1948 o f imported two and three wheelers. In 
1959, it registered as Bajaj Auto and obtained a license to set up a manufacturing plant at 
Akurdi, which went into production in 1960. Ten years later, by 1971, it introduced the three- 
wheeler goods carrier and in 1972 the Bajaj Chetak scooter. In 1975, it went into a joint venture 
with M aharashtra Scooters limited, a state owned enterprise. By 1984, it was in a position to set 
up joint ventures with Kawasaki o f Japan at a new plant in Aurangabad to diversify into 
motorcycles and nropeds from scooters. Bajaj scooters were a phenomenal success in all major 
cities, towns and suburbs by the mid 1980s. By the 1990s, the Bajaj Group valued at US$ 3 
billion had evolved into a family run business house with 27 companies specialising in cotton 
processing, two and three wheelers, electrical goods, steel products, ferro-alloys, financial 
services, travel, investment and insurance. In June 2006, Rahul Bajaj, the head o f the family run 
business group, was elected to the Rajya Sabha from Maharashtra with support from the BJP, 
the Shiv Sena and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP).
Similarly, the TVS group, founded by T V Sundaram Iyengar in 1911 based in Tamil 
Nadu rode the expansion o f private transport with the introduction o f  the moped in 1980 when 
TVS 50, the first Indian two-seater moped rolled out o f the factory at Hosur in Tamil Nadu. . It 
has 29 companies in its fold and is valued at US$ 450 millions.
The most obvious example o f  a Tate entrant’ into this pattern is that o f the Ambanis 
who started in the synthetic fibre trade and manufacture and then successfully diversified into 
petrochemicals. But the story goes back a few decades. According to one account, Dhirubhai 
Ambani spent a decade in Aden where he was first employed as an attendant in a petrol station 
owned by Shell and later employed as a clerk in an affiliate o f Burmah Shell from 1949 to 1958. 
However, the less discussed feature in this business lore is his source o f  primary accumulation 
in this period. This came from two kinds o f ‘entrepreneurial’ activity. According to a report in 
the The Hindu (July 15 2002) this was smelting silver and mediating disputed insurance 
settlements. In Aden, the silver in coins was worth more than the coins themselves. Ambani 
bought up the coins, melted them and sold the silver. He also mediated insurance payments on 
behalf o f  Indian traders with shipping companies for a previously agreed ‘cut’. After nine years 
in Aden, Ambani returned to India in 1958. He started his first company, Reliance Commercial
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Corporation, a commodity trading and export house with Aden as a primary destination for 
Indian spices and importing textiles. So, the early history o f Reliance is very much in keeping 
with the ‘trading house’ pattern o f the 1940s and 1950s based on forms o f  primary accumulation 
outside the direct ambit o f state regulations.
In the first step o f Reliance's highly successful strategy o f diversification from trade to 
industry through import substitution, Dhirubhai Ambani started a textile mill in Naroda, 
Ahmedabad, in 1966 taking advantage of the subsidies offered for setting up industry in 
backward areas. In 1975, a technical team from the World Bank certified that the Reliance 
textile plant was ‘excellent by developed country standards’.
The company went public in 1977, another unusual move, raising money through equity 
rather than the usual model o f bank led debt finance. Reliance Industries sold shares on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange. Most other Indian companies till then had floated only small amounts 
o f stock on the exchange. Reliance had 58,000 investors buy its shares when it went public, 
making it one o f  the most widely held stocks at the time. This move helped the Ambanis to be 
less dependent on a state-financed debt structure and the new found financial muscle helped 
when Ambani broke into the burgeoning petrochemicals sector.
The third departure was the building o f Ambani’s own branded retail chain through 
developing franchises in a move to counter the barriers erected by old ‘textile’ entrepreneurs, 
who retained their grip over wholesalers and retailers. By the early 1980s, such franchisee shops 
under the brand name ‘V im al’ became a feature in all cities in India, big or small.
Between 1973 and 1978, the Ambanis, who were associated with retail trade in textile, 
diversified into synthetic textile manufacturing. The foray into synthetic textiles required 
petrochemicals as raw materials. So in another move o f backward integration, Ambani entered 
the petrochemicals business. According to one account based on an interview o f an elected 
office-holder in FICCI who preferred to remain anonymous, the license for entry into the 
petrochemical sector came as the reward for supporting and propping up the Emergency regime. 
Building on his previous successes in building direct social channels with the Congress faction 
in power, he was able to secure one o f the new licenses for this business. This diversification by 
a ‘late-comer’ was possible because o f the MRTP Act which prevented top houses like the 
Goenkas, who also had a base in textiles, from diversifying into synthetic fibre and 
petrochemicals. The rivalry over petro-chemical based fibres between these two houses led to a 
media battle in the financial press in the early 1980s.
In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the rise o f diversified groups from the 1970s can be 
traced to primary accumulation in agriculture (Baru 2000). The rise o f Nagarjuna founded in 
1973 in Kakinada is one o f  a transition from agrarian accumulation to industry. KVK Raju, a 
first generation technopreneuv came from a wealthy agrarian background. On graduating from 
Banaras Hindu University and the Madras Institute of Technology he went on to complete his 
Master's in Mechanical and Industrial Engineering from Michigan State University and the
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University o f Minnesota, USA. After a short stint in the American Industry he returned to India 
and worked for short periods at Caltex Oil Refinery, Orient General Industries and Associated 
Electrical Industries. Finally, he joined Union Carbide o f India and stayed there for 15 years. In 
1973, he founded the Nagarjuna Group with an investment o f US$ 23 million. The Group has 
since then come a long way to become a diversified conglomerate with an asset base o f US$ 2.5 
billion. The same is true o f  new corporate players in steel like the Jindal group, operating in the 
power sector and cement.
Apart from the old business houses that formed the top o f the industrial oligarchy, most 
o f the contemporary oligopolistic corporate houses in India either entered into manufacturing in 
the 1960s or 1970s; or underwent a series o f diversifications in this period. Each o f these 
success stories follows from the shortage economy o f the 1970s followed by a booming black 
market and very high margins from trade (Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 1995). These 
diversifications are similar to those o f the 1930s in India (Bagchi 1972, Chandravarkar 1992) in 
terms o f a spurt in investment through wealth accumulated in periods o f economic crisis, except 
in one respect - the role o f  the state. The state remained a cheap source o f subsidies through land 
provision in designated areas and bank loans in this investment melee o f the late 1970s. The 
agency o f the state provided not just protection, but an active guarantee against failure and 
sickness along with the willingness to turn a blind eye to the ‘private’ rent-seeking networks 
through the channels o f  ‘contracting’ and ‘sub-contracting’. This ‘contractor capitalism’ 
embraces small and large businesses and is a characteristic o f both private and public enterprise. 
At the same time, the regulatory apparatus o f the state was not extended through any firm 
strategy to control the developments o f the market in finance that started growing from the late 
1970s.
By the early 1970s, another kind o f expansion process was evident in the transport 
sector, with the growth o f public investment in roads that created accumulation opportunities 
through the creation o f private wholesale and retail chains. As road transport networks started 
building up through state investments, a long network of dealerships of sales of two-wheelers, 
trucks and jeeps and also in the finance needed for their purchase started growing. The Shriram 
groups origins in 1974 can be traced back to two businesses: one in chit funds, a form o f small- 
scale private lottery scheme that ensured everybody won in a single cycle o f the fund and the 
other in the financing o f  truck purchases subject to minimal regulation by the state.
These informal markets in finance were the basis o f private non-banking finance that 
started developing from the late 1970s though they had existed since the colonial period and 
even before. But Ponzi type schemes characterised the growth o f  such finance from the late 
1970s which came into public light when one such scheme, Sanchaita, was taken to task by the 
state for paying interest that was much higher than that prevailing in the market. A survey o f 50 
medium-sized family- run business houses in Kolkata revealed that most business houses ran
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private deposit schemes amongst trusted clients even though accounts books do not reveal their 
existence.
The 1970s were specifically crucial in terms of the setting up o f new enterprises that 
then became the stuff o f ‘rags to riches’ business lore in the 1980s and 1990s. The Sahara India 
group’s story began in 1978. Starting on a modest scale with a capital of only Rs. 2000, the 
company has traversed a long way to become a frontrunner among Indian conglomerates. 
Today, Sahara India is a major entity on the corporate scene having an asset base o f over Rs. 
50,000 crores (10.87 billion US $) and diversified business interests that include: public deposit 
mobilisation, infrastructure & housing, media & entertainment, aviation, consumer products, 
information technology, Sundarbans project, Sahara hospitals, Araria ju te project, life insurance, 
mutual funds, housing finance, power project, computer manufacturing, hotels and the NR1 
caring scheme. Sahara India’s rise is linked to the shift towards patron-client relationships 
between sections o f aspiring capitalists and ruling parties that became one o f  the characteristic 
feature o f mainstream Indian politics from Indira Gandhi’s period. In this particular case, the 
rise o f the company was dependent first on the Janata Dal and then on the Samajwadi Party led 
by Mulayam Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh.
This was accompanied by another phenomenon: public sector managers and 
technocrats, beneficiaries o f the highly subsidised post-independence higher education system, 
turning into ‘entrepreneurs’, linked to the early ‘Non Resident Indian’ phenomenon whereby of 
a new generation equipped with US degrees came to take over the mantle if  the ‘family 
business’ took off or set up pioneering ‘family groups’ in business in the ‘new’ and upcoming 
sectors in the economy.
Lower down the hierarchy, traders in suburbs became local wholesalers and then 
diversified into retail trade integrating into the structure of the Indian industrial and commercial 
hierarchy. But a handful o f monopoly houses in collaboration with the branches and Indian 
subsidiaries o f powerful multinational concerns, dominated the market structure for industrial 
goods.
The state food corporations and Food Corporation o f India held control over the public 
distribution o f foodgrains (Swaminathan 2000). The strengthening o f mercantile capital through 
the institutional structures o f the market and the state in food and cotton in Tamil Nadu is well 
documented (Harriss-W hite 1985: 44 -51). Not only the marketing o f agricultural produce, but 
also the supply and distribution o f essential consumer goods, agricultural inputs and even a 
large part o f food stuffs, were controlled by the same commercial monopolies. This allowed 
surplus extraction through unequal terms of trade between agriculture and industry (AIKS 
1979). However, in the 1970s the terms o f trade turned against industry. The Green revolution 
led to accumulation in agriculture and the ‘shortage’ economy o f hoarding, black marketing and 
racketeering also helped agricultural prices. The first had a narrow impact mostly in Punjab, 
Haryana and Western UP but the latter was more or less a countrywide phenomenon.
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At the very bottom o f the economic hierarchy o f rural power, the state suddenly became 
a source o f enrichment through fertiliser subsidies, development loans and bank finance apart 
from ‘contracts’ for public works programmes. In some cases merchants were landowners and 
owners o f small and medium scale industry -  so there were twin processes o f finance available: 
through loans geared towards land promotion and small-scale industry and factoring services by 
nationalised banks. In other cases, the asset structure was geared towards agrarian trade, 
infrastructural work and non-agrarian diversification into small trade and services.
There were two kinds o f capital formation processes in evidence: one that can be traced to 
the organised sector, which has been described above. The other major area was the unorganised 
sector in trades, hotels, real estate and business services (EPWRF 2002b). Both these processes 
were reliant on the state-led process and linked to one another. This was because the formal and 
informal sectors merged into one another in the hierarchy o f the market and with the 
informalisation within the formal sector. The growth o f the new business houses followed the 
old practice o f maintaining a range o f holding companies under the structure o f ‘family run 
business groups’ to ensure minimum levels o f trade unionisation and maximisation o f tax 
evasion.
The decade o f the 1970s represented a period o f balancing acts in terms o f economic 
policy. The expansion o f the public sector in terms o f completion o f existing or approved 
projects continued, though marked by significant delays. The state, in a move to resolve the 
contradictions o f diversified accumulation and an underdeveloped capital market, went into an 
expansion drive in the banking sector. It imposed significant strictures on profit repatriation by 
foreign capital through the enactment o f the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1973 (FERA) 
and set limits on the acquisition of further assets by big business houses through the MRTP Act. 
This addressed the barriers in the interlocking o f finance and industry on one hand and erected 
limits on the modes o f profit-repatriation by ‘foreign companies’ without taking away their right 
to ‘equal status’ with Indian companies that had been ensured through the Companies Act in 
1956 under the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy.
FERA required that all firms dilute their foreign equity holdings to 40% if  they wanted 
to be treated as Indian companies. Exceptions wre made for technology-intensive, export­
intensive and core sector firms in which upto 74% foreign equity holding was allowed. For most 
companies, the 40% limit was enough to retain managerial control. Foreign parent corporations 
retained hold by issuing fresh equity ensuring domestic shareholding was fragmented. Except 
for some high profile cases like IBM and Coca Cola, most foreign companies remained in India 
(Athreye and Kapur 1999).
According to statistics given by Pranab Mukherjee, Minister o f Commerce, Civil Supplies, 
Steel and Mines, to the Lok Sabha on 14th March 1980, 473 branches o f foreign companies 
existed in India as on 31st March 1978, out o f which only 75 were engaged in processing and 
manufacturing. There were 146 Indian subsidiaries o f foreign companies out o f which 103 were
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engaged in processing and manufacturing activities (Lok Sabha 1980: p p l97-198). Thus in spite 
o f FERA, number o f foreign companies in India had increased from 300 in 1966 to 473 in 1980,
The direction o f diversification in industry was more or less contingent on three factors 
or three different sources o f  state patronage within the limits set by the MRTP Act - access to 
bank finance, infrastructural facilities and tax concessions.
State patronage o f the urban and rural middle and lower-middle classes was also a 
phenomenon traceable to this period. Much o f it was rhetoric, but a few significant measures 
stand out. An increase in public sector managerial employment and the fillip to ‘small 
accumulation5 were twin prongs o f the same fork o f patronage.
The market in primary equities was being promoted in the ‘zone o f non-intervention5 by 
the state along with the development o f ‘deposit5 mobilisation tapping into middle class small 
investors. The nationalisation o f banks in 1969 set limits on the accumulating possibilities for 
big players in the finance sector. But with the dilution o f equity by FERA companies by the late 
1970s, the stock market came into its own followed by the first speculative boom o f the early 
1980s (Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 1995), FERA company shares provided an investment outlet 
for the accumulated money capital o f Indian business (Patnaik 1979).
We have already seen in the history o f the Ambanis how the opening up o f the financial 
market assisted new players to enter the accumulation process. The early history o f the Sahara 
group founded as a loose trading cum financial house in 1978 and growing through deposit 
mobilisation, followed this trajectory. The Sanchaita scandal reminiscent o f a Ponzi-type 
strategy suggests that not all o f the activity in these loosely regulated financial markets was 
productive. . The crisis o f ‘finance’ that capitalists were complaining about (See Chapter Five) 
was thus resolved to a certain extent through a ‘laissez faire5 approach to the development o f the 
capital market in the late 1970s. The agricultural surplus from the rich peasants also found a 
convenient channel in this relatively free market in capital in the early development of the stock 
market.
It must be noted at this point that the emergence o f  ‘new’ business groups was not a 
smooth and seamless transition. Three kinds o f barriers to transition from trade to manufacturig 
have been discussed in this chapter. The first was the barriers created due to the propensity of 
the licensing system to erect barriers o f entry for new aspirants. The second was the definition 
o f scale by the state which decided the nature o f incentives available to aspiring businesses. The 
third was the question o f access to technology and finance. Only, those groups, which could 
find ways to cross these barriers, emerged as players in the field. As we have argued in Chapter 
Five and in the present chapter, the question o f  licensing, scale and finance was slowly resolved 
by changes in state policy in the 1970s as a response to the rising power o f  ‘new5 capitalists. 
The question o f technology access however remained unresolved and as we shall see in Chapter 
Seven, how the question o f technology access drove the overseas expansion o f capital in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
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6.6 State and Capital: Negotiations on Intervention
A schism developed between employers o f  industrial origin and those from the trading
classes about the modalities o f resolution o f disputes. Industrial employers had earlier accepted 
the processes o f negotiations with trade unions mediated by the state through the Industrial 
Disputes Act in spite o f dissatisfaction with many provisions o f  the Act and working o f  wage 
boards and the Bonus Commission (See Section 4.6 for details). However, traders lobbied very 
strongly against such facilitation of organised negotiations for wage standardisation and social 
benefits for labour by arguing against the right o f ‘any worker’ to raise a dispute (FICCI 1954: 
9). Thus industrial employers believed in organised negotiation, trading classes did not. This 
was perhaps because the structure o f commercial enterprise ensured internal control o f labour. 
But there was recognition by the state that the contradictions between workers and employers 
were intensifying and the social antagonism towards ‘business’ was increasing with food 
shortages, hoarding and racketeering (Ghosh 1998; Nayar 2001; Das and Bandopadhyay 2004). 
The intense social antagonism was manifest in the burning and looting o f business 
establishments in the food riots in Nagpur, Bombay and Mysore (Nayar 2001:104; Chandra
2003). Industrial capitalists made an effort to bridge this schism by trying to build a common 
coalition with traders on the issue o f labour laws. This was reflected in the change o f name of 
the All India Organisation o f Industrial Employers to the All India Organisation of Employers.
Babubhai M Chinai in 1967 announced as President o f the AIOIE that the
...nam e and the style o f the Organisation just half an hour ago at a 
Special Meeting has been changed to All India Organisation o f Employers. The 
word ‘industrial’ has been deleted, because labour legislation is increasingly 
being extended not only to different forms o f manufacturing but to other 
establishments in trade and commerce as well. (AIOIE, 1967)
FICCI noted that the broadening o f markets for labour, capital and products, instead of 
supporting political cohesion as the Nehruvian model would have assumed, generated local 
hostility and strengthened the position o f antagonistic local groups. This was the basis o f centre- 
state struggles, which was clear in the different mobilisations o f the period in different parts o f 
India (Baru 2000). For FICCI members, this implied two things: First, acceptance by all 
political parties that worthwhile achievements were possible only if  there were a recognisable 
system o f  order and control. Second, the importance o f cooperation between employers was just 
as great as the need to compete. FICCI cited inter and intra-trade union rivalries as the key 
problem and were keen to see the political structure o f the trade union movement dismantled in 
favour of an economistic union movement. FICCI members further claimed that non-recognised 
and minority trade unions had no right either to raise disputes or represent the case o f any 
workman. Thus sections o f industrial entrepreneurs were still concerned with what they wanted 
the role o f  the state to be in industrial relations. But they were also developing new alliances to 
combat the labour militancy.
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Using the under-utilisation o f  capacity in the industrial sector as symptomatic evidence 
o f excessive labour regulation, FICCI representatives, like Harish M ahindra by 1975 were 
advocating ‘regime change’: opening the doors to foreign investment (FICCI 1975) and 
advocating a policy that came from the ‘Forum for Free Enterprise’ a decade earlier.
The rise in the merchant-capital base brought about by agrarian prosperity and the 
expansion o f the small and medium enterprise base through the 1970s exacerbated part o f the 
schism within the capitalist class. Another section o f manufacturers was organising to bridle the 
rising power o f  traders. The rise o f the Confederation o f Indian Industries from the early 1980s 
as a competing body to the might o f FICCI has to be seen in this context. Schisms within the 
capitalist class were also evident in terms o f realignments in political alliances during this 
period. This was a period that witnessed the rise o f right wing parties with a mass base 
concomitant with the political fragmentation o f the Left. The conflict in industry was resolved 
with a practice that started from the 1970s. This was done by revising the legal definitions of 
large, medium and small-scale industry in terms o f assets in an upward direction. The Janata 
government o f 1977 adhered to this policy.
Changes in such definitions in Industrial policy also entailed an element o f appeasement 
o f the top business groups as the definiton o f ‘large enterprise’ kept expanding. The Janata 
government o f 1977 rode the crest o f this conflict, due to the schism within the capitalist class 
between the new entrants and the old business houses and followed further deregulation by 
changing the focus o f state assistance from large to small-scale enterprise and revising the 
definition o f scale in an upward direction in terms o f asset size. This brought an increasing 
number o f capitalists within the fold o f state patronage. This was followed up and broadened in 
the 1980s after the coming to power o f the reconsolidated Congress (I) under Indira Gandhi 
followed by Rajiv Gandhi. Deregulation was pursued through delicensing and a change in the 
list o f items reserved for the private sector defined by scale and allowing the entry o f the private 
sector into areas earlier designated for public sector. In most cases, private investment in both 
intermediate and final goods followed immediately for example in steel and petrochemicals. 
Sponge iron and pig iron were delicensed in the mid-80s to meet the shortage o f this vital 
product for the foundry and the mini-blast furnace units. The Jindal group had already 
established their first plant at Hissar and was developing the second one at Vizag.
According to Chibber (2003), the forces gathering to dismantle the regulatory apparatus of 
the state were generated endogenously deriving from the political strength o f the capitalist class. 
In India, the demands came from the emergence o f new groups, who gathered strength as 
industrialisation progressed in an uneven manner, and came to see the system o f internal 
controls and artificial monopolies as an obstacle to their own expansion. The pressure which 
these sections exerted to dismantle the dirigiste regime was given added force by the rapid 
decay o f  the planning apparatus itself, during the Indira-Sanjay years (Chibber 2003). The 
degeneration o f the economic state apparatus, its transformation into a tool for consolidating the
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power o f the Gandhi family (the obvious manifestation o f which was the coterie around Sanjay 
Gandhi that controlled licenses, permits and contracts) culminating in the emergency (Chandra 
2003; Frankel 2005), eased the task o f legitimising a shift away from the era o f industrial 
planning(Chibber 2003).
The relations between the state and the capitalist class were not always supportive, as 
the developmental-state literature suggests they may have been. But neither was it completely 
antagonistic, as suggested by Herring, who argues that the bureaucrats were an elite corps of 
self-confident generalists who had no expertise to substitute for capitalists and little 
understanding o f the enterprises they regulated (Herring 1999: 324). Yet Herring acknowledges 
that individual capitalists could get support on a selective basis based on family connections, 
geographical origins, school ties, marriage alliances, side payments and so on. For Herring, it 
was a Polanyi-type embeddedness o f the state that worked against the sort o f capital-state 
relationship that can empower a state to act against some in the interests o f all. Herring argues 
that particularistic embeddedness derived from such selective social ties created in practice a 
porous state; regulations deterred some, delayed everyone, but in Herring’s final analysis only 
intermittently approached stated goals. But there was an active promotion o f a technocracy, 
which made up the core o f skilled professionals in state run enterprises and nationalised banks. 
The ties between public and private sector managerial technocrats had a common basis in class 
and social background, which were not necessarily particularistic -  and it was this corp that 
would join the next generation o f  technopreneurs and argue for disinvestments by the state in 
less than a decade.
Nayar’s explanation echoing that o f Bhagwati is that the state in India had less policy 
flexibility than authoritarian regimes in East Asia. In this view, democracy did not altogether 
preclude reform, but often required a crisis to push it through (Nayar 2001, Bhagwati 1993). 
They both cite the food crisis o f the 1960s and the foreign exchange crises o f 1966 and 1991 
and the reforms that followed in the form o f limited liberalisation in 1966 and the more 
sustantive reforms o f 1991 as evidence. However a more historicized account o f crises since the 
1970s does not provide credible evidence to support this view. The brutal repression o f trade 
unionists before and after the railway strike (Ranadive 1990), the use o f  the state apparatus to 
completely smash and prevent manifestations o f public discontent during the Emergency regime 
and the increased centralisation o f power (Chandra 2003) all took place through formally 
democratic mechanisms. In this sense, democracy did not preclude repression and centralisation. 
In the face o f crisis in 1966, the state did not manage to push through any decisive ‘reform’, but 
combined a series o f  regulatory policies with deregulation to accommodate changes in the 
process o f  accumulation. The terrain o f ‘intervention’ kept changing repeatedly For example, 
the reform in response to the food crisis was an import substituting one with ‘self-sufficiency’ in 
food production as the stated aim (Ghosh 1998). However, the devaluation o f the rupee in 1966 
was a liberalising imperative which by Nayar’s own argument came at the behest o f  the World
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Bank (Nayar 2001: 100). However, the 1970s saw a series o f interventionist moves described 
below, liberalising moves by changing the definition of scale described above and active non­
intervention in the development o f  the stock market. In fact, it has been argued that some 
specific protective interventions like Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) led to the 
development o f stock market and fmancialisation o f the economy in the 1970s (Patnaik 1979). . 
Thus the neat classification o f reforms only as a response to crisis does not hold good.
The most significant contribution o f Hazari was the identification o f the ‘business 
group’ as the representative unit o f Indian capital. The group in this view consisted o f a number 
o f related and unrelated activities controlled by a single central decision-making authority and 
thereby functioning as a co-ordinated organisation (Hazari 1967). This meant that besides a high 
degree o f product concentration, monopoly in India consisted o f the predominance of a few 
representative units o f capital in most areas o f industry. The key houses o f business, both old 
and new, found ways to keep their toehold in the economy through the structure o f family run 
business houses.
Critical structural change comprised the rapid growth o f industries like chemicals, 
petrochemicals, garments, gem cutting and electronics (Chandrasekhar 1994). This led to the 
entry o f  new business houses with large and medium scale enterprises. A shift in the leadership 
o f the class was imminent with these ‘new’ actors finding a platform in FICCI as well as the 
Confederation o f Indian Industries (CII) since the early 1980s. While the state, independent o f 
the interests it was trying to balance, had a certain degree o f autonomy vis a vis the private 
corporate sector, its ability to ensure investment o f a kind that went beyond short-run profit 
maximisation was limited by the political strength o f the corporate sector itself. This strength 
was visible in the alignment o f the new capitalists with the regional political parties that were 
emerging since the 1960s and gained ground during the 1980s. The Ambani group and Sahara 
India became closely linked to the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh.
Besides carrying the burden o f  supplying infrastructural inputs, the supportive role of 
the state can be seen in its revised policy vis a vis the investments o f financial institutions. By 
virtue o f  holding (through the financial institutions) more than 25% o f the paid-up capital o f 
private joint-stock companies, the state was in a position to wield considerable influence over 
the private sector. But unlike South Korea, the control over financial resources had never been 
utilised to influence investment decisions in the private corporate sector. The reason for this is 
clear, the Indian capitalist class could create significant political space for itself in the political 
process in the ways described above.
As state financing o f industrialisation could not be combined with effective 
compulsions o f  productivity growth, the strategy o f the state changed subtly to one o f enabling 
the corporate sector to raise its own finances on favourable terms.
The fact is ignored that bank credit to industry also causes damage 
unless it is based on the mobilisation o f real resources by the banking system. 
This is the crux o f  our credit policy. Tight money policy may have resulted in
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denying credit to some priority sectors or project. If  so, the needs o f such 
priority sectors should be reviewed, and credit on a selective basis should be 
provided to them. There can be no general liberalisation. I wonder if 
industrialists, even those who command the confidence o f the investing public, 
have done all that they can to tap private savings. (Indira Gandhi, Address to 
FICCI, April 25, 1975)
W hether Mr Ambani took this advice or whether Mrs Gandhi was influenced by his 
ideas is difficult to assess, but we can see that the views o f a leader o f  emerging capitalists and 
the prime minister had converged.
From the mid-1970s onwards, the state gave up the remnants o f  the Mahalonobis 
paradigm and shifted to popular appeasement through the 20-point programme and slogans of 
‘garibi hatao’. State expenditures also became increasingly oriented towards subsidies to 
favoured groups and to providing large middle class employment in the government and public 
sector. The Integrated Community Development Scheme was expanded in 1975 under Indira 
Gandhi. The demand for ‘social justice’ was its main plank. The Samajwadis changed this to 
caste -equality. The Congress lost out in this power struggle at the grass root level in Northern 
and Western India. Its monopoly over power in South India had already been significantly 
eroded because o f the autonomy movements that had gained political space in the previous 
decades.
The proclivity to private enrichment at social expense permeated the ranks o f 
bureaucratic functionaries and made corruption an endemic feature o f this period. This has been 
noted by Hazari (1967) in the discussion on the process o f issuing licenses that became a 
preserve of power and pelf. We have also noted the nexus between land ownership and bank 
finance in Section 5.4. Ghosh (1998) has shown that even the conservative estimates o f the 
black economy in India ranged from l/3 rd to l/5 th o f  the national product. In the process state 
functionaries alienated capitalists in FICCI as well though the black economy spanned the 
public and the private sector (Kumar 1999). Within the left intellectual framework, the 
conclusion was that the corporate private sector, constituted by ‘monopolies’needed stricter 
control and regulation because both functionaries o f the state and the owners o f monopolies 
were implicated in corrupt practices. Government policy took an alternative route by changing 
course through a new set o f  selective interventions that sought to release the capital constraints 
in new ways and accommodate and encourage new ‘monopolies’.
The nationalisation of banks in the 1970s and the creation o f financial institutions 
earlier were meant to serve the needs o f the capital accumulation process in keeping with the 
state-led paradigm. Table 6B shows that assistance to the private sector from financial 
institutions rose in absolute value throughout the 1980s.
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Tabe 6B: Sectorwise Sanctions from All India Financial Institutions
Sector 1980-81 
Sanctions in 
Rs Crores
1988-89 
Sanctions in 
Rs Crores
Total 
Sanctions 
in Rs 
Crores 
from 
1980-81 
to 1988- 
89
1980-81 
Percentage 
share o f 
Total
1988-89 
Percentage 
Share of 
Total
Percentage
Share
between
1980-81
and 1988-
89
Private 1675.39 8816.94 41443.55 81.36 67.88 73
Public 236.29 2712.92 9512.88 11.47 20.89 16.75
Joint 102.69 1185.15 4107.92 4.99 9.12 7.23
Cooperative 45.15 27.35 1715.11 2.19 2.11 3.02
Source: Yechury Table 2, 1992: 43; IDBI, Table 2A, 1989-90
The decades o f the 1980s demonstrate a policy o f financing by national financial 
institutions o f private and joint sector enterprises at the cost o f the public sectors and co­
operatives as is clear from Table 6B.
Since the structure was that o f a mixed economy, with private sector investment and 
production decisions determined by the unequal distribution of purchasing power, government 
allocations were often out o f line with flows generated by private agents. Planning became 
difficult to implement and also irrelevant as private sector allocations determined the course of 
the economy. Among other things, the incapacity o f the government to tax the rich led to the 
black economy that was estimated to be l/3 rd to 1/501 o f the recorded national product estimate 
(Ghosh 1998). Kumar (1999) has estimated it to be considerably larger -  about half the size of 
the official economy.
From the 1980s, members o f a new entrepreneurial class in finance and industry 
emerged even from the ranks o f executives and managers o f state-owned banks and enterprises 
themselves (Patnaik 1999) disproving theories about the bureaucracy being a separate class 
(Herring 1999, Bardhan 1990). None o f these initiatives were a planned or consistent set o f 
policies, they were ad hoc measures as the state entered a phase where state-society 
relationships had suddenly taken a turn towards discontent and violence.
The effect o f these policies on patterns o f regional accumulation became visible and 
differentiated across states. With the old seats o f industrial capital being caught in stagnation, 
Gujarat and M aharashtra saw a proliferation o f trade, agro-based market expansion and finance. 
Punjab saw a pattern o f small and medium scale based expansion in industry following the 
Green Revolution that had a direct impact on the economy o f  New Delhi. The eastern part of 
India, especially West Bengal saw a long deindustrialisation due to the weakening o f  colonial
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capital and the reluctance o f capitalists to invest in big ventures under a Left government. The 
regional distribution o f  aid from the Centre was also politically biased against states that were 
ruled by parties opposed to the Congress in the 1970s and 1980s based on relative lobbying 
power (Biswas and M arjit 2000).
Table 6C clearly points to a regional imbalance in assistance to industrial development 
from the lead industrial development bank in India over a period o f 24 years. The Western states 
followed by the Southern ones saw the bulk o f state assistance coming their way. The support to 
Maharashtra and Gujarat far outweighs the assistance to other states. We can safely assert that 
this allocation indicates the political clout o f  capitalists in these states and point to a systemic 
underinvestment in other states.
Table 6C: State wise Assistance Sanctioned and Disbursed by 1DBI
(In Rs Millions)
Region State Amount
Sanctioned from 
July 1964 to June 
1988
Amount
Disbursed from 
July 1964 to June 
1988
Sum
disbursed
regionally
South Andhra Pradesh 26851 16602 60629
Karnataka 19740 15555
Tamil Nadu 28791 21738
Kerala 8266 6734
West Gujarat 35480 26294 66965
Maharashtra 39526 29403
Goa 3179 2403
Rajasthan 12044 8865
North Punjab 9535 6812 47375
Haryana 8221 6016
Uttar Pradesh 31427 22246
Himachal Pradesh 3648 2492
Madhya Pradesh 14647 9809
East West Bengal 15430 10095 24947
Bihar 7901 4565
Assam 2375 1963
Arunachal Pradesh 120 86
Manipur 212 141
Meghalaya 474 391
Mizoram 199 160
Nagaland 188 172
Orissa 9657 7102
Sikkim 147 129
Tripura 160 143
Union Territories 5825 4644
Source: Table 2.4, p33, ID BIAnnual Report 1987-88
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6.7 Consequences of Expansion of Capital
The process o f uneven development was embryonic in the contradictions o f the Nehru-
Mahalanobis strategy, not because regulatory strategies are fundamentally polarising as is 
sometimes argued by mainstream neoclassical economists like Forbes (2002) and Debroy and 
Bhandari (2005). The problems rather were the narrow ambit o f the state’s regulatory reach and 
the inability to sustain the regulatory mechanism because o f  the political power o f the 
expanding capitalist class. These problems heralded a brief period o f  despotic populism in the 
1970s combined with an increased centralisation o f state power during the Emergency regime. 
But this brief period was followed by a re-negotiation o f the extent and nature o f state 
intervention.
This account downplays the merits o f the argument that the decline in public expenditure 
meant, as discussed earlier, that in promoting growth, the state could not adequately fulfil its 
other Keynesian role o f expanding the domestic market. More significantly, the changes in the 
nature o f intervention by the state marked the birth o f a process that created entire sectors of 
accumulation in the economy that had very little to do with a planned industrial transformation, 
the hallmark o f the Nehruvian vision. The nationalisation o f banks created an economic 
paradigm that on the one hand extended into rural areas and led to a transformation o f the 
political landscape there. On the other hand, it facilitated a new pattern o f accumulation with a 
new nexus between trade and finance that was vital to the economic diversification of the 1980s.
The process o f diversification had several distinct features. The first phase of 
diversification began with the food crisis. The beneficiaries were often the ‘rich peasants’ and 
wholesale and retail traders whose accumulation was sustained by the state’s role as ‘risk 
absorber’ through support prices, and subsidised loans to build storage and transport facilities. 
This was partly the result o f the transformation of production for the beneficiaries o f the two 
phases o f  the ‘Green Revolution’ -  first in wheat in Punjab and Haryana and the second in rice 
in parts o f Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
This was accompanied by another trend, as public sector managers and technocrats, 
beneficiaries o f the highly subsidised post-independence higher education system became 
‘entrepreneurs’, linked to the early ‘NRT phenomenon o f a next generation equipped with US 
degrees to take over the mantle if  the ‘family business’ took o ff or the setting up o f new family 
businesses after a period o f employment in the corporate sector in the US and in India. Bank 
credit and social networks were key facilitators in this direction. The growth o f a new set o f 
capitalists in new sectors was greatly facilitated by a number o f further factors:
• Prosperity o f a set o f rich and middle farmers in certain parts o f North and later South 
India due to the ‘Green Revolution’ in wheat and rice.
• The growth o f retail and wholesale trade beneficiaries who gained a lot o f political 
leverage out o f the food crisis through the ‘support price system’.
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•  The emergence o f a new set o f ‘entrepreneurs’ starting with relatively modest means in 
medium scale industry through the gradual liberalisation o f import content and no 
longer bound to the public sector for basic and intermediate goods.
The 1980s saw state policy changing towards the promotion o f joint sector development and 
the selective opening up to FDI and diversification o f the economy through state promotion of 
the telecom, petrochemical and IT sectors with a move towards export promotion. As the small 
and medium scale industries grew in asset formation, the upper limits for investment that 
defined these sectors kept changing to keep them still within the network o f privileged 
patronage. Even in 1981, the FICCI president was arguing that ‘public sector versus private 
sector, domestic market versus export market, and small industry versus large industry are 
‘dead’ issues’ (FICCI 1981). According to the analysis put forward by FICCI, the distinctive 
lines between the private and the public sector were blurred and one merged into the other 
through the share holding patterns and market based linkages to bring about coordination and 
interdependence.
Development o f the private sector is greatly influenced by the growth o f the public 
sector. The export market can be better served if  industry has access to the domestic 
market. Small units develop faster when they are complementary to the growth o f large 
industry. (FICCI 1981: 8)
The expansion o f the capitalist class over two decades since the 1970s led to a change in its 
relationship with the state. The 1990s were characterised by a restructuring o f the relationship 
with metropolitan capital, asset stripping o f the state through policies o f ‘disinvestments’ 
(privatisation) and more recently the intensified of expansion o f the top rungs o f Indian capital 
into other countries. By then, almost all the demands o f various sections o f the capitalist class 
since the 1960s seem to have been met. However the complete deregulation o f labour laws and 
the depoliticisation of the trade union movement is the singular demand that still remains to be 
satisfied. The main contradiction is the employment neutrality o f the emerging accumulation 
strategy and the widening scope o f upward mobility only amongst the top two deciles o f the 
population that has resulted in this period o f  state-led accumulation. Thus neither ‘trickle down’ 
nor ‘pulling up’ has led to upward mobility through employment beyond the top twenty percent 
o f income groups.
But the most significant development was in the sphere o f technology provision, where the 
nature o f intellectual property rights was redefined through the promulgation o f the National 
Patents Act o f 1970, replacing the colonial Patents and Designs Act o f 1911. This requires a 
more specific elaboration and forms the basis o f the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ capital in 
the pharmaceutical sector, the subject o f our enquiry in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven
New Enclaves: ‘Old Oligopolies and New Entrants’ in the Pharmaceutical Sector
This chapter will further develop three interdependent arguments that have already been 
made: first, capital expansion after the third plan period was dependent on the entry o f ‘new’ 
capitalists into industry some o f whom had already been in business for many years in trading 
or other capacities. Thus diversification was into new and not necessarily related areas of 
business by old players. Second, the 1980s saw a change in the relationship between state and 
capital in the modalities o f transfers, incentives and protection but not a fundamental rupture. 
The redefinitions o f zones o f state control and command discussed in Chapter Six assisted the 
growth and diversification o f ‘new’ business houses. Third, these changes led to a further 
divergence o f interests between big business houses and the smaller ones. There was already a 
latent and developing conflict based on the deepening relationships o f dependency in the 
‘linkages’ that grew between the two during the period o f controlled development.
In Chapter Six, we argued that the expansion of the capitalist class in India benefited 
from changes in the zones o f intervention and non-intervention. Ironically, these changes were 
often driven by political pressures o f mass movements and trade union activity that did not 
appear to be in the interest o f the big bourgeoisie (Section 6,1 and 6.2); cleavages within the 
Congress with the desertion o f key leaders that led to the emergence o f oppositional politics o f 
the ‘right’ manifest in the emergence o f  the Jan Sangh as a leading political player from within 
the twists an turns o f the JP movement (Chandra 2003); and changes in the international 
environment. In other words, most o f these changes were not driven by any overt change in the 
political strategies o f  capital till the 1980s. However after the clear shift to neoliberalism, partly 
driven by pressures emanating from changes in the world economic structure and the 
contradictions of dirigiste populism in the 1970s, we do see some evidence o f a change in 
capitalist strategies towards short-termism and production according to conventional 
comparative advantage. This does amount to a reversal o f the strategy o f developing capabilities 
that had developed under the aegis o f state protection in the period from 1966 to 1980.
In this chapter, we present a study o f  the pharmaceutical sector in the Indian economy 
to explore the changing relationship between state and capital since the 1970s. Our findings 
establish that capital-state relations have changed in the zones o f intervention by the state in 
favour o f the political power o f capital rather than by the state becoming minimalist in the 
Hayekian sense in the period o f neoliberalism. Reverse engineering has been reversed into 
higher levels o f technology dependence and the growth o f joint ventures with technology 
leaders. The ‘trickle-down’ employment generation of the 1970s and 1980s has been reversed 
into a double-digit growth process contingent on job reduction, casualisation and rising prices in 
the pharmaceutical sector.
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Section 7.1 presents a summary of the changing processes o f state intervention and the 
effects on the pharmaceutical sector. Section 7.2 is a review o f the growth and development o f 
the pharmaceutical sector in the Indian economy. Section 7.3 analyses the changing priorities of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the period o f the shift to neoliberalism. Section 7.4 outlines the 
growth and accumulation patterns o f capital in the pharmaceutical sector. Section 7.5 discusses 
the limits on the scope o f state intervention in the period o f neoliberal growth. Section 7.6 
summarises the implications o f the changing relation between state and capital for the Indian 
economy.
7.1 State Intervention and the Pharmaceutical Sector
In the 1930s, cotton textiles, jute, sugar, cement, shipping, engineering, and tea formed 
the core o f capitalist enclaves in the economy (Bagchi 1972; Ray 1979). By the 1960s, the 
economic horizons had expanded through the import substituting incentives o f the 1956 
Industrial Policy, and big business families diversified into paper, cotton textiles, construction, 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals (Ghoshal, Piramal and Bartlett 2000). The 1970s and 1980s saw 
the rise o f ‘new’ business houses following on from the second round o f diversification into 
‘new’ sectors. In the 1990s further new sectors developed in information technology, 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, two wheelers, jeeps and tractors, biscuits, cement, and 
electronic media and entertainment (Ghoshal et al 2000).
It has been observed in the literature that the abolition o f the product patent regime in 
1972 saw a remarkable growth o f the pharmaceutical industry. India and Japan are the only two 
countries where Western MNCs do not dominate the market. India is actually a net exporter and 
self-sufficient in drugs with prices amongst the lowest in the world. Thus it has attained the 
distinction o f being a source o f good quality cheap drugs for the rest o f  the world (Chaudhuri
2004). This has to be seen in the context o f  the structure o f the healthcare market in India. The 
proportion o f public expenditure on health to GDP in India is only 0.9% while the average 
public spending o f  Less Developed Countries is 2.8% o f GDP. Only 17% o f all health 
expenditure in India is borne by the government, the rest being borne privately by the people, 
making it one o f the most privatised healthcare systems o f the world (Mukherjee 2004).
Many people die o f communicable diseases in India and the resurgence o f some diseases 
like Malaria, Dengue and Tuberculosis have also been observed in the recent past. However, the 
allocations in the Health Budget for combating major communicable diseases have gone down 
steadily since the mid 1980s and the decline was exacerbated during the period o f the BJP led 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) rule, spending on AIDS being the only exception. Among 
the major communicable diseases, allocation for the control o f Malaria as a proportion o f total 
expenditure on combating communicable diseases has gone down from 16.34% in 1998-99 to 
7.22% in 2003-04; in case of TB it has fallen from 7% to 4.37% in the same period. This has to 
be seen in the light o f the state’s change in health policy during the period o f liberalisation.
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While the government has been keen to advertise its pious intention o f creating various ‘centres 
o f excellence’ across the country that can be traced back to the text o f the ‘new economic 
policy’ o f Rajiv Gandhi’s prime-ministership (Government of India 1985), expenditure budgets 
show that capital expenditure in the health budgets o f the Central government actually declined 
from Rs. 45.09 crores in 1996-97 to Rs. 7.3 crores in 2001-02 (Mukherjee 2004).
In previous chapters we have seen that a significant expansion o f capitalist 
manufacturing sectors can be traced to the period between 1965 and 1980 -  a period otherwise 
recognised as one of acknowledged recession in Indian industry. This period has historical 
similarities with earlier periods o f shortage and inflation. Traders gain in periods o f  industrial 
recession. The business house structures meant that the trader-cum-industrialist just shifted the 
focus o f profit, while their control over the capital commanded by these business houses 
remained intact. A  second strand in our argument was to explore the implications o f changes in 
the relationship between the state and capitalist enterprises in the 1970s expressed in changes in 
the legal framework. The main changes have already been discussed, the passing of the 
Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1970 (MRTP) and the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act 1973 (FERA). The first led to the growth o f ‘new’ business houses sometimes 
displacing the old ones in terms o f assets and control over markets; the second restricted the 
nature of profit repatriation by MNCs and thus partially discriminated against them reversing 
the ‘level playing field’ o f the Nehru years to the advantage o f the indigenous big business 
houses o f India. Another important legal change that will be discussed in this chapter was the 
Indian Patent Act o f 1970 that was implemented in 1972 and which replaced the colonial 
Designs and Patent Act o f 1911. This changed the definitions o f intellectual property rights 
opening up the possibility o f a climb up the technology ladder for those businesses which were 
in a position to attempt it. The third and final strand o f our argument has been to explore the 
expansion o f  primary accumulation into the market for finance allowed by critical state non­
interventions in financial markets and the continuing provision o f the Hindu Undivided Family 
in personal laws that ensured assets remained concentrated.
In all these ways, the state that emerged in the 1980s as a ‘facilitator for capital’ 
combining both policies o f ISI and ‘new’ policies that legitimised a market-led growth process 
was a product o f the turmoil o f  the 1970s.The joint-venture structure from the early 1980s 
ended the learning phase based on state protection and moved towards conventional 
comparative advantage since the 1980s. This static view of comparative advantage derived from 
‘perfect market’ assumptions which emphasised development o f trade and production based on 
low opportunity costs derived its logic from neo-Ricardian models (for examples o f such 
analysis, see M arjit and Acharyya 2003; Batra and Khan 2005). The prospect o f abandonment 
o f the 1970 patent law under TRIPS by 2005 through changes in the Indian Patent Act in order 
to comply with the WTO compatible liberalised regime actually forced many Indian 
pharmaceutical companies to access new markets or old markets more aggressively by focusing
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on their bulk production technologies and putting new development o f patents on a back burner. 
From our account in this chapter, it can be argued that even for big Indian pharmaceutical 
companies, there have been scant moves to explore the options o f developing new formulations 
in the product patent era under TRIPS. Being unable to invest the kind o f funds needed for 
‘discovery research’ big pharmaceutical companies are finding in contract manufacturing an 
alternative means to maintaining high growth rates. In their own vision o f the future, they want 
to use their strength to grow bigger by transforming their relationship from one o f vendors to 
global producers to that o f strategic partners in the next millennium (Indian Drug Manufacturers 
Association 2005). Thus Indian companies have been competing for US FDA approval. India 
has the highest number o f US FDA approvals outside the USA followed by Italy. The 
restructuring o f  intellectual property rights as a result o f changes in the international patent 
regimes under TRIPS and the consequent amendments to the Indian Patent Act, led to a 
structural change in the nature o f technology access that was a reversal o f  the 1970s pattern. The 
spate o f mergers and acquisitions in the sector in the 1990s and beyond were geared towards 
overseas expansion o f top Indian companies and the consolidation o f Western multinational 
interests in India. This was a multi-pronged approach o f restructuring technology, production, 
finance, and labour deployment in production, sales and marketing structures.
The restructuring o f sources o f  finance can be traced back to the 1970s in the 
emergence o f the market in financial instruments as a supplement to developmental banking. 
This is another area where public investment was critical at the early stages and was then 
increasingly supplemented by the private sector. Institutional investment from both the public 
and the private sectors contributed to the growth o f the share-holding patterns o f private 
companies. Resource mobilisation was a highly political process where the distinction between 
public and private structures became blurred with the increased activity o f both sectors in the 
stock market. As early as 1973, the stock market emerged as an option for the private sector as 
is evident from the Ranbaxy case study discussed in this chapter and the Ambani case study 
presented in the previous chapter. Between 1973 and 1978, several upcoming big business 
houses benefited from this as we have demonstrated in the previous chapter.
A comparative study o f holding structures show that for all pharmaceutical companies 
that were listed on the stock market, the holding structures comprises o f family owned stocks, 
followed by stocks held under Hindu Undivided Family accounts except for the two big Muslim 
houses, and a number o f ‘group’ companies. There are also substantial holdings o f shares by 
public banks like the Industrial Development Bank o f India and other nationalised banks. In 
some cases, new IPOs were issued, but in most cases, it was periodic divestment o f institutional 
shares which contributed to the growth o f  the financial market. This is clear from SEBI Issues 
and Listing reports 1994, and various Underwriter and Debenture Reports, Registrar o f 
Companies, 1975-2003.
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We will argue that all o f these phenomena are connected very explicitly with the 
changing nature o f state intervention and goes beyond the simplistic dichotomy between state 
and market led processes. Our case study in this chapter will be the drugs and pharmaceutical 
sector, one o f the burgeoning sectors in the period of neoliberalism that emerged out o f the 
changes in the zones o f intervention and non-intervention in the 1970s. This chapter 
concentrates on the study o f the pharmaceutical sector as the initial rise o f  this sector can be 
traced to the period between 1965 and 1980 and the subsequent expansion from the 1980s 
coincides with the growth o f neoliberal policies. The sector reflects all o f the factors discussed 
earlier. The most notable development was the achievement o f ‘competitive’ advantage in bulk 
manufacturing at the expense o f  research and development supporting new formulations in the 
era o f neoliberalism, in spite o f the initial commitment o f the state to move up the technology 
ladder. The evidence on this is complex and we will put forward our argument in the form o f an 
analytical narrative.
7.2 Growth and Development of the Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Industry
According to the estimates o f the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association (IDMA) the
aggregate production o f bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals was valued at around Rs.320, 000 
millions in 2005 with 40% o f production geared towards exports (IDMA 2005: 2). From data 
available up to 1999-2000, the Indian pharmaceutical sector was made up o f  20, 053 registered 
units with a steady expansion in the last three decades. The size o f  India’s pharmaceutical 
market was $ 4.9 billion in 2003. This constitutes about 1% o f global pharmaceutical sales and 
about 10% o f the total generic market in the world. In value terms, India is the 14* largest 
market in the world. In volume terms, India’s share is around 8% and is the 4 ^  largest after the 
USA, Japan and China. India is among the top five bulk drugs manufacturers o f  the world. India 
has the largest number o f US FDA approved manufacturing facilities outside the USA. India 
exported drugs worth $ 3.2 billion in 2005 to more than 65 countries. This made India the 1 4 ^  
largest exporter o f drugs in the world (Chaudhuri 2005a).
From Table 7A, we can see that the first major expansion in the sector took place in the 
1970s with a doubling o f the number o f production units between 1969-70 and 1979-80. This 
was followed by a phenomenal trebling o f the number o f production units from 1979-80 to 
1989-90. That the growth rate o f these units from 1989-90 to 1999-2000 has declined 
remarkably in the decade o f experiments with neoliberalism is also clear from Table 7A. .
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Table 7A: Drugs and Pharmaceutical Production Units
Year Number o f Units
1969-70 2257
1979-80 5156
1989-90 16000
1999-2000 20053
Source: IDMA Bulletin, Various Issues
The pharmaceutical industry in India caters to a huge domestic market producing 70% 
o f the country's demand for bulk drugs, drug intermediates, pharmaceutical formulations, 
chemicals, tablets, capsules, orals and injectibles (IDMA Annual Publication, 2005: 3). 
Although the Indian market accounts for just 8 percent o f the world drug production volume and
1.5 percent by value, it is ranked fourth in the world in terms o f market capitalisation (IDMA
2005), Thus more than production or sales volume, it is the share values o f  the leading 
pharmaceutical houses that made the Indian pharmaceutical sector stand out in the neoliberal 
era.
O f the total o f 20053 units, 250 are large units, about 15000 small-scale units, the rest 
being medium scale, which form the core o f the pharmaceutical industry in India. Five are 
Central Public Sector units. These 20,053 units produce the complete range o f pharmaceutical 
formulations, namely, final products ready for consumption by patients and about 350 bulk 
drugs, i.e., chemicals having therapeutic value and used for the production o f pharmaceutical 
formulations. Nearly 20% o f manufacturing units are involved in manufacturing o f bulk drugs 
(IDMA 2005: 3).
The average growth o f the drug industry has been around 10% per annum during the 
last decade. The market for pharmaceuticals is highly oligopolistic. According to one estimate, 
the top 250 pharmaceutical companies control 70% o f the market with one market leader 
holding nearly 7% o f market share (IDMA 2005). Thus, industry concentration was sustained 
through the period o f neoliberalism although new business houses ousted older ones in the 
rankings. The domestic pharmaceuticals industry output was around Rs 260 billion in the 
financial year 2002, which accounted for 1.3% o f the global pharmaceutical sector. O f this, bulk 
drugs accounted for Rs 54 billion (21%) and formulations the remaining Rs 210 billion (79%) 
(IDMA Bulletin 2003). In the financial year 2001, imports were Rs 20 billion while exports 
were Rs 87 billion (IDMA Bulletin 2002). Small-scale units are mainly involved in the 
production of bulk drugs and thus form the production base o f the industry. These are also a 
major source o f one or two complete pharmaceutical formulations like paracetamol and 
niacinamide. Progressive liberalisation since the 1980s o f the products reserved for the small- 
scale sector has led to a significant depletion in its production base (Chaudhuri 2004). Eight 
bulk drugs and two complete formulations listed in Table 7B below are still reserved for the 
small-scale sector according to the notification issued by the regulatory body o f the state in
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2003. This was after the progressive liberalisation o f items reserved for the small-scale sector 
since the mid 1980s.
Table 7B List o f reserved Drug and Pharmaceutical Products for Small-scale Production, 2003
Product Code Description o f  Product
31060101 Para amino phenol -  Indl. Grade
310628 Pyrazolones
310650 Benzyl benzoate
310658 Niacinamide
313125 Paracetamol
31315801 Methyl parabens and sodium salt starting from para hydroxy benzoic 
acid.
31315901 Ethyl parabens and sodium salt starting from para hydroxy benzoic 
acid
31319501 Propyle paranens and sodium salt starting hydroxy benzoic acid
3131960 Calcium gluconate
310126 Aluminium hydroxide gel
Source: Notification No. S.0.655 (E) dated 5.6.2003, Government o f India
To trace the development o f the pharmaceutical sector in its present form, we need to 
jum p back a few decades to survey the developments since independence. At independence, 
twenty-eight multinationals accounted for a quarter o f total investment (Chaudhuri 2005a) and 
38% o f  sales (IDMA 2002). These corporations operated under the colonial Patent and Designs 
Act, 1911 and were engaged mainly in the import o f drugs from their country o f  origin. The 
Patents and Designs Act guaranteed recognition o f ‘product’ patents. It must be noted, that till 
the Indian Patent Act was introduced in 1970, intellectual property defined by patent-holdings 
on products were still based on the colonial Act o f 1911 and all intellectual property rights were 
defined by this Act. Thus the argument that reverse engineering was legally allowed through the 
use o f process patents as part o f the ISI policies o f the post-independence period is entirely 
false. In fact, product patents led to the domination o f Indian subsidiaries o f multinational 
pharmaceutical companies through the decades o f the Nehru-Mahalanobis period (Organisation 
o f Pharmaceutical Producers in India 1971).
During and after World War II, foreign companies like Squibb, Glaxo, and Pfizer 
continued their presence in India within the framework o f the Companies Act o f 1956 through 
holding companies and subsidiary undertakings. In the first decade after independence, 
government policies for the pharmaceutical sector further encouraged multinational companies 
to establish manufacturing bases in India. Multinationals were invited by the Congress
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government at the Centre to invest and assured them o f fair treatment. This happened as early as 
1949. This is recorded in the official collection o f Nehru’s speeches published by the 
Government o f India (1995). These companies quickly gained a dominant position in the Indian 
pharmaceutical market. In spite o f the parallel growth o f Indian pharmaceutical production, 
multinationals enjoyed a market share o f over 80% till the 1970s (FICCI 1990).
In 1901, a nationalist scientist, P.C. Ray, set up the Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceutical 
Works Limited (BCPL) in Calcutta. This was the first Indian pharmaceutical company and the 
first Indian venture that specialised in the manufacture o f quality chemicals, drugs, 
pharmaceuticals and home utility products, employing indigenous technology, skills and raw 
materials. According to details from the company records, lending support and contributing to 
its efforts were the pillars o f  anti-colonial and anti-imperialist nationalism - Gandhi, Nehru, 
Subhash Chandra Bose, Dr. Nilratan Sarkar, Dr. B C Ray, Dr. R G Kar and Rajsekhar Basu, the 
leading Bengali linguist and litterateur who was an employee in BCPL (Annual Reports, BCPL, 
Various Years). BCPL was taken over by the Central government after it became sick through 
running chronic losses and management failure over a significant period. The aim o f the state 
takeover was to turn around the situation and in the 1970s it became a public sector enterprise.
This example o f a scientist-entrepreneur driving the move towards building a progressive 
national bourgeoisie can be observed in the trajectories of Visveswaraiya, the Dewan o f Mysore 
and Hameid, the pioneer o f CIPLA, a top private sector pharmaceutical enterprise today. The 
growth and performance o f such enterprises were different from the merchant turned 
industrialist in other business houses. They were not dependent either on Hindu Undivided 
Family (HUF) status or on a large number o f holding companies that shaped the development of 
most business houses.
By the Second Plan period, some Indian pharmaceutical houses like East India 
Pharmaceuticals, Dey’s Medical, and Calcutta Chemicals (all based in Kolkata) and Alembic 
(Gujarat) were established through import substituting industrial policies using licenses, 
subsidies in land for setting up manufacturing industries and tax incentives. For example, 
Sarabhai in Gujarat started as distributors for Squibb but then received licenses for import 
substitution and soon became one o f the earliest production houses to establish its reach in the 
national market. However, throughout the 1960s, India's pharmaceutical market remained 
dominated by foreign drug makers. The domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing industry was 
limited in large part to dosage- preparation, packaging, and the distribution o f  existing 
formulations. In the Third Plan period, public sector investment in pharmaceuticals started. 
This state-led investment process led to several new enterprises foraying into pharmaceuticals 
all through the 1960s and 1970s.
The conflict o f interest between multinational companies and Indian companies was 
reflected in the formation o f separate manufacturers’ association. The Indian Drug 
Manufacturers Association was formally constituted in 1961 though there had been an informal
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network o f Indian enterprises in the pharmaceutical sector since 1945. The Organisation of 
Pharmaceutical Producers in India (OPPI), established in 1965, consisted mainly of 
multinational companies operating in India. OPPI had opposed the introduction o f process 
patents arguing that it would lead to ‘copying’ that amounted to ‘stealing5 intellectual property. 
The IDMA played a critical role in pushing politically for an Act legalising process patents and 
from its annual documents, it is clear that the Indian Patent Act o f 1970, which came into effect 
from 1972, was considered a major victory by IDMA members.
With the introduction o f the Indian Patents Act that replaced the colonial Patent and 
Design Act, 1911 and the Drug Price Control Order in 1970, Indian players discovered new 
avenues o f growth, and consequently, the share o f the multinationals declined. The Indian 
Patents Act, 1970, provided opportunity to Indian players by allowing reverse process 
engineering o f known molecules both under and o ff patent. Thus the Indian Patents Act (1PA) 
1970, was largely responsible for the change in structure o f the market. The IPA recognised 
“process patents55 as against “product patents”, which were prevalent in the metropolitan 
countries and in India through the colonial Patents and Design Act o f 1911. As a result, for the 
first time, Indian manufacturers could produce internationally patented drugs within the country. 
This was possible by developing an alternative process for the drug, after reverse engineering, 
using the relatively cheap and large manpower base of qualified pharmacists and scientists 
available in the country. Thus, the multinationals felt discouraged from introducing their latest 
products, on which they had patents internationally, in the Indian market even as the Indian 
companies increasingly took up the manufacturing of formulations (Chaudhuri 2005b).
The monumental change for pharmaceutical companies in the 1970s came with the 
Indian Patent Act o f 1970. It provided the incentive for Indian capitalists to enter into the Indian 
drug industry. According to estimates by the IDMA, the 1970 legislation spawned 20,000 new 
drug makers and 60,000 new brands in India. Anji Reddy, who founded Uniloid, which 
developed into Dr Reddy's in 1984, with $40,000 cash and a bank loan o f $120,000, sums this 
up.
We (Dr Reddy’s Laboratory) are products o f that (1970 law). But for 
that, we wouldn't be here. It was good for the people o f  India, and it was good 
for this company (Dutta2003: 105).
The Reddy family's 26 percent stake in Dr Reddy's Laboratories was valued at $400 
million in 2005 (Ibid),
That the regulations under the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) 
o f 1971 strengthened the growth o f medium scale factories through the decade o f the 1970s is 
argued in Chapter Six. Two other major interventions by the state were characteristic o f this 
period -  the first aimed at altering the structure o f property rights in technology by introducing a 
national legislation on patents and the second was geared towards a system o f price controls on 
drugs.
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Through the new patent law, the government gave most drug makers the license to 
reverse-engineer drugs developed in the advanced capitalist countries. These were then passed 
on as sub-licenses to various small and medium scale units specialising in bulk drugs. Very 
soon, the price o f drugs in India crashed, and with it the share o f foreign drug makers in the 
Indian market (Chaudhuri 2005b). In 1970, 75 percent o f the drug market in India was held by 
multinational corporations, in 1990 their share stood at 30 percent (IDMA 2005). According to 
the IDMA annual report for 2005, drugs sell at 3 to 15 percent o f  their Western prices in India. 
GlaxoSmithKline, the national market leader in India, estimates that the country accounts for 35 
percent to 40 percent o f the drug giant’s global sales by volume, but only 1 percent by value 
(IDMA 2005: 3-5). Cipla, whose revenues were estimated at $226 million in 2001 makes and 
sells more than 400 of the world’s top 500 branded drugs (IDMA 2005).
7.3 The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry
Public sector enterprises played a critical role in the early development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry. In 1954, the first public sector drug company Hindustan Antibiotic 
Ltd. (HAL) was established with technical assistance from the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and UNICEF (Lok Sabha 1954: 121). The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Limited 
(IDPL) was established in 1961 with technical assistance from the Soviet Union (IDPL Annual 
Report 1965). Three other public sector companies were acquired by the state after they became 
‘sick’ under private ownership. These were Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
(BCPL), Bengal Immunity (BI) and Smith Stanistreet Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (SSPL), all located 
in or around Calcutta. Drug prices in India were amongst the highest in the world at the time of 
independence (Chaudhuri 2004). All the five public sector drug companies mentioned above 
played an important role in the production o f essential drugs at affordable prices in the 1960s 
and 1970s,
Though public sector enterprises account for just 10% o f  output currently (FICCI 2005), 
historically they have been a training ground for technical staff and entrepreneurs who then 
entered the private sector. A random survey o f  1000 senior technical personnel between the 
ageses o f 40 to 60 in the pharmaceutical sector revealed that 71% had initially worked in either 
public sector companies or research laboratories under the Central government. Thus the public 
sector helped develop technological capability by extensive training o f  professionals, and 
building technology centres and companies. While public research institutions built up research 
and development capabilities, state enterprises accumulated production knowledge and 
experience. A World Bank sponsored study in 1997 argued that intellectual property laws of 
1970 gave a certain degree o f  protection for patents and trademarks which, along with price 
controls, encouraged Indian entrepreneurs and scientists to keep medicine costs down (Felker et 
al 1997).
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The biggest impetus to the industry from the public sector came in the field of research 
and development with the expansion o f 80 government laboratories dedicated to chemical and 
pharmaceutical research. According to a statement by the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research in 2002, even today, most pharmaceutical research originates in government-owned 
laboratories (CSIR 2005). According to an estimate by IDMA (2004), a chemist with a PhD 
could be hired in that year for a salary o f $15,000 a year against maybe $100,000 in the USA.. 
The immense skilled labour created through a highly subsidised higher education provided by 
the state could also harnessed for making drugs, where the cost o f development o f  drugs is 60 
percent below that o f average international costs (Chaudhuri 2005b).
The reversal o f the role o f the public sector in India in pharmaceuticals started from the 
late 1990s. Under the privatisation process, the role o f the public sector has been marginalised 
and all the units have become sick through underinvestment. Attempts have been made to either 
privatise or close them. Hindustan Antibiotic Ltd. (HAL)’s penicillin plant, the biggest in the 
country, has been handed over to the private sector. Its streptomycin plant has also been leased 
to a private company for manufacture o f other drugs. IDPL, which had the biggest 
pharmaceutical plant in Asia, closed from 1996 for want o f proper financial assistance from the 
government. The public sector drug companies used to supply raw materials to small-scale 
sector. Now, these small companies are facing difficulties in procuring raw materials. The fate 
o f Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (BCPL), Bengal Immunity (BI) and Smith 
Stanistreet Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (SSPL) is similar. The move from tragedy to farce lies in the 
history o f ‘sickness’ in the case o f these three units. They became public sector enterprises 
because the government took them over after the private owners made them sick. Now they are 
up for closure or privatisation as they have been rendered ‘sick’ again as state run enterprises.
The capability o f the Indian drug industry which was made possible by the Indian 
Patents Act o f 1970, has been under sustained attack ever since the World Trade Organisation's 
Trade-related Intellectual Property' Rights (TRIPS) agreement was reached in 1995 in 
Marrakesh, Morocco. India, along with many other countries, agreed to grant 20-year product 
patents on pharmaceutical products from January 1, 2005. The question that has often baffled 
economists is why Indian companies did not resist this except by making some reluctant noises. 
According to a survey by the editors o f Economic and Political Weekly, 1,500 listed firms in the 
pharmaceutical sector registered 59 per cent growth in operating profit in a single year in 2001 - 
2002. But the top line companies such as Ranbaxy, Dr Reddy, Wockhardt and Cipla contributed 
to much o f the growth. These companies were making substantial quick profits by capturing the 
generics market in the US. Just one compound, Fluoxetine, yielded more than 50 per cent o f Dr 
Reddy's operating profits in the US in a single year. These companies were also investing in 
research and development. But most often this was still directed at reverse engineering which 
would be of little use with the new product patent regime under the WTO (EPW, Editorial, 
October 19, 2002). In other words, the editors were pointing out the short-term aims o f the
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industry in the face o f the change in patent laws by arguing that ‘analysts point out that the 
Indian drug industry is not looking beyond its nose’.
Scale and Concentration of Industry
The pharmaceutical industry, though it started in Bengal is today concentrated in 
Gujarat and Maharashtra. The history o f the pharmaceutical industry in Gujarat dates back to 
1907 with the setting up o f a small pharmaceutical unit by the Alembic group at Vadodara 
(Baroda). Today the organised sector units like Sarabhai Chemicals, Cadilla Groups, Torrent 
Group, Synbiotics, Cynamide India, Hoechst, Abbott Lab (I) Ltd, Atul, Rallis and others have 
established large production facilities in or around Baroda. By 1962 there were 288 factories 
employing 27510 workers. Till the early 1960s Baroda was considered to be a cultural and 
educational centre. In 1962, Baroda witnessed a sudden spurt in industrial activity with the 
establishment o f  Gujarat Refinery. At that time, the dominant industrial groups were chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, cotton textiles and machine tools. Several factors have been cited in the 
literature, such as raw material availability, product demand, skillful mobilisation o f human, 
financial and material resources by the government and private entrepreneurs, as having 
contributed to Baroda becoming one o f India’s foremost industrial centres (Chaudhuri, 2005b; 
Felker et al, 1997)
At present, Gujarat accounts for about 3267 registered pharmaceutical industrial units 
involving capital investment o f Rs. 75 billion mainly in the small and medium scale sector but 
also including 50 multinational companies (Annual Survey o f Industries, 2005; FICCI, 2005). 
For example, Sri Krishna Keshav Laboratory was a small and relatively young unit in the sector. 
In 1970, this firm formed a joint venture with a US based Company, McGaw Private Limited. 
The new company was named McGaw Ravindra Laboratories India Ltd. This firm was involved 
in the production o f medical disposables and intravenous fluids, and led to the emergence of 
many entrepreneurs in the field, including the founder o f Core Parenterals, one o f the largest 
firms in the sector today.
While Gujarat is currently one o f the major hubs o f the pharmaceutical industry in 
India, it is pressured with the possibility o f losing out on the premier position to the industrially 
upcoming states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. With more than 7,000 licensed drug 
manufacturing units and close to 50 per cent o f the country's total pharmaceutical production, 
the state holds a prominent place in the country's pharmaceutical map. However, no 
considerable foreign direct investment has found its way to this state in the field of 
pharmaceuticals in the recent period of neoliberal growth. Though Gujarat is saturated with 
pharmaceutical and allied sector industries today, according to small-scale industrial owners, the 
growth perspective is very bleak as there is little opportunity for further investments either by 
local companies or from outside (CSIR 2005).
The other important concentration has been in Maharashtra for the past 46 years. Over 
50% o f manufactured drugs in India are currently produced in Maharashtra. The Maharashtra
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government’s industrial policy therefore plays a large role in determining national policy on the 
import and local manufacture o f  pharmaceuticals in India. With a collective strength o f around 
35,000 retailers, M aharashtra State Chemists and Druggists Association (MSCDA), is the fourth 
largest pharmacists’ organisation in India (MSCDA 2005).
In both states, quality norms and modern requirements due to competition have 
increased the financial burden on existing small units to even survive. However, the local 
industry seems to have felt the heat and has already begun to plead with the state government to 
come forward with some sort o f  encouraging measures. The Confederation o f  Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industries’ representing the small-scale industry assert that it is almost certain 
that at least 3500 units would have to close down in the near future, and that already about 1000 
units have downed their shutters in different parts o f the country (Deccan Chronicle, June 23 
2005). The only ray o f  hope is to wait for the sympathetic attitude o f state drug controllers in 
various states, thus constituting a renewed dependence on the state to provide assistance in the 
face o f the structural changes in the market under the new liberal regime. Lack o f adequate staff 
in various drug control administrations could delay the inspection process but a liberal attitude 
on the part o f the Drug Control Administration could help the units survive for some more time.
But small-scale pharmaceuticals are bearing the heat o f the changes in licensing policy 
since the 1990s and the new patent deals since 2000. The loan licensing policy has also had a 
significant impact on the small-scale sector. All manufacturing o f drugs in India requires a 
license. M anufacturing is defined by the Drug Control Authority as including any process or 
part o f a process for making, altering, ornamenting, finishing, packing, labelling, breaking up or 
otherwise treating or adopting any drug with a view to its sale or distribution. It does not include 
dispensing or packing at the retail sale level. A license is required for each such location at 
which drugs are to be manufactured, and also for each drug to be manufactured. The license has 
to be renewed periodically. It is also possible to obtain a license to manufacture a product in the 
factory premises owned by another party, a practice called “loan licensing.” About 30 per cent 
o f large-scalepharmaceutical production was accounted for by loan licensing arrangements in 
1992. This covered 8000 units which were entirely loan license manufacturers and accounted 
for 60 per cent o f installed capacity in the rest o f the small-scale sector (EPW Editorial January 
18, 1992). Big industry that had developed an antagonistic attitude to the small-scale sector 
became vocal on behalf o f the small-scale sector in changing the position o f the state from a 
position o f  abandonment to loan licensing operations with modifications in loan licensing 
arrangements. This came at the cost o f  narrowing the ambit o f price controls in the sector from 
143 to 63 drugs in 1992. Today only 20 or so drugs are in the ambit o f price regulation by the 
state.
Development o f Linkages in Pharmaceuticals
During the 1960s and 1970s the pharmaceutical industry mostly imported machines
from Europe for their processing and packaging needs. The chief suppliers were big
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multinationals like Aeromatic, Glatt, Fete, Manesty, Kilian, Hofliger & Karg, Hassia, Sparkler, 
Stunk and Zanasi. In the mid 1970s the country went through a severe shortage o f foreign 
exchange and as a result the Indian government introduced very high import duties and 
restrictive import licensing policies on machinery. This forced all the pharmaceutical companies 
to develop links with Indian engineering enterprises to manufacture machines locally. This was 
perhaps the only route for the pharmaceutical industry to enhance production and cater to the 
growing demands o f the domestic market.
This created a niche for small-scale engineering companies to provide machineries to 
the pharmaceutical industry. Hundreds o f  machinery manufacturers mushroomed to cater to the 
needs o f  thousands o f pharmaceutical companies over a period o f time. The Indian Pharma 
Machinery Manufacturers Association (IPMMA) was founded on December 23 2001 in New 
Delhi and was registered as a trade association to specifically represent the Indian 
pharmaceutical machinery manufacturers. The estimated business revenue from this sector 
which includes processing, packaging, utility equipments and other ancillary products is around 
Rs. 15000 millions out o f which Rs.2000 millions accounted for exports in 2005 (IPMMA 
2005). A survey o f 26 out o f 150 members shows that this sector is clustered around Mumbai, 
Thane, Ahmedabad and Hyderabad.
Packaging accounts for 5-6% o f the cost o f the final product. The pharmaceutical 
packaging industry is highly concentrated. The largest Indian pharmaceutical packaging 
company Bilcare is classified as medium scale industry with market worth estimated at Rs 1600 
million. Its production facilities are based in Pune, but in 2005 it set up another plant in 
Singapore. The total industry is estimated to be worth Rs 250, 000 million and growing at a rate 
o f 12-14 percent annually. Ess Dee Aluminium under the Datta Group o f Companies saw a 
meteoric rise since 1994 with a fifth o f the market share (IDMA 2005).
The last important linkage was through the expansion o f the chain o f sales and 
marketing intermediaries and this expands not just into all the states and union territories but 
also into Nepal and Bhutan in a private sector network of regional distributors, stockists and 
sub-stockists, wholesalers and retailers.
7.4 Patterns of Accumulation and Growth in the Pharmaceutical Sector
In 1964, the only Indian business group with a large pharmaceutical company in the top
list was Sarabhai. In 1990, Sarabhai was still among the top league, but it had slid down in 
market capitalisation. By 1994, 7 companies were in the list o f top rankers -Ranbaxy, 
Wockhardt, Cipla, Dr Reddy’s, Ajay Piramal, Sun Pharma and Torrent. We will establish 
through case studies that it was both the Patent Act and the politics o f MRTP that combined to 
create the space for these new capitalist expansions.
The development o f  Ranbaxy is similar to that o f Reliance recounted in Chapter Six. 
Ranbaxy was incorporated in 1961 and went public in 1973. For the twelve months ending 
December 31, 2005, the company's global sales were US $1178 Millions. Overseas markets
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accounted for 75% o f global sales. The company's largest market was the USA with sales o f US 
$ 328 Millions, accounting for 28% o f total sales in 2005, while Europe accounted for 17%. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China contributed 29% to global sales. Ranbaxy has also joined hands 
with GlaxoSmithKline Pic for a global alliance in the area o f drug discovery and development. 
Presently two research programs, one in the area o f anti-infectives and another in the asthma 
segment have been identified and are in progress (Annual Report 2004).
Ranbaxy was originally an Amritsar based company floated by two cousins— Ranjit 
Singh and Gurbax Singh— to distribute medicines supplied by A Shionogi, a Japanese 
pharmaceutical company manufacturing vitamins and anti-tuberculosis drugs. Ranbaxy's name 
was a fusion o f the two earlier promoters. It ran a small store in Delhi’s Cannaught Place area. 
When Ranbaxy defaulted on a loan owed to Bhai Mohan Singh, Bhai Mohan Singh bought up 
the company for Rs 2.5 lakh. He soon became a distributor for Pfizer, a leading multinational in 
India (Bhandari 2005). Thus the initial history o f the company was that o f a trader and stockist 
for a foreign multinational.
Under Bhai Mohan Singh, Ranbaxy initially maintained its course, preparing and 
packing existing branded pharmaceutical products for the Indian market. Like many Indian 
drug companies o f this period, Ranbaxy obtained a license and invested in an antibiotics plant in 
Okhla in 1960 as an equal joint venture partner with Lapetit Spa (Milan) o f Italy and began 
production in 1962. Within five years the joint venture collapsed over a dispute over technology 
transfer and Mohan Singh bought out Lapetit’s share. The company’s early rise was based on 
the launch o f Calmpose, a generic formulation o f the hugely popular Roche patent o f Valium. 
Released in 1969, Calmpose immediately placed Ranbaxy on India's pharmaceutical map. Thus 
process engineering was key to the company’s early rise. By this time, the eldest son Parvinder 
Singh had joined the family firm in 1967 after receiving a PhD from Michigan (Bhandari 2005). 
Ranbaxy Laboratories went public in 1973 at the height o f the early stock market boom, and the 
company acquired 25,000 shareholders. Thus raising capital through the stock market rather 
than established channels o f debt finance is also in keeping with the trajectories o f the 
development o f new capitalists traced in Chapter Six. The same year Ranbaxy set up a 
multipurpose chemical plant for the manufacture of several bulk drugs at Mohali in Haryana 
with technology supplied from Hungary (Annual Report, 1974).
The political alliances that Bhai Mohan Singh made in this period have been outlined 
vividly in popular accounts (Bhandhari 2005). Ranbaxy’s annual report o f the early 1970s 
would have Bhai Mohan Singh’s picture with Indira Gandhi on the front page (Annual Report 
1973). President V V Giri flew specially to Mohali in Punjab, to inaugurate Ranbaxy’s factory 
in the early-1970s, though the investment was only a paltry Rs 10 million. Based on interviews 
with three Ranbaxy employees in the 1970s, it is clear that those who served with Ranbaxy in 
the 1970s marvelled at Singh’s ability to get import licences for drugs. Quite strongly linked to 
the Congress, Bhai Mohan Singh, recipient o f two national awards, was everybody’s friend in
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political circles. He was one o f Indira Gandhi’s key supporters during the Emergency along 
with Dhirubhai Ambani. It is alleged that the 1975 Hathi Committee Report, which gave a huge 
boost to Indian pharmaceutical companies, was written in the drawing room of Bhai Mohan 
Singh.
In 1977, Ranbaxy made its first international foray in its joint venture in Lagos, Nigeria 
and then into M alaysia and Thailand. Ranbaxy expanded its production at home as well, 
opening a new state-of-the-art dosage plant in Dewas in 1983. In 1987, the company became 
India's leading antibiotic and antibacterial producer when it completed a new API plant in 
Toansa, in Punjab. The Toansa facility backed up Ranbaxy's plans to enter the U.S. market, and 
in 1988, the Toansa plant received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, one o f the 
earliest cases o f USFDA approval before the final outcome o f the Uruguay round. As part o f  its 
new strategy, Ranbaxy launched its own research and development centre in 1985.
The company also stepped up its marketing efforts, launching a new dedicated 
marketing subsidiary, Stancare, that year. By 1990, the company had a new product to sell, 
when Ranbaxy was granted a U.S. patent for its doxycycline antibiotic preparation. The 
following year, the company was granted a U.S. patent for its cephalosporin preparations, and 
the company built a new state-of-the-art facility for their production in Mohali. Thus the move 
towards securing an international footing through USFDA approvals came immediately after the 
major liberalisation o f the Indian economy under the Congress government in 1991. A major 
milestone for the company came in 1992, when it reached a marketing agreement with Eli Lilly 
& Co. The companies set up a joint venture in India to produce and market Lilly's branded 
pharmaceuticals for the domestic market. At the same time, Lilly agreed to begin marketing 
Ranbaxy's generic medications in the United States. In this way, Ranbaxy gained widescale 
access, backed by the giant Lilly, into the world's single largest drugs market (Annual Reports, 
Various Issues).
Parvinder Singh took over as head o f the company— ousting his father in a family feud 
in 1992 (Bhandari 2005). By then, Ranbaxy had grown into one o f India's largest 
pharmaceutical companies on the basis o f its generics production. Yet as pressure grew on India 
to begin enforcing international drug patents, the company itself appeared to have reached a 
crossroads—-to remain focused on copying generic molecules, or to begin developing new drugs 
in-house. The company chose the latter, after a struggle between the old and the new patriarch 
(Bhandari 2005) and in 1993 adopted a new corporate mission to announce its reformulated 
ambitions: ‘to become a research-based international company’ (Annual Report 1993).
Ranbaxy succeeded in its overseas expansion through a series o f jo in t ventures 
described as ‘piggybacking’ (Sengupta 2003). By the middle o f the current decade, nearly 80 
percent o f its sales came from outside India. As a first step, the company launched a new joint 
venture in China, backing its entry into that market with a production facility in Guangzhou. 
The following year, the company established subsidiaries in London and Raleigh in North
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Carolina. In 1995, the company stepped up its U.S. presence with the purchase of Ohm 
Laboratories Inc., which gave the company its first manufacturing plant in that market. Ranbaxy 
then launched construction o f  a new state-of-the-art manufacturing wing, which gained FDA 
approval. Thus the ‘research base’ was developed through a spate o f international joint ventures 
and outright acquisitions.
This new facility enabled Ranbaxy to step up its presence in the United States, and in 
1998 the company began marketing its generic products under its own brand name. In addition, 
the company filed an application to begin Phase I clinical testing o f its first in-house developed 
New Chemical Entity (NCE). The following year, the company's Novel Drug Delivery System 
(NDDS) efforts paid off as well, when Bayer acquired the rights to market Ranbaxy's single 
daily-dosage ciprofloxacin formulation.
Ranbaxy's international expansion continued as well, with the launch o f  marketing 
operations in Brazil. As the largest pharmaceuticals market in Latin America, Brazil was the 
cornerstone o f the company's plans to expand throughout the region. Ranbaxy also expanded in 
Europe, with the agreement in 2000 to acquire Bayer’s Germany-based generics business, 
Basics. The company added production plants in Malaysia and Thailand. Meanwhile, a younger 
member o f the family diversified into a hospital network business named Fortis once again 
capitalising on the ‘healthcare reforms’ o f the mid-1990s that encouraged the development of 
expensive private state-of-the-art hospitals and clinics.
According to media reports in 2001, Ranbaxy stocks was at one time a favourite of 
Ketan Parekh, an infamous stock broker based in Mumbai who has been linked to several 
‘seams’ in the stock market. He first shot into prominence when he took the stock to the almost 
unthinkable level o f Rs 1300. Though reportedly, he is no longer active in the stock, newspaper 
reports suggested that a Ranbaxy subsidiary was used in the Global Trust Bank (GTB) scam in 
July 2004 in which Parekh was heavily implicated and probably suffered losses. Ranbaxy had a 
history of active involvement in the stock market- through stocks and through badla investment 
(SEBI 2005). Though the annual report for 1999, the alleged year o f investment in GTB shares 
does not show any GTB shares in writing, it could have been done in 2000 without public 
knowledge. According to a media report, “the company’s silence on the whole issue is 
intriguing” (The Hindu Businessline, July 26 2001). The development o f Ranbaxy encapsulates 
the growth o f trading house turned manufacturers with initial accumulation from money 
lending, contracting and real estate into an Indian multinational with global presence in less than 
40 years.
The history o f the Khorakiwalas o f Wockhardt goes back to 1897 when they started as 
Akbarallys, a small retail outfit that slowly developed into a Department Store, following the 
concept o f convenience shopping under one roof in Bombay, after the British owned 
Department Stores like Whiteway Laidlow, Evan Fraser, Hall & Anderson, and Army & Navy 
Stores closed down. F. T. Khorakiwala, chairman o f the Akbarally's chain o f department stores
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is a former sheriff o f Mumbai and the chancellor o f New Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI) 
University. In 1960, the Khorakiwala family acquired Monginis, a small Italian owned cake 
shop in the Fort Area o f Bombay. This bakery business expanded in the 1980s and 1990s 
tlu'ough franchisee networks into select urban areas in the country. The Khorakiwala family 
formed Worli Chemicals as a partnership in 1959. The company changed its name to Wockhardt 
Pharmaceuticals but continued its operations as a firm manufacturing pharmaceuticals in a 
factory located at Worli, Mumbai. Between 1973 and 1979, the Company set up a new 
manufacturing plant for pharmaceutical formulations at Chikalthana near Aurangabad in 
Maharashtra. Another Company Wockhardt Synchem Pvt. Ltd. was formed to manufacture bulk 
drugs at Ankleshwar in Gujarat. In 1983 Wockhardt Pvt. Ltd. and Wockhardt Hitech 
Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. were formed to manufacture nutrition foods at Kalal in Gujarat. 
Wockhardt Pvt. Ltd. and Wockhardt Hitech Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. were amalgamated with 
Wockhardt Synchen Pvt. Ltd. and the name was changed to Wockhardt Ltd. which converted 
into a public limited company. In 1989-90, the company set up an intravenous fluid 
manufacturing plant at Waluj with technical assistance from Pharmaplan GmbH o f Germany. 
Wockhardt diversified into medical services by setting up a day care facility in Calcutta. The 
Group's principal activity is to manufacture and trade in pharmaceutical products, biopesticides 
and agro products. The Group has seven manufacturing locations and a research and 
development centre (Annual Reports, Various Issues). Thus W orkhardt stalled under the 
import-substituting regime o f the 1950s, diversifying from its bakery and retail business into 
pharmaceutical manufacture and trade. It expanded manufacturing after the Indian Patent Act in 
the 1970s and took advantage o f the jo in t venture years o f the early 1980s to expand its
technology base. It also piggybacked on the ‘healthcare reforms’ to set up several day care
centres and clinics with state o f the art equipment that catered to the ‘health market’ for those 
who could afford it.
In 1935, Khwaja Abdul Hamied, a young scientist, set up the Chemical Industrial and 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories which acquired the acronym Cipla, at 289 Bellasis Road where a 
small bungalow with a few rooms was taken on lease for 20 years for Rs 350 a month. He gave 
the company all his patent and proprietary formulas for several drugs and medicines, without 
charging any royalty. On August 17, 1935, Cipla was registered as a public limited company 
with an authorised capital o f Rs 6 lakhs. Cipla was officially opened on September 22, 1937 
when the first products were ready for the market. The Sunday Standard wrote on September 
24, 1937:
The birth o f Cipla which was launched into the world by Dr K A
Hamied will be a red letter day in the annals o f Bombay Industries. The first
city in India can now boast o f a concern, which will supersede all existing firms 
in the magnitude o f its operations. India has lagged behind in the march of 
science but she is now awakening from her lethargy. The new company has 
mapped out an ambitious programme and with intelligent direction and skilful 
production bids fair to establish a great reputation in the East. (CIPLA Annual 
Report 1987)
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In 1942, Dr Hamied's blueprint for a technical industrial research institute was accepted 
by the government and led to the birth o f the Council o f Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR), which is today the apex public sector research body in the country. In 1944, Cipla 
bought premises at Bombay Central and decided to put up a ‘first class modern pharmaceutical 
works and laboratory’. It was also decided to acquire land and buildings at Vikhroli. With 
severe import restrictions hampering production, the company decided to commence 
manufacturing the basic chemicals required for pharmaceuticals. In 1946, Cipla's product for 
hypertension, Serpinoid, was exported to the American Roland Corporation with a total sales 
value o f Rs 800,000, a big amount in 1946. Five years later, the company entered into an 
agreement with a Swiss firm for manufacturing foromycene. Thus technology transfer before 
the Patent Act o f 1970 was dependent on such arrangements with foreign corporations. Dr 
Y usuf Hamied, the founder's son, returned with a doctorate in chemistry from Cambridge and 
joined Cipla as an officer in charge o f research and development in 1960. In 1961, the Vikhroli 
factory stalled manufacturing diosgenin. This heralded the manufacture o f several steroids and 
hormones derived from diosgenin. Thus CIPLA is one o f the earliest stories o f import- 
substitution, this time by a scientist entrepreneur and thus does not have a history o f primitive 
accumulation in trade and finance unlike our other case studies. But once again it could only 
expand its base in the 1970s after the intervention o f the Indian Patent Act. Since then, it has 
evolved into a global player through ‘discovery research’ and following its own path, avoiding 
the piggybacking on multinationals that has been the norm in the neoliberal era.
Most o f today’s top-league pharmaceutical houses can be traced to the development o f 
production facilities in the period between 1970 and 1990 through the provisions o f  the patent 
act, state assistance and capital raised from both nationalised banks and the market -  Glenmark 
(1977), Sun Pharma (1983), Dr Reddy’ s (1984), Elder Pharma (1988). Apart from the 
protection for ‘process patents’, loan sanctions from development banks to the ‘miscellaneous 
chemicals’ sector, the bulk o f which constituted disbursement to the pharmaceuticals sector 
increased phenomenally. The actual amount disbursed by just one bank, Industrial Development 
Bank o f India (IDBI) increased to Rs 2167 millions in 1987-88 (IDBI 1987-88: 32 Table 2.3). 
The aggregate amount disbursed to this sector from July 1964 to June 1988 amounted to Rs 
12781 millions (Ibid). From this we can see that state assistance through direct loans, the 
refinancing o f industrial loans and the discounting o f bills expanded all through the period from 
1965 to 1980 and beyond in the debt-driven growth scenario o f the 1980s.
Joint ventures became the common mode o f expansion. This came with state support for 
joint ventures that allowed an Indian pharmaceutical producer to piggyback on to an American 
generics company, either as a supplier or as a revenue-sharing partner. Cheminor, the part o f the 
Dr Reddy's group that specialises in selling generics to developed country markets formed a 
series o f alliances with American generics firms. Wockhardt entered a jo in t venture with New
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Jersey-based Sidmak Laboratories, which markets two o f its formulations; the two firms split 
the profits evenly. Ranbaxy went a step further and became a pioneer in buying companies in 
advanced markets. In 1995 they acquired Ohm Laboratories in New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
The next year it was an Irish firm, a German firm, a Chinese firm and so on. Ranbaxy's generic 
drugs pipeline is valued at a figure between $250 million and $300 million and focuses mainly 
on drug delivery systems such as one-a-day versions o f  major drugs. Ranbaxy recently scored a 
success by licensing to Bayer a once-daily version o f Bayer's leading drug, the anti-infective 
Ciprobay. Bayer proposed to sell the product in Germany and in the US under the deal.
At the same time liberalisation o f the MRTP Act through the new economic policy o f 
1985 under Rajiv Gandhi saw the first spate o f  acquisitions and mergers in the domestic market. 
Nicholas Piramal was the only significant group that made an entry through an outright 
acquisition. They acquired Nicholas Laboratories, a small formulations company in 1988 from 
Sara Lee.
Two kinds o f processes can be identified in our accounts: import substitution reliant on 
Western education and technology and based on ‘professional’ state aided development (CIPLA 
in the earlier period, BCPL, Dr Reddy’s in the initial period) and unrelated diversification based 
on American or British educated second generation technocrats entering the family owned 
structures o f business houses (Wockhardt, Nicholas Piramal and Ranbaxy) in the 1970s and 
1980s. These two processes contributed to the emergence o f ‘new’ capitalists in this sector.
Growth was spread over Baroda and Ahmedabad in Gujarat, New Delhi, Mumbai, 
Punjab, Haryana and Hyderabad. However, the industry still remains concentrated in 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. Along with an indigenous history o f industrial development that dated 
back to the late colonial period, the general state induced investment pattern elucidated in Table 
6A (see previous chapter) was directly correlated with the regional concentration o f industry in 
these two states. They were the biggest beneficiaries of financial assistance along with an 
indigenous history o f industrial development that dated back to the colonial period. This was 
directly related to the amount of financial assistance given to the states by state owned finance 
companies and development banks. Within associations of bulk drug producers in Gujarat, there 
is a feeling o f  losing out to Maharashtra in terms o f investment, output and formulations during 
the neoliberal period when states started competing against each other to bring in investment in 
the absence o f  a directed licensing and planned investment policy.
7.5 Scope and Limits of Current Arenas of Intervention
In absolute opposition to the neoliberal compartmentalisation o f the state and the 
market, the functionaries o f the two zones have come even closer in the years o f neoliberal 
deregulation with acquisitions from the public sector facilitated by state functionaries. With 
liberalisation relaxing licensing rules, Indian companies have found it easier to seek 
manufacturing partnerships. But, once again, only companies that have modern manufacturing
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facilities, with sizeable capacities and financial muscle have been successful in roping in 
international clients. Battles on patents are intrinsically tied to extent o f political influence over 
the state and are not tame legal battles. The ineffectiveness o f the drug control authority is 
symptomatic o f the even greater power o f capitalists to make any effort at control utterly futile. 
Meanwhile this process is highly contingent on incentive structures and indirect subsidies in the 
form o f tax-cuts by the state evident in the Annual Budget (2001-2002). The 2001-2002 budget 
o f the BJP led NDA government provided weighted deduction o f 150% o f  the expenditure on 
in-house research and development in certain areas. This has been extended to biotechnology as 
well for clinical trials, filing patents and obtaining regulatory approvals and reformulated 
transfer-pricing norms.
Sucheta Dalai, a business columnist points out that among the many things that India 
was rushing to offer unasked to the United States after September 11, 2001, was External 
Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh’s generous offer o f $1 million worth o f Ciprofloxacin— the 
antidote to anthrax, sourced from Ranbaxy. This was a deal that was aimed at opening up the 
large US market to at least three Indian companies (Indian Express, 22nd October 2001). Thus 
the attempts at lobbying the US government for greater access to markets have been the key to 
the expansion o f drug companies into the US market.
The link between state functionaries and key actors in the pharmaceutical sector was 
raised in the Indian parliament in 2006. In the liberalised system o f licensing, licenses have 
become freely transferable unless challenged by competing agencies for patents. Consider the 
recent battle between the Indian drug company Cipla and the multinational drug company, 
Roche. The patent o f Tameflu, supposed to be the only drug for the treatment o f bird flu was 
the cause o f the legal dispute. The campaign material from one Hetero drugs, an Indian 
company, which had acquired the sub-licence from Roche, a foreign multinational, was quoted 
in Parliament in March 2006. The Times o f India reported in December 2005 that the company 
had already invested about 17 million dollars to produce the drug in India. The report claimed 
that the UPA led Indian government by the middle o f January would acquire about one million 
such capsules and Hetero would be supplying these drugs. Some Left MPs demanded a 
thorough investigation as to what was the linkage between the Government o f India acquiring 
this one million capsules o f Tameflu at the price o f 12 million dollars and the so called outbreak 
o f bird flu in India in January which created a sustained spell o f rumour and fear that lasted for 
months (Rajya Sabha, March 14 2006).
According to Tehelka, a media organisation, the value o f  Roche’s deal with Hetero 
Drugs was worth Rs 100 crore and the company expected a profit o f at least 10 percent. Hetero 
was set to export the bird-flu drug Oseltamivir to countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh. 
Hetero, the Rs 720-crore pharmaceutical group company based in Hyderabad, is a relatively 
young company started in 1993. It has a good reputation in bulk drugs but is unknown in 
formulation drugs. Roche’s awarding license to the relatively unknown, Hetero, was not a
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surprise as the Swiss giant did not want to give any boost to its competitors —  Cipla and 
Ranbaxy. C ipla’s calculations were that if  the situation got serious, the government would 
anyway give it a compulsory license, for which it would part with a “reasonable royalty”. Roche 
expects 1.1 billion to 1.2 billion Swiss francs ($921 million) in sales o f the drug to governments 
this year, excluding its sales as a treatment for influenza. The company is working to ramp up 
its sales by 100 million treatments to a total o f 400 million treatments this year.
“The government began stockpiling the drug from January 15, while bird flu visited 
later. The government has spent $18 million (almost Rs 80 crore) on the purchase, not a small 
sum as claimed by certain quarters,” said Basu, a Left Member o f  Parliament in the Upper 
House in a statement to the media. He added that the drug was being purchased from 
multinationals while there was a law after the third amendment to the Patents Act that in case o f 
an epidemic, the government can give compulsory license to a company to produce essential 
drugs, even patented ones. The controversy exposed the nature o f disputes and alleged 
corruption involving private and public functionaries in the new economic regime (Khare 2006).
There are other emerging patent disputes as well. Recently, Smith Kline Beecham has filed 
for exclusive marketing rights (EMR) for Rosiglitazone, an anti-diabetic drug, which it markets 
all over the world. However, three other Indian companies also manufacture and market the 
drug. Torrent, Dr Reddy's and Sun Pharmaceuticals have also filed for EMR, highlighting the 
need to streamline the policies o f the Indian patents office (EPW Editorial, December 9, 2000).
This is reflected in the feeble efforts o f the state in the area o f establishing an 
empowered authority' enforcing drug control procedures. The recommendation for setting up a 
National Drug Authority' in the report o f 1975 was reiterated in the drug policies o f 1986 and
1994 but was not implemented till 1997. The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority 
(NPPA) was set up as an attached office o f  the Department o f Chemicals and Petrochemicals on 
29th August 1997 after an upheaval in Parliament over the question o f  likely spurts in the price 
o f medicines in the domestic market. It has a mandate for setting ceilings on the sale price o f 
bulk drugs and formulations covered in the First schedule. Only 74 out o f 500 commonly used 
bulk drugs were kept under statutory price control. The Drug Price Control Order (DPCO),
1995 was an order issued by the Government o f India under Section 3 o f the Essential 
Commodities Act, 1955 to regulate the prices o f drugs. The Order provided the list o f price- 
controlled drugs, procedures for fixing o f drug prices, methods o f  implementing prices fixed by 
the Government and penalties for contravention among other things. For the purpose of 
implementing the provisions o f  the DPCO, state powers have been vested in the NPPA.
Drugs have been declared an essential and accordingly put under the Essential 
Commodities Act. All formulations containing the bulk drugs under the First schedule either in 
a single or combination form fall under the price control category. However, the prices o f other 
drugs can be regulated in the public interest. The effect o f the shake-up that occurred in the drug 
regulatory authority in the 1990s was only tentatively felt in 2000 when the NPPA cut the prices
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of 12 widely sold formulations and brought eight bulk drugs under price control, affecting a 
number o f  companies. Earlier in April 1999, the NPPA hiked the prices o f 20 drug 
formulations, including Dettol liquid antiseptic, Novalgin tablet and insulin injections. The 
NPPA also reduced the prices o f three formulation packs, including Zevit by 50 per cent and 
Becosule by 31 per cent, according to an official release. With the price fixation of four 
formulation packs for the first time, the authority had revised the prices o f  33 medicines. It also 
sought to recover from several large companies the excess they have charged over the 
prescribed price as per the DPCO but this did not proceed very far.
From Table 7C, we find that the number o f drugs under price control came down 
steadily over the years and stood at 73 in 2003. The Drug Policy announced by the NDA 
government in 2002 recommended that the number o f drugs under price control be further 
reduced to 25.
Table 7C Number o f Drugs under Price Control
1970 1979 1987 1995 2003 Proposed in the Drug 
Policy, 2002
All drugs 347 163 76 73 25
Source: Mukherjee 2004
As a result o f the policies o f decontrol, the prices o f  drugs have increased several times, 
many drugs being sold at 200 to 500 % profit margins, with only 20% o f  the population being 
able to access all the essential drugs they require (National Coordination Committee for Jana 
Swasthya Sabha 2004). The prices o f commonly used antibiotics, anti-diabetics and analgesics 
have increased substantially. Out o f the 253 formulations sold by the 73 top selling brands in 
2000, 169 accounting for 67% o f the sample show a price rise, with only 49 amounting to 19% 
show price declines and 35, accounting for 14%, show unchanged prices (Rane 2003),
The other expected, but nevertheless revealing, observation was the share o f contingent 
liabilities disputed by the companies that were studied. A contingental liability may or maynot 
be liability to the company. It is mandatory to show the liability in the balance sheet. For 
example, a document for equity shareholders for Alembic revealed that up to June 30, 2003, Rs 
193.65 millions were listed as contingent liabilities. From some basic calculations, we find that 
this accounts for 18% o f its profits before tax and 30% o f its profits after tax for the last three 
periods (Alembic 2003). This is based on a calculation o f Alembic’s average profits before tax 
for the last three years at Rs. 1054.9 millions and Profits after Tax o f Rs. 652.85 millions. The 
structure o f pending liability shown in Table 7D establishes the disproportionately high share of 
income tax and sales and excise tax. The data on liabilities to employees in terms o f wage 
revision is not even estimated in these accounts.
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Table 7D: Contingent Liabilities o f Alembic Pharma
Liability Details
Rs
Millions
Excise Duty 40.354
Sales Tax Liability 22.155
Income Tax Liabilities 104.334
Bills Discounted by Banks 4.536
Water Charges 4.138
Department o f Chemicals and Petrochemicals, 
GOI 3.493
Guarantee and Counter Guarantee on behalf of 
Associates 14.646
Non-payment o f Gas bills to ONGC **
Wage Revision and other Employees Demands ***
Total 193.656
Source: Issue Document for Alembic Limited for Primary Equity issue, December 2003 
** This dates back to the period 1982-1987, where for five years the Company did not pay its 
gas bills to the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation.
*** The company claimed that this was impossible to ascertain.
A similar review o f the documents o f ten other major pharmaceutical companies 
revealed similar patterns o f contingent liabilities in taxation. One must bear in mind that the 
Indian state has been ‘rationalising’ its tax structures with drastic cuts in corporate income tax 
rates since 1991 in consultation with the top representative associations o f the Indian corporate 
sector like FICCI and ASSOCHAM. Thus the primary accumulation aspect o f tax evasion 
continues unabated in spite o f the reforms and more importantly helped by the deregulation and 
dismantling o f powers o f tax authorities o f the state.
Thus mergers and acquisitions, some degree o f subversion o f patent laws and a scramble
for captive markets by big pharmaceuticals are a product o f  the receding ambit o f state
jurisdiction in the economy. This rampant ‘marketism’ through non-intervention is propped up 
by state structures o f  incentives in the form o f incentives such as tax subsidies and concessions. 
Thus the new role o f the state has allowed a regime of expansion that is hinged on even greater 
non-transparency in the field o f formulation drugs, while bulk drug manufacturing, the life-
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blood o f the huge small-scale sector, is fighting for survival in the two most industrially 
‘developed’ states of Gujarat and Maharashtra.
Top Indian pharmaceuticals have been expanding their operations in Brazil under the 
auspices o f Mercosur through either direct investment or joint ventures (Sengupta 2003). For 
example, Ranbaxy, the top ranking Indian pharmaceutical giant, launched a joint venture in 
pharmaceuticals in Sao Paulo in 1999 with the registration o f 50 formulations. Another big 
company Core Healthcare has developed a subsidiary that markets their products in Sao Paulo. 
Strides Arolabs, a less well-known company has formed a joint venture in Rio de Janeiro and a 
factory for manufactured finished products in the State o f Espirito Santo (Sengupta 2003).
Other overseas expansions through joint ventures and acquisitions have been recorded 
in the earlier section. Such ventures have problematic effects on the Indian economy. With the 
manufacturing base o f  small-scale industries in pharmaceuticals shrinking and drug prices 
hitting the roof, this pattern o f expansion o f larger firms reduces the possible effects o f 
intervention and purposive action for Indian national development even if  state functionaries 
were willing to take such action. In any case, the class basis o f  the state defined by its ties to big 
capitalists and their powerful organisations is such that this will is hard to trace since the 1980s.
Restructuring o f Labour Deployment and Organisation
The rapid growth o f the Indian pharmaceutical industry in its new phase hides behind it 
a number o f  dire consequences for the people working in that industry and for the wider 
employment prospects in the Indian economy. Between 1957 and 1966, the daily employment 
in factories making drugs and pharmaceuticals went up from 222,000 to 474,000 (Indian Labour 
Statistics, Various Issues). According to the Federation o f  Medical Representatives Association 
o f India (FMRAI), in 2003, the pharmaceutical industry employed close to 3 million workers 
and more than two thirds were employed in highly skilled areas such as research, quality 
assurance, pharmacy & chemistry, engineering, business and technical management (FMRAI 
2004).
The starkest contradiction within the ‘growing’ pharmaceutical sector has been the 
retrogression in employment with massive retrenchments all through the 1990s. At the same 
time there has been a growing trend to informalize key sections o f the workforce to increase 
their workloads and to lower wages. The dimensions o f  the retrenchments go far beyond the 
‘jobless growth’ attributed to Indian manufacturing in the 1990s (Bhalotra 1998). What has 
followed in this sector can be better characterised as job-reducing manufacturing growth. 
Boehringer Mannheim, and Park Davis who were the lone producers o f Chloramphenicol in 
India stopped their production as its prices in the international market became cheaper than the 
cost o f production in India. Sarabhai Chemicals closed their Vitamin C plant for a similar 
reason. In the attempts to shift to contract manufacturing and sales, Hindustan Ciba Geigy, 
Roche, Abbot, Boehringer Mannheim, Boots, Park Davis, Unichem and others have closed their 
factories, offered a voluntary retirement scheme to workers and sold the factory sites at a
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premium price. Apart from these closures, Pfizer, Rhone Poulenc, Hoechst, Glaxo have reduced 
their work force through Voluntary Retirement Schemes. These companies are manufacturing 
their products with the help o f loan licences. Some o f these companies have opened new smaller 
factories in new places and appointed workers with lower wages and a greater workload. More 
casual workers are being appointed. In the last two years in the Mumbai Thane region of 
Maharashtra around 30,000 workers have lost their jobs in the pharmaceutical industry. Table 
7E below provides an estimate o f retrenchments in some pharmaceutical factories from the 
1990s.
Table 7E: Estimates o f Retrenchment o f Factory Workers
Company Year Reduction of work force in Factor
Glaxo 1995 1564
Hoechst 1996 1049
Knoll Pharma (Boots) 1995 600
Smith Kline Beecham 1995 208
E. Merck 1995 194
Rhone Poulenc 1996 700
Hindusthan Ciba Geigy 1993 907
Duphar Interfran 1996 154
Bayer 1996 590
Abbott 1996 All workers (estimated to be 500)
Roche 1996 All 320 workers
Boehringer Mannheim 1997 All 335 workers
Park Davis 1997 All 650 workers
Pfizer 1995 215
Unichem 1997 All workers (estimated to be 300)
Source: FMRAI Records, Responses o f Office Bearers of Unions 
The total number o f  workers in the pharmaceutical factory sector is estimated to be 
2,000,000. Our estimates from the table above along with the figures for retrenchment in the 
small-scale sector amounts to 38,276. These are likely to be underestimates as all companies 
that were surveyed refused to divulge any figures and Unions had credible estimates for only a 
few factories.
Apart from factory workers, distribution workers are also gradually being replaced by a 
Cost & Freight (C&F) agency system. The early instance o f outsourcing o f labour can be traced 
to the domestic operations o f big pharmaceuticals. Most o f  the new entrants like Sun Pharma
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outsourced their labour force in sales and marketing networks to stockists and distributors who 
emerged as ‘cost and freight’ (C&F) agents, a phenomenon that was overwhelmingly evident in 
the 1980s in all middle and top ranking pharmaceutical companies. According to a FMRAI 
spokesperson, “companies are recruiting employees o f casual nature in the guise o f officers, 
contracting the work out, making sales a part o f the service conditions, imposing punitive 
actions, and also imposing unbearable workloads and a humiliating work system. Even after 55 
years o f  independence, the central government has failed to announce minimum wage for the 
sales promotion employees”. The workers are employed by agents who can raise their workload 
and lower wages. In the last decade around 15 thousand distribution workers have lost their jobs 
in the pharmaceutical industry (FMRAI 2004). Moreover, through the agency system the 
Government is deprived o f sales tax. Thus tax evasion and casualisation o f the work force are 
the twin motives that drive the C&F system.
According to FMRAI sources, in the marketing field, sales promotion employees are 
facing tremendous attacks in the name o f franchise, co-marketing, and appointment o f 
communicators . Many permanent sales promotion employees are losing their jobs. Many others 
are appointed under the designation o f ‘executives’ to remove them from the fold o f the union. 
And again, more casual and contractual workers are being recruited. In this context, in 1997, in 
the national working committee meeting held in New Delhi, the FMRAI gave a call for a 
‘Bombay march’ on November 29, 1997. It demanded from the Organisation o f Pharmaceutical 
Producers o f India an eight-point charter including job security in the light o f mergers, 
maintenance o f service conditions, recruitment to permanent categories, the rationalisation of 
the work system and the implementation o f the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of 
Service) Act.
The change in marketing and sales structure emerged as a progression from financial 
widening. CIPLA made a whole range o f employees in sales and promotion in distant and 
remote places redundant by establishing direct marketing through mailers with the opening up 
o f the mail and courier service sector to private operations. Thus opening up the postal service 
to the private sector had an impact on both employment in small towns and also led to increased 
centralisation o f  operations in the pharmaceutical services sector.
About 100,000 o f the 200,000 medical and sales representatives working in the sector 
participated in the one and a half month long relay strike from May 8 to June 25 2003 at the call 
o f the Federation o f Medical and Sales Representatives Associations o f India (FMRAI), in 
pursuance o f their 9 point demands charter. The strike began in Kerala on May 8 and concluded 
in West Bengal on June 25 covering Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Gujarat and Assam with 300 
city and town units o f the organisation taking part in it (Peoples Democracy, July 13 2003).
A review o f 100 contracts o f employment with C&Fs in Patna, Kolkata and Delhi 
revealed a norm o f one or two-year employment contracts with no statutory benefits like 
provident fund and employees state insurance. Net take home salaries ranged from Rs.1500 to
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Rs 5000 per month with an average o f Rs 2500/-. In the cases where statutory benefits were part 
o f contracts, 72% o f the 50 respondents interviewed complained about non-compliance by the 
employer. 40% o f the respondents specifically said that their employment was subject to a 
verbal agreement not to join the union. As the agreements between C&Fs and registered 
pharmaceutical companies operate on the borderline o f  the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sectors, a 
‘flexible’ framework o f labour relations had emerged in the pharmaceutical sector well before 
1991 and has been exacerbated in the last two decades in spite o f  existing labour laws.
The findings o f the survey fits in with the observations put forward by the FMRAI 
General Secretary, Amitava Guha “One o f the biggest achievements o f FMRAI has been the 
enactment o f  Sales Promotion Employees (SPE) Act, 1976 by the central government. 
However, the central government never took keen interest to see that all pharmaceutical 
companies are appointing their sales staff according to the provisions o f the Act. This has 
resulted in the drug companies appointing sales personnel on their own terms and conditions, 
which is a direct violation o f the Act. Today companies are recruiting medical representatives as 
officers and several o f them are given jobs only after signing agreements with the company to 
stay away from FMRAI. This has not only weakened the bargaining power o f the medical 
representative fraternity, but has also adversely affected the service conditions and job  security 
o f the medical representatives” .
7.6 Implications for the Indian Economy
The observations in this chapter have to be seen in the context o f the National Health 
Policy (NHP), which was announced by the NDA government in 2002. It amounted to an 
abandonment of the concept of “comprehensive and universal health care”, which India was 
committed to as a signatory to the Alma-Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care o f 1978. The 
NHP remains silent on drug prices and manufacturing with the Ministry o f Industries taking 
over the decisions about Drug Policy. Glossing over the issues concerning basic healthcare, the 
NHP instead argues for greater privatisation —  privatisation o f  existing public hospitals, 
creating new private hospitals and subcontracting public health to NGOs, and emphasising the 
creation o f health facilities to attract foreign exchange and promoting health tourism (Mukherjee 
2004).
One could argue that the pharmaceutical sector is a very specific arena o f the Indian 
economy. But in fact, very similar patterns based on import substitution in the 1970s, dependent 
on small and medium scale led growth resulting in highly concentrated market structures, can be 
traced in many sectors in the economy. Some o f these have been highlighted in the case studies 
in Chapter Six. Patent protection, access to bank finance, public sector led R&D and the 
creation o f a skilled workforce was common to the development o f  each o f these sectors. The 
supplementary route o f tapping into the stock market is also associated with most success 
stories in this period. Some o f these patterns have been discussed in earlier chapters. The
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structure o f both ‘old’ and ‘new’ corporate groups in terms o f holding patterns that provide 
‘control’ mechanisms both for the owners and flexibility o f labour organisations is also a 
common feature. At the same time, there has also been rampant non-compliance with tax and 
labour laws. These have repeatedly been the cause o f public debate and social concern without 
any effective change.
Our survey of the changing relations between state and capital in the phannaceutical 
sector, which, according to mainstream rhetoric was meant to break down this concentration 
affirms that the beneficiaries o f  state-capital relations have actually not changed in its tendency 
to lead to the concentration o f assets. We have shown in the third section the concentrated 
nature o f market structure in pharmaceuticals. Our findings establish that capital-state relations 
have changed in the zones o f intervention by the state in favour o f the political power o f capital 
rather than by the state becoming minimalist in the Hayekian sense in the period of 
neoliberalism. The ‘trickle-down’ employment generation o f the 1970s and 1980s has been 
reversed into a double-digit growth process contingent on job reduction, casualisation and rising 
prices in the pharmaceutical sector. Forms o f informalisation through loan licensing, contract 
manufacturing and casualisation o f labour have become central to the growth o f the sector. 
Reverse engineering has been reversed into higher levels o f technology dependence and the 
growth o f joint ventures with technology leaders. Indian phannaceutical companies have also 
globalised their production with effects on Indian employment growth and investment. Relative 
independence in technology has come at the cost o f a much greater reliance on international 
financial markets and contract business that in itself adds to not just volatility but also to the 
highly concentrated asset structures spanning an international market and based on casualised 
forms o f labour.
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Conclusion
This research has addressed the relationship between state and capital in India from the 
period o f the balance o f payment crisis and the IMF loan o f 1966 till the liberalisation o f the 
1980s. This is a critical period because it marked a gradual but distinct move towards 
neoliberalism in contrast to the earlier liberalisation episodes since independence. A survey of 
academic writing across disciplines established that most analyses ignored the importance o f the 
domestic political forces that had shaped the adoption o f neoliberalism as the dominant ideology 
in India in a context that was undoubtedly helped by the restructuring o f the global economy 
and the exhaustion o f the dirigiste experiment in India.
Three main arguments inform the thesis. First, while many critics o f neoliberalism have 
focused on the limitations o f neoclassical economics and methodological individualism, less 
attention has been given to the dialectical relationship between ideology and internal political 
forces. This research has explored some o f these relationships. In particular, the changing 
political relationships between capital, labour and the state can inform a better understanding of 
why neo-liberalism was adopted when it was. Second, in India, the expansion o f capital both 
during the ‘dirigiste’ and ‘neoliberal’ periods was dependent on the state; and in both periods 
key features o f  capital accumulation depended on changing ‘zones o f intervention’ and ‘non­
intervention’ o f the state. Third, the critical period between 1965-66 when contradictions within 
the ‘state-led capitalist path’ came to a head and the decisive turn towards a ‘neoliberal’ strategy 
in the 1980s was characterised by important continuities and changes in the ‘sites’ o f primary 
accumulation o f capital that reveal important internal drivers o f the move towards liberalisation.
We have argued that the expansion o f capital in the first three decades o f the post­
independence period not only led to a concentration of assets, but also put the top business 
houses in a position o f  political and economic power that enabled them to export capital and 
technology abroad from the 1960s. This growth of capital was directly a product o f the 
seemingly inward looking ISI policies o f the period. The preoccupation o f organised capital at 
this time was with ways to subjugate labour in the absence o f  effective strategies to enhance 
productivity growth. It was also at this time that cracks began to appeal- in the contract between 
state and capital that had been established at independence and this manifest itself in debates 
around the Companies Act and the jurisdiction o f the Industrial Disputes Act.
The central task o f our thesis is to examine the processes that were unleashed during the 
period o f stagnation in the 1970s that led to the break from the growth strategy funded by public 
expenditure. We argue that during this time new aspirants to the capitalist class began to see the 
abuses o f the licensing system by the clique o f ‘insider’ capitalists in the 1970s as a threat. 
These new business groups saw the regime o f  internal controls as an impediment to the 
development o f their own profitability and power. The rise o f these ‘new’ business groups was 
regionally differentiated, and this is consistent with observations o f growing regional
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differentiation within India in the subsequent growth period. With the rise o f new capitalists, 
there were also significant developments in the capital market, and an increase in ‘rentier’ 
finance, which sought to decontrol financial markets and ensure a delinking from production as 
it saw profit opportunities in capital markets.
Economic policy in response to these new economic and political forces led to increasing 
controls in some areas and deregulation in other areas. Later this was combined with populist 
policies. As a result, the role o f the state in this period is impossible to understand in terms of 
the false dichotomy between the public and private sectors suggested by neoclassical analysts o f 
this period. The changing nature o f state intervention is a more complex story that we can 
understand in terms o f changes in the social processes o f accumulation in the industrial and 
other sectors o f  the economy in response to changes in the structure o f  the economy, the social 
structures o f employment and labour organisation and the related changes in the strategies o f 
labour and different fractions o f capital.
For instance, our study o f the pharmaceutical sector showed that the shift from dirgisme 
to neoliberalism, capital-state relations changed in the zones o f intervention in response to the 
greater political power o f some sections o f capital rather than by the state becoming minimalist 
in the Hayekian sense. Reverse engineering strategies were reversed as higher profits were 
sought for a time through higher levels o f technology dependence on Western countries and the 
growth o f joint ventures with technology leaders. The growth strategies o f the 1970s and 1980s 
that offered some limited protection for labour were reversed with job reduction, casualisation 
and rising prices in the pharmaceutical sector, achieving for a while double digit growth rates.
In a continent-sized country, our research had to sacrifice a lot o f  detail.lt may be accused 
o f generalisation based on relatively limited evidence. For example, a more detailed review o f 
the agrarian question could not be undertaken except to outline the processes through which 
agrarian accumulation figured in the expansion o f the capitalist class especially since the 1970s. 
However, despite the broad subject o f the study, we attempted to be historically specific and 
identify the key elements that shaped the dialectical relationship between state and capital in a 
market-economy trying to develop on capitalist lines. We concentrate on the arument that the 
change from a low productivity low growth strategy towards a strategy achieving modest 
productivity growth led by high growth niches in the economy was driven by ‘new’ oligopolies 
that had emerged in the same way as earlier capitalists with new waves of traders turning to 
manufacturing. The thesis outlines the social processes through which these new capitalist 
emerged and the role o f the state in this process. We trace critical aspects o f the changes in the 
relationship between state and capital from the consolidated capitalist influence on policy in the 
early days o f the independent Indian state to the rise, growth and diversification o f  the capitalist 
class and the consequent changes in the state-capital relationship. In this exercise, we have tried 
to cover diverse forms o f evidence. Much has been written on the period under consideration 
and it is impossible to address the huge literature on post-independent economic development in
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India. We have had to be very selective in the use o f such secondary sources and have done so 
only when such writings are directly relevant either in supporting or challenging our arguments 
and evidence.
The growth o f  the capitalist sector in India has always to a large extent depended on 
specific relationships with the state. We saw this in the development o f capitalist enclaves in the 
late colonial period when the political power o f the tiny capitalist class was linked to the crisis 
o f the British empire in the inter-war years due to the competition faced by British capital from 
other rising imperial powers. However, big capitalists soon achieved much greater influence 
over the structure and parameters o f ‘development’ and capital accumulation in the state-to-be 
through their strong representation in the National Planning Committee in the years prior to 
independence. This change in the political power o f capitalists had to do with political 
developments within the mainstream o f the national liberation struggle, the marginalisation of 
the Left within the Congress between the Haripura to Tripuri sessions (1938 and 1939) and 
Congress taking office in the Provincial Governments in 1937.
After independence, the majority o f FICCI members representing ‘big’ Indian capitalists 
were in favour o f regulated capitalist development as had been agreed in the National Planning 
Committee report so long as the parameters o f the planned economy were defined in 
consultation with capitalists. Given the low development o f  private finance capital, the 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in India at Independence were dependent on state 
patronage and protection for their profits, sources o f finance, for the protection o f personal laws 
defining the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) as a legal entity to preserve the family-run 
business house structures, for access to technology and for disciplining labour.
From the Second Plan, state support was seen as very important by business even though 
the state’s supportive role was limited to assistance in terms o f trade protection, supply of 
capital goods and access to technology. All o f these were in turn dependent on the ‘goodwill’ o f 
Western nation-states whose priorities at that time included maintaining their geopolitical 
dominance and stability in a world threatened by ‘actually existing socialism’. The two decades 
after independence saw a rapid fall in the share o f agriculture and a rise in the share o f regulated 
manufacturing. This structural change was a reversal o f the colonial structure o f the economy 
both in terms o f growth and sectoral shares. The sources o f bank finance were not controlled by 
the state in this period and remained in the ‘private5 sphere o f the economy. The question of 
‘conditionalities on capital’ did not arise, as the ‘developmental state’ needed the capitalist class 
more than the capitalist class needed the state for the physical expansion o f capital due to the 
nature o f power that had accrued to the small but politically strategic capitalist class in the 
course o f the national liberation struggle. The dilemma lay elsewhere, the capitalist class was 
dependent on the state in the ‘disciplining o f  labour’ -  the other class that had developed 
legitimacy and power through the plurality o f trade union organisations since the 1920s.
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It was not so much the process of planning and ISI per se, but the capitalist class’s 
relationship with labour in an ideological climate that was hostile to capitalism that defined the 
contours o f  the capitalist class’s dependent relation with the state. For all other purposes the 
state was dependent on capitalists more than capitalists’ dependence on the state to make good 
the massive state led industrialisation undertaking after independence. Marjit and Acharyya 
(2003) in their neoliberal take have focused on the contrast between the formal and informal 
sectors in studies o f  labour, but not in studies o f capital. Our enquiry provides a perspective that 
highlights the importance o f subjugating organised labour and thus creating incentives for the 
‘informalisation’ o f  the economy both during ‘state-led capitalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’. In the 
period o f dirigisme, workers had a political voice as long as trade unions were willing to defend 
the interest o f workers and raise the level o f political struggle in spite o f the ruthless subjugation 
by the state from time to time. Neoliberalism brought with it the demand for scrapping o f 
‘labour laws’. This is a demand for rolling back the achievements o f  the post-independence 
trade union movement; not the scrapping o f archaic colonial laws as is often argued by - 
economists who see India’s existing labour laws to be a big barrier to labour market flexibility ( 
Das 2000; Debroy and Bhandari 2005).
The scope for legally pursuing reverse engineering was only possible after 1970 with 
the scrapping o f the Colonial Patent Act o f 1911 The power o f the landed rich ensured that 
agriculture saw no reforms; neither did the huge private industrial sector that consolidated and 
diversified under the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy with assurances o f  no state take-over in the 
foreseeable future and a ‘level playing field’ for foreign capital. The public sector was geared to 
provide the infrastructure needed for post-independence capitalist development. The private 
capitalist sector was never made accountable or responsible.
Thus uneven development was embedded in the contradictions o f the Nehru- 
Mahalanobis strategy, not because it was conceived as a regulatory strategy as is argued by 
Bhagwati (1993) and Krueger and Chinoy (2002). On the contrary, first, the narrow ambit o f  its 
regulatory reach and second, its inability to effectively implement its regulatory mechanisms 
because o f  the political power o f the expanding capitalist class were key to the limited 
sustainability o f dirigisme. One outcome was a brief period of despotic and dirigiste populism in 
the 1970s combined with an increased centralisation o f  state power through the Emergency 
regime. But this period also saw repeated negotiations o f the extent and nature o f state 
intervention.
In the period between 1965 and 1980, the state remained the concentrated repository of 
power in terms o f transfers to the capitalist class but also the repository o f the power to 
negotiate, control and limit the organised power o f industrial labour. By 1967, the one-party rule 
o f the Congress was breaking down under its own contradictions and challenges from other 
oppositional parties that combined motley ideologies along with a support base mired in the 
caste-class nexus that defined social relations in most parts o f India. Class based organised
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politics was concentrated in Left strong-holds based on the simultaneous organisation o f  small 
and middle peasants to acquire property rights over land and the organisation o f urban industrial 
labour in the pockets o f capitalist enclaves. The contradictions o f  planning, the accentuation of 
poverty, the failure o f  the Congress to accommodate the intermediate classes and factions in the 
development process or to break the hegemony o f the landlord and rich peasants within the 
Congress led to new alliances inside and outside Congress which kept realigning through the 
1970s. These remained unstable and made it impossible for any political coalition to provide the 
stable incentive structure vital for the primary accumulation o f  capital to be productive.
By 1974 there was the Nav Nirman uprising in Gujarat, which inspired the 1974 JP 
movement in Bihar directed against corruption, bureaucracy and the centralisation o f power. 
The urban petty-bourgeois uprising took a militant turn by March 1975 along with militant 
strikes by the working class that had reached a crescendo with the Railway strike in 1974. The 
state came down heavily on all forms o f dissent (Chandra 2003, Frankel 2005), but it was clear 
that in the ten years from 1964 it was on the plank o f ‘social justice’ that anti-Congress 
alignments bid for power at the level o f state governments. Apart from Communist-dominated 
regions where the political agenda revolved around militant struggles for land reform and trade 
unionisation o f the labour force, the polity became increasingly defined by regional agendas 
often linked to caste as in Bihar, or ethnolinguistic and ‘son o f the soil’ revivalism as in 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. But underlying it all was an intense dissatisfaction with the 
unevenness o f the growth process up to 1975.
The absence o f thoroughgoing land reforms, a result o f the bourgeoisie's compromise 
with landlordism, kept productive forces in agriculture arrested. The market for mass 
consumption goods remained restricted and grew slowly for this reason. Moreover, the ability of 
the state capitalist sector to keep expanding, and thereby to keep enlarging the market for the 
private capitalist sector, got progressively undermined: the low agricultural growth put a ceiling 
on the rate at which public investment could grow without squeezing the living standard o f  the 
masses to an extent intolerable in a democracy; in addition, the ruling classes enriched 
themselves from the public exchequer, a form o f ‘primitive accumulation o f capital’, which 
further curtailed the growth o f  public investment. The dirigiste strategy o f capitalist 
development, dependent on expanding public investment, entered a cul-de-sac and lost social 
support even as metropolitan capital— and, in particular, finance capital— stepped up its 
offensive against this strategy through the Bretton Woods institutions, and later the WTO, in a 
world where the crucial political support coming from socialist countries had disappeared.
Our account o f  Indian growth glosses over the merits o f the argument that the decline in 
public expenditure meant that in promoting the primary accumulation o f capital, the state could 
not adequately fulfil its other role o f  expanding the domestic market. We focus instead on what 
the state did in enabling new entrants to enter and drive growth. This included the reversal o f 
the ‘level playing field’ through national patent legislation, some restrictions on monopoly and
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the freeing o f some economic space for the stock market to enable new sources of capital 
accumulation and reduce the dependence on state finance. The nationalisation o f banks on the 
other hand extended accumulation into rural areas and led to a transformation o f the political 
landscape. This also facilitated a new pattern o f accumulation with a new nexus between trade 
and finance that was vital to the economic diversification o f  the 1980s as shown in Chapter 
Five. The interlocking o f  bank finance with industry was attempted through bank 
nationalisation. However the capital constraint meant that the way out was to tap into middle 
class savings through the stock market. This remained outside the ambit o f state regulation for a 
period long enough for business houses to capitalise on the opportunity.
The process o f diversification had quite distinct features. The first phase of 
diversification came after the food crisis o f the late 1960s. The beneficiaries were often the ‘rich 
peasants’ and wholesale and retail traders whose accumulation was sustained by the state’s role 
as ‘risk absorber’ through support prices, and subsidised loans to build storage and transport 
facilities. This was partly the result o f the transformation o f production for the beneficiaries of 
the two phases o f the ‘Green Revolution’ -  first in wheat in Punjab and Haryana and the second 
in rice in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
A second feature was the transformation o f some public sector managers and technocrats, 
beneficiaries o f the highly subsidised post-independence higher education system, into new 
‘entrepreneurs’. This was linked to the early ‘Non Resident Indian’ phenomenon o f sons and 
daughters o f the entrepreneurial class equipped with US degrees ready to take over the mantle if  
the ‘family business’ took off. Financial credit from state institutions, bank credit, political 
connections and social networks were key to expansion in this direction.
A final feature had to do with changing tastes in the ‘narrow’ domestic market. Import 
liberalisation in the 1980s had very little to do with a big ‘export’ drive. It was more in line with 
the changing structure o f social relations in India led by a distinct but related social 
phenomenon o f enrichment and accumulation. This change was driven by the prosperity of a set 
o f rich and middle farmers in certain parts o f North and later South India due to the ‘Green 
Revolution’ in wheat and rice, and the retail and wholesale trade beneficiaries who gained from 
the food crisis through the ‘support price system’. To prevent massive social upheavals in the 
1970s, the state stepped up public expenditures aimed at job creation and transfers to emerging 
rural political groups that had been empowered through the green revolution. This was 
accompanied by the entry o f a new set o f technocratic ‘entrepreneurs’ starting with relatively 
modest means in medium scale industry through the gradual liberalisation o f import content and 
no longer bound to the public sector for basic and intermediate goods.
Capital expansion after the third plan period was dependent on the entry o f ‘new’ 
capitalists some o f  whom were really old investors who had been in business for many years. 
Thus diversification was into new and not necessarily related areas o f business by old players. 
At the same time, developments in terms o f redefining the zones o f state control and command
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also led to the growth and diversification o f ‘new’ business houses. The 1980s saw a change in 
the relationship between state and capital in the modalities o f transfers, incentives and 
protection but not a fundamental rupture. These changes led to a further divergence o f interests 
between big business houses and the smaller ones after dependency relations in terms of 
‘linkages’ grew between the two in the period o f  controlled development.
The 1980s also saw state policy changing towards joint sector development between the 
public sector and the big private sector. With selective opening up to FDI and diversification of 
the economy through state promotion o f  telecom, petrochemical and IT sectors, there was a 
modest move towards export promotion but the inability to impose any measure o f discipline on 
the capitalist class led to an unprecedented rise in foreign borrowings. As the small and medium 
scale industries grew, definitions o f scale in terms o f asset size kept changing to keep most 
enterprises within the network of direct patronage. Even in 1981, the FICCI president was 
arguing that the public sector versus private sector, domestic market versus export market, and 
small industry versus large industry were ‘dead’ issues. According to the analysis put forward 
by FICCI, the distinctive lines between the private and the public sector were blurred and one 
merged into the other through the share holding patterns and market based linkages that sought 
to bring about coordination and interdependence.
According to the ideologues within the leading chambers o f commerce, the 
development o f the private sector was greatly influenced by the growth o f the public sector, the 
export market could be better served if  industry has access to the domestic market and small 
units would develop faster when they were complementary to the growth of large industry. By 
1975-76, a new pattern had set in. Unregulated manufacturing marked the rise o f new business 
houses assisted by MRTP, FERA and the Indian Patent Act. The nationalised banks played an 
important role in terms o f loan assistance but non-banking finance through deposit mobilisation 
and equity mobilisation by tapping into the savings o f small investors were characteristic o f this 
period.
However after the shift to neoliberalism, driven by changes in the world economic structure 
and the contradictions o f the dirigiste populism o f the 1970s, there was a reversal o f capitalist 
strategies towards short-term considerations o f quick profits and conventional comparative 
advantage.This was a significant reversal o f the capability-building approach developed under 
the aegis o f state protection in the period from 1966 to 1980.
The 1990s were characterised by a restructuring o f the relationship with metropolitan 
capital, asset stripping o f  the state through policies of privatisation often termed ‘disinvestment’ 
and more recently the intensification o f expansion of the top rungs o f  Indian capital to other 
countries. Roughly all the demands o f various sections o f the capitalist class since the 1960s 
seem to have been realized under neoliberal economic policies that emanated from the imperial 
centres o f capital and that were apparently meticulously adopted by capitalists in India who 
were in a position to gain from the new regime. However the complete deregulation of labour
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laws and the depoliticisation o f  the trade union movement are the important demands that still 
remain to be satisfied. The main contradiction o f the present neoliberal expansion is the limited 
employment generated by the new accumulation strategy and the widening upward mobility of 
the top two deciles o f the population. Thus neither ‘trickle down’ nor ‘pulling up’ has led to 
upward mobility through employment beyond the top twenty percent o f income groups.
Our review o f the pharmaceutical sector shows that a significant development in the sphere 
o f technology acquisition was achieved by redefining the nature o f intellectual property' rights 
through the promulgation o f the Indian Patents Act o f 1970. State patronage combined with the 
national patent laws formed the basis for an accelerated expansion o f ‘old’ firms and the entry 
o f ‘new’ capital into the pharmaceutical sector through the 1970s. More recently, patent laws 
were changed once again in keeping with the commitment to Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) leading to the withdrawal o f process patents and the establishment o f a 
twenty-year lifeline for product patents. In this latest phase o f liberalisation, the capitalist 
expansion o f  the pharmaceutical sector has been driven by short-term considerations o f profits 
and the exploitation o f conventional comparative advantage. While this has allowed the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector to sustain high levels o f growth, there are important implications here for 
further capability development.
One could argue that the pharmaceutical sector is a very specific part o f the Indian 
economy. But in fact, very similar patterns can be seen in many growth sectors o f  the Indian 
economy. Growth was often based on import substitution in the 1970s that led to growth driven 
by small and medium sectors. The subsequent strategy o f  tapping into the stock market is also 
associated with many other successful sectors in the liberalisation period. Some o f these 
patterns have been discussed in earlier chapters. The continuity in the structure o f both ‘old’ and 
‘new’ corporate groups in terms o f holding patterns that provide ‘control’ mechanisms over 
labour and finance is also a common feature. The changes brought about by liberalisation had 
critical impacts on the access o f different sections o f the capitalist class to technology and 
finance, and resulted in radical changes in the attitude of Indian capitalists towards ‘integration’ 
into the ‘new’ imperial order. They also accelerated the informalisation o f capital-labour 
relations with an intensification o f attacks on both organised and unorganised labour.
In the 1960s it was argued that the pattern o f government expenditure and private 
spending, and the structure and design o f the accumulation strategy, were elite designed and 
elite benefiting. This could be deduced from the consumption patterns o f the Indian middle 
class, in the items o f government current expenditure and in the continued feebleness o f the tax 
effort. Our survey o f  the changing relations between state and capital in the pharmaceutical 
sector after liberalisation, which according to mainstream rhetoric was meant to break down 
elite concentration, affirms that the beneficiaries o f state-capital relations have actually not 
changed if  assessed by the concentration o f assets. Chapter Seven demonstrates the 
concentration in the market structure in pharmaceuticals. The achievement o f  a new spurt o f
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growth also came at the cost o f total reliance on international financial markets and contract 
business that adds to volatility and relies on casualised forms o f labour deployment.
It is remarkable that these developments happened with very little public debate. The 
initial developments began during the Emergency regime where the political atmosphere was 
one o f  suppression o f opposition. That many o f the key actors were close to the leading political 
functionaries responsible for the Emergency facilitated the reform process. The cover provided 
by the global shift towards liberalism in the subsequent period also paved the way for the 
ideological transition.
However, in the decades o f neoliberalism, the increasing power o f capital to negate or 
subvert any attempts o f control has become a moot point as state power has become so 
entangled with big capitalist interests that even feeble attempts at establishing discipline or 
control over the accumulation process have been abdicated. In the ensuing melee o f the ‘free 
market for the powerful’, the mainstream media and US returned Fund-Bank economists from 
India have pledged their faith in the market and dismissed the usefulness o f any debate. The link 
with globalisation came at a conjuncture when the intended and unintended effects o f the state- 
capital relationship had rendered some sections o f big Indian capital competitive and in a 
position to expand not just in the domestic economy but overseas as well. However, it 
perpetuated the dependency o f  Indian capital for techniques and finance on more advanced 
capitalist countries and has paved the foundations o f a ‘franchisee economy’ relying on cheap 
and ‘flexible’ labour. The polity has been increasingly fragmented by ‘identity politics’ 
endorsed by a postmodernist intelligentsia that does not even recognize the need for a critique of 
the economic strategies o f  capital. Petty-bourgeois ideologues revel in the power o f Indian 
capital and limit themselves to preaching the importance o f corporate social responsibility.
The findings o f our research inevitably open up many further questions and lines of 
enquiry. An important and critical research task that would complement this work would be to 
study the changing strategies o f  other constituents o f society in the shift from dirigisme to 
neoliberalism. It would be interesting and relevant to look at how the roles o f caste, class, 
religion and gender have changed in the post-independence period, both driving and responding 
to changes in the state-capital relationship. This admittedly is a difficult task and involves two 
sets o f issues. One is the complex question o f  discerning the multiple ways and the extent to 
which each o f these categories play a role in the accumulation process. Related to this is the 
question whether the social markers o f  identity can be deconstructed into discrete units. The 
second issue relates to tracing the minute ways in which each o f  these social relations figure in 
the accumulation process as they constitute the hidden abode o f reproduction o f social relations. 
But one important set o f literature has already developed focussing on the effects o f  neoliberal 
state policies on gender relations and dalit occupations (See Chapter One). Another set o f 
literature addresses the theoretical issues involve in the conceptualisation o f these categories in 
the capitalist mode o f production (See Chapter Three). Based on case-studies, field surveys and
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oral testimonials, an attempt can be made to explore the correlations and possible mechanisms 
o f causation between the changing capital accumulation processes and the changes in role of 
markers o f social identity like caste, class, religion and gender. A second and important research 
theme would be on comparative political economy studying similar shifts from state-led 
capitalist processes in comparable societies like Brazil, Egypt and Turkey with suitable 
modifications o f the framework o f research. At a deeper level, an important research and 
political task is to study the development o f  gender relations and the changing role o f patriarchy 
in the fifty years o f transition from a state-led capitalist society to the panoply o f social relations 
evolving out o f neoliberal changes. But the most important task for the activist researcher is to 
study the mutiple modes o f resistance that have developed within India against the backdrop of 
changes in the relationship between state and capital in the transition to neoliberalism. These 
new social forces may in time further shape the evolution of capitalist development in India.
XXX
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